JUDGMENT 1. The doctrine of sufficient cause (a convenient, rather an imprecise expression) in section 5 of the Indian limitation Act both of the years 1908 and 1963, is one, which has throughout the history of its subject matter, been expressed with considerable generality. The best known formulations, those of lord Dunedin in the case of (J) Brij inder v. Kanshi Ram 44 LA. 218 AIR. (1917) P.C. 156 and of Sir John Edge in the case of (2) Sunder Bai v. Collector of Belgaum, 46 LA. 15 : A.I.R. (1918)P. C. 13"5, adapted in this context by P.N. Mookerjee, and Bijayesh Mukherjee, JJ. in the case of (3) Chandramull v. Goenka 67 C.W.N. 482 and used by p. N. Mookerjee and Niyogi JJ. in the case of (4) Ram Charitar v. Nagendra 64 C.W.N. 223, which I had the privilege of arguing when at the bar, speak generally of the causes, sufficient to condone the delay without any attempt at a particular definition. I am not prepared to refine upon them with any dialectical subtleties, as cases on this section under the statute arose and would arise in future in infinite diversity of circumstances. The concurrence of experienced opinions however is enough, without any additional attempt of my own, to review the subject-matter over again in detail. 2. Often we find, the said expression 'sufficient cause used indifferently to denote, on the one hand in a broad popular sense, and on the other, used as a term of art, which may be regarded as offending judicial discretion. In a few reported cases we also find that instead of segregating the two questions (i) whether it was a gross and inexcusable mistake of a lawyer (ii) whether, it was the applicant's careless choice of a lawyer : the Courts confused the two, by asking whether it was a case of a mistaken advice or by arriving at a compound finding that it is not, satisfied that ignorance of law is not a sufficient cause. There is no need to regret these tendencies, indeed to do so, when consideration of this subject has passed through many notable minds from Mr. S. Erskine in the case of (5) Bhaee Chund v. Purtab Chund, 1 M.I.A. 154 onwards, would indicate a failure to understand its exact and precise nature. There is no need to regret these tendencies, indeed to do so, when consideration of this subject has passed through many notable minds from Mr. S. Erskine in the case of (5) Bhaee Chund v. Purtab Chund, 1 M.I.A. 154 onwards, would indicate a failure to understand its exact and precise nature. This doctrine of sufficient cause, in my mind, has (some times unconsciously) thrived on ambiguity and it would be mistaken, even if it were possible, to try to crystallise its rules or its aspects into neat definite propositions. It is one which is to be applied to factual situations of a particular case as examined in detail in the instant case by my learned brother, which I forbear from repeating, with a broad and flexible rule of judicial discretion and I desire to guard against the dangerous ambition of wishing to regulate and to foresee everything. This again does not mean that there -would be no degree of any certainty that the doctrine does or does not apply to a given set of facts. It is also not to be supposed or encouraged that a bare allegation of sufficient cause is enough. Positively, there are certain sensitive areas as to which the law will require in a case, the test of sufficient cause to be passed. Such an area has long, been and still is that of utter negligence, carelessness, bad faith of the applicant, his misconduct, his initial approach to the lawyer being not bonafide and the like. Negatively, there are types of cases (and it is one of this that principally concerns us here) such as no inaction of the applicant, no lack of his bonafides, diligence and due care, no gross want of legal skill and laches of his lawyer, no case of deliberate mistake and callous misfortune and the like : as to which the Court should be prepared to say with some confidence that they do not enter into the field. The tests are briefly expressed and I hope that I do justice to them if I say further that the Court should also endeavour to keep it in mind that hard ship, undue generosity and maudlin sympathy are no grounds of sufficient cause and that there should not be concealment or suppression of material facts. 3. The tests are briefly expressed and I hope that I do justice to them if I say further that the Court should also endeavour to keep it in mind that hard ship, undue generosity and maudlin sympathy are no grounds of sufficient cause and that there should not be concealment or suppression of material facts. 3. There may be some exorbitant or special features in an individual case, even in types of cases, where they obtained acceptance, but we are to call for a fresh examination of circumstances in each case, which might take it out of the accepted category. Some such limitation on the meaning of sufficient cause must surely have been present to the mind of Subba Rao J. (as his Lord-ships then was) speaking for the supreme Court, in the case of (6) Partha Sarathy v. State of Andhra Pradesh A.I.R. (1966) S.C. 38 before whom all the facts must have been stated but we get in paragraph 5 of the said report at page 40, observation on the skeleton facts and the sole reasons given by the applicant to the effect that "he thought" that he would get the time in obtaining the certified copy, of the order refusing leave to appeal to the Supreme Court as "he was wrongly informed of the practice of this Court", which was, according to the learned Judge, was nothing but a "vague allegation" in the affidavit and, therefore, their Lordships could not be persuaded to condone the delay of 62 days. Moreover, the decision is a compound one in that it mainly decided the application of the provisions of Section 12 (2) of the Indian Limitation Act 1963, to the facts of the said case. 4. ONCE again I should like to pro test against the great number of cases which are so