Judgment G.N.Prasad, J. 1. This appeal by the Judgment-debtors arises out of an objection preferred by them under Sec. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The decree under execution is a compromise decree passed in a money suit which was instituted by the decree-holders on the foot of a handnote for Rs. 2178/-. The total claim in the suit was for Rs. 2944/10/-. But by compromise between the parties, it was decreed that the judgment-debtors would pay to the decree-holders a sum of Rs. 2.000 on or before the 23rd October 1958 in full satisfaction of their dues up-to-date. There was also a default clause in the compromise petition, which was made a part of the decree, to the effect that if the judgment-debtors did not pay the sum of Rs. 2,000.00 to the decree-holders by the appointed date, then the claim laid in the suit would stand decreed in full together with costs of the suit and future Interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum. The judgment-debtors failed to make the payment by 23-10-1958. Thereafter the decree-holders made an application for amendment of the decree, which was allowed, and the following words were inserted in the decree: "It is ordered that the defendants do pay Rs. 2944/10.00 as claim and do also pay Rs. 660/11/- as costs of the suit with future interest at 6 P. C. P. A. to the plaintiff." The date of the original decree was the 20th July, 1958, and the date of the amendment was the 28th January, 1959. The application for execution of the decree was filed on the 3rd January, 1962 and the same was registered as Execution Case No. 3 of 1962. 2. The judgment-debtors put forward two objections to the execution (i) that the default clause of the decree was unenforceable, being in the nature of a penalty within the meaning of Section 74 of the Contract Act, and (ii) that the application for execution was barred by limitation. 3. Both these objections were overruled by the executing Court. As to the first objection, the executing Court held that it was not competent to go behind the decree, but to execute it as it stood. 3. Both these objections were overruled by the executing Court. As to the first objection, the executing Court held that it was not competent to go behind the decree, but to execute it as it stood. On the question of limitation, the executing Court held that the starting point of limitation was the 28th January, 1959, when the decree was amended, and the execution petition having been filed within three years from that date, it was within time. 4. Against the decision of the executing Court, the judgment-debtors preferred an appeal in the lower appellate Court where they pressed only their first objection, namely, that the default clause in the compromise decree was penal, and as such not enforceable in law. The lower appellate Court dismissed the appeal holding that the objection was without substance and the judgment-debtors were liable to pay the entire amount of the claim as incorporated in the amended compromise decree. Being thus aggrieved, the judgment-debtors have preferred the present appeal. 5. So far as the objection with regard to the penal character of the default clause in the compromise decree is concerned, I am clearly of the opinion that it cannot succeed. It was really not in the nature of a penalty as urged on behalf of the judgment-debtora It is to be remembered that the decree was passed on the basis of a compromise between the parties. The judgment-debtors did not like to contest the claim which the decree-holders had made in the money suit. They only wanted some concession which the decree-holders agreed to give to them on condition that the judgment-debtors paid to them a sum of Rs. 2,000 in full satisfaction of the claim on or before the 23rd October 1958. This was undoubtedly a very favourable term so far as the judgment-debtors were concerned, because the sum of Rs. 2,000 was less even than the principal amount which was Rs. 2178.00. In other words, what the decree-holders had agreed to forgo was not only the entire interest and costs of the suit, but also a part of the principal sum which had been advanced under the handnote in suit. As against this, the default clause merely provided that the decree-holders would be entitled to a decree for the full amount of their claim besides costs land future interest. As against this, the default clause merely provided that the decree-holders would be entitled to a decree for the full amount of their claim besides costs land future interest. Even on contest, the decree-holders would have been entitled to a decree in those very terms. In other words, no additional advantage was secured by the decree-holders under the default clause, to which they would not have been entitled in case a decree would have been passed in their favour after contest. In this regard also, the judgment-debtors were in an advantageous position, inasmuch as if they had contested the suit, they would have had to incur more costs of their own. Considering the terms of the decree as a whole, I am satisfied that there was no element of penalty in the default clause. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants then raised the question of limitation. As already stated, the question of limitation was not raised in the lower appellate court. That, however, cannot preclude the appellants from raising the question in this Court, because it is a question of law, for the decision of which no additional facts or materials are necessary. Besides, the Court has to go into the question of limitation even where it has not been raised by the defendant or the judgment-debtor. Sec.3 of the Limitation Act imposes upon the Court a duty to dismiss an ap- plication made after the prescribed period of limitation even though limitation has not been set up as a defence. 