ORDER This is a Civil revision petition filed under Section 115 C.P.C. read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India to set aside the order of the Second Sub-Judge, Manipur dated 7-1-1966 passed in Judicial Misc. Case 66 of 1966 in Title Suit 1 of 1964/84/18 of 1965 on the file of his Court under Section 10 read with Section 151 C.P.C. staying the trial of Title Suit 1/64/84/18 of 1965 pending disposal of Title Suit 67/51 of 1961 on the file of the First Sub-Judge and Civil Appeal Cases 10, 11 and 12 of 1964 on the file of the District Court. 2. The facts of the case, which led up to the institution of the present revision petition are as follows. Three persons, by name, Ningthoubi Kabui Khullakpa, Paolung Kabui and Kangkhuinlung Kabul of Kakhulong village adjoining Imphal filed Title Suit 67/51 of 1961 in the Court of the first sub-judge, Manipur, against Ngounipu Kabui of the same village, Union of India and Union Territory of Manipur in a representative capacity alleging that there is a village worshipping ground known as Lamthokpham of the entire village of Kakhulong (described in the schedule A in that suit), that the site was being used from times immemorial and for more than 65 years as a common Lamthokpham for annual religious and customary performances and that the first defendant in that suit, viz., Ngounipu Kabui trespassed into a bit of land out of the A schedule measuring 24 x 21 described in the B schedule and constructed a kacha house. They further alleged that, though, the Chairman of Imphal Municipality issued a notice to him on the application filed by the plaintiffs in that suit directing him to vacate the same, he did not do so, that the plaintiffs learnt that the B schedule land was settled upon him by the Deputy Commissioner with the approval of the Chief Commissioner of Manipur on 24-6-1960, that they challenged the order of the Deputy Commissioner before the Chief Commissioner of Manipur in Rev. Misc. Case 7 of 1960, that they did not succeed and that the Chief Commissioner referred them to the Civil Court. Misc. Case 7 of 1960, that they did not succeed and that the Chief Commissioner referred them to the Civil Court. So, they filed Title Suit 67/51 of 1961 in the Court of the First Sub-Judge, Manipur, on 11-5-1961 for declaration of their title to and for recovery of possession of the suit land covered by the plaint B schedule in that suit. After trial, the suit was dismissed on 16-12-1953. The matter is now said to be pending in appeal and cross objections in the Court of the District Judge in Manipur in Civil Appeals 10 to 12 of 1964. 3. In the meanwhile, the Chief Commissioner granted another piece of land (which is to the east of the plaint B schedule land in title suit 61/51 of 1961 forming part of the plaint A schedule land in that suit) to two different persons by name Apambi Kabuini and Patinjai Kabui alias Yaima Kabui. So, the petitioners herein filed Title Suit 1 of 1964/84/18 of 1965 in the Court of the Second Sub-Judge, Manipur on 14-6-1965 against the respondents herein for declaration of their right, title to and interest over the suit land as their customary right and as their village place of worship and to set aside the settlement of the land in favour of the respondents 1 and 2. They also prayed for an injunction restraining the respondents from interfering with their right to use the land for the purpose of Lamthokpham. 4. Alter three witnesses for the plaintiffs were examined, the respondents filed Judicial Misc. Case 68 of 1966 in Title Suit Case 1/64/84/18/85 of 1865 to stay the trial of that suit pending disposal of Civil Appeal Cases 10 to 12 of 1964 on the file of the District Court, Manipur. The Second Sub-Judge allowed the petition on 7-11-1966. Hence the present civil revision petition to set aside his order. 5. The point which was argued and which arises for determination is whether the order of the lower Court is correct. 6. Section 10 C.P.C. runs as follows :- "10. The Second Sub-Judge allowed the petition on 7-11-1966. Hence the present civil revision petition to set aside his order. 5. The point which was argued and which arises for determination is whether the order of the lower Court is correct. 6. Section 10 C.P.C. runs as follows :- "10. No Court shall proceed with the trial of any suit in which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim litigating under the same title where such suit is pending in the same or any other Court in (India) having jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed, or in any Court beyond the limits of (India) established or continued by the (Central Government) and having like jurisdiction, or before the Supreme Court." So, in order that the section may apply, the following conditions must be satisfied :- (a) The matter in issue in both the suits must be substantially the same. (b) The previously instituted suit must be pending in the same court in which the subsequent suit was brought or in Appellant different Court in India having jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed or in a Court established or continued by the Central Government and having like jurisdiction or before the Supreme Court. (c) Both the suits must be between the same parties or their representatives. (d) Such parties must be litigating in both the suits under the same title. 