JUDGMENT : The appellant had been charged under S. 302, Indian Penal Code and was found guilty by the Sessions Judge, Aijal, Mizo Hills, of the offence under S. 304, Indian Penal Code on the ground that although apparently he committed the offence of murder, as he must be deemed to have acted on the heat of the moment while temporarily deprived of self-control his acts fell within one of the exceptions to S. 300, Indian Penal Code and therefore the accused must be deemed to have committed the offence under S. 304. Accordingly the learned Sessions Judge sentenced him to two years rigorous imprisonment. Hence the appeal. 2. The prosecution case briefly is that on the night of the occurrence, that is 7-5-61, at about 8-30 P.M., there was a quarrel between the accused Abdul Halim and the two deceased persons Tajibur Rahman alias Taju Mia and Lalu Mia, in the course of which the accused is said to have stabbed the two deceased persons and caused their death. It is the case of the prosecution that as many as four persons, namely, Nripendra Kumar Deb (P. W. 16), N. Burman (P. W. 2), Laia (P. W. 10) and one Mizo girl, were inside the house of the accused playing cards. Some one knocked at the door from outside but the door was not opened. The persons who were outside and knocked at the door used abusive filthy language. Therefore P. W. 18 (Nripendra) opened the door and went away, and the two persons, the deceased Lalumia and Taju Mia, entered the house by force. 3. There is no direct evidence of the prosecution in this case, as none of the witnesses deposed that they were present at the scene where the deceased persons sustained injuries. The evidence is, therefore, purely circumstantial. This circumstantial evidence consists of the following: (1) that a statement was made by deceased Taju to Jalaluddin (P. W. 12) that the accused Abdul Halim caused him injuries; (2) that the accused told Nandiram Nath (P. W. 19) that he had hidden a dagger between the two cook-sheds near the Thana and that he had kept a stone over it and requested the witness to throw the dagger away; and (3) that the accused had some stains of what looked like blood on his clothes. 4. 4. The question that has to be determined is whether this circumstantial evidence sufficiently established the guilt of the accused in this case beyond reasonable doubt and that the circumstantial evidence satisfied the requirements of proof applicable to circumstantial evidence. It may be stated that when a case rests purely on a circumstantial evidence, the evidence must not only establish that a crime has been committed but it should also establish that it was the accused that in all probability has committed the crime and should also at the same time exclude the possibility of any other conclusion. Applying these tests I am not satisfied that the circumstantial evidence in this case can be said to have established the guilt of the accused. The dying statement said to have been made by deceased Taju to Jalaluddin is not corroborated. Jalaluddin (P. W. 12) himself when he made a report to the Havildar immediately thereafter did not mention to him that Taju Mia made the statement to him. Although a dying declaration can be taken as evidence and may in certain circumstances be accepted as the sole basis for conviction, normally some corroboration of the statement must be forthcoming from other evidence in the case. This is particularly necessary in relying on extra judicial confessions, and particularly when there is no evidence in the case corroborating the dying declaration attributed to the deceased, a conviction should not ordinarily be based on such uncorroborated statement. On a consideration of the facts of the case, I do not consider it safe to act upon this dying statement when the evidence supplied by Jalaluddin in regard thereto is not corroborated. As regards the evidence that the accused had told Nandiram Nath (P. W. 19) about his hidden dagger, that has been denied by the accused in his statement and there is no evidence corroborating the statement said to have been made by the accused. Even assuming that such a statement has been made, it does not connect the statement with the crime. Even assuming that such a statement has been made, it does not connect the statement with the crime. It would have been a different matter if the accused is said to have confessed to P. W. 19 that the dagger with which he killed the deceased was kept hidden in such a place while such a statement made to a Police Officer or in Police custody would have been inadmissible in evidence for any purpose other than to merely establish the recovery of the dagger it could be used as a confessional statement when made to persons other than the Police Officers as in this case. But there is no such confession attributed to the accused. As regards the other circumstance that some stains of what looked like blood were found on the dagger that was recovered and on the clothes of the accused, there is no proof that they contained human blood as these articles had not been sent to the Chemical Examiner and the opinion of the Serologist had not been obtained. There are many missing links in the evidence produced by the prosecution in this case and it cannot be said that it has been established beyond reasonable doubt that on that evidence the accused could be held to have committed the offence in question. 5. In the result, the case fails for want of proof. I would accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence and direct that the accused be set at liberty forthwith. Appeal allowed.