ORDER M.H. Beg, J. - The Petitioner is the owner of house No. 90/131, Iftikharabad in the City of Kanpur, a part of which he originally occupied in 1942 as a tenant. In 1942, his family consisted of himself, his wife and an infant child. It appears that the needs of his family grew with passage of time. Now, he has not only his wife but also a married daughter and her husband, four daughters with ages ranging from 8 to 16 years, a father-in-law aged about 90 years and a son aged about 22 years living in the same accommodation as he originally occupied. It was even alleged in paragraph 6 of the petition, that his grown up son had to divorce his wife because of shortage of accommodation which consists of a room 12 feet by 8 feet, with a small enclosed attached courtyard, a kitchen, a laterine, a bath and an upper storey with another room, a chhajja and a tinshed on it, 2. The Petitioner bought this house in 1960 and avers that he did so as it had another part which could satisfy his expanded needs. At that time, Habib Ahmad Khan opposite party No. 3 was the tenant in the other adjoining part of the house which the Petitioner had bought. The Petitioner alleges that, although he bought the whole house, he did not take proceedings for evicting Habib Ahmad Khan as the tenant had pleaded that he was going away to Pakistan soon and would himself vacate his portion for the Petitioner. Before leaving for Pakistan, however, Habib Ahmad Khan is alleged to have inducted Rahmat Sher Khan opposite party No. 2 as a licensee and left him to be dealt with by the Petitioner. Before Habib Ahmad Khan had vacated the premises and left for Pakistan the Petitioner had filed an application on 4-2-1963 for the release of the accommodation in possession of the tenant about to leave. On the other hand, the contesting opposite party, Rahmat Sher Khan, had also filed an application dated 25-1-1963 for the allotment of this accommodation to him. In this application, he had stated that he had been occupying the accommodation as a paying guest living with the tenant since 1962. He also claimed relationship with the departing tenant. 3. On the other hand, the contesting opposite party, Rahmat Sher Khan, had also filed an application dated 25-1-1963 for the allotment of this accommodation to him. In this application, he had stated that he had been occupying the accommodation as a paying guest living with the tenant since 1962. He also claimed relationship with the departing tenant. 3. It appears that 16-2-1963 was fixed for the hearing of the allotment application of Rahmat Sher Khan. There is a note dated 13-2-1963 made by the Rent Control Inspector on the application of the Petitioner under Rule 6 that this application should also be considered on 16-2-1963 for a decision on it as the tenant's allotment application was to be heard then. On 16-2-1963, the Rent Control Inspector made a report to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, opposite party No. 1, in which he stated that the application for release under Rule 6 had been enquired into by him. He gave the particulars of the accommodation, as detailed above, in the possession of the Petitioner and he stated the number of persons living with the Petitioner as mentioned above. He confirmed that the Petitioner's father-in-law, who was also living with him, was about 90 years in age. He also found that the Petitioner had purchased the house in December, 1960. As against this, the only circumstances mentioned by the Inspector were; that, the Petitioner had not taken any step earlier for getting the accommodation from the tenant and that the Petitioner had given wrong information that his son was married although the son was divorced. Both the circumstances mentioned by the Inspector were capable of explanation by the Petitioner. The Petitioner's explanation of the first circumstance was that Habib Ahmad Khan himself had under-taken to vacate the premises. The second circumstance alleged was that the Petitioner had given wrong information about the married son. It could be said that the Petitioner had not given full information as he had not mentioned that his son had to divorce his wife owing to shortage of accommodation. In other respects, no in-accuracy was found in the Petitioner's case. These were matters which could have been explained if the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had chosen to conduct an inquiry and given an opportunity to the Petitioner to meet the circumstances appearing in the case against the Petitioner. In other respects, no in-accuracy was found in the Petitioner's case. These were matters which could have been explained if the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had chosen to conduct an inquiry and given an opportunity to the Petitioner to meet the circumstances appearing in the case against the Petitioner. Even if the whole of the Inspector's Report were read, the need of the Petitioner would appear to be genuine. 