This is an appeal filed by the plaintiff in Civil Suit No. 26 of 1955 on the file of the Sub-Judge of Tripura in Agartala against the judgment and decree dated 26-9-1958 dismissing with costs the suit filed by the appellant for declaration that the respondents are the appellant's licensees living in the plaint schedule old Thakur Boarding house, situate within the appellant's Uliayanta Palace Compound in Apartala and for recovery of possession of the same. (2) The case of the appellant is that his father late His Highness Bir Bikram Kishore Dev Barma Manikya Bahadur was the sole proprietor and the sovereign authority of the entire Tripura State. During his regime the respondents used to live in the Harem situate within the Uiiayanta Palace of the Maharaja in Agartala. Some boy students of Thakur families were living in the plaint schedule old Thakur Boarding, which is about 6 kanis in extent. The respondents 1 and 6 (who were the defendants 1 and 2) were living in the Royal Harem as members of the Royal family. In 1347 T. E. there was a sudden devastating fire in the Royal Harem, which destroyed the abodes of all respondents and rendered them homeless So the appellant's father late Bir Bikram Kishore Dev Barma Manikya Bahadur shift­ed the students from the Thakur Boarding house elsewhere and permitted the respon­dents 1 and 6 along with Maharai Kumar Aditya Kishore Dev Barma, Maharai Kumar Hernanta Kishore Dev Barma and other Maharai Kumars and members of the Royal family to live in the old Thakur Boarding house temporarily as his licensees. The late Maharai a took pity upon the Maharai Kumars including the first respondent and with a view to providing them with separate houses he selected plots of lands at different places outside the Palace Compound. He sanctioned suitable amounts of money to all the Maharai Kumars excepting the first res­pondent for the construction of houses on the plots. The late Maharaia's widow, Mata Maharani. sanctioned a sum of Rs. 8,000 for construction of a house for the first respon­dent. After the death of late Maharaia and during the period of Regency of Mata Maharani and shortly after the fire incident all the Maharai Kumars excepting the first respondent and late Maharai Kumar Ariun Kishore Dev Barma constructed separate houses on their respective plots with the money sanctioned to them. 8,000 for construction of a house for the first respon­dent. After the death of late Maharaia and during the period of Regency of Mata Maharani and shortly after the fire incident all the Maharai Kumars excepting the first respondent and late Maharai Kumar Ariun Kishore Dev Barma constructed separate houses on their respective plots with the money sanctioned to them. They shifted from the Thakur Boarding house with their family members to their respective houses. Late Maharaj Kumar Ar.iun Kishore Dev Barma died childless after his marriage in the Thakur Boarding house in or about 1944 or 1945 A. D. After his death, his widow also died. His mother had predeceased him in 1939. The seventh respondent (third defendant) was living in the Royal Harem until the death of the mother of late Maharaj Kumar Arjun Kishore Dev Barma. After her death, she left the Royal Harem on her own will and began to live in the Thakur Boarding house as a licensee and with the permission of late Maharaja looking after late Maharai Kumar Arjun Kishore Dev Barma. (3) The appellant further averred in his plaint that in spite of the selection of a plot of land and sanction of Rs. 8,000 by the Regent Maharani, the first respondent did not construct any house and continued to live in the old Thakur Boarding house, though he took possession of the plot of land and sold away a portion of it. The ap­pellant's father late Maharaja died in May, 1947, A. D. According to the traditional custom of the Tripura Royal family, the appellant became the sole heir of his father and the sole sovereign authority of the entire Tripura State. But, as he was a minor, his mother Sri Srimati Maharani Kanchan Prava Devi took up the administration of Tripure State as Regent and began to administer it. In the month of August. 1947 A D. India was partitioned and two separate indepen­dent Dominious namely, India and Pakistan were formed. On 15-10-1949, A. D Tripura State was merged with the Dominion of India. Prior to the merger the Central Gov­ernment of India and Regent Mata Maharani entered into an Agreement on 1-9-1949. A. D. According to the Agreement, all the buildings, homestead lands "dighis" etc. On 15-10-1949, A. D Tripura State was merged with the Dominion of India. Prior to the merger the Central Gov­ernment of India and Regent Mata Maharani entered into an Agreement on 1-9-1949. A. D. According to the Agreement, all the buildings, homestead lands "dighis" etc. situate within the boundary compound wall of Ujjyanta Palace in Agartala were settled along with the other immovable properties as the private properties of the appellant Thus, he become their absolute owner It became necessary for the appellant to take possession of the old Thakur Boarding house The appellant's mother served a written notice upon the respondents 1, 6 and 7 (defendants 1. 2 and 3) requesting them to vacate the Thakur Boarding house In reply, the first respondent on his behalf and on behalf of the respondents 6 and 7 intimat­ed Lt. Col Kumar B. B. Dev Barma. an employee of Maharani, by a letter dated 4-8-1950, A D. that the respondents 1. 6 and 7 were ready to vacate the building as soon as arrangement was made for the ac­commodation of the first respondent by con­structing a house for him on the selected plot. They requested her to permit them to live in the old Thakur Boarding house for some time. The appellant agreed to their prayer and refrained from taking any action to eject the respondents But, the respon­dents did not vacate the building though they were served with repeated notices. Finally, the appellant issued a registered notices on 19-1-1955 through his lawyer. The respondents refused to lake "hem (4) The appellant finally averred in his plaint that the respondents 6 and 7 (defen­dants 2 and 3) are entitled, according to the traditional custom of the Royal family, to live in the Royal Harem until their death under the care of the appellant, as they are female members of the Royal Harem and that the appellant was and is still will­ing to accommodate them in the Royal Harem. (5) So, the appellant filed the suit valu­ing the same for the purpose of jurisdiction at Rs. 50,000 and paying Court-fee of eight annas for declaration that the respondents are his licensees and for recovery of posses­sion of the plaint schedule old Thakur Boarding house. (6) The first respondent filed written statement contending that he was not served with any valid notice, that the valuation of the suit as Rs. 50,000 and paying Court-fee of eight annas for declaration that the respondents are his licensees and for recovery of posses­sion of the plaint schedule old Thakur Boarding house. (6) The first respondent filed written statement contending that he was not served with any valid notice, that the valuation of the suit as Rs. 50,000 was highly inflated, that the building does not cost so much amount, that the suit is bad for non-joinder of his mother as a party, that it is also bad for multifariousness and that the Court-fee paid is not correct. He further alleged in his written statement that the suit building was outside the Palace Compound when the boy students of Thakur families resided in it and that it was called as Thakur Boarding house because of the resident of Thakur family boys. It is his case that after the fire incident in the Royal Palace, the late Maha­raja made arrangements for the accommoda­tion of the Maharaj Kumars, his Kachua wives and other members of the Royal family according to his bounden