7. But, in the present case there are some essential and material differences in both the suits regarding the matter in issue in both of them, which are not substantially the same. They are, firstly, the land in dispute in the previous suit is 24 x 21, while the land in dispute in the present suit is not the said land, but is a different land which is to the east of he previous suit land. The subject-matter in both the suits is different. Also, while in the previous suit, the settle obtained possession of the land settled on him, in the present suit, the grantees were not given possession of it. It is said that there is a small temple on the suit land in the second suit. The subject-matter in both the suits is different. Also, while in the previous suit, the settle obtained possession of the land settled on him, in the present suit, the grantees were not given possession of it. It is said that there is a small temple on the suit land in the second suit. Secondly, as can be seen from the issues in both the suits, the plaintiffs in the previous suit claimed prescriptive right by virtue of their alleged enjoyment of the suit land for more than 65 years. But, in the subsequent suit the plaintiffs claimed to have acquired their right by virtue of customary right. Thirdly, in the previous suit an issue was raised that the plaintiffs were indeterminate and fluctuating body, while in the subsequent suit the plaintiffs claimed their right as a determinate and definite body of persons. Fourthly, while in the case of the previous suit land, the settlement was granted by the Deputy Commissioner with the approval of the Chief Commissioner, in the case of the subsequent suit land the settlement was granted by the Chief Commissioner and the legality of the grants made by them differs in both the suits. Fifthly, the settlee-defendants in both the suits are not the same. Thus, all the matters in issue and causes of action in both the suits are not substantially the same. 8. The contentions of the learned counsel for the respondents are that the plaintiffs in the previous suit claimed the right of Lamthokpham over the entire plaint A Schedule land, that the plaint B Schedule land in that suit and the plaint land in the present suit form part of the entire block, that in the reply notice dated 16-10-1961 and also in the appeal before the Director of Survey the parties proceeded on the ground that the land covered by the present suit formed part of the entire block, that, thus, though the subject-matter in both the suits is not identical, the test of res judicata has to be applied, that the right of Lamthokpham claimed by the villagers in the present suit was directly and substantially in issue in the previous suit and that the present suit has to be stayed pending disposal of the appeals in the District Court. In support of his contentions he relied on note 72 at pages 375 to 377 under Section 11 C.P.C., Vol. In support of his contentions he relied on note 72 at pages 375 to 377 under Section 11 C.P.C., Vol. I, AIR Commentaries, 7th Edition and the decisions cited therein. In Kedar Nath v. Baldeo Prasad, AIR 1929 Oudh 172 a transferee of a promissory note filed a suit against the holder of it and also against its executant for recovery of the money due under the promissory note. But, the relief was refused. He subsequently filed another suit for damages against the holder of the promissory note. It was held that the subsequent suit was barred by the rule of res judicata. In Jai Hind Iron Mart v. Tulsiram Bhagwandas, AIR 1953 Bom 117 , it was held that Section 10 C.P.C. does not contemplate an identity of issues between the two suits, that it does not require that the matter in issue in both the suits should be entirely the same or identical, but that the section requires that the matter in issue in the two suits should be directly and substantially the same, that there must be an identity of the subject matter, and the field of controversy between the parties and that, though, they need not be identical they must be substantially the same. In Srimati Raj Lakshmi Dasi v. Banamali Sen, AIR 1953 SC 33 it was held that the test of res judicata is the identity of title in the two litigations and not the identity of the actual property involved in the two cases. In Sunderabai v. Devaji Shankar. AIR 1954 SC 82 it was held that where the right to claim in both the suits is the same, a subsequent suit would be barred as res judicata, though the right in the subsequent suit ii sought to be established on a ground different from that in the former suit and that it would be only in those cases, where the rights claimed in the two suits were different, the subsequent suit would not be barred as res judicata, even though the property was identical. The decision in Mt. Sardaran v. Shiv Lal, AIR 1944 Lah 282 (FB) was approved. The decision in Mt. Sardaran v. Shiv Lal, AIR 1944 Lah 282 (FB) was approved. In Shorab Merwanji Modi v. Mansata Film Distributors, AIR 1957 Cal 727 it was held that the matter in issue in the two suits may be substantially the same, although different reliefs may be claimed by the two different plaintiffs on the basis of their respective cases. In Ram Narain v. Ram Swarup AIR 1962 All 108 it was held that complete identity of the subject-matter is not necessary to attract the application of Section 10 C.P.C., but that if a matter directly and substantially in issue in a previous suit is also directly and substantially in issue in a later, then under Section 10 C.P.C., the later suit is to be stayed. It was further held that any matter common to the two suits will not attract the provisions of Section 10 C.P.C., but that the matter must be of substance so that its decision in one suit shall affect materially the decision of the other suits. 