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1967 DIGILAW 298 (ALL)

Arjun Deo v. Kishori Lal Mehta

1967-08-23

J.N.TAKRU

body1967
JUDGMENT J.N. Takru, J. - This is a petition by Raj Deo praying that this Court may be pleased to punish the opposite parties for committing contempt of this Court. 2. The brief facts, on which this petition is based, are these. The petitioner filed a second appeal in this Court against the concurrent judgments and k decrees of the Courts below ordering his ejectment from the premises in dispute. This appeal was filed against Sri Kishori Lal Mehta, opposite party No. 1. The appeal was admitted under Order 41, Rule 11, C, P.C. on the 15th September, 1966 and an ad intrim order was passed therein the same day, staying the execution of the decree for the appellants ejectment on certain conditions. Shortly thereafter the clerk of the learned counsel who filed the appeal sent a telegram to the petitioner at Hardwar informing him about the admission of his appeal and of the stay order passed therein. The petitioner had, however, left Hardawar for Allahabad before the receipt of that telegram there. When the petitioner reached Allahabad on the morning of the 16th September, 1966, he sent an express telegram at 10-15 A. M. to his wife Smt. Kishan Kumari informing her about the aforesaid stay order. When this telegram was taken for delivery to Smt. Kishan Kumari at about 1-50 oclock the same afternoon it was forcibly taken from the telegraph messenger by Sri Kishori Lal Mehta, opposite party No. 1, who lived on the ground floor of the premises, on the first floor of which the disputed premises were situate. Immediately thereafter opposite-party No. 1 brought the Amin and 15 or 20 men to the premises in question, and forcibly , got the belongings of the petitioner removed from there and thrown along with his wife and children on the road side pavement. According to the petitioner opposite party No. 1 indulged in the aforesaid high-handed acts with full knowledge of the order passed by this Court on the 15th September 1966, I and he had, therefore, rendered himself liable to punishment for committing contempt of this Court. 3. The petition was filed against two persons, namely Sri Kishori Lal Mehta, and the Amin of the Munsifs Court Saharanpur. On the 10th April, 1967 this Court issued notice to both the opposite-parties. 3. The petition was filed against two persons, namely Sri Kishori Lal Mehta, and the Amin of the Munsifs Court Saharanpur. On the 10th April, 1967 this Court issued notice to both the opposite-parties. For some reason or the other the second opposite-party could not be served, and the petitioner was in some hurry to have his petition decided, he sought t the permission of this Court on the 16th August, 1967 to delete his name from the array of opposite parties. The permission was granted the same day and thereafter opposite-party No. 1 alone remained as the alleged contemner. In response to the notice issued to him opposite-party No. 1 put in appearance and also filed a counter-if affidavit in which he catagorically denied knowledge of the receipt and contents of the telegram dated the 15th September, 1966. As for the telegram dated the 16th September, 1966, his case was that it was brought to him sometime in the afternoon. He took delivery of it and sent it through Jia Ram to Smt. Kishen Kumari, who was sitting outside with her children having been ejected from the disputed premises earlier in the forenoon through the Amin. The petitioner filed a rejoinder affidavit in which besides controverting the averments made by opposite-party No. 1 in his counter-affidavit and re-iterating the averments made by him in his earlier affidavit he further stated that opposite-party No. 1 was also aware of the stay order on the 15th of September 1966 as his wife a Smt. Kishan Kumari immediately on receipt of it had taken it to him for being read out and translated to her and opposite-party No. 1 after reading it informed her that it contained a message from her husband regarding bis safe arrival at Allahabad. It was further averred that the petitioners wife, children and belongings were ejected some time about 9 p.m. on the 16th September, 1966 and not in the forenoon. Thus the only matter falling for the determination is as to which of these conflicting versions can be said to have been established, bearing in mind the well-established rule that contempt proceedings, being quasi-criminal in their nature, the onus of establishing his case affirmatively lies on the petitioner. 4. Thus the only matter falling for the determination is as to which of these conflicting versions can be said to have been established, bearing in mind the well-established rule that contempt proceedings, being quasi-criminal in their nature, the onus of establishing his case affirmatively lies on the petitioner. 