Judgment U.N.Sinha, J. 1. This application has been filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India by the management of a cinema for quashing the order passed by the authorities under Bihar Shops and Establishments Act. 1953 (Bihar Act VIII of 1954), incorporated in Annexure C, dated the 6th October. 1966, and Annexure D, dated the 16th May 1966. The order incorporated in Annexure C was passed by the Assistant Labour Commissioner under Sec.28 of the Act under which the petitioner of this Court has been ordered to pay a sum of Rs. 1,380-60 paise to respondent No. 3(a) of this application for arrears of wages for the period from 1st May, 1960 to 21st April, 1961. The order incorporated in Annexure D was passed by the Industrial Tribunal, an Appellate Authority under Sec.28(7) of the Act, by which the original order has been affirmed. 2. The facts necessary for determination of this application are as follows: Respondent No. 3(a) had been employed as chief operator of the cinema in question and he was dismissed from service on the 31st May. 1960. The employee filed an application under Sec.26 of the Bihar Shops and Establishments Act (Annexure A) complaining of the dismissal and making the following prayers: "(a) to reinstate the complainant, (b) to pay the complainant all the back wages for the period of his forced unemployment due to his illegal dismissal, and (c) to pay a reasonable compensation to the complainant for causing harassment and humiliation to him by illegal dismissal."This application was allowed in part by the presiding officer of the Labour Court by order, dated the 23rd March, 1961 (Annexure B). The employer was ordered to reinstate the employee and also to pay him one months wages by way of compensation. Nothing specifically was decided about the second prayer regarding claim of arrears of wages. Thereafter this respondent-employee filed an application under Section 28 of the Act before the Assistant Labour Commissioner on the 25th August, 1962, claiming arrears of wages from the 1st May 1960 to 30th April, 1961, at the rate of Rs. 140 per month, amounting to a total sum of Rs. 1726.66 paise. As indicated earlier, the employer had been asked to pay an amount of Rs. 1,380.60 paise for the period mentioned above, at the rate of Rs. 140 per month, amounting to a total sum of Rs. 1726.66 paise. As indicated earlier, the employer had been asked to pay an amount of Rs. 1,380.60 paise for the period mentioned above, at the rate of Rs. 118 per month No other compensation has been granted by the Assistant Labour Commissioner. This order has been affirmed by the Industrial Tribunal. 3. In support of the application filed in this Court, learned Counsel for the management has urged two points. The first contention is that the application filed under Sec.28 of the Act was barred by limitation under Rule 22 of the Bihar Shops and Establishments Rules, 1955, and as respondent No. 3(a) had not applied before the Assistant Labour Commissioner for condoning the delay in filing the application, the officer had no jurisdiction to condone the delay and bear the application. The second contention urged by the learned Counsel is that when the employee had asked for arrears of wages in his application made under Sec.26 of the Act, for the period of forced unemployment and as that relief had not been granted to him by the presiding officer of the Labour Court, the claim was barred by res judicata and the Assistant Labour Commissioner had no jurisdiction to grant any arrears of wages. 4. The relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules are Sec.26. Sub-sections (1), (2) and (6) and Sec.28, Sub-sections (1) and (2) and Rule 22. Sub-rules (1) and (2) of the Rules, which are quoted below: Sec.26- "(1) No employer shall dismiss or discharge from his employment any employee who has heen in such employment continuously for a period of not less than six months except for a reasonable cause and without giving such employee at least one months notice or one months wages in lieu of such notice: Provided that such notice shall not be necessary where the services of such employee are dispensed with on a charge of such misconduct as may be prescribed by the State Government, supported by satisfactory evidence recorded at an inquiry held for the purpose. (2) Every employee, so dismissed or discharged may make a complaint in writing, in the prescribed manner, to a prescribed authority within 30 days of the receipt of the order of dismissal or discharge on one or more of the following grounds, namely: (i) there was no reasonable cause for dispensing with his services, or (ii) no notice was served on him as required by Sub-section (1): or (iii) he bad not been guilty of any misconduct as held by the employer. * * * * 5.