Judgment :- 1. This appeal is by defendants 2 to 7 in a suit for recovery of landed property on strength of title. The suit property belonged to one Mutharakkal tarwad, and has been allotted in partition in 1918 to Kunhikrishna Panicker, subject to certain liabilities. As he did not discharge those liabilities, the creditor sued in O. S. No. 306 of 1924 on the file of the Munsif, Chowghat, and got a decree charged on the property. The plaintiff got an assignment of the decree, executed it and purchased the suit property in court-sale on July 1, 1942, Ex. A5 being the relative sale certificate. He obtained delivery of the property on September 15, 1942. Defendants 1 and 2 obtained a conveyance of the property from Kunhikrishna Panicker in 1922 as per Ex. B1. Defendants 3 to 7 are members of their tavazhi. The present suit by the plaintiff is to recover the property from defendants 1 to 7 on the ground that in spite of the delivery proceedings under Ex. A5, the defendants continued on the property. The defendants contended the suit to be barred by limitation, but it has been repelled by the courts below. In this appeal, the contention is repeated urging that the institution of this suit beyond 12 years of the date of delivery in the former suit is barred under Art.142 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The question then is as to the date of presentation of this suit. 2. This suit was originally instituted in the Court of the Munsif, Chowghat, on September 15, 1954, that is exactly the eve of expiry of 12 years from the date of delivery in the prior suit. The value of the property for purposes of court-fee was shown in the plaint at Rs. 1630 odd but only a court-fee of one rupee was paid on it that day. The court ordered on September 16. "Court-fee paid not sufficient. The plaint copies not produced. Returned. Time one week." Obviously by the above order, the court allowed a week for payment of the deficit court-fee payable on the plaint. On September 18, 1954, the plaint was represented with the entire court-fee paid thereon. The defendants then contended the suit to be under-valued, whereupon the plaintiff applied for a return of. the plaint for presentation to the Subordinate Judge's Court. On September 18, 1954, the plaint was represented with the entire court-fee paid thereon. The defendants then contended the suit to be under-valued, whereupon the plaintiff applied for a return of. the plaint for presentation to the Subordinate Judge's Court. It was returned on February 25, 1955 and was presented on the same day in the Subordinate Judge's Court, Ottapalam. The controversy is whether the institution of the suit was on September 18, 1954, or on February 25, 1955, which to the date is beyond 12 years of the plaintiff's dispossession by the defendants, as it is admitted that the defendants continued in possession of the property in spite of the delivery had on September 15, 1942. 3. When a plaint is insufficiently stamped the court may, under S.149 CPC., allow the plaintiff to pay the deficit court-fee and when it is paid in accordance with the court's order the plaint has to be deemed properly stamped in the first instance. The court having allowed a week's time from September 16, and the deficit court-fee having been paid on September 18, the case comes strictly under S 149 CPC. For all purposes the entire court-fee has therefore to be deemed to have been paid on September 15 itself. The " contention that the valid presentation of the plaint was only on September 18, 1954, has therefore to be overruled under S.149 CPC. 4. It is next contended that the plaintiff having got the plaint returned from the Munsiff as if the suit was under-valued, and represented it in the Subordinate Judge's Court, the presentation in the court of incompetent jurisdiction has to be ignored and the date of institution of the suit has to be taken as February 25, 1955, when it was presented in the proper court. Counsel for the plaintiff claims exclusion of time from September 15.1954 to February 25,1955, under S.14 of the Limitation Act. Though a specific ground of exemption under S 14, Limitation Act, has not been taken in the plaint, counsel submits that R.6 of Order VII CPC. is no bar in this case as the facts necessary for the application of S.14 can be seen from the endorsements on the plaint itself. Order VII R.6, CPC. requires the plaint to show the grounds upon which exemption from the law of limitation is claimed. is no bar in this case as the facts necessary for the application of S.14 can be seen from the endorsements on the plaint itself. Order VII R.6, CPC. requires the plaint to show the grounds upon which exemption from the law of limitation is claimed. The grounds of exemption to be shown in the plaint must necessarily have been existing on its date or in other words must relate to events preceding the suit. Events subsequent to the original presentation of the plaint (though it happened in a wrong court) cannot normally be expected to be made in the plaint. Such events can be mentioned in a plaint only by an amendment thereof; but in most of such cases as in the present case, the facts or events may be seen in the endorsements on the plaint. That such endorsements can be relied on for purposes of exclusion of time under S.14 of the Limitation Act read with Order VII R.6 CPC., has been held in Sukhbir Singh v. Piare Lal (AIR. 1923 Lahore 591), Bincdilal v. Satyendrasingh (AIR. 1956 Madhya Bharat 97), Firm Lalchand Mathmel, v. Firm Balaram Rameshwar (AIR. 1957 Madhya Pradesh 95), and also by this court in Raman Kunjukrishnan v. Raman Viswanathan (1964 KLT. 449). 5. It is then argued that the plaintiff had, in the first instance, deliberately undervalued the suit and that therefore he is not entitled to the exclusion of time under S.14 of the Limitation Act. Counsel for the plaintiff states that he has valued the suit originally at 10 times the revenue assessed and settled on the land; but the court ordered him to value the suit at the market value of the disputed property and compelled him to pay court-fee thereon. Under S.7(v) (b), of the Court-fees Act, 1870, as amended in Madras, court-fee payable "in suits for possession of land (is) according to the value of the subject-matter; and such value shall be deemed to be. where the subject-matter is land, and where the land forms an entire estate, or a definite share of an estate paying annual revenue to Government, or forms part of such estate and is recorded as aforesaid and such revenue is settled, but not permanently, ten times the revenue so payable." Ex. where the subject-matter is land, and where the land forms an entire estate, or a definite share of an estate paying annual revenue to Government, or forms part of such estate and is recorded as aforesaid and such revenue is settled, but not permanently, ten times the revenue so payable." Ex. A 10 is the pattah for the suit property, Re Survey No. 230/ whose original area was recorded as 16 acres 25 cents which is the area claimed in the plaint, though the extent recorded at the resettlement is far above it. The suit property must therefore be held to have been separately recorded in the land records and been assessed to annual revenue. The revenue assessed under Ex. A-10 for 45.76 acres being Rs. 326.06, it cannot be said that the value given in the original plaint for the 16.25 acres claimed in the plaint at Rs. 1630 odd was a deliberate under-valuation. The plaintiff's institution of the suit with valuation mentioned above seems to have been bona fide, and his conduct in not challenging the order of the court, which appears prima facie, to be erroneous, would not militate against his bona fides in the matter. I would therefore hold the plaintiff entitled to exclusion of time under S.14 of the Limitation Act from September 15, 1954 to February 25, 1955. If that be allowed, the suit is admittedly in time. The Second Appeal has no force and is accordingly dismissed, with costs. Dismissed.