often cited on the subject from the mass of which Mr. Bhattacharjee considerately drew a few samples which furnish an unhappy instance of history teaching by examples for the only lesson which they impart is, that no one case can govern any other and that each case depends upon its own circumstances. The problem is if I may say so, rather obscured than illumined by the mass of the case law by which it is surrounded, if not submerged. The problem is if I may say so, rather obscured than illumined by the mass of the case law by which it is surrounded, if not submerged. As, however, they were cited, I only refer to them for the purpose of saying that the facts there stand out differently from the facts in the present case and they would be of no assistance here. The cases are (7) Harendra Lal v. Hari dassi Dabi 14 C.W.N. 420 (8) Krishna sand v. Ramasami A.I.R. (1917) P.O. 179 (9) Phani Bhusan v. Natini Bala, 67 C.L.J. 107, (10) Rajendra Bahadur v. Rajeswar Bali 41 C.W.N. 1189 (P. C.) A.I.R. (1917) P. C. 276: (11) Kishan Chand v. Md. Hussein, A.I.R. (1942)Lahore, 394 (12) Dinabandhu v. Jadumani A.I.R. (1954) S.C. 411- 1955 (1) S.C.R. 140 ; (13) Asaram v. State A.I.R. (1956) Madhya Bharat, 127, (14) Mohanlal v. Tej Singh, A.I.R. (1958) Madhya Pradesh 96; (15) Umrao singh v. M. R. Kachi, A.I.R. (1960)M. P. 140; (16) Sitaram v. Authority under P. W. Act A.I.R, (1960; S.C. 260- 1960 (1) S.C.R. 875 ; (17) J, D. Bhargava v. J. L. Bhargava, A.I.R (1961) S.C. 832-1961 (2) S.C.R. 916; (18) Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields A. I. R (1962) S.C. 361 : 1963 S.C. R. 762; (19) Smt. Shanti Debi v. Satya Pal a. I. R. (1964) Punjab 289, (20) State of Bihar v. Md, Ismail A.I.R. (1967)Patna, 1. (21) Mariambai v. Hanifasai, a. I. R. (1967) Madhya Pradesh 107, (22) Chunilal v. State of Madhya Pradesh A.I.R. (1967) Madhya Pradesh, 127. I find it impossible to extract from these cases, even by an argument not silentio, any inference that the sufficiency of the cause is limitative and sterilising. I am left, even after the above arguments we have heard, with much of the original predisposition of the matter. The line of thought that section 5 should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice, is, I think behind the court's acceptance of con donation of delay. By way of illustrations we can refer to the judgment of sir Patrick Spens, Chief Justice of the federal court in the case of (23) Bank of Commerce v. Protap Chandra Ghose, 1946, F. C. R. 32 : A.I.R. (1946) F. C. 12, the judgment of Chakravarti. By way of illustrations we can refer to the judgment of sir Patrick Spens, Chief Justice of the federal court in the case of (23) Bank of Commerce v. Protap Chandra Ghose, 1946, F. C. R. 32 : A.I.R. (1946) F. C. 12, the judgment of Chakravarti. C. J. with lahiri J. in the case of (24) Khetramoni v. Surendra Mohan 60 C.W.N. 200) (infra), the judgment of Sir Arthur collins, C. J. speaking for the Bench in the case of (25) Krishna v. Chathappan i. L. R. 13 Mad. 269, the judgment of Sir Asutosh Mookerjee, sitting with Beach-croft, J. in the case of (26) Prosonno v. Ramchandra, 17 C. L. J. 66 and the judgment of the three learned Judges in the letters Patent Bench of the Bombay high Court after Macleod, C. J. differed with Shah, J. in the case of (27) Nagindas motilal v. Nilaji Moroa, I. L. R. 48 bom. 442. These illustrations are sufficient to show that the courts are not lacking in toils which enable them to select from the whole range of segments of commonly current and recognisably normal grounds of sufficient causes of acceptable shape. I need add here only that they may be listed provisionally in categories which can never be closed in the twilight of debatable ground between the facts of each case and they should be allowed to remain fluid. 5. ON the aspect of the argument that the onus of proof in such cases is heavier on the Union of India, the State government, on the Municipal Corporation and on such public bodies Mr. Bhattacharjee gets inspiration from the decision in the case of (28) Municipal board of Lucknow v. Kali Krishna a. I. R. (1944) Oudh 135. The Rajasthan high Court, however, has not taken the same view in the case of (29) Keshab prasad v. State of Rajasthan A.I.R. 1957, Rajasthan, 24. Bhattacharjee gets inspiration from the decision in the case of (28) Municipal board of Lucknow v. Kali Krishna a. I. R. (1944) Oudh 135. The Rajasthan high Court, however, has not taken the same view in the case of (29) Keshab prasad v. State of Rajasthan A.I.R. 1957, Rajasthan, 24. The Assam High court has taken a view in the case of (30) State of Assam v. Haji Habib I.L.R. (1951) Assam, 252 A.I.R. (1952)Assam, 48, that the language of section 5 of the Limitation Act 1903 docs not justify discrimination between the State and the Subject I feel the force of the reasoning in the Oudh case but I do not feel able to accede, from the language of section 5 of the Acts, to any deduction of the principle that the onus of proof is heavier in such cases moreover, the doctrine based on the wide ground of judicial discretion, the wider aspect of substantial and equal justice must always be considered of course coupled with the narrower aspect of the accrual of the valuable right of the other parties. Without such guidance, the court cannot hope to arrive at a sensible, rational and up-to-date conclusion on what is a sufficient cause. 