(a) The prescribed authority shall cause a notice to be served on the employer relating to the said complaint, record briefly the evidence adduced by the parties, hear them and after making such inquiry as it may consider necessary pass orders giving reasons therefor. (b) In passing such order the prescribed authority shall have power to give relief to the employee by wav of reinstatement or money compensation or both." Sec.28- "(1) Where contrary to the provisions of this Act any deduction has been made from the wages of an employee, or any payment of wages has been delayed, or any sum is otherwise due from the employer to the employee such employee, or any legal practitioner or any authorised agent or any officer of a registered trade union or any Inspecting Officer may make any application in such manner, within such time, and to such authority as may be prescribed for a direction under Sub-section (2). (2) When an application under Sub-section (1) is entertained, the prescribed authority shall hear the application in the prescribed manner and may, without prejudice to any other penalty to which an employer is liable under this Act, direct the refund of the amount deducted or payment of the delayed wages or any other sum to the employee, together with the payment of a compensation not exceeding ten times the amount deducted in the first case and not exceeding ten rupees in other cases: Provided that no direction for the payment of compensation shall be made in the case of delayed wages if the authority is satisfied that the delay was due to (a) a bona fide error or bona fide dispute as to the amount payable to the employed person, or (b) the occurrence of an emergency, or the existence of exceptional circumstances such that the person responsible for the payment of the wages was unable, though exercising reasonable diligence to make prompt payment, or (c) the failure of the employed person to apply for or accept payment." Rule 22- "(1) An application under Sub-section (1) of Sec.28 shall be made to a sub-Divisional Magistrate or an Assistant Commissioner of Labour of the local area or the Labour Court at Muzaffarpur for Tirhut Division and at Ranchi for Chotanagpur Division or an officer authorised in this behalf by a notification in the Official Gazette within six months from the date on which, deduction from the wages was made or from the date on which the payment of wages was due to be made as the case may he: Provided that an application may be admitted after the period of six months if the applicant satisfies the authority that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period: Provided further that the applications pending before the Labour Court, Patna, before coming into force of this rule shall be heard and disposed of by it. (2) An application under Sub-section (1) of Sec.28 by or on behalf of an employee shall be made in duplicate in Form XII, Form XIII or Form XIV, as the case may be, one copy of which shall bear the requisite court-fee as prescribed in Rule 25. (2) An application under Sub-section (1) of Sec.28 by or on behalf of an employee shall be made in duplicate in Form XII, Form XIII or Form XIV, as the case may be, one copy of which shall bear the requisite court-fee as prescribed in Rule 25. The application shall also be accompanied by a certificate signed by the applicant to the effect that the contents of the application are true to the knowledge and belief of the applicant, and that no such application for the same dues has been filed before any other authority." The question of limitation was dealt with by the Assistant Labour Commissioner in the following manner. It appears that the delay in filing the application under Sec.28 was condoned by the authority after satisfying itself about the sufficiency of the cause of delay After the management had appeared, evidence was adduced to show how the delay had been made and papers were filed by both the parties. On a consideration of the materials on record, the Assistant Labour Commissioner stated thus: "From the papers filed by the applicant and the opposite party which constitute the only evidence in this case and which have been accepted by both the parties as genuine and correct it appears that the applicants union first approached the special officer (Implementation and Evaluation) Department of Labour, Bihar Patna on 26-4-1961 for the implementation of the orders of the Labour Court regarding the reinstatement of the workman by the opposite party and, thereafter the matter was always under correspondence between the officers of the Labour Department, the applicants union and the management. The matter was ultimately considered vide item No. 17 of the agenda in the meeting of the Implementation and Evaluation Committee of the Labour Department on the 18th August 1962, when the Commissioner after hearing the representatives of both the parties felt that the concerned employees might take action under the Bihar Shops and Establishments Act for the realisation of their claims. Consequently this application was filed before this Court on 25-8-1962 for a direction under Sec.28 of the Bihar Shops and Establishments Act. Consequently this application was filed before this Court on 25-8-1962 for a direction under Sec.28 of the Bihar Shops and Establishments Act. Thus on the whole there has been no delay in filing of this claim The applicant has also stated that he was acting in the spirit of the Code of Discipline in Industry which is a tripartite Code evolved at the national level for the conduct of managements and the unions and therefore did not file this claim straightway. He was depending in good faith upon the intervention or efforts of the officials of the Labour Department and such bodies as the Implementation and Evaluation Committee for an amicable settlement of the dispute without any litigation and hence wanted to give full opportunities to these bodies to act in the matter of the employees claim. This attitude of the applicants union is really appreciable and accordingly I feel that there is full justification in this is case for the condonation of the