duty and according to the customs of the Royal family and made them live in the Thakur Boarding house after getting the same included within the Palace Compound. It is also his case that as there was want of accommodation in the Thakur Boarding house and as each Maharaj Kumar was entitled to get a separate place for dwelling, the late Maharaja made arrangements for their separate houses and sanc­tioned money for the same and that those Maharaj Kumars, who were willing to leave the house vacated the rooms occupied by them in the Thakur Boarding house The first respondent further alleged in his written statement that he was suffering from rheum­atism, that late Maharaja sanctioned to him a sum of Rs. 12,000. but that he did not receive it that he took on settlement with his own money of a certain plot of land in Agartala town from the Government of India on paving proper nazarana and that he sold away a portion of it for want of money It is not correct to state that the late Maharaja allotted the said plot of land to the first respondent The Maharaja in his bounden duty was maintaining the Maharai Kimian and it is the duty of the Raj State to arrange for the accommodation of the Mahnraj Kumars and their family members. The first respondent further pleaded in his written statement that being indifferent to the traditions and the previous glory of the Royal family, the appellant filed the suit to deprive the respondents of their houses and to make money by selling away the same, as the price of land in Agartala town rose up on account of influx of refugees from East Pakistan. (7) The sixth respondent (second defen­dant) filed separate written statement plead­ing that she is the Kachua widow of late Maharaja Birendra Kishore Dev Barma Manikya Bahadur, that the Kachua Ranis, as members of the Royal family, are entitled to live inside the Royal Harem, that they are entitled to be maintained by the Raj State and that they were also getting month­ly allowances. Sons born of them are ad­dressed and known as Maharaj Kumars They are also entitled to become Maharajas Her specific case is that, when she was liv­ing in the Royal Harem, she informed the late Maharaja about 18 years prior to the suit and some time after the fire incident, that she was feeling inconvenient to live in the Royal Harem and requested him to make auangement for her future comforts as she had no children, that the late Maharaja gave her three separate and specified rooms; an adjacent verandah and a portion of small land lying in the north eastern portion of the Thakur Boarding house in lieu of her room in the Royal Harem and permitted her to live therein according to her will, that she is not a licensee and that she is not liable to be ejected. The other allegations made by her in her written statement are the same as those made by the first respon­dent-defendant in his written statement. The other allegations made by her in her written statement are the same as those made by the first respon­dent-defendant in his written statement. (8) The seventh respondent (third defendant) alleged in her written statement that from long before the fire incident she had been living in a portion to the west of the Royal Harem along with some Raj Kumars, .that the mother of Maharaj Kumar Arjun Kishore Dev Barma died in his infancy, that the 7th respondent brought him up like her son, that after the fire incident the late Maharaja brought the property within the boundary of Royal Harem, that he selected different plots of lands in the town of Agartala in lieu of the houses which were occupied by the Maharaj Kumars, that ac­cordingly Thakur Boarding house was select­ed as the place of the respondents 1 and 6 and also as the place of respondent 7 along with Arjun Kishore and that thus she had been living in the Thakur Boarding House since 1347 T. E. permanently as its owner It is also her case that Arjun Kishore Dev Barma executed a will on 3-2-1942 A. D in her favour bequeathing all his proper­ties, moveable and immovable, to her, that the obtained Letters of Administration on 25-8-1357 T. E. from the Original Side of the High Court of Tripura and that she is not liable to be evicted from the suit property. The other allegations in her written statement are substantially the same as those in the written statements filed by the respon­dents 1 and 6 (defendants 1 and 2). (9) The appellant filed a petition on 21-1-1958 for the amendant of the bounda­ries of the plaint schedule building on the ground that the "Settlement Khatian" of all the lands in Agartala was made and publish­ed in 1347 T. E., but that the settlement Dag Nos. were not mentioned in the plaint schedule and that, therefore, the description of the boundaries should be amended with reference to the names of the adjoining owners of the land. The amendment was allowed. (10) The Sub-Judge framed a number of issues. However, he did not consider the issues relating to non-joinder of parties, multifariousness and the description of the boundaries of the amended schedule on the ground that the issues were not pressed by both the sides. The amendment was allowed. (10) The Sub-Judge framed a number of issues. However, he did not consider the issues relating to non-joinder of parties, multifariousness and the description of the boundaries of the amended schedule on the ground that the issues were not pressed by both the sides. On the other issues he held that the plaint as framed by the appellant treating the respondents 1, 6 and 7 as lice­nsees is maintainable, that the suit is not barred by the principles of estoppel, acquie­scence and waiver, that the Court-fee paid is adequate and that no notice was neces­sary, as the respondents were licensees of the appellant. He further held that the ap­pellant is the owner of all the properties including the suit building with Ujjayanta Palace Compound, but that they are not liable to be evicted until they are provided with suitable house sites and reasonable amounts for building their houses thereon So, he dismissed the suit with costs. (11) The plaintiff filed the present ap­peal being aggrieved with the judgment and decree of the Sub-Judge. During the pen­dency of the appeal, the third defendant died issueless and her name was wrongly deleted. Her name is noted in the Cause title of this Judgment as that of the deceased Seventh respondent. Subsequently, the first respon­dent also died. So his legal representatives were added as the respondents 2 to 5. In this judgment the parties are referred to, as arranged above. The points which were argued and which arise for determination are: (i) Whether the respondents 1, 6 and 7 were licensees in respect of the suit build­ing as contended by the appellant. (ii) Whether the customary right of re­sidence pleaded by the respondents is true, valid and binding on the appellant. (iii) Whether, in any event, the first res­pondent was provided with a suitable separate building and whether the respon­dents 2 to 5 are liable to be evicted from the suit building. (iv) Whether the sixth respondent (second defendant) should shift back to the Royal Harem, as pleaded by the appellant. (v) Whether the suit is bad for multi­fariousness. (vi) Whether the Court-fee paid in (12) POINTS (i) to (iv): These points are connected and are, therefore, considered to­gether. Late H. H. Maharaja Radha Kishore Dev Barma Manikya Bahadur was the father of late H. H. Maharaja Birendra Kishore Dev Barma Manikya Bahadur. (v) Whether the suit is bad for multi­fariousness. (vi) Whether the Court-fee paid in (12) POINTS (i) to (iv): These points are connected and are, therefore, considered to­gether. Late H. H. Maharaja Radha Kishore Dev Barma Manikya Bahadur was the father of late H. H. Maharaja Birendra Kishore Dev Barma Manikya Bahadur. The latter was the father of late H. H Bir Bikram Kishore