6. IT is true that Mr. Bhattacharjee has been influenced by some words spoken by their Lordships in the case of (31) Surendra v. Mohendra (infra)36 C.W.N. 420 : I. L. R. 59 Cal. 781 : A.I.R. (1932) Cal. 589 and in the case of (32) Bijanlata Basak v. Bhudhar Chandra Das (infra) 59 C.W.N. 693 and in other cases of like nature but while not ignoring the power and weight of the observations made therein, I am not deterred by the features of the said cases from reaching the conclusion of a surer foundation of a bonafide mistake in the instant case, that the cause is not insufficient. I con fess that I form this opinion with pleasure. For the reasons which I have set out and subject to what I have said, i am unable to accept the contentions powerfully put forward by the learned counsel appearing for the Respondent. Certain helpful expositions were also resolutely contended by Mr. Bhattacharjee but they are to be used rationally and not too literally as the enquiry is to be raised in each case as to what are the circumstances in which those expositions can be applied. Certain helpful expositions were also resolutely contended by Mr. Bhattacharjee but they are to be used rationally and not too literally as the enquiry is to be raised in each case as to what are the circumstances in which those expositions can be applied. The delicacy of the operation of law of settling the bounds has long been familiar. 7. Before parting with the case I want to mention that Mr. Bhattacharjee added to his main argument, a subsidiary contention that is the application filed on August 1, 1966, was defective and as the defect was not removed before December 20, 1966 this further delay should be explained. Though the learned Counsel for the respondent did not shrink from the assertion that the application should be thrown out on this ground alone, this argument cannot be accepted because of the specific provisions of the Appellate Side Rules permitting such application to be filed and giving power to remedy the defects which have been clone in this case. It is perhaps proper for me to add that the contention is too technical and notional to bring the case within the rule that the application must be deemed to have been filed on December 20, 1966 and not earlier, as it would seriously embarrass the working any application, in practice. In my view it would be a lamentable conclusion to reach that no remedy could be had from the law in such eases. 8. Having had the benefit of reading the opinion of my learned brother which succeeds mine and on an acceptance of the facts as found and as related in his judgment I am content to say that I am in concurrence with it in the view that the applicant's failure in presenting the application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court timorously, was with sufficient cause and the delay of 27 days should be condoned and that as both the parties are legally aided, each is to have no present liability for the payment of costs to the other. The application would now be registered and would proceed according to law. A. C. Sen J. : the present Rule was issued on an application under section 5 of the limitation Act for the condonation of delay in filing an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. 9. The application would now be registered and would proceed according to law. A. C. Sen J. : the present Rule was issued on an application under section 5 of the limitation Act for the condonation of delay in filing an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. 9. The Union of India, appellant to the Supreme Court, is the petitioner before us. 10. The opposite party, an employee under the Union of India, having been dismissed from service as a result of departmental enquiry instituted a suit far a declaration that the order of dismissal was bad in law and that he was still in service. The suit was decreed by the trial Court and on appeal the suit was dismissed by the lower appellate court, On second appeal to the High court the suit was decreed. The Union of India intends to prefer an appeal to the Supreme Court after obtaining the necessary certificate under Art. 133 of the Constitution. 11. The judgment in the second appeal was delivered by the division bench on September 28, 1965. The application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was filed on August 1, 1966. According to the report of the Additional Stamp reporter dated September 9, 1966 the application would have been in time up to July 5, 1966, but was out of time " by 27 days on the date of filing, namely august 1, 1966. The Union of India has therefore applied under section 5 of the Limitation act for the condonation of this delay of 27 days for reasons stated therein. 12. Under the Limitation Act of 1908, the period of limitation prescribed for an application by a person desiring to appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to the Supreme Court for leave to appeal is 90 days from the date of the decree appealed from (Art. 179) Under the Limitation Act of 1968, the period of limitation prescribed for an application to the High Court for a certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court under clause (1) of article 132, Article 133 or sub-clause (c) of clause (1) of Article 134 is 60 days from the date of the decree, order of sentence (Art. 132. 13. 13. IT is common case that if the application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court filed on August 1, 1966 is governed by the Limitation Act of 1908 then it must be held that the application was filed in time. But the petitioner itself has stated in para. 12 of the present petition that "it now appears that the revisions of the new limitation Act of 1963 should apply" if the new Act of 1963 applies then there is no question (hat the application for leave to appeal was filed 27 days out of time. 14. IT is first of all to be ascertained whether the Union of India in fact depended upon the advice of the learned advocate Mr. P. K. Ghose in order to ascertain the last date of filing the petition for leave to appeal to the supreme Court, whether the petitioner in fact was misled by the wrong advice given by Mr. P. K. Ghosh, and whether the petitioner took all necessary steps for filing the petition for leave within the period mentioned by Mr. P. K. Ghose. It is not disputed that under the present Limitation Act of 1963 the last date for filing the application for leave to appeal was July 5, 1966. 