delay." I do not think that the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner, that, the Assistant Labour Commissioner had no jurisdiction to condone the delay, in the absence of any application having been filed by the employee to that effect, is valid An application under Sec.28(1) of the Act by or on behalf of the employee has to be made in a particular form mentioned in Rule 22(2), of which Form No. XII is relevant in this case, and apparently, the employee, respondent No. 3(a), must have filed his application under Sec.28(1) in this form, and if evidence was led before the Assistant Labour Commissioner for the purpose of condoning the delay in filing the application, there was no bar in the Assistant Labour Commissioner applying the first proviso to Rule 22 and condoning the delay on the evidence adduced by the parties and on hearing them The question of limitation raised before the appellate authority also failed, and in this context learned Counsel for the petitioner has drawn our attention to paragraph 11 of the order of the appellate authority and has contended that the appellate authority was in error in holding that there was only a delay of six days (between the 18th August, 1962 and the 25th August, 1962), which had been condoned by the Assistant Labour Commissioner (18th August. 1962, was the date on which the controversy about arrears of wages had been placed before Implementation and Evaluation Committee, when the Committee had felt that the employee might take action under the Bihar Shops and Establishments Act for realisation of his claim. This particular contention raised by the learned Counsel is merely academic in this case, because, the assistant Labour Commissioner was under no misapprehension to the effect that the delay was only of six days. The Assistant Labour Commissioner was clear in his concept that the employee has filed his application more than a year late. In my opinion, it is not possible to interfere at this stage in our writ jurisdiction, by holding that the authorities below were in error in concluding that the delay in filing the application by respondent No. 3(a) under Sec.28 of the Act may he condoned On behalf of the petitioner reliance was placed on the case of B. N. Elias & Co. (Private) Ltd. V/s. Payment of Wages Authority, a decision of the Calcutta High Court, reported in (1961) 2 Lab LJ 297. That was a case under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (Act 4 of 1936). Under Sec.15(2) of that Act, where an application is made based on any deduction from wages or on delayed payment of wages, such application must be presented within six months from a certain date mentioned in the first proviso to Sec.15(2), and under the second proviso an application may he admitted after the said period of six months if the applicant can satisfy the authority concerned that he had sufficient cause for not making that application within that period. On the analogy of the case of B N. Elias & Co.. On the analogy of the case of B N. Elias & Co.. it is argued on behalf of the petitioner, that, the question whether sufficient cause had been made out for condoning the delay in filing the application under Sec.28 of the Bihar Shops and Establishments Act, is a question of law and the authorities in this case have committed an error of law, on the face of the record, in condoning the delay made by respondent No 3(a) in filing his application under Sec.28 But, the decision of the Calcutta High Court is clearly distinguishable as the decision was really based on the fact that delay had been condoned in that case on inadmissible evidence This is clear from the following conclusion of the learned Judges: I have stated above that in the application made for condonation two letters were relied upon dated 16th January, 1958, and 31st December, 1958. It was stated in the petition that originals of other correspondence relevant on the point would be filed at the time of hearing. The applicant was directed by the Court below to produce such originals. In its judgment, dated 19th May, 1950 the Court below has recorded that the applicant had shown original letters dated 13th January, 1958, 4th February, 1959 30th May, 1958, 4th August, 1958 and 21sl November, 1958. These are stated to be letters addressed by the applicant to the opposite party meaning thereby the company. None of these letters produced were original letters and could not be, because originals could only be in the possession of the company I have looked into the record and I find that all of them are copies. With regard to three of them, certificates of posting were produced, and with regard to one a slip of paper containing certain initials was produced. Nobody came to prove any of the letters or the receipt, although the company denied having received any of the letters. This was the only material before the Court below. With regard to three of them, certificates of posting were produced, and with regard to one a slip of paper containing certain initials was produced. Nobody came to prove any of the letters or the receipt, although the company denied having received any of the letters. This was the only material before the Court below. It held that inasmuch as there was this correspondence, and no reply was sent to any of these letters, and because the case was filed within six months from the date of the last letter, there was sufficient cause." It was in this context that the learned