Dev Barma Manikya Bahadur. The appellant is his son. The sixth respondent (second defendant) and the seventh respon­dent (third defendant) namely, Shrimati Surjya Mani Devi and Shrimati Lila Prava Devi alias Lilabati Devi are the Kachua widow Ranis of late H. H. Maharaja Bir­endra Kishore Dey Barma Manikya Bahadur The first respondent (first defendant) Maharaj Kumar Shri Giridhari Kishore Dev Barma Bahadur was a son of late Maharaja Birendra Kishore Dev Barma Manikya Bahadur by another wife D. Ws. 1, 2 and 3 (Maharai Kumar Aditva Kishore Dev Barma, Maharaj Kumar Hemanta Kishore Dev Barma and Maharaj Kumar Mohan Kishore Dev Barma) are the sons of late H. H. Maharaja Birendra Kishore Dev Barma Manikya Bahadur and are Maharai Kumars. As such they are all members of the Royal family. (13) According to the appellant, the first respondent (first defendant) and the sixth respondent ( second defendant) were living in the Royal Antapuram (Harem) and were shifted to the suit building called old Thakur Boarding house in or about 1347 T. E. by the appellant's father after the Royal Harem was gutted by fire. Also, according to the appellant, D Ws. 1, 2 and 3 and other Maharaj Kumars of the Royal family were also shifted to the suit building as licensees by the late Maharaja, the father of the ap­pellant. With regard to the circumstances under which the seventh respondent (third defendant) shifted to it, his case is different, though, according to him she was also a licensee. It is that one Maharaj Kumar Arjun Kishore Dev Barma, son of late H.H, Maharaja Birendra Kishore Dev Barma Manikya Bahadur was living with his mother. But, the mother died during the infancy of Maharaj Kumar Arjun Kishore Dev Barma and the seventh respondent left the Royal Harem out of her own will and began to live with Arjun Kishore looking after him in the suit building as a licensee. But, the mother died during the infancy of Maharaj Kumar Arjun Kishore Dev Barma and the seventh respondent left the Royal Harem out of her own will and began to live with Arjun Kishore looking after him in the suit building as a licensee. But, to prove his case the appellant did not examine himself: nor did he examine his mother There might be some excuse for the non-examination of the appellant, because he was a minor when the respondents oc­cupied the suit building But his mother, who was his Regent, should have been ex­amined. However, she was not examined. The appellant examined five witnesses namely, Manindra Mohan Dhar, Nagendra Chandra Dev Barma, Bankim Behari Dev Barma, Amulya Ratan Deb and Paresh Chandra Bhadra as P. Ws 1 to 5. P. W. 1 (Manindra Mohan Dhar) worked as clerk in the Sadar Collectorate. He was examined to prove Exts. 3 to 6 relating to the Re­cord of Taskshisi Taluk Bandabasta case 37 of 1950 in the office of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Sadar and the petition filed by the first respondent and the orders passed there­on for the allotment of the site and for the construction of a house thereon for the bene­fit of the 1st respondent P. W. 2 (Nagendra Chandra Dev Barma) is working as the personal staff of the Maha­raja. He was examined to prove that the respondents 6 and 7 (defendants 2 and 3) submitted an application Ext. 7 dated 1-9-1958 A. D. to the Regent Maharani agreeing to vacate the suit building and asking her to give them a plot of land, adjacent to the old Thakur Boarding house, for rent and that the first respondent (first defendant) submitted an application Ext. 8 to P. W. 3 (B. B. Dev Barma) agreeing to vacate the suit premises after the Regent Maharani built a house for him on the site allotted to him by her husband. He proved th» signatures of the first respondent on Exts. 3 and 7 to 9. His evidence is that the res­pondents 6 and 7 called him when he was going to the office and handed over Ext. 7 to him and that under the orders of the Maharani Raimata he gave the petition to Janesh Babu in the office. He proved th» signatures of the first respondent on Exts. 3 and 7 to 9. His evidence is that the res­pondents 6 and 7 called him when he was going to the office and handed over Ext. 7 to him and that under the orders of the Maharani Raimata he gave the petition to Janesh Babu in the office. P. W. 3 (Bankim Behari Dev Barma) was working as Assistant Military Secretary during the time of the appellant's father late H. H. Maharaja Bir Bikram Kishort Dev Barma Manikya Bahadur. He was ex-mined to show that D. Ws. 1, 2 and 3 Maharaj Kumars constructed houses and shifted to them that the first respondent obtained a plot of land and that the first respondent wrote Ext. 9 dated 1-9-1958, a letter in reply to the letter of P. W. 3. He also deposed that the first respondent wrote Ex. 8 to him agreeing to vacate the suit building and requesting the Rajmata to make arrangement for his permanent resi­dence on the land allotted to him. He further stated that when the Raj Antapur was gutted the late Maharaja (father of the appellant) asked the respondents to live in the Thakur Boarding house. P W. 4 (Amulya Ratan Dev) is a Postal Peon who was ex­amined to prove the refused registered notices as per Exts. 10, 10 (a), 11, 11 (a), 12 and 12 (a). P W 5 (Paresh Chandra Bhadra) was working as Tehasildar in the Taluka of Maharaja and Maharani He proved Exts. 13 and 14, documents to show the boundaries of the disputed building. He was also ex­amined to prove the signatures of the first respondent on Exts 3 and 8. 10, 10 (a), 11, 11 (a), 12 and 12 (a). P W 5 (Paresh Chandra Bhadra) was working as Tehasildar in the Taluka of Maharaja and Maharani He proved Exts. 13 and 14, documents to show the boundaries of the disputed building. He was also ex­amined to prove the signatures of the first respondent on Exts 3 and 8. But, he ad­mitted that he was not present when the late Maharaja permitted the respondents 1, 6 and 7 to occupy the suit building He stated in the cross-examination that he was aware of the "title" of the Maharaj Kumars and the Ranis, on the strength of which they are residing in the Palace Compound Thus, except P. W. 3 (Bankim Behari Dev Barma) others have no personal knowledge as to The circumstance under which the respon­dents 1, 6 and 7 came to occupy the suit building (14) The respondent No. 1 admits hay-mg occupied a portion of the building in question after the fire incident took place and after he was shifted therefrom by the appellant's father to the suit building. The sixth respondent's case is that, as she re­quested the appellant's father to accommodate her in the suit building on account of cer­tain inconveniences felt by her in the Royal Harem, the appellant's father permitted her to occupy a portion of the suit building. Ac­cording to the seventh respondent (third defendant) and also even according to the appellant, she came to reside in a portion of the suit building to look after late Maha­raj Kumar Ari'un Kishore as his mother died in his infancy. As such, the circumstances under which they occupied the suit building differ. But, their common case is that there is a custom in the Royal family that the ruling Maharaja is bound to provide for the residence and the maintenance of the Maharaj Kumars and the Kachua Ranis as well as the other members of the Royal family and that, according to the same custom, un­less suitable accommodation is given to them elsewhere, the respondents 1, 6 and 7 were not bound to vacate the suit building. The witnesses, who were examined to speak to this custom are D. Ws. The witnesses, who were examined to speak to this custom are D. Ws. 1 to 3 (Maharaj Kumars Aditya Kishore Dev Barma, Hemanta Kishore Dev Barma and Mohan Kishore Dev Barma) and the respondents 1, 6 and 7, who were not separately numbered as witnesses Their evidence has to be scrutinised to find whether such a custom it made out or not D. W. 1 (Maharaj