15. The judgment in the second appeal was delivered on September 26, 1965 and an application on behalf of tie petitioner for certified copies of the judgment and decree was filed on the very next day, namely September 29, 1965 the decree was signed on April 7, 1966. Stamps and folios required for the certified copies of the judgment and the decree were notified by the office on April 21, 1966 and they were supplied on the very same clay on behalf of the petitioner. In the meantime Sri S. N. Sen, Solicitor to the Central Government on receiving a letter dated March 2, 1966 from the Garrison Engineer Calcutta division made enquiries from Sri P. K. Ghose, learned Advocate in charge of the case on behalf of the petitioner, the union of India, by a letter dated March 5, 1966 about the certified copy of the judgment. 16. Certified copies of the judgment and the decree were made ready for delivery on May 6, 1966 and they were, taken delivery of on behalf of the petitioner that very day. 16. Certified copies of the judgment and the decree were made ready for delivery on May 6, 1966 and they were, taken delivery of on behalf of the petitioner that very day. The said copies were forwarded on May 7, 1966, the very next day, by Sri P. K. Ghose, the petitioner's Advocate, to Sri S. N. Sen Solicitor to the Central Government. The certified copies of the judgment and decree were forwarded to the garrison Engineer, Calcutta Division by Sri S. N. Sen en May 10, 1966. 17. IN response to a letter dated June 2, 1966 written to Sri S. N. Sen by the Garrison Engineer, Calcutta division Sri S. N. Sen wrote a letter on June 10, 1966 to the petitioners Advocate, Sri P. K. Ghose, enquiring to the time within which the appeal was to be filed to the Supreme Court of India. 18. SRI P. K. Ghose, Advocate for the petitioner intimated the time for filing the application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court by a letter dated. June 14, 1966 addressed to Sri S. N. Sen, solicitor to the Central Government. As stated above, the certified copies of the judgment and the decree obtained from the High Court were sent to Sri S. N. Sen by Sri P. K. Ghose on May 7, 1966. Therefore on June 14, 1966 when Sri P. K. Ghose was writing the aforesaid letter intimating the time. for filing the application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court he was in fact not in possession of those certified copies. There is, therefore, nothing un usual that Sri P. K. Ghose to be on the safe side, mentioned 80 days and not 90 days as the time for filing the application under Article 133 of the Constitution after May 6, 1966, because for various reasons sometimes it is not possible to get under section 12 of the limitation Act the benefit of the entire period from the date of the application for certified copies to the date of taking delivery of them. We find no reason to disbelieve the statement in para 6 of the supplementary affidavit that Sri P. K. Ghose set apart a margin of 10 days as the certified copies were not in his possession at the time of writing the letter of June 14, 1966 to Sri s. N. Sen. 19. MR. We find no reason to disbelieve the statement in para 6 of the supplementary affidavit that Sri P. K. Ghose set apart a margin of 10 days as the certified copies were not in his possession at the time of writing the letter of June 14, 1966 to Sri s. N. Sen. 19. MR. Bhattacharyya, the learned counsel for the respondent opposite party urges that the letter of June 14, 1966 written by Sri P. K. Ghose to Sri S. N. Sen clearly shows that the story that Sri P. K. Ghose was under the impression that the period of limitation is 90 days is a myth. We cannot accept this suggestion. There is no reason why Sri P. K. Ghose would say that the time for filing the application on under art. 33 of the Constitution was 80 days from May 6, 1966 unless he was under the impression or opinion that the period of limitation was 90 days from the date of the decree after making allowance for the time taken in obtaining the certified copies of the judgment and the decree. 20. To resume the chain of events, on June 16, 1966 Sri S. N. Sen forward ed a copy of the said letter written by Sri P. K. Ghose on June 14, 1966 to the garrison Engineer, Calcutta Division for his information. On July 18, 1966 Sri S. N. Sen instructed Sri P. K. Ghose, Advocate to file an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. On the same day papers wore sent to Sri P. K. Ghose for taking necessary steps in the matter. The Garrison Engineer, Calcutta Division, was also informed the same by Sri S. N. Sen in reply to his letter of July 18, 1966. Sri S. N. Sen, in his letter dated July 13, 1966 to the Garrison engineer asked the latter to request the latter's assistant dealing with the matter to contact Sri P. K. Ghose and to give him further instructions if considered necessary by the latter. 21. IT may be recalled that according to the report submitted by the additional Stamp Reporter the last date for filing the application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court expired on July 5, 1966. 21. IT may be recalled that according to the report submitted by the additional Stamp Reporter the last date for filing the application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court expired on July 5, 1966. Therefore, the necessary instruction to file the application was given to Sri P. K. Ghose nearly two weeks after the expiry of the last date of filing. Can it be said that the petitioner was guilty of gross negligence in not giving any instruction to Sri P. K. Ghose between June 16, 1966 and July 5, 1966 ? If it is found as a fact that the petitioner entirely depended upon the advice given by Sri P. K. Ghose as to the last date for filing the petition for leave to appeal, then it cannot be said that the petitioner was grossly negligent in not instructing Sri P. K. Ghose to file the application on or before July 5, 1966. According to the advice given by Sri P. K. Ghose as to the last date for filing the application namely 80 days after May 6, 1966, the last date would be July 25, 1966 and the necessary instruction was given to Sri P. K. Ghose to file the application on July 18, 1966. 