7. I have already mentioned the various dates which are relevant for decision of the question of limitation. The original decree was passed on 20-7-1958-The amendment of the decree was made on 28-1-1959 and the application for execution was filed on 3-1-1962. The period of three years prescribed under Article 182 of the Limitation Act 1908, which was in force at the relevant time, would ordinarily run from the date of the decree, that is to say, the 20th July. 1958, and on this footing the application for execution filed on 3-1-1962 would seem to be barred by limitation. The decree-holders, however, seek to bring the application within the period of limitation by urging that the terminus a quo in the present case was the date of the amendment of the decree which was well within three years of the date of the application for execution. The decree-holders, however, seek to bring the application within the period of limitation by urging that the terminus a quo in the present case was the date of the amendment of the decree which was well within three years of the date of the application for execution. The question for consideration, therefore, is whether the stand taken by the decree-holders is fit to succeed. Clause (4) of Article 182 provided that where a decree has been amended, the time from which the period of limitation would begin to run was the date of the amendment. It is, however, well settled by a series of decisions of this Court that it is not every amendment of the decree which gives a fresh start to limitation and an amendment which gives a fresh start to limitation must be an amendment of a substantial character as affecting the rights of the parties. For example, in Kalanand Singh V/s. Raj Kumar Singh, 2 Pat LJ 286 = (AIR 1917 Pat 517), it was held that an amendment of a rent decree which consisted merely of a correction in the rate of rent, but did not alter the amount of rent decreed, did not provide for a fresh starting point of limitation. Similarly, in Rameshwar Narain Misra V/s. Raghunandan Purbey, AIR 1938 Pat 57, it was held that an amendment consisting of a variation of the amount of costs to the extent of Rs. 1/2/- was really a clerical error or a trifling arithmetical error, and not an amendment of the decree within the meaning of Clause (4) of Article 182. Speaking for the Court in that case. Fazl All, J. (as he then was) made the following observation: "Coming now to the merits of the present case, it appears to me that the amendment which gives a fresh start to limitation must be an amendment in the real sense of the term, that is of some substance as affecting the rights of the parties, and not merely the correction of a clerical error or a trifling arithmetical mistake such as the Court might at any time correct of its own motion. In the present case there was no real amendment of the decree and the Court which was asked to amend it, did not issue notice to the opposite party before passing orders upon the decree-holders application, I am therefore inclined to think that Article 182, Clause (4) cannot be availed of by the decree-holder and the execution is barred by limitation." On the same principle, it was held in Kesho Singh V/s. Bhuneshwari Kuer, AIR 1942 Pat 478 that an amendment of a substantial nature gave a fresh start to limitation under Clause (4) of Article 182. In that case, the decree, as originally passed, was a money decree giving to the decree-holder the right to sell the right, title and interest of the judgment-debtors in the holding. By the amendment, the decree-holder was conferred the right to sell the holding of the judgment-debtors, and not merely their right, title and interest therein; In these circumstances, their Lordships held that the starting point of limitation was the date of the amended decree, and not the date of the original decree. 8. In the present case, I have already set out the terms in which the decree was amended on 28-1-1959. The decree as originally passed on 20-7-1958 did not mention the amount of Rs. 2944/10.00 and Rs. 660/11/- as costs which were inserted by the amendment. But the decree, as originally passed, provided: "It is ordered that the suit be decreed in terms of the compromise which will form part of the decree." Turning to the compromise petition which forms part of the decree, I find that it was clearly provided therein that in event of the judgment-debtors defaulting in the payment of Rs. 2,000.00 to the decree-holders on or before the 23rd October 1958, the plaintiffs, namely, the decree holders would be entitled to a decree for the full amount of their claim in the suit, besides the costs of the suit and future interest at -/8/- annas per cent per mensem. In the earlier portion of the decree, it was clearly indicated that the claim in the suit was for Rs. 2178/- on account of principal and Rs. 766/10.00 on account of interest on the basis of a handnote dated the 15th Kartik 1361 Fasli. In the earlier portion of the decree, it was clearly indicated that the claim in the suit was for Rs. 2178/- on account of principal and Rs. 766/10.00 on account of interest on the basis of a handnote dated the 15th Kartik 1361 Fasli. Reading the decree as a whole, that is to say, along with the compromise petition forming part of it, it is manifest that what was decreed in favour of the decree holders at the original stage was precisely what was inserted in the decree by the amendment made on 28-1-1959. In other words, the amendment did not affect the rights of the parties in any way. The amendment only worked out the rights of the parties in terms of money in accordance with what had been decreed originally. I am, therefore, of the opinion that it was not at all an amendment in the real sense of the term, and such an amendment was wholly insufficient to give a fresh start to limitation under Clause (4) of Article 182 of the Limitation Act. In other words, the period of three years prescribed for the application for execution started from the date of the original decree, and not from the date of the amendment of the decree, and as such, the application for execution filed beyond the period of three years from the date of the original decree must be held to be barred by limi-tation. 9. In the result, this appeal succeeds. The orders of the Courts below are set aside and the application for execution is dismissed as barred by limitation. The appeal is allowed; but in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.