4. Now as stated above the case for the petitioner is that though opposite-party No. 1 had come to learn about the stay order on the night of the 15th of September, 1966 and again in the afternoon of the 16th of September, 1966, he paid no heed to it and wilfully flouted it at about 9 p.m. on the 16th of September, 1966. So far as opposite party No. ls knowledge of the stay order on the night of 15th of September, 1966 is concerned all that need be said is that it is not possible to accept the petitioners case in that regard, as the allegations on which it is founded, if correct, should have been stated in petition and the affidavit filed in support of it. The learned counsel for petitioner contended that the omission of the said allegations in the petition and its accompanying affidavit may have been due to the fact that Smt. Kishan Kumari being an illiterate woman might not have realised the importance of mentioning the facts connected with the first telegram to her husband. I am, however, unable to accept this contention for the obvious reason that even if Smt. Kishan Kumari forgot to mention about that telegram to her husband, the latter would not have failed to make enquiries about it from her. Besides it seems highly improbable that Smt. Kishan Kumari would have taken the telegram to opposite-party No. 1 for being read and translated to her, having regard to the strained relations which must have existed between them. I am therefore satisfied that the petitioner far from establishing his allegations regarding the first telegram cannot even be held to have succeeded in raising a reasonable doubt in their favour. His case in that regard must consequently be rejected. 5. In support of his case regarding the telegram dated the 16th of September, 1966 the petitioner examined Sri Raj Kumar Sharma, the telegraph messenger who went to deliver the telegram dated the 16th of September, 1966 to Smt. Kishan Kumari. His case in that regard must consequently be rejected. 5. In support of his case regarding the telegram dated the 16th of September, 1966 the petitioner examined Sri Raj Kumar Sharma, the telegraph messenger who went to deliver the telegram dated the 16th of September, 1966 to Smt. Kishan Kumari. The witness stated that when he went to deliver the said telegram to Smt. Kishan Kumari at 1-50 P.M. at her residence and called out to her, he heard a feminine voice coming from the first floor asking him to come up as she was cooking food. At that time opposite party No. 1 was sitting in his room and he asked him to give the telegram to him. The witness gave telegram to opposite party No. 1. The witness further stated that opposite party No. 1 opened the envelope, read the telegram and signed its receipt. When the witness was coming out he met Smt. Kishan Kumari who was known to him from before, and he told her, on her enquiring from him about the telegram, that it was with opposite party No. 1. On this evidence, particularly the part concerning the hearing of the feminine voice by the witness asking him to come upstairs the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the story set up by opposite party No. 1 that Smt. Kishan Kumari had been ejected before the receipt of the said telegram was a patent lie. This contention is certainly of considerable force provided the evidence of this witness regarding the hearing of the feminine voice from upstairs can be believed. It is true that there is nothing in the evidence of this witness to show that he had any reason for taking sides in this matter. However, from the case set up by the petitioner himself, and its attendant circumstances and probabilities, I am satisfied that the testimony of this witness in this regard cannot be implicitly relied upon. It is true that there is nothing in the evidence of this witness to show that he had any reason for taking sides in this matter. However, from the case set up by the petitioner himself, and its attendant circumstances and probabilities, I am satisfied that the testimony of this witness in this regard cannot be implicitly relied upon. To begin with if the statement of this witness that just as he was going away after delivering the telegram to opposite party No. 1 he met Smt. Kishan Kumari whom he knew from before and that on her asking him where the telegram was he replied that he had given it to the opposite party No. 1 is to be believed then there is no explanation-nor was any offered by the learnad counsel for the petitioner-why Smt. Kishan Kumari would not take delivery of it from opposite party No. 1 right away, and get its contents disclosed to her by some independent person. It is impossible to believe that if opposite party No. 1 had not taken over possession of the premises in question before the receipt of the telegram Smt. Kishan Kumari would have remained indifferent to it, and, in any case, would not have demanded to know its contents when ..he was threatened with immediate ejectment at night time as alleged by her. I am therefore satisfied that tested on the touchstone of probabilities the case set up by the petitioner in his rejoinder affidavit is clearly an afterthought and the evidence of his witness suggesting that when he went to deliver the telegram to Smt. Kishan Kumari at 1.50 p.m. she was still in the house is not worthy of acceptance. There is thus no reliable evidence in support of the petitioners case, with the result that this petition is liable to fail. I accordingly dismiss this petition and discharge the notice issued to opposite party No. 1, but, in all the circumstances of the case, make no order as to costs.