22. IS there anything on record from which it can be said that the petitioner was aware, inspite of the advice given by Sri P. K. Ghose, that the period of limitation would expire on july 6, 1966 or that the petitioner was not in fact misled by the wrong advice given by Sri P. K. Ghose ? There is nothing on record to that effect. Mr. Bhattacharyya, the learned Counsel for the respondent, says that it is inconceivable that the Union of India could not have ascertained with due diligence the lest date for filing the application. The union of India is not in the same position as an ordinary private litigant. Its resources are unlimited and the best legal advice is available to it Mr. Bhattacharyya, therefore, concludes that it must be held that either the union of India was aware that July 5, 1966 was the last date or that it could have ascertained the last date with due diligence. We cannot accept this contention of Mr. Bhattacharyya first of all, suspicion is not evidence. Bhattacharyya, therefore, concludes that it must be held that either the union of India was aware that July 5, 1966 was the last date or that it could have ascertained the last date with due diligence. We cannot accept this contention of Mr. Bhattacharyya first of all, suspicion is not evidence. There are no materials on record to show that was possible for the Union of India to know the exact date if it was a bit more vigilant or that the Union of India did not exercise due diligence in ascertaining the real position as to the last date of filing the application. 23. SRI P. K. Ghose was the Advocate in charge of the case. In fact at the hearing of the present petition under section 5 of the Limitation Act he was holding the junior brief led by Mr. Dutt, Sri P. K. Ghose gave the advice as to the last date of filing the application for leave to appeal. The advice was communicated to the Garrison engineer, Calcutta Division through Sri s. N. Sen. Solicitor to the Central government who in his letter dated June 16, 1966 explained to the Garrison engineer the content of the letter of Sri P.K. Ghose as to the last date of filing the application for leave to appeal. The Garrison Engineer maintained con tact with Sri S. N. Sen and through Sri s. N. Sen with Sri P. K. Ghose on behalf of the Union of India. The Garrison engineer cannot be blamed for accepting the advice given by Sri P. K. Ghose and in a way endorsed by Sri S. N. Sen on the question of limitation. He should have been guilty of gross negligence if he did not rely on the advice given by the Advocate in charge and also by the solicitor to the Central Government. The Garrison Engineer for all practical purposes represented the Union of India so far as the various proceedings in the present case is concerned. It is, there fore, clear that the petitioner, namely, the Union of India entirely depended on the advice given by Sri P. K. Ghose an the question of limitation. The petitioner certainly was not guilty of negligence in depending on the advice of Sri P. K. Ghose and it is absurd to suggest that the conduct of the petitioner was not bonafide. 24. The petitioner certainly was not guilty of negligence in depending on the advice of Sri P. K. Ghose and it is absurd to suggest that the conduct of the petitioner was not bonafide. 24. IT is not possible as suggested by Mr. Bhattacharyya, the learned Counsel for the respondent, to make a distinction between the Union of India and an ordinary private litigant in the matter of relying on the advice given by the advocate in charge. The Union of India might or might not have in the present case the opportunity of having better advice from legal adviser more eminent and competent than Sri P. K. Ghose. It would be useless speculation to try to ascertain the real position. In the case of an ordinary private litigant too, he may have the opportunity of getting better legal advice than that given by the lawyer in charge of the case. If no such enquiry is permissible in the case of a private litigant; in our opinion no such enquiry is permissible even in the case of the Union of India. The only thing to be seen is whether any particular advice was in fact received by the union of India and whether in fact the union of India acted according to that advice. In the present lase we have no doubt in our mind that the Union of India did receive definite advice from Sri P. K. Ghose and in a way from Sri S. N. Sen as to the last date of filing the application for leave to appeal and the Union of India did not act according to the advice given. The application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was ultimately filed by Sri P. K. Ghose on august 1, 1966 and Sri S. N. Sen was informed accordingly by Sri P. K. Ghose by a letter dated August 1. . 1986. 25. IT may be asked why Sri P. K. Ghose filed the application on August 1, 1966 instead of filing it on or before July 25, 1966. . 1986. 25. IT may be asked why Sri P. K. Ghose filed the application on August 1, 1966 instead of filing it on or before July 25, 1966. The answer is obvious, Sri P. K. Ghose was under the impression that the old and not the new Limitation Act would apply and he must have calculated the last date of filing, after receiving back the certified copies of the judgment and the decree from Sri s. N. Sen on or about July 13, 1966, the last date of filing under the old limitation Act was August 4, 1966, and the application was actually filed on august 1, 1966. Hence, no adverse inference can be drawn as to the conduct of Sri P. K. Ghose for not filing the application on or before July 25. 