Judge held that no explanation had been given for certain period mentioned in the judgment and that the order condoning the delay showed errors apparent on the face of the record. The two principles laid down by the learned Judge were in the following words:- - "First of all it has not appreciated the legal principles to be applied in determining what constituted sufficient cause within the second proviso to Sub-section (2) of Sec.15 of the Payment of Wages Act. Secondly, the Court below was confused on the question as to whether the letters produced before it were originals or copies, and it accepted as evidence these copies without anyone proving the same of their contents or their receipt by the company, in accordance with law." In the instant case, however, no such question arises, as I have indicated above that the Assistant Labour Commissioner condoned the delay in filing the application under Sec.28 of the Act, after full consideration of the evidence adduced before him and taking note of the actual delay made in the case. Reliance is also placed on the case of Management of Sri Gandhiban Bus Service. Chingleput V/s. Presiding Officer. Labour Court, reported in AIR 1966 Mad 292 But that decision is also distinguishable, as will appear from the following quotation taken from paragraph 20- Unless there is a finding that the workers wore ignorant of their lawful rights or were prevented from putting forward their claims by reason of other circumstances, the decision that ignorance of law could be regarded as a sufficient cause in certain circumstances cannot apply As the passage cited above indicates, the mere allegation of ignorance, of law is not sufficient. It is to be sub-ported by a reference to surrounding circumstances before the authority could accept that as a sufficient excuse within the meaning of the section There is no finding in that regard anywhere in the order of the Labour Court."I have stated just now, that in the instant case, the delay in filing the application under Sec.28 was condoned on the facts and circumstances and not on a speculative conclusion. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 8(a) has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dinabandhu Sahu V/s. Jadumoni Mangaraj, reported in AIR 1954 SC 411 . That was a decision under the Representation of People Act 1951 (Act No. 48 of 1951), where there is a proviso to Section 85 in the following terms: "Provided that if a person making the petition satisfies the Election Commission that sufficient cause existed for the failure to present the petition within the period prescribed therefor. The Election Commission may in its discretion condone such failure." An argument had been advanced before their Lordships of the Supreme Court challenging an order of condonation of delay on the ground that it had been passed "suo motu" and not on an application of the party praying that the delay may be excused and, therefore, the order condoning the delay was not valid Support for this contention was sought on a decision under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act. as was stated in the judgment of the Supreme Court. But their Lordships stated that they were not impressed by this contention. It may be that, in the instant case, the order passed under Sec.28 of the Bihar Shops and Establishments Act was subject to appeal, but the appellate authority has also refused to interfere and, therefore, in my opinion. as was stated in the judgment of the Supreme Court. But their Lordships stated that they were not impressed by this contention. It may be that, in the instant case, the order passed under Sec.28 of the Bihar Shops and Establishments Act was subject to appeal, but the appellate authority has also refused to interfere and, therefore, in my opinion. Dinabandhu Sahus case, AIR 1954 SC 411 , does support learned Counsel for respondent No. 8(a) for his contention that this Court ought not to interfere, in its writ jurisdiction, on the question of limitation Another decision has been relied upon by learned Counsel for respondent No. 3(a) namely, the case of Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. V/s. Bhutnath Banerjee, reported in AIR 1964 SC 1336 That was a case where delay had been condoned under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act in setting aside an abatement Learned Counsel relied on the following observations of the Supreme Court:- - "Section 5 of the Limitation Act, on the other hand, empowers the Court to admit an application, to which its provisions are made applicable, even when presented after the expiry of the specified period of limitation if it is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not presenting it within time. The Court, therefore, had jurisdiction to determine whether there was sufficient cause for the appellants not making the application for the setting aside of the abatement of the suit in time and, if so satisfied to admit it," and has argued that in the instant case, when the Assistant Labour Commissioner held that sufficient cause had been made out for condoning the delay, he had full jurisdiction to proceed with the application filed under Sec.28, and when the appellant authority has refused to interfere the matter should come to an end This argument should also be accepted as valid Learned Counsel for respondent No. 3(a) has also relied upon the case of The Imperial Tobacco Co. of India Ltd. V/s. Asst. Labour Commr., Patna, reported in 1966 BLJR 632 =( AIR 1967 Pat 153 ), which was a case under the Bihar Shops and Establishment Act. of India Ltd. V/s. Asst. Labour Commr., Patna, reported in 1966 BLJR 632 =( AIR 1967 Pat 153 ), which was a case under the Bihar Shops and Establishment Act. In this case, the principle laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case reported in AIR 1964 SC 1336 , was applied in dismissing the application filed under Sec.