Kumar Aditya Kishore Dev Barma) deposed that after the fire ac­cident took place in the Royal Harem, he and D. Ws. 2 and 3 (Maharai Kumar Hemanta Kishore Dev Barma and Maharai Kumar Mohan Kishore Dev Barmal and Maharaj Kumar Arjuri Kishore Dev Barma were given the suit building for their residence permanently, that, later on, they were given separate new houses as there was want of accommodation in the suit building and that, therefore, D. Ws. 1, 2 and 3 (Maharaj Kumars') shifted to them from the suit build­ing. It Is also his evidence that the first respondent Giridhari Karta occupied the rooms, which were previously occupied by D. W. 1 and D. W. 2 (Maharaj Kumar Hemanta Kishore Dev Barma) and that the seventh respondent Rani Lilabati Devi also shifted to the same building along with Maharaj Kumar Arjun Kishore His evi­dence shows that the children born to Kachua Ranis have a right to become Mararaias He deposed that, the sixth respondent (Rani Suriva Man! Devi) was residing in the Royal Harem and that after she requested the late Maharaja to provide for her residence in the suit building due to inconvenience in the Harem, she was given some rooms, in the suit building. But in the cross-examination, he stated that he did not remember under what right the suit house was given to him and others by the late Maharaja. D. W. 2 (Maharaj Kumar Hemanta Kishore Dev Barma) corroborated the evi­dence of D. W. 1 and added that it was the duty of the Maharaja to give the Maharaj Kumars and the Kachua Ranis permanent accommodation and that in performance of that duty he gave them the suit house for their residence. He added that, as the late Maharaja got a house constructed for him elsewhere and as he felt inconvenient to reside in the same building, he vacated it. He added that, as the late Maharaja got a house constructed for him elsewhere and as he felt inconvenient to reside in the same building, he vacated it. But, even in the chief examination he stated that the appellant can evict the respondents, if he arranges for their accommodation else­where according to the status of the Royal family. He stated in his cross-examination that the late Maharaja, father of the appel­lant, gave him a plot of site and money for construction of a house, that he also gave similar plots and money to D Ws. 1 and 3 (Maharai Kumar Aditya Kishore Dev Barma and Maharai Kumar Mohan Kishore Dev Barma) for construction of houses and that they are living in the new houses. He ad­mitted that he was not present when the late Maharaja ordered the first respondent to live "permanently" in the suit house, as alleged by the first respondent He deposed that there is a custom in the Royal family that the Maharaja should provide for ac­commodation of the members of the Royal family, that his predecessors also were given similar houses and that, therefore, D. W. 2 stated that it was the bounden duty of the Maharaja to provide accommodation to the member? of the Royal family According to him. after such accomodation was made, D. Ws. 1. 2 and 3 (Maharai Kumars) shifted to the new houses. He further deposed that though he could not state under what right the respondents possessed the suit house, they have got a right to reside therein as members of the Royal family The evidence of D. W. 3 (Maharaj Kumar Mohan Kishore Dev Barma) is also to the same effect. He deposed that with­out making suitable arrangement for the ac­commodation of the respondents, the appel­lant could not evict them from the suit building. He furthe' stated that, on account of the fact that, after the incident of fire took place, the Maharai Kumars were given houses, and that some of them were accom­modated in the Govt houses and Government Quarters. He inferred that the appellant it responsible for the accommodation of the members of the Royal family Thus the evi­dence of the Maharai Kumars D. Ws. He inferred that the appellant it responsible for the accommodation of the members of the Royal family Thus the evi­dence of the Maharai Kumars D. Ws. 1, t and 3 shows that they vacated the suit build­ing, which they occupied after the Harem was gutted, only after separate building were built for them and that there is a custom in the Royal family under which the Maharajah of the State is bound to provide for the residence of its members. (15) The first respondent (first defen­dant) also gave evidence to the effect that he is entitled to the suit house until suit­able accommodation is made for him else­where. But, when he was confronted with Ext. 8, letter dated 4-8-1950, addressed to P. W. 3 (B. B. Dev Barma) in which he admitted that he would shift from the suit house whenever permanent arrangement for his residence was made elsewhere, he de­posed that he did not remember whether he wrote any such letter. In the cross-ex­amination also he stated that he did not remember whether he addressed any such letter. He did not deny having signed it. A comparison of his signature on Ext. 8 with his signatures in the written statements goes to show that they are all identical. There is no doubt that he wrote the letter offering to vacate the suit building, if he was provided with accommodation else­where. The sixth respondent Rani Surjya Mani Devi stated that, as she was feeling inconvenient in the Harem, she requested the appellant's father, late H H Bir Bikram Kishore Manikya Bahadur, to provide for her residence in the suit building and that, therefore, he permitted her to live in the suit house permanently. Her evidence also shows that she improved her quarters and also got constructed some additional rooms. But, when she was confronted with Ext, 7, letter dated 9-6-1359 T. E. proved by P. W 2 (Nagendra Chandra Dev Barma) wherein she offered to vacate the suit building and re­quested the appellant's mother to allot her a site near the suit building on rent, she deposed that she could not state definitely whether Ext. 7 bears her signature or not. 7 bears her signature or not. Similarly, though the seventh respon­dent (third defendant) stated that the ap­pellant's father gave her the rooms occupied by her in the suit building for residence per­manently after she shifted to look after late Mahara.i Kumar Arjun Kishore, she too stated that she did not remember whether she signed Ext. 7 or not offering to vacate the suit building if she was given some other site on rent But she again stated that the signature therein might be hers and that did not, however remember She did not men­tion in Ext. 1-A her petition for letters of Administration (Certificate case No 3/1357 T. E.) on the basis of a will executed by late Arjun Kishore, that the portion of the suit building occupied by him was his and that she Rot it under the will. Thus, the evi­dence of the respondents 6 and 7 regarding Ext. 7 is vague P. W 2 (Nagendra Chandra Dev Barma) at first stated that they signed it in his presence. Later on, he deposed that he did not know who wrote it and then came out with a story that he was not present when it was written. So, the circumstances under which it was said to have been got written by the respondents 6 and 7 old Ranis are suspicious. Ext 7 no doubt contain an offer by the respondents 6 and 7 to pay rent for the residence to be provided by the appellant's mother and improbabilises the theory of custom set up by the respon­dents. But one fact is clear that they insist­ed upon some provision to be made for their residence elsewhere, if they were to vacate the suit building. Similarly, the first res­pondent also insisted in Ext 8 (hat a house should be got built by the appellant's mother on the plot allotted to him So, the offer in Ext 7 to pay rent ran be disregarded (16) The respondents being members of the Royal family are thus entitled to claim under the above customary right that the appellant should make suitable provision for