26. The main question to be considered in the light of the facts stated above whether the petitioner has succeeded in satisfying the court that the petitioned had sufficient cause for not making the application on or before July 5, 1966 which according to the report submitted by the Additional registrar, was the last date for making the application. In para 12 of the petition it has been said that the petitioner's advocate was under the bonafide belief that the provisions of the previous Limitation Act should apply in this case. Therefore, the cause of delay is the wrong advice given by the petitioner's advocate namely Sri P. K. Ghose, To what extent is the lawyer mistake a sufficient case for condoning the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act ? In (32) Bijanlata Basak v. Bhudhar Chandra Das 59 C.W.N. 639 the only statement of fact to make out a case of sufficient cause for condoning the delay was that the lawyer was not conversant with the practice of filing appeals. The Division Bench of our high Court presided over by Das Gupta J. as his Lordship then was, observed as follows : I find it difficult to under stand how a statement of this nature that the lawyer did not know the law on the subject can be accepted as sufficient causes". The Division Bench of our high Court presided over by Das Gupta J. as his Lordship then was, observed as follows : I find it difficult to under stand how a statement of this nature that the lawyer did not know the law on the subject can be accepted as sufficient causes". In the instant case it has not been stated that the lawyer, namely Sri P. K. Ghose was not conversant with the practice of filing an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, what has been stated is that the lawyer, namely Sri P. K. Ghose was under a bonafide belief that the old Limitation act of 1908 would apply. Therefore, the facts of the present case are entirely different from the facts in (32,) Bijanbala's case 59 C.W.N. 639. 27. Some difficulty is created by section 31 of the now Limitation Act. Clause (b) of that section provides that nothing in the new Act shall affect any suit, appeal or application instituted, preferred or made any proceeding arising out or in connection with the appeal. An application for leave to appeal to the supreme. Court against an appellate decree may reasonably be argued to be a proceeding essentially linked up with the appeal itself. If that be so it may be argued that as the present second appeal was preferred before, and pending at the commencement of the new limitation Act, the present application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court will not be affected by the new Limitation Act. 28. Section 32 of the new Limitation Act says that the Indian Limitation act 1908 is hereby repealed. Section 6 of the General, Clauses Act deals with the effect of appeal, unless a different intention appears, the repeal does not affect any right, or privilege acquired under any enactment so repealed. The period of - limitation for an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under the old Act of 1908 is longer than the period of limitation for such an application under the new Act of 1963. Can this longer period of limitation b be regarded as a privilege, if so was this privilege acquired by either party to the second appeal preferred by the respondent before us before the commencement of the new Act of 1963 ? Can this longer period of limitation b be regarded as a privilege, if so was this privilege acquired by either party to the second appeal preferred by the respondent before us before the commencement of the new Act of 1963 ? It be held that the longer period of limitation is a privilege and that this privilege was acquired by the Union of india before the commencement of the new Act of 1963, the further question remains whether this privilege remains unaffected by the repeal of the old Act of 1908, or whether a different intention appears in the repealing Act of 1963. Section 30 (b) of the new Act of 1963 deals with appeals or application for which the period of limitation is shorter than the period of limitation prescribed by the old Act of 1908 but that section deals with appeals or application for which the time started running before; the commencement of the new act of 1963. What will happen in the case of an appeal or application for which time starts running after the commencement of new Act of 1963 ? If it is argued that for such an appeal or application the period of limitation will be as under the Old Act of 1908, the privilege of the longer period having been acquired under the old Act, the argument cannot be said to be absurd on the face of it. Whenever an existing Act is replaced by a new Act, the question frequently arises whether the enforcement of a particular right or the institution of any judicial proceeding will be governed by the old Act or by the new act. This question arises with regard to the law of limitation as well. When the Limitation Act of 1877 was replaced by the Limitation of 1908 this question, namely whether the Act of 1877 or then of 1908 would apply, arose in a number of decided cases. Therefore, in the instant case, Sri P. K. Ghose, the learned advocate on behalf of the Union of India cannot be blamed because he thought that the application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was to be filed within the period prescribed by the old Act of 1908. 29. Therefore, in the instant case, Sri P. K. Ghose, the learned advocate on behalf of the Union of India cannot be blamed because he thought that the application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was to be filed within the period prescribed by the old Act of 1908. 29. The above discussion indicates that the law relating to the period of limitation for filing an application for leave to appeal against decree passed in a second appeal filed before the commencement of the new Limitation Act of 1963, but decided after such commencement cannot be said to be beyond dispute. At any rate the law on this point cannot be said to be absolutely clear, as suggested by Mr. Bhattacharyya, the learned counsel on behalf of the respondent. 