JUDGMENT K.B. Asthana, J. - The only point for determination in this second appeal is whether the defendant failed to pay the amount of arrears demanded in the notice served upon him by the plaintiff. The plaintiff respondent is the owner of the premises in suit in mohalla Lonamandi of Agra City. The defendant appellant is his tenant in that premises. The plaintiff also resides in another premises in the same mohalla. In the month of October, 1958 the plain-tiffs served upon the defendant a notice of demand for arrears of rent. The defendant by a money order sent the requisite amount of to the defendant within the time of the expiry of the notice period. This money order was ultimately refused by the plaintiff on 2-12-1958 presumably for the reason that on 2-12-1958 the money order was tendered for payment to the plaintiff after the expiry of the period of notice. The plaintiff had also served upon the defendant a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act terminating the tenancy and asking him to quit. The defendant, it is alleged, neither paid the arrears of rent nor vacated the premises, hence the suit. 2. Apart from the allegation that the defendant had defaulted in the payment of the rent, the plaintiff also pleaded that the defendant committed nuisance, had damaged the premises and had also raised unauthorised construction as grounds for ejectment. The two courts below have recorded findings against the plaintiff on the pleas of nuisance, damaging the premises and raising of unauthorised constructions but finding that the defendant failed to pay the arrears of rent decreed the suit for ejectment. When this appeal was argued at the earlier stage two issues were sent down to the court below for recording of findings. Those issues were as follows: (1) In what circumstances the endorsement on the money order coupon dated 2-12-1958 came about to be written? (2) Whether the said money order was tendered to the plaintiff on any date prior to 2-12-1958? If so, on which date and with what results? The court below has now recorded its findings which are before me. On issue No. 1 the court below reports that it was not possible to arrive at any finding inasmuch as the records in the post office in respect of the relevant money order have been weeded out. If so, on which date and with what results? The court below has now recorded its findings which are before me. On issue No. 1 the court below reports that it was not possible to arrive at any finding inasmuch as the records in the post office in respect of the relevant money order have been weeded out. On issue No. 2 the court below has recorded a finding that the money order was actually tendered for payment to the plaintiff on 15-11-1958 but he did not accept the amount having told the postal peon to bring it some other time to enable him to consult his lawyer in the meantime. 3. The finding of fact on issue No. 2 mentioned above has been objected to by the learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent.- I have heard the learned counsel at some length. I do not think the objection is worth accepting. The defendant himself appeared in the witness-box and stated that he had gone with the postal peon on 15-11-1958 when the money order was taken for delivery to the plaintiff and the plaintiff saying that he would consult his lawyer asked the postal peon to come with the money order on some other day. The learned counsel submitted that the best evidence on this material question of fact, which would have been of the postal peon, was not produced before the court and the defendant's uncorroborated testimony should not be accepted. The defendant in his statement has given satisfactory explanation as to why the postal peon could not be produced. He stated that he never knew the name of the postal peon and since the records were weeded out in the post office nobody was in a position to inform him of the name of the postal peon. This explanation has been believed by the learned judge of the court below and I do not see any reason why I should differ from it. After all the defendant was the tenant and he must have made all efforts to save his tenancy and it is not unnatural in those circumstances to find the defendant being anxious to see that the Money order sent by him was tendered for payment to the plaintiff as early as possible. After all the defendant was the tenant and he must have made all efforts to save his tenancy and it is not unnatural in those circumstances to find the defendant being anxious to see that the Money order sent by him was tendered for payment to the plaintiff as early as possible. It was then submitted that there was no specific plea raised by the defendant that the money order was tendered before the plaintiff on 15-11-1958 hence no oral evidence on that question of fact ought to have been allowed to be adduced by the defendant. I find in the written statement a definite plea being raised that the rent was remitted but it was refused by the plaintiff. Of course no specific date of refusal is mentioned, but that to my mind would be a matter of evidence. An issue was framed by the court below on the question whether the defendant was in default of payment of rent. - The parties tendered evidence on that issue. It was not a new case which the defendant put up when the matter was sent to the court below for recording of findings. In fact this Court felt that there was some lacuna in the judgment of the court below and the question that the money order was tendered even before 2-12-1958 being material ought to have been considered and it was for that reason that a clear finding was required on that material question of fact. Since there is no strength in the objection of the plaintiff respondent to the findings recorded, it is now proved that the money older sent by the defendant was tendered for payment to the plaintiff within the period of notice of demand but the plaintiff refused to accept the amount. I. therefore, hold that the defendant did not fail to pay the amount of the arrears demanded within :he time fixed in the notice. 4. I. therefore, hold that the defendant did not fail to pay the amount of the arrears demanded within :he time fixed in the notice. 4. Even assuming that there was no satisfactory evidence that the money order was tendered for payment to the plaintiff within the time fixed by the notice, in my opinion the fact that money order for the amount deniarruer Was sent to the plaintiff i within the period of expiry of notice, eve if the money order was tendered for payment to the plaintiff after the period of the expiry of notice, the provisions of law would be complied with and the defendant would not be held to have failed to pay the amount demanded in the notice. It was contended that the post office will be the agent of the sender of the money order and not the agent of 411e receiver of the money artier and therefore the amount tendered to the post office within the period of notice would not amount to tender to the landlord on that date. To. my mind this fine question of law as to whose agent the post office is would be relevant and material when considering the liability of the post office for any default or breach committed by it. in a case of the nature which I am dealing with, namely, that of the landlord and tenant, I think the proper approach ought to be from the point of view how normally a tenant would conduct his affairs. It has come in evidence in this case that many a times before money orders were sent to the landlord and rent was accepted. Post Office is an agency which under the law performs the service of tendering the money to an addressee on receipt of a fee which the sender pays, If the sender tenders the money to the post office, pays the necessary charges and gives an address of the receiver thereof, ordinarily the amount of the money order will be paid to the receiver within a reasonable time, say three or four days. It is a very legitimate way of conducting ones affairs. Many a business transaction takes place by tendering of money through money orders. I do not think the intention behind clause (a) of sub-sec. It is a very legitimate way of conducting ones affairs. Many a business transaction takes place by tendering of money through money orders. I do not think the intention behind clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) of Section 3 :of the U. P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act was that the amount demanded under the notice must always be personally tendered in cash to the landlord, and unless that is done within the time fixed in the notice of demand the tenant would be deemed to have failed to pay the arrears demanded. Any legitimate and lawful method adopted by the tenant for payment of the arrears demanded would, to my mind, be sufficient compliance with the provisions of that clause. I am unable to agree with the learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent that it must also always be proved that the money order was tendered for payment to the landlord within the time fixed by the notice of demand and in the absence of any such proof the tenant should be deemed to have failed to pay- the amount demanded. If that interpretation or construction were given to clause (a) then by his own action the landlord can always avoid the delivery of the amount of the money order within the period prescribed by the notice and then refuse the money order on a day beyond the period prescribed by the notice and thus make the tenant suffer for no fault of his. I am, therefore, unable to subscribe to the view canvassed before me that unless the amount sent by money order in answer to a notice of demand is also actually delivered within the period fixed by the notice, the provisions of clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) of Section 3 of the U. P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act would not be complied with. 5. For the reasons given above to allow this appeal and set aside the decree of the court below and dismiss the plaintiff's suit for ejectment. In the circumstances of the case there would be no order for costs. Appeal allowed.