their residence elsewhere They are said to be getting monthly allowances towards their maintenance and this also probabilises the existence of a customary right of residence. The contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant is that the custom set up by the respondents has not been proved to be an ancient one. He relied on Mt Subhani v. Nawab. AIR 1941 PC 21, where it was held that, though the English rule that a custom, in order that it may be legal and binding must have been used "so long that the memory of man runneth not to the con­trary" cannot be applied to Indian condi­tions, still it must be ancient But it was further laid down that it depends upon the circumstances of each case as to what anti­quity must be established before the custom can be accepted In Dattaiirao Bahiroiirao v. Vijayasinhrao ( AIR 1960 SC 1272 ) it was held that the party must allege and prove the custom on which he relies. In this case, the evidence of the Maharai Kumars D Ws. 1, 2, 3 and that of the respondents 1 6 and 7 goes to show that the appellant's father provided separate buildings for D. Ws. 1 to o as they are Maharai Kumars. No doubt, there is n evidence to show that such build­ings were constructed even in ancient times. But, one fails to see why the appellant's father should have got separate building constructed for D. Ws. 1 to 3. After all they were all his step-brothers. As rightly urged by the learned Counsel for the respondents, the appellant's father must have thought that he was bound by the traditions and customs of the Royal family to provide far separate residence of Maharai Kumars It is an admitted fact, on behalf of the ap­pellant, that a site was allotted by his father for the first respondent also and that the appellant's mother the Regent Maharani also provided funds for the construction of a house. It is again to be noted that the ap­pellant himself admits in paragraph 13 of his plaint that there is a traditional custom of the Royal family under which the Ranit will have to be provided for their residence in the Royal Harem and that he is willing to accommodate the respondents 6 and 7 in the Royal Harem. Thus, the appellant admits the existence of a custom at least with regard to the Ranis of the Royal family, though they are Kachua Ranis. The evidence of D. Ws. Thus, the appellant admits the existence of a custom at least with regard to the Ranis of the Royal family, though they are Kachua Ranis. The evidence of D. Ws. 1, 2, 3 (Maharaj Kumar Aditya Kishore Dev Barma, Maha­raj Kumar Hemanta Kishore Dev Barma and Maharaj Kumar Mohan Kishore Dev Barma) and the respondents 1. 6 and 7 shows that the sons of the Kachua Ranis are en­titled to the privilege of being called as Maharai Kumars and that they are also en­titled to become Maharajas. The evidence of the sixth respondent Rani Surjya Mani Devi is that late H. H. Maharaja Bir Chandra Manikya Bahadur, late H. H. Maharaja Radha Kishore Manikya Bahadur and late H. H. Maharaja Birendra Kishore Mauikya Bahadur were all sons of Kachua Ranis and that all of them became Maharajas. As such, it appears to be improbable that when the Kachua Ranis are entitled admittedly to a right of residence in the Royal Harem. their sons, who are Maharaj Kumars, could be left in the street without any accommoda­tion. So, the custom set up by the respon­dents that the Maharaj Kumars and thf Kachua Ranis are entitled to a right of suit­able residence either in Palace Compound or elsewhere in buildings to be provided bv the appellant appears to be true, (17) The next contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant is that the State is impartible and that nobody can have any manner of right as against the appellant's property He relied on a case relating to the same Tripura State namely. Neelkisto Deb Burmono v. Beerchunder Thakoor (1867-68) 12 Moo Ind App 523 (PC). Then Lordships of the Privy Council held that the succession to the Tripura State was gov­erned by the "Kulachar" or family custom and that according to it, the Maharaja could name the "Jobraj" and "Burra Thakoor". of whom the first would succeed to the throne and the latter to the office of "Jobraj". It was also held that "the title to the throne and the Royal lands was one and the same, that survivorship could not obtain in such a possession from its very nature and that claims to the estate in lands and to rights in others over it. It was also held that "the title to the throne and the Royal lands was one and the same, that survivorship could not obtain in such a possession from its very nature and that claims to the estate in lands and to rights in others over it. as to maintenance, for ex­ample, were distinct and inconsistent claims" Their Lordships also held that as there could be no such survivorship title by sur­vivorship, where it varied from the ordinary title by heirship, could not. in the absence of custom, furnish the rule to ascertain the heir to a property which was solely owned and enjoyed and which passed by inheri­tance to a sole heir It was also the conten­tion of the learned Counsel for the appellant that before the merger of Tripura State with the Union of India, the appellant'? mother, as Regent Maharani, during the minority of the appellant, and the Central Government entered into an Agreement as per Ext. 17 dated 9-9-1949 and that under Art. Ill, the appellant became full owner of fell the properties including the suit building situate within the Ujjayanta Palace Com­pound. I had occasion to refer to this Agree­ment in Pancha Sri jut Maharaj Kirit Bikram Kishore Dev Barma v. Rani Ujjwala Devi, (First Appeal 13 of 1958, D/- 8-2-1967 (Tri.) on the file of this Court), wherein I dealt with the subject regarding Act of State and the construction of the Agreement exhaus­tively. Vide paragraphs 30, 31. 32 and 33 of my judgment in that case. It is needless to discuss once again the same questions and the decisions having bearing on this sub­ject. There is no doubt that the appellant is- the owner of the suit building by virtue of the Agreement Though the respondents 1. 6 and 7 pleaded that there was a com­pound wall for the Harem only, they ad­mitted that the appellant's father built a compound wall including the suit building also within Ujjayanta Palace Compound. Though the respondents set up their own title to the suit building, the custom alleged and proved by them is that they are liable to be evicted from the suit building, provid­ed they are given alternative accommoda­tion suitable to their status and life and con­sistent with the fact that they are the mem­bers of the Royal family. Though the respondents set up their own title to the suit building, the custom alleged and proved by them is that they are liable to be evicted from the suit building, provid­ed they are given alternative accommoda­tion suitable to their status and life and con­sistent with the fact that they are the mem­bers of the Royal family. None of them took any steps to have his or her own title to the suit property declared by the Union of India. So, even if they have any title to the same, their title must be deemed to have/ been extinguished under Ext. 17. Agreement entered into by the two high contracting parties, namely, the Sovereign ruler of Tripura State and the Union of India. But. the Question of title of the appellant to the suit building does not solve the present dispute in view of the customary obligation on him to provide for residence of the Royal family members. The above decision of the Privy Council does not support the contention of the appellant's learned Counsel that there cannot be any customary right of residence against an impartible estate holder. On the other hand, such a right can be upheld, if there is proof of any such customary right Vide Mulla's Hindu Law, Page 569, 13th edi­tion. So even though the