4. The Petitioner's allegation was that he was not given a hearing upon his application Under Rule 6 and in any case, he was not given any opportunity to meet whatever was against him in the contents of the report made by the Inspector. The part played by the Inspector is some-what significant. His report obviously spoke with two voices. A bare perusal of it is enough to make one suspicious. The Inspector had, as already indicated above, made a note on the Petitioner's application Under Rule 6 that it should be linked with the file for allotment in which the date of hearing was 16-2-1963. This obviously meant that the date of hearing for the release application was not 16-2-1963. Hence, the Inspector had noted that it should be linked with the file of the case in which the date of hearing was 16-2-1963. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer did not keep a regular record of either of the two cases. There is no order sheet from which it could be easily found out what proceedings took place and on which date. There is nothing to show apart form the above mentioned note of the Inspector, that the date of hearing upon the Petitioner's application Under Rule 6 could be 16-2-1963. There is no order of the RC and EO fixing 16-2-1963 for considering the Petitioner's application. This state of affairs transpires from a perusal of the file produced on an application made on behalf of Rahmat Sher Khan opposite party No. 2. Indeed, the file is so badly kept that the learned Counsel for Rahmat Sher Khan at first stated that there was no order at all dated 16-2-1963 on the file. This order, which is assailed by this writ petition, was actually found on the back of the allotment application made by Rahmat Sher Khan which had not yet been granted. On the back of this application are some nothings resembling those on an order sheet. This order, which is assailed by this writ petition, was actually found on the back of the allotment application made by Rahmat Sher Khan which had not yet been granted. On the back of this application are some nothings resembling those on an order sheet. These nothings show the Petitioner had filed a review application. The contents of the review application, a copy of which is annexed as Annexure 4 to the petition, show that the Petitioner had promptly objected on 16-4-1963 by means of the 'review' application and complained to the RC and EO himself that he had not given him time to meet the only material against him which was supposed to be contained in the Inspector's report. The notice issued to the Petitioner on 8-2-1963, of which a copy is Annexure 2, only mentions that the application by Rahmat Sher Khan for allotment will be taken up on 16-2-1963 so that the Petitioner may put in objections to that. In other words, the case of the Petitioner Under Rule 6 was taken up suddenly after a report presented then and there on a date not fixed for it and disposed of hastily without giving him due opportunity to apprise himself with the contents of the report or to meet anything, in it. The contents of the impugned order made on 16-2-1963, attached as Annexure 3 to the petition, also show that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer acted only on the Inspector's Report but even then ignored the most important part of the report which disclosed the bonafides of the needs of the Petitioner on the face of it. In these circumstances, the order passed on 16-2-1963 cannot be said to be a bonafide or legally valid order. An essential requirement of a bonafide order is that it must be passed after honestly and fairly applying the mind to the relevant facts and law applicable with reference to which the question before the officer concerned has to be decided. 5. The cases cited before me show that the only question that arises upon an application Under Rule 6 is whether the application is a bonafide one. 5. The cases cited before me show that the only question that arises upon an application Under Rule 6 is whether the application is a bonafide one. The question of considering the needs of a tenant does not arise at all in such a case as it does in a case of permission u/s 3 of the UP Rent Control and Eviction Act because there is no tenant at this stage whose needs have to be considered. It was held by a Full Bench of this Court, in R.S. Singh v. R.C. and E.O. 1964 AWR 177 that the provisions of Rule 6 are mandatory and if the District Magistrate is satisfied that the landlord bonafide requires the accommodation for his own personal occupation, he must allow the application Under Rule 6. In giving the majority view, Desai, C.J. pointed out (at page 183, para 16): However pressing the other's needs may be he has no claim against this accommodation for against the landlord and the State Government could very wisely refuse to consider them as against the landlord's needs. No landlord is under an obligation to meet needs of others however pressing they may be his right as the owner of the accommodation is not subject to the pressing needs of another and it makes no difference whether the pressing needs are of an individual or of a)public authority or institution. 