9. There cannot be any dispute with regard to the above propositions of law laid down by the decisions. The scope of the two suits was already referred to in para 7 supra. Regarding the subject-matter of dispute in both the suits, it has to be noted that a small site measuring 24 x 21 only was the suit land in the previous suit. The Courts could not legally give any finding regarding the remaining portion of the land, said to have been also claimed by the villagers as the place of worship, since that was not at all the subject-matter of dispute in that suit. The respondents counsel argued that if a persons right of way through another persons house compound in a particular place is negatived, then he cannot claim any right of way through some other portion of the same compound. It is difficult to appreciate this contention. If really a person has right of way through the same land of another person at different places by way of easement or custom etc., and if his right of way through a particular portion of the others land is negatived it does not follow that his right of way, if he has any, through a different portion of the same land is also extinguished. As such, the matter in issue in both the suits is different. Again, prescriptive right claimed in the previous suit ii different from customary right and the evidence in proof of the same also differs. It has to be further noted that in the previous suit, the plaintiffs were said to be fluctuating body of persons, while in the subsequent suit the plaintiffs claimed to be a definite body of persons. Again, it is to be noted that the settlement was made in the previous case by the Deputy Commissioner with the approval of the Chief Commissioner. But, in the present case the grant was said to have been made by the Chief Commissioner himself. So, the legality of the grants in both the cases differs. But, the respondents counsel contended that the Land Reforms Act in Manipur was introduced on 1-6-1961, that the previous grant was made on 30-7-1960 when Assam Land and Revenue Regulation was in force, that the subsequent settlement was made on 30-9-1961 after Manipur Land Reforms Act was introduced and that while the Deputy Commissioner was the proper person prior to 1-6-1961 to settle the lands, the Chief Commissioner is the proper person to settle the same after 1-6-1961. All these matters will have to be canvassed in the subsequent suit. In the petition filed under S. 10 C.P.C. to stay a subsequent suit, the legality or otherwise of the two different grants made at different times cannot be canvassed. They have to be gone into more fully in the suit. Thus, the subject-matter and causes of action in issue are not substantially the same in both the suits. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that, if for any reason the previous suit is disposed of on some other points not covered by the present suit and if the present suit is then taken up for trial, and if in the meanwhile the old witnesses die, the plaintiffs will be seriously handicapped, carries much weight. 10. The second condition, that the previous suit must be pending in the same court or in another court having jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed, is satisfied. For, an appeal is only a continuation of the suit. Vide pages 223 and 224 of AIR Commentaries on C.P.C. Vol. 10. The second condition, that the previous suit must be pending in the same court or in another court having jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed, is satisfied. For, an appeal is only a continuation of the suit. Vide pages 223 and 224 of AIR Commentaries on C.P.C. Vol. I, 7th Edition and also Bepin Behary Mozumdar v. Jogendra Chandra, AIR 1917 Cal 248, Jamini Nath v. Midnapur Zamindari Co., AIR 1923 Cal 716, Annamalay Chetty v. B.A. Thornhill, AIR 1931 PC 263, Sm. Jinnat Bibi v. How-rah Jute Mill Co. Ltd., AIR 1932 Cal 751, and Krishnarao Namdeorao v. Shridhar Ramchandra AIR 1947 Nag 154. There is no dispute about this point by the petitioners counsel, provided that the other conditions of Section 10 C.P.C. are satisfied. 11. Regarding the difference in the identity of the parties the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents is that the settlees in the second suit were represented by the settlee and the other defendants in the prior suit, since the subsequent settlement by the Government was made on 30-9-1961 after 11-5-1961, the date of the institution of the previous suit. He relied on the passages at pages 347 and 349 of AIR Commentaries on C.P.C. Vol. I, 7th Edition and the decisions cited therein viz., Govindaswami Filial v. Sivarama Rao, AIR 1934 Mad 292 , Arulayi v. Rakka Kudumban, AIR 1938 Mad 501 which reversed the decision in Rakka Kudumban v. Arulayi, AIR 1937 Mad 228 . The Laxmi Bank Ltd. Akola v Harikisan, AIR 1948 Nag 297 : Mt. Bachint Kaur v. Karam Chand, AIR 1948 Lah 195 and Onkarmal Agarwalla v. Bireswar Hazra, AIR 1959 Cal 195 . This contention will be correct if the subject-matter in dispute is directly and substantially in issue in both the suits. But, as I have held that they are not, the settlees in the subsequent suit are not bound by the decision in the previous suit. 12. The last condition for the applicability of Section 10 C.P.C. is that the parties must be litigating in both the suits under the same title. This is also different in the two suits, as the settlee in the previous suit got title from the Deputy Commissioner, while the settlees in the subsequent suit got title from the Chief Commissioner. Thus, Section 10 C.P.C. does not apply. This is also different in the two suits, as the settlee in the previous suit got title from the Deputy Commissioner, while the settlees in the subsequent suit got title from the Chief Commissioner. Thus, Section 10 C.P.C. does not apply. Vide also Bharat Nidhi Ltd. Delhi v. Shadi Lal. AIR 1954 Punj 114. 13. The learned counsel for the petitioners argued that the circumstances of the two cases are such that the Court can also exercise jurisdiction under Section 151 C.P.C. even if Section 10 C.P.C. does not apply. He relied on Ch. Mohd. Afzal v. Mt. Saradar Begum, AIR 1949 Lah 69 and Sri Bhola Prasad v. Smt. Jagpala, AIR 1955 All 384. But it is not necessary to decide this point, since I find that Section 10 C.P.C. does not apply. 14. In the result, the Civil revision petition is allowed with costs to be paid by the contesting respondents 1 and 2 and the order of the lower Court is set aside. Petition allowed.