30. WE make it clear that there is no doubt in our mind that the present application for leave to appeal to the supreme Court should have been filed within the period prescribed by the new act of 1963. As a matter of fact the entire proceeding under section 5 of the limitation Act was argued on the footing that the new Act would apply, otherwise there would have no occasion for filing the present application for condonation of delay. The petitioner too has stated in his petition that now it appears that the new Limitation Act would apply. We have considered the effect of repeal and the true import of sections 30 (b) and 31 for the purpose of showing that the state of law is such that even an experienced lawyer is likely to commit an error as to the period of limitation for filing an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against the decree passed in appeal filed before but decided after the commencement of the new Limitation Act of 1963. In a sense the law is in an un settled state because of the provisions contained in section 31 of the new limitation Act of 1963. This point is also not covered by any authority. In a sense the law is in an un settled state because of the provisions contained in section 31 of the new limitation Act of 1963. This point is also not covered by any authority. Therefore even if we apply the test laid down by Das Gupta, J. in (32) Bijanlata Basak's case, 59 C.W.N. 639 by way of an obiter dictum, mistake committed by Sri P. K. Ghose in advising the union of India that the period of limitation would be as laid down in the old limitation Act of 1908 is a good ground for condoning the delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act. 31. Mr. Dutt, the learned Advocate for the petitioner strongly relied on the case of (24) Kshetromoni Dasi v, Surendra Mohan 60 C.W.N. 200 in support of the contention that the reliance on the mistaken advice of Sri P. K. Ghose was sufficient cause for the condonation of delay. 32. In the instant case there is nothing on record to show that the union of India was itself guilty of carelessness or lack of ordinary prudence in choosing Sri P. K. Ghose as lawyer. We are satisfied from the materials an record that the Union of India acted bonafide and with reasonable care in approaching Sri P. K. Ghose for advice as to the period of limitation. It should be borne in mind that the advice given by Sri P. K. Ghose passed brought the hand of Sri S. N. Sen, Solicitor to the central Government. Mr. Bhattacharyya contends that the Union of India should have consulted Mr. P. K. Roy, who argued the second appeal on behalf of the Union of India as the leader of Sri P.K. Ghose, on the question of limitation and that the Union of India was guilty of carelessness as well as lack of ordinary prudence in choosing Sri P. K Ghose, instead of Mr. P. K. Roy's advice as to the period of limitation. We can not accept, this contention. The riling of an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court is part of acting and not pleading, and the Union of India cannot be said to be guilty of carelessness or lack of ordinary prudence in not selecting a senior Advocate like Mr. P. K. Roy, in the matter of acting. We can not accept, this contention. The riling of an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court is part of acting and not pleading, and the Union of India cannot be said to be guilty of carelessness or lack of ordinary prudence in not selecting a senior Advocate like Mr. P. K. Roy, in the matter of acting. The petitioner in Kshetromani dasi's case 60 C.W.N. 200 was an old lady, nearly 80 years old. In out opinion that does not in any way affect the principle laid down by the learned C. J. in that case. We too have indicated above that no invidious distinction can be made between a private litigant and a public authority like the union of India in the matter of the availability of better legal advice. 33. IN the (4) Ram Charitar v. Nagendra Chandra 64 C.W.N. 223 decided by P. N. Mookerjee and Niyogi, JJ. forgetfulness of the lawyer was held to be sufficient cause for condonation of delay. In the instant case Sri P. K. Ghose no doubt filed the petition for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, but prior to that he tendered advice to the Union of India as to the last date of filing the petition. Sri P. K. Ghose was not at all guilty of any negligence not to, speak of gross negligence in filing the application on August 1, 1956 according to his notion as to the last date for filing the application. There fore there cannot be any question of rejecting the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act on the ground of negligence or carelessness on the part of Sri P. K. Ghose in filing the appeal 27 days out of time. Similarly there cannot be any question of throwing out the application on the ground that the union of India was guilty of negligence or want of ordinary prudence in approaching Shri P. K. Ghose for advice as to the period of limitation. As pointed out above the Union of India acted bonafide and with due care and prudence in approaching Sri P. K. Ghose, for advice as to the last date for filling the application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. 34. MR. Bhattacharyya, the learned counsel for the respondent strongly relied upon (31) Surendra v. Mohendra 36 C.W.N. 320. As pointed out above the Union of India acted bonafide and with due care and prudence in approaching Sri P. K. Ghose, for advice as to the last date for filling the application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. 