appellant is the full owner of the suit building, still there is customary obligation on him to provide for suitable accommodation of the respondents (18) The learned Counsel for the appel­lant then contended that the erstwhile kings of England could kill their own wives or do anything and were above the custom to provide for residence of the Royal family members and that therefore, the ap­pellant is also above the custom to provide for residence of the Royal family members. But, I do not think that the Kings of Eng­land can be compared with the appellant Maharaj If he is in the same position as an erstwhile King of England, then nothing prevented him from forcibly evicting the respondents from the suit building and tak­ing possession of it. But, I do not think that the Kings of Eng­land can be compared with the appellant Maharaj If he is in the same position as an erstwhile King of England, then nothing prevented him from forcibly evicting the respondents from the suit building and tak­ing possession of it. (19) Then, it was the next contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the custom, even if true, can no longer be enforced against the appellant, as he lost the State of Tripura and as the marriage of the respondents 6 and 7 (the Kachua Ranis) with H. H. late Maharajah Birendra Kishore Dev Barma is invalid in view of the fact that bigamy is an offence now. He relied on Muzaffar Muhammed v. Imam Din, (AIR 1927 Lah 642). It was held that the initial presumption in favour of restricted power of alienation applies to members of agricul­tural tribes, who are members of village communities, but that where family al­together changes the profession from agri­culture and settles down in urban area and adopts trade, then no such initial presump­tion exists. This decision does not have any application to the facts of the present case It is proved that there is a custom under which the appellant is bound to provide for the residence of the respondents. Though he might have been deprived of the State, he has not been deprived of the Ujjavanta Palace and other properties. He is still their owner. The custom under which he if bound to provide for the residence of the respondents does not cease to apply to him simply because his State was marged with the Union Territory of India, for which he has been given compensation etc. by the Union Territory. I do not think that simply because the Tripura State was merged with the Union Territory of India, the respon­dents will be deprived of their customary right of residence. Also, the marriage of the respondents 6 and 7 with late H H. Birendra Kishore Dev Barma was not bigamous, when it took place. That bigamy is now prohibited has no bearing on the validity of their customary right of resi dence in question (20) The Subordinate Judge further held on the basis of Article V of Ext. Also, the marriage of the respondents 6 and 7 with late H H. Birendra Kishore Dev Barma was not bigamous, when it took place. That bigamy is now prohibited has no bearing on the validity of their customary right of resi dence in question (20) The Subordinate Judge further held on the basis of Article V of Ext. 17 (that the members of the Maharajah's family should be entitled to Personal Privi­leges, dignities etc.) that the respondents are entitled to right of residence His view is incorrect. This aspect of the case was discussed by me in Para. 32 of my judg­ment in (First Appeal 13 of 1958 D/- 8-2-1967 (Tri.) on the file of this Court) where­in I referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in W. P. 57/1962. Article V of Ext. 17 refers to Personal Privileges and not to any right to immovable property (21) The next question that was argued by the appellant's Counsel and that arises for determination is whether, assuming that the customary right of residence pleaded by the respondents is true, the appellant pro­vided for alternative residence of the res­pondents. According to the appellant he provided the same for the first respondent. The judgment of the Sub-Judge shows that he did not consider this aspect of the case at all in it. He did not refer to the evidence and give any finding whether the appellant provided for alternative accommodation of the first respondent or not. The case of the appellant is that his father allotted a site near the sites allotted to D. Ws. 1. 2, 3 (Maharaj Kumar Aditya Kishore Dev Barma, Maharaj Kumar Hemanta Kishore Dev Barma and Maharaj Kumar Mohan Kishore Dev Barma). The case of the appellant is that his father allotted a site near the sites allotted to D. Ws. 1. 2, 3 (Maharaj Kumar Aditya Kishore Dev Barma, Maharaj Kumar Hemanta Kishore Dev Barma and Maharaj Kumar Mohan Kishore Dev Barma). that the appellant's mother sanctioned a sum of Rs 8,000 for the construction of a house by the first respon­dent, that, in fact, after the State was in­tegrated with the Indian Union Territory, a house was constructed on the same site, that the first respondent was thus provided with alternative suitable accommodation and that, therefore, he is liable to be evicted from the suit premises P. W. 1 (Manindra Mohan Dhar) who worked in the Sadar Collectorate as clerk deposed that the first respondent submitted an application on 17-12-52 A. D. for settle­ment of a plot of land 1 kani, 14 gandas and 15 dhurs appertainine to town sheet No. 7 of Mouja Krishnanagar within Nutan Haveli. The evidence of P. W 1 shows that the then Chief Commissioner of Tripura, Sri V. Nanjappa sanctioned settlement of the plot in favour of the first respondent as per Ext, 4 Order dated 2-7-1952 A. D. The evidence of P W 1 further shows that he was present when the Chief Commissioner passed the order and that the order-sheet of the record was partly written by P W. 1 (Manindra Mohan Dhar) In Ext 5 dated 21-11-1950 A D the Revenue Officer out up a note on the subject of Taskhishi Taluk settlement of the plot in Taskhishi Taluk Bandobasta case No 37/1950 in the office of the Sub-Divisional Officer. Sadar in favour of the first respondent that the Sadar Collector might be asked to submit a re­port as to why the arrears of rent from 1357 Tripura Era should be charged when the first respondent did not actual^ take possession of the land Ext. 6 dated ip-2-1951 is an order of the D O.. Sadar which shows that there was correspondence regarding the land given to the first respondent and other Maharaj Kumars for construction of houses thereon Ext 6 reads that for the construction of homesteads for some other Raj Kumars belonging to the Royal family, some lands lyins to the wesi of the road which runs by the west of Temple of Jagannath were ac­quired and given to some other Raj Kumars for construction of their homesteads- there­on. It also reads that from a perusal of the records it was seen thai Khas land? were given to five Maharai Kumars mentioned in the margin of Ext 6 including the first res­pondent for their dwelling house.' and that proposal.' for Taluki settlement for con-structior of houses were made and e ranted in the name of all Kumar Bahadurs except the first respondent. Ext 6 also shows that proposals for settlement were sent and granted in the names of the Kumar Baha­durs from 1355 T E and 1356 T E making them liable for payment of the land revenue since the dates on which they took posses­sion of the lands. Ext. 6 further shows that the land was divided into several plots and allotted to the Maharaj Kumars through the P. W. D. according to the wishes of late Maharaja Manikya Bahadur who selected the respective plots for each of them and that further details might be had from the P. W. D. on enquiry. Ext. 6 reads that though the plot prayed for by the first res­pondent was selected and allotted to him at the time when the other plots were allotted to other Kumar Bahadurs, the first respon­dent did not apply for