6. The manner in which the impugned order of 16-2-1963 was passed against the Petitioner gives rise to the suspicion that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and the Rent Control Inspector may be aware of the correct legal position and that the matter was decided in such haste so that the Petitioner may have no opportunity of showing that his application was bonafide. However, it is not possible to say anything more than that about the motive behind the passing of such a hasty order. It is, in any case, evident that the order was passed without giving due opportunity to the Petitioner to establish that his application was bona fide. The order was passed without regard to relevant facts and the requirements of law in such a case. Such an order is not, in my opinion, a bonafide order which can be allowed to stand. The order was passed without regard to relevant facts and the requirements of law in such a case. Such an order is not, in my opinion, a bonafide order which can be allowed to stand. In the case of a void order, the order may not even require to be set aside, as it does not exist in the eye of law. In such cases, the Petitioner could maintain an application before the RC and EO for a reconsideration of the whole case. I do not, however, propose to decide the question of powers of review possessed by the RC and EO. It is preferable to quash such an order by means of a writ or order of this Court when the matter has actually been brought to this Court and considered by it. 7. It was contended that the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, passed upon an application Under Rule 6, is not a quasi-judicial order at all and did not need an inquiry to be made before passing the order. In particular, it was urged that no reasons need be given in rejecting the application Under Rule 6. Reliance was placed upon a Division Bench decision in Bhagwat Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh 1965 AWR 655 where it was held that an authority is obliged to give reasons for its orders only in two cases: (1) when the statute or law, under which it acts, requires it to do so; and (2) when it is empowered to pass a certain kind of order only upon its finding that certain facts or conditions exist. Now the Full Bench case already cited, R.S. Singh v. RC and EO (supra), lays down that a Rent Control and Eviction Officer is bound to pass an order in favour of the landlord if certain conditions are satisfied by the landlord showing that the application is bonafide. This necessarily implies an inquiry into those conditions if there are any facts and circumstances appearing against the Applicant. It follows that reasons should be given to show whether the conditions precedent to passing the order had been satisfied or not. 8. This necessarily implies an inquiry into those conditions if there are any facts and circumstances appearing against the Applicant. It follows that reasons should be given to show whether the conditions precedent to passing the order had been satisfied or not. 8. Another case relied upon on behalf of the opposite parties was Jhallu Ram v. State of Uttar Pradesh 1965 AWR 722 where Manchanda, J. held that "The High Court cannot sit in judgment on the appraisal of evidence or conclusions which may have been arrived at u/s 7-F of the Act". That case does not help the opposite parties inasmuch as no principles of natural justice were violated there. The statement of facts in that case showed that the order was passed after giving parties full opportunities to meet the material against them. 9. In Jagdish Narayan Upadhyaya v. D.M. Fatehpur 1964 AWR 732 Manchanda, J. said: "It is also obligatory for the RC and EO to give an opportunity to the owner of being heard before disposing of an application Under Rule 6. The arbitrary and summary disposal of the application Under Rule 6 will not do. In the present case, the order of the RC and EO clearly shows that no proper inquiry was held and no proper opportunity whatsoever was given by him to the owner to controvert the report of the Inspector which, according to the owner, was not on the basis of local inquiry but on the basis of some questions put to the owner by the Inspector at his own residence". In other words, the failure to give an opportunity to meet an adverse report of the Inspector violates the rules of natural justice. The nature of the inquiry will necessarily vary from case to case. Inasmuch as there is no allottee at this stage, the inquiry may be very summary. The RC and EO may be satisfied on the bare statement of an owner that his application is bonafide. In other cases, the facts may disclose that there is a bona fide disputant and a "list". In such cases, the RC and EO may have to hold a more detailed inquiry, give both sides due opportunity of putting forward their cases and pass a more elaborate and considered order. 10. In other cases, the facts may disclose that there is a bona fide disputant and a "list". In such cases, the RC and EO may have to hold a more detailed inquiry, give both sides due opportunity of putting forward their cases and pass a more elaborate and considered order. 10. It was held in Z. Begam v. RC and EO 1958 AWR 752 by Dhavan, J. that although Rule 6 did not necessitate a detailed inquiry in every case, in the sense of hearing both sides, yet, it meant applying an inquiring mind to the claim of the Applicant and there may be cases where a detailed inquiry is required and evidence may have to be taken. The view taken there was also that each case will depend upon its own faces. In the case before me, the RC and EO appears to have acted on some preconceived notion almost mechanically. 11. I, therefore, quash the order dated 16-2-1963 and send back the case to the RC and EO for disposal according to law. The Petitioner will get his costs from the opposite parties.