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure against an order of the Assistant Labour Commissioner passed under Sec.28 of the Bihar Shops and Establishments Act. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has tried to distinguish the Imperial Tobacco Companys case, 1966 BLJR 632 =( AIR 1967 Pat 153 ), from the instant case on the ground that the delay had been condoned in that case on the ground that the controversy between the parties in regard to overtime wages was under mutual discussion for the purpose of making settlement, in which the management of the company had taken part, whereas in the instant case, the delay was caused by the act of respondent No. 3(a) alone in taking other steps before tiling his application under Sec.28 of the Act. But such question really relates to the facts of the case, and, as indicated earlier, the Assistant Labour Commissioner was fully conversant with the state of affairs. Moreover, it is clear from the quotations made from the order of the Assistant Labour Commissioner that, he had taken note of the correspondence between the Special Officer (Implementation and Evaluation), the employers union and the management of the cinema and it is not possible to hold that am aspect of the facts of the case was omitted to he noticed I would, therefore, hold that the argument based on the delay in filing the application under Sec.28 must fail. 5 In my opinion, the second contention raised on behalf of the petitioner must also fail for the following reasons. Even assuming that arrears of wages could have been dealt with by the Labour Court while considering the application under Sec.26 of the Act, no question of res judicata can arise as under Section 26(5)(b) of the Act, money compensation tan be granted by the Labour Court at its discretion whereas the complaint that is expected from a dismissed employee under Sec.26(2) is against the order of dismissal on the grounds mentioned in that sub-section. The decision of the prescribed authority being final, as mentioned in Sec.25(6) of the Act it is difficult to hold that the claim became barred by res judicata, only because the presiding officer of the Labour Court did not choose to deal with the accuseds prayer made by the dismissed employee Learned Counsel for respondent No 3(a) has urged that the meaning of "reinstatement" contemplated by Sec.26 of the Act is that the dismissed employee is put back in the same position as if he had never been dismissed and as by reinstatement status quo ante the dismissal is restored, the Assistant Labour Commissioner was perfectly justified in granting arrears of wages to the employee under Sec.28 of the Act. This contention is not without force and reference may be made to Words and Phrases Judicially Defined. Volume 4, edited by Rowland Burrows, at pages 524-525 of the 1944 edition. As will appear from the quotation given from Hodge V/s. Ultra Electric Ltd., (1943) 1 KB 462, a party can show from the context or the purpose of an order that the sense in which an order of reinstatement was made was not in the sense of restoring the status quo ante the dismissal. In the instant case. I do not think that the order of the Labour Court, dated the 23rd March, 1961, can he interpreted to mean that the employee concerned was not replaced in the position from which he was dismissed so as to restore the status quo ante the dismissal and that one months wages granted by way of compensation was taken to he all the arrears of wages to which the employee was entitled. It may he mentioned that apart from claiming arrears of wages, the employee had also claimed "reasonable compensation" for harassment and humiliation I do not think that only because the presiding officer of the Labour Court had not specifically granted arrears of wages claimed by the employee, he was debarred from making the claim under Sec.28 of the Act. I do not think that the principle of Explanation 5 of Sec.11 of the Code of Civil Procedure can be evoked in a case of this nature, as has been contended by learned Counsel for the petitioner. 6. For the reasons given above. I do not think that the principle of Explanation 5 of Sec.11 of the Code of Civil Procedure can be evoked in a case of this nature, as has been contended by learned Counsel for the petitioner. 6. For the reasons given above. I am of the opinion that this application must fail and it is dismissed with costs payable to respondent No. 3(a). The cost is assessed at Rs. 100. 7. Sri Sarwar Ali appearing for respondent No. 4, the State of Bihar, has argued that this respondent has unnecesssarily been impleaded as a party and, therefore, costs should be awarded in favour of this respondent also. I do not think that am valid ground has been made out for awarding cost to the State of Bihar, as the real contending party is respondent No. 3(a). The State of Bihar has not been called upon to answer any of the contentions which arose. Therefore, this prayer is refused. Narasimham, J. 8 I agree.