Taluki settlement of the land and that, therefore, no proposal could be sent. Ext. 6 goes on to read that the Head Surveyor submitted a report to the effect that the land might be settled in favour of the first respondent in the same way in which the other plots were allotted to the other Kumar Bahadurs without any Nazarana and on a revenue of Rs. 6 per kani per year and on realisation of revenue for 3 years. Thus, Ext. 6 shows that the late father of the appellant selected plots for all the Maharai Kumars including the first res­pondent and that, though the first respon­dent waited for some time, ultimately he applied for the settlement of the land in his favour. Ext. 4 is an order of the Chief Commis­sioner dated 2-7-1952 A. D., in the same Taluk Bandobasta Case No. 37 of 1950 in the Sub-divisional Office, which shows that the proposal to settle the land measuring 1 kani, 14 gandas and 15 dhurs (allotted to the first respondent by the late father of the appellant) in favour of the first respon­dent was approved. Ext. Ext. 4 narrates the his­tory of the case and mentions that the land, which was acquired for the construction of homesteads of Kumar Bahadurs belonging to the Royal family, was lying fallow, that the land sought to be settled in favour of the first respondent is by the side of the plots given to D. Ws. 1, 2, 3 (Maharai Kumar Aditya Kishpra Dev Barma, Maharai Kumar Hemanta Kishore Dev Barma and Maharai Kumar Mohan Kishore Dev Barma), that there was direction to the effect that the lands in the possession of the Maharai Kumars, appertaining to Government plots on which they constructed their homesteads might be settled with them without any Nazarana as Taskhishi Taluks on payment of 3 years arrear revenue and on fixation of proper revenue and that subsequently the direction was modified to the effect that instead of 3 years' arrears 10 years' arrears should be collected in some cases. Ext. 4 further reads that the letter No. 6123/33 dated 7-10-50 A. D. of the Work and Buil­dings Department showed that a sum of Rs. 8,000 was drawn from the Treasury for the construction of the homestead of the first respondent, that it was lying in deposit in the name of the Chief Commissioner, that the land of the first respondent did not appertain to Government quarters, but that it was lying fallow and that it should be settled upon the first respondent on the same terms as those of the other Ral Kumars, who were given settlement of Taskhishi Taluk on the adjacent surrounding plots at a revenue rate of Rs. 6 per kani annually and on 3 years' revenue from 1358 T. E. to 1360 T. E. as Nazarana. Thus, the proposal was made to settle the same plot on the first respondent. There are also some more conditions of settlement mentioned in Ext. 4. Condition No. 13 is that the first respondent should complete construction of the verandah and front portion of the building according to the approved plan of the Government with­in six months and that in default the land would be taken delivery of and settled to others. Ext. There are also some more conditions of settlement mentioned in Ext. 4. Condition No. 13 is that the first respondent should complete construction of the verandah and front portion of the building according to the approved plan of the Government with­in six months and that in default the land would be taken delivery of and settled to others. Ext. 3 is the application of the first respondent to the Sadar Collector by which he prayed for settlement of Taskhishi Taluk in his favour and stated therein that he was willing to pay the arrears of land revenue for 3 years namely, from 1358 T. E. to 1360 T. E. and that an order might be passed in his favour for pasting "touji". Ext. 3 is dated 17-12-1952 Thus, the first respondent came to be in possession of a plot of land which was selected by the appellant's father and a house was built on it at a cost of Rs. 8,000 which was granted by the ap­pellant's mother. Evidently, the appellant's father made the same provision for the residence of the first respondent in the same manner in which he provided for the sepa­rate residence of the other Maharai Kumars namely, D. Ws 1, 2 and 3 (Maharaj Kumar Aditya Kishore Dev Barma, Maharai Kumar Hemanta Kishore Dev Barma and Maharaj Kumar Mohan Kishore Dev Barma). (22) As against the above evidence the first respondent, who examined himself as a witness, gave prevaricatins stories about the acquisition of the above mentioned plot of land and house. In Para. 15 of the writ­ten statement filed by him. he stated that he took settlement of a certain plot of land in Agartala town with his own money from the Government of India on payment of proper Nazarana and that he sold away a portion of the plot for want of money He further pleaded in the same para that the said plot of land was never allotted to him by the late Maharaia, father of the appel­lant. Also, he averred that though the ap­pellant's father sanctioned to him a sum of Rs. 12,000 on account of his physical dis­abilities, the first respondent did not get the same. But. Also, he averred that though the ap­pellant's father sanctioned to him a sum of Rs. 12,000 on account of his physical dis­abilities, the first respondent did not get the same. But. in the evidence he deposed that he took settlement of certain plot of land situate in Krishnanagar in Agartala town from the Government of India and that he had applied for the same during the tenure of office of Sri V Naniappa. the then Chief Commissioner Then, he deposed that during the life-time of the late Maharaja the latter wished to give the first respondent the same plot of land, but that he did not accept it. So the first respondent obtained possession of the same plot of land allotted to him by the appellant's father, though he obtained possession of it after the death of the appellant's father. As such, the plot is the same. Again, the first respondent deposed that though the appellant's father sanctioned to him a sum of Rs. 12,000 for the construc­tion of a house, the first respondent did not accept it, because it was agreed that the ap­pellant's father should get the house con­structed for him. He went on to depose that a house was, in fact, constructed over the said plot with money sanctioned by the Chief Commissioner but that the first res­pondent himself did not withdraw the money required for the construction of the house from the Treasury. He admitted that he did not spend a single pie for the con­struction of the house and he pretended Ignorance that he did not know how much amount was spent for the construction of the house. But, he was definite that the amount spent for the construction of the house was not sanctioned by the late Maha­raja. In such a case it is not known why the Government got the house built for him on the plot selected by the appellant's father Thus, the evidence of the first respondent is a tissue of lies. It is impossible to believe that out of sympathy the State Government or the Central Government constructed the building for the benefit of the first respon­dent. But, as can be seen from Ext 4, a sum of Rs. 8,000 was sanctioned by the erstwhile Maharaja for the construction of the house for the benefit of the first respondent and the house was built with the said funds. But, as can be seen from Ext 4, a sum of Rs. 8,000 was sanctioned by the erstwhile Maharaja for the construction of the house for the benefit of the first respondent and the house was built with the said funds. So, the first respondent should have abso­lutely no grievance and could not be heard to state that alternative suitable accom­modation was not made for him It was made for him in the same manner in which it was made for other Raj Kumars D. Ws. 1, 2, 3 (Maharaj Kumar Aditya Kishore. Maharai Kumar Hemanta Kishore and Maharai Kumar Mohan Kishore). The