34. MR. Bhattacharyya, the learned counsel for the respondent strongly relied upon (31) Surendra v. Mohendra 36 C.W.N. 320. It will be seen that the facts in that case are entirely different from the facts in the case before us. The ground for excusing delay in that case was really not the wrong advice given by the lawyer, but failure on the part of the lawyer to advise that an appeal from the preliminary decree was necessary. There fore that case has no application to the facts of the case before us Besides, in that case it has nut been stated that a wrong advice given by the lawyer can never be treated as a sufficient cause for ex tension of time under section 5 of the limitation Act. Their Lordships in fact quoted with approval the following passage from the judgment of Brett, m. R. in (3) Highton v. Trehern (1878)48 L. J. K. B. 167. "in cases where a suit has suffered from negligence or gross want of legal skill of his legal adviser, ho must have his remedy against that legal adviser and meantime the suit must not suffer. But where there has been a bonafide mistake, not through misconduct or through negligence nor through want of reasonable skill but such as a skilled person might make I very much dislike the idea that the rights of the client should be thereby forfeited". We have indicated above that in the instant case the mistake on the part of Sri P. K. Ghose, was bonafide. It has not been suggested on behalf of the respondent that Sri P. K Ghose was guilty of misconduct. The mistake was not committed through negligence, because he was well aware of the change in law; only he made a mistake in arriving at the correct conclusion as to whether the old or the new Limitation act would apply. We have further pointed out that the mistake committed by Sri P. K. Ghose is one which is likely to be committed even by a skilled lawyer. We have further pointed out that the mistake committed by Sri P. K. Ghose is one which is likely to be committed even by a skilled lawyer. In our opinion, the principle relied upon by their Lordships in surendra's case 36 C.W.N. 320 does not compel us to reject the present application under section 5 of the Limitation act. The learned Counsel for the respondent drew our special attention to a decision of the Oudh Chief Court namely (28) Municipal Board. Luck-now v. Kali Krishna Narain A. I. R, 1944 oudh 135. The instant case is distinguish able on facts. In our opinion, the decision of the chief Court of Oudh is not applicable to the facts of the present case. Besides in that case the applicant namely the municipal Board, Lucknow was found to be negligent. However, even if there be a slight conflict between the decision of the Oudh Chief Court and the view taken by Chief Justice Chakravarti in kshetramoni's case, 60 C.W.N. 200, we propose to follow the Bench decision of our. High Court. 35. The case of (6) Partha Sarathy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1966 s. C. 38 cited on behalf of the respondent has no bearing upon the facts of the case before us. In that case, there was an application for condoning the delay of 62 days in filing the petition for special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The petitioner at first tried to establish that there was no delay, but he failed. Next, he argued that there was sufficient cause for delay. This argument too was negatived with the following observations. The only reason given is that he thought that the time in obtaining the certified copy of the order refusing leave to appeal to the Supreme Court will be counted for the purpose of calculating the period of limitation for filing the special leave petition, as he was wrongly informed of the practice of this court. The Limitation Act of 1963 came into existence on October 5, 1963. It was more than a year since the Act was passed when the petition was filed in this court. The vague allegation that the petitioner was wrongly informed of the period of limitation cannot possibly be a ground for excusing the delay. It is not known who supplied the wrong information 1o the applicant. It was more than a year since the Act was passed when the petition was filed in this court. The vague allegation that the petitioner was wrongly informed of the period of limitation cannot possibly be a ground for excusing the delay. It is not known who supplied the wrong information 1o the applicant. Therefore it was not a case in which the lawyer gave a wrong advice. How far the wrong advice of the lawyer is sufficient cause for excusing the delay was not discussed at all in Partha Sarathy's case. 36. The recent decision of our High court in (3) C. Indra Kumar v. J. M. Goenka, 67 C.W.N. 482, is, in our opinion, in favour of the petitioner before us. It was argued on behalf of the respondent that is all the material facts required for the proper exercise of discretion by the Court had not been disclosed by the petition, discretion in the matter of condoning delay should not be exercised in favour of the petitioner. We cannot accept this argument. In our opinion the petitioner is not guilty of suppressing any material facts required for the proper exercise of our discretion. No doubt some of the facts were disclosed not in the main petition, but by way of supplementary affidavit but the respondent has not been prejudiced in any way thereby, as he was given sufficient opportunity to controvert the facts disclosed in the supplementary affidavit. 37. The learned Counsel for the respondent cited numerous decisions of other High Courts to convince us that having regard to the facts and circum stances of the instant case the delay should not be condoned. No useful purpose will be served in discussing them. All of them are distinguishable on facts. Moreover we are not inclined to deviate from the course consistently followed by the different benches of our High court in the matter of granting relief under section 5 of the Limitation Act. In the result the application is allowed, and the delay of 27 days is condoned. Let the application be registered if otherwise in form and be proceeded with according to law. In the special circumstances of the case there will be no order for costs.