This is a second appeal against the order of Revenue Appellate Authority, Udaipur dated 19.3.64 upholding the order of the Assistant Collector, Udaipur dated 7.1.1961. As second appeal does not lie against the impugned order the second appeal was treated as revision as per order of Division Bench dated 1.4.64. The facts of the case in brief are that a suit for possession under the Rajasthan Procedure & Jurisdiction Act was decreed in favour of the non-applicant on 22.8.55 As there was question of title involved, an appeal was filed in the court of District Judge, which was also dismissed in default on 28th May, 1957. No appeal was preferred against the judgment of the District Judge dated 28 5-57 but a restoration application was made within time. This restoration application was dismissed on 12.10.57. An appeal was filed in the Rajasthan High Court which was dismissed on 9.8.60. The non-applicants decree holders filed first execution application on 23rd November, 1955 in the court of Sub-Divisional Officer, Girwa which was dismissed in default on 21st June, 1957. Second execution application No. 4/60 was presented on 12th October, 1960. The first application bad been stayed by the District Judge but the said order was operative only till the dismissal of the restoration application on 28 5-57. The period of limitation started on 28.5.57 and an execution application should have been made by 28th May, 1960. This objection on limitation to the execution application was taken in both the courts below but was over-ruled on the ground that all the time taken up to the dismissal of appeal in the High Court should not be counted towards period of limitation and the period should run from 9.8.60. Aggrieved by this order the present revision has come before me. I have heard counsel for the parties and perused the record. Counsel for the applicants has urged that the lower court has gone wrong in not appreciating that there was no appeal from the order of the District Judge dated 28.5.57. The appeal was against the restoration application and, therefore, the time taken in the pursuit of this application should not count towards computing the period of limitation. The counsel for the non-applicants has stated that it will have to be determined whether a subsequent application dated 12.10.60 was a second application, or a continuation of the same which was dismissed on 21.6.57. The counsel for the non-applicants has stated that it will have to be determined whether a subsequent application dated 12.10.60 was a second application, or a continuation of the same which was dismissed on 21.6.57. He further stated that the order dated 21.6.57 whereunder the first application was dismissed in default cannot be said to be a final order as in the last seven or eight hearings the proce-edings were being adjourned for non-receipt of order in appeal and the decree holder had nothing to do on the date of the hearing. He also contested the legal proposition urged by the learned counsel for the applicants that the period of limitation should run from 28.5.57 and not from 8.10.60 on which the final order was passed by the High Court. I have again carefully considered the whole question. The learned counsel for the non-applicants drew my attention to Chitaleys Commentary note 143 to Art. 182 of the Indian Limitation Act wherein it has been stated that an execution application must be deemed to be pending so long as no final order disposing it of judicially has been passed thereon. A subsequent application in such a case for execution will be deemed to be one merely for the continuation of the original proceeding. On the other hand, where a final judicial order terminating the proceeding has been passed on the application, it cannot be revived, and a subsequent application for execution will be regarded as a fresh application and not as one for a revival or continuation of the original proceedings. This observation is based on a number of authorities such as 1933 Madras Page 418, 1956 Madras 490, 1937 Allahabad page 513, 3 Calcutta L. R. 161. There can be no exception to this principle but the question for determination would be whether in this case a final order was passed on 21.6.57 when the first application was dismissed in default. No authority was cited to show that an order on execution application dismissing it in default is not a final order disposing it of judicially. To all intents and purposes such an order has to be deemed to be a final order. The contention of the learned counsel for the non-applicants that the court on 21.6.57 had nothing to do is also not borne out by the facts. To all intents and purposes such an order has to be deemed to be a final order. The contention of the learned counsel for the non-applicants that the court on 21.6.57 had nothing to do is also not borne out by the facts. As appeal against the decree passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer had been dismissed by the District Judge on 28.5.57 it cannot be construed that on 21.6.57 the executing court could not proceed further. With regard to the second point Art. 182 clause 2 of the old Limitation Act which is applicable in this case reads inter alia as under : for the execution of decree or order of any Civil Court not provided for by Article 183 or by sec. 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Three years; or where a certified copy of the decree or order has been 2 registered, six years. 1. The date of the decree or order, or2. where there has been an appeal the date of the final decree or order of the Appellate court, or the withdrawal of the appeal. The question for determination is whether the word appeal contained in Art. 182 would mean only an appeal against the decree or order which was subject matter of execution or would include also an appeal against any collateral order such as taken in restoration proceedings. On this question there had been difference of opinion in various High Courts. The Madras High Court in Nanduri Ramchandra Rao vs. Chintamanl and others (AIR 1939 Mad. p. 157) have held that the words "where there has been appeal used in Art. 182, cl. 2 applied to appeal from orders refusing to set aside ex-parte decree." The same view was taken in earlier case by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Nagendra Nath Dey vs. Suresh Chandra Dey (AIR 1932 P.C. p. 169). A contrary view however, was taken by the Allahabad High Court in Kr. Bahadur Singh vs. Shiv Shanker (1950 All. p. 327) wherein it was held that an appeal under Art. 183(2) means an appeal from the decree sought to be executed and no other appeal. A contrary view however, was taken by the Allahabad High Court in Kr. Bahadur Singh vs. Shiv Shanker (1950 All. p. 327) wherein it was held that an appeal under Art. 183(2) means an appeal from the decree sought to be executed and no other appeal. When an application to set aside an ex-parte decree is dismissed and an appeal preferred against the application so dismissed limitation for execution of ex-parte decree runs from the date of the ex-parte decree and not from the date of the dismissal of the application to set aside ex-parte decree. A similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in Bhawanipur Banking Corporation Ltd. vs. Gorishanker Sharma (1950 S.C. p. 6) where it was held that an appeal from the decree does not cover appeal from an order passed in a collateral proceeding or having no direct connection with the decree under execution. The Rajasthan High Court in Chandmal vs. Bhuramal (AIR 1951 Raj. 150) have followed the view of the Allahabad High Court as stated above and held that the word "Appeal referred to in Col. 3 of cl. 2 of Art. 182 does not include an appeal preferred against an order refusing to set aside an ex-parte decree but must be confined to an appeal only from an decree or order sought to be executed. Hence limitation for the execution of the ex-parte decree in such a case runs from the date of the ex-parte decree. In view of the aforesaid view of the Rajasthan High Court so far as this court is concerned the matter is finally set at rest. The learned courts below have, therefore, gone wrong in holding that the period of limitation in this case starts from 8.7.60 the date of dismissal of appeal by the High Court refusing to set aside the ex-parte decree. It obviously starts from the date of the ex-parte decree and hence the execution application was time barred. The learned courts below have committed a material irregularity in the exercise of their jurisdiction. I, therefore, for the reasons given above, accept this revision and set aside the order of the Revenue Appellate Authority, Udaipur dated 19.3.64 and order of the Trial Court dated 7.1.61.