con­tention of the learned Counsel for the res­pondents that the house was given to the first respondent on account of his illness is not tenable. (23) The evidence of the first respondent that he refused the offer of the late Maha­raja to take the plot or to take the sum of Rs. 12,000 also cuts his case. For. when the late Maharaia offered to provide for alter­native suitable accommodation for the first respondent, he was not entitled to refuse the same, according to the custom already re­ferred to. As per the custom the late Maha­raja offered to provide the first respondent with suitable alternative accommodation (as done by him to other Maharaj Kumars) and it was the bounden duty of the first res­pondent to have accepted the same. So, even If the evidence of the first respondent that he refused the plot of land and the amount is believed to be true, he had no right to persist to stay in the suit building. So file respondents 2 to 5 (who are his legal repre­sentatives) are not entitled to continue to be in possession of the suit building. (24) So far as the sixth respondent Shrimati Surjya Mani Devi, Kachua Rani of the appellant's grandfather Maharaja Birendra Kishore Manikya Bahadur, is con­cerned, the appellant admits in Para. 13 of his plaint that according to the traditional custom of the Royal family she is entitled to live in the Royal Harem. The appellant does not want her to live in the suit buil­ding or to go elsewhere. The alternative suitable accommodation for her, according to his case, is the Royal Harem. But the term "suitability" is indefinite. What is suitable according to the appellant might not be suitable according to the sixth res­pondent and vice versa. The appellant does not want her to live in the suit buil­ding or to go elsewhere. The alternative suitable accommodation for her, according to his case, is the Royal Harem. But the term "suitability" is indefinite. What is suitable according to the appellant might not be suitable according to the sixth res­pondent and vice versa. The evidence of D. Ws. 1, 2, 3 (Mahrai Kumar Aditya Kishore, Hemanta Kishore and Mohan Kishore) and the sixth respondent herself shows that, sometime after the fire incident took place, the sixth respondent requested the appellant's father to provide for her resi­dence in the suit building as she felt incon­venient to live in the Royal Harem along with others and that, therefore, the appel­lant's father provided for her residence in the suit building by allotting some rooms for her. Her evidence also shows that she improved the same and constructed some more rooms. The evidence in this regard is trustworthy and reliable. The contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant is that the sixth respon­dent has no right to dictate terms to him and ask him to provide for her residence in a particular place and that she is bound to go back to the Royal Harem. He relied on my judgment in (First Appeal No. 13 of 1958, D/-8-2-1967 (Tri) on the file of this Court). In that case one Shrimati Rani Uijwala Devi, who was the sister of His Highness Maharaia Bir Bikram Kishore Maiky a Bahadur, father of the appellant, claimed certain building within the Uijayanta Palace Compound under on oral gift. I dis­believed her story of oral gift. I also held that her title to the property, if any, came to an end by virtue of the Agreement dated 9-9-1949 (Ext 17 in this case) between the Union Government of India and the appel­lant's mother as Regent Maharani and that in any case the building must be deemed to have been resumed from Rani Uijwala Devi and regranted to the appellant under the Agreement Thus, Uijwala Devi was not a member of the Royal family and had no right of residence. In the present case, the sixth respondent is not entitled to claim any title to any portion of the building in question. But by virtue of the customary right of the Royal family members, she is entitled to residence suitable to her status and convenience. In the present case, the sixth respondent is not entitled to claim any title to any portion of the building in question. But by virtue of the customary right of the Royal family members, she is entitled to residence suitable to her status and convenience. As such, the decision in the above First Appeal No. 13 of 1958, D/-8-2-1967 (Tri.) decided by me does not directly have any bearing on the question of right of residence claimed by the sixth respon­dent. Right of residence is different from title to the property. In fact, the appellant admits that the sixth respondent has got the right of resi­dence according to the Royal family custom. Inasmuch as the appellant's father found that the portion given to her in the suit building was convenient and suitable to her, I think that she cannot be directed to vacate the same and go back to the Royal Harem. After all, she appears to be very old and I do not think that it is proper for the ap­pellant to ask her to go back to the Royal Harem and live in it, especially after she came out from it after she felt inconvenient. The learned Counsel for the sixth respon­dent stated that the appellant does not live in Agartala, that the Royal Harem is not properly maintained and that the members of the Harem are suffering. But, there is |no evidence on this point. However, in view of the fact that the appellant's father considered that the rooms given to the sixth respondent in the present suit building would be convenient to her, I direct that she should continue to live in the same until her death. (25) Regarding the seventh respondent, it is to be noted that she died issueless dur­ing the pendency of the appeal. So, the appellant is entitled to recover possession of the portion occupied by her. In fact, the Counsel, who appeared for the deceased seventh respondents, also had no objection to this course. (26) For the above reasons, I find points (i) and (iv) in the negative and points (ii) and (iii) in the affirmative. (27) Point (v):- The case of the first respondent was that his mother was also living in the same premises occupied by him and that she is a necessary party to the suit. An issue was raised in the lower Court on this point. (27) Point (v):- The case of the first respondent was that his mother was also living in the same premises occupied by him and that she is a necessary party to the suit. An issue was raised in the lower Court on this point. But, the judgment of the lower Court shows that it was not pressed. How­ever, the suit cannot fail for non-joinder of the mother of the first respondent. The matter can be disposed of as between the parties on record. (28) The respondents 1, 6 and 7 also raised a plea in their written statements that the suit is bad for multifariousness. The judgment of the lower Court shows that they gave up this plea also. However, though the circumstances under which the respondents were alleged to have occupied the suit building differ, the case of the ap­pellant regarding all of them is that they occupied it as licensees. So the suit does not fail for multifariousness. (29) For the above reasons, I find point (v) in the negative. (30) Point(vi):- The appellant value the suit at Rs. 50,000 and paid court-fee of -/Bl­under Cl. (5) of Schedule II of the Court-fees Act. Clause (5) of Schedule II of the Court-fees Act applies to a case of a plaint or memorandum of appeal in a suit to establish or disprove a right of occupancy, when a court-fee of -/8/- is payable. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents is that, after the death of the appellant's father, the alleged license in favour of the respondents 1, 6 and 7 terminated, that the respondents must be deemed to be trespassers and that ad valorem court-fee is payable. He relied on Chinnan v. Ranjithammal, AIR 1931 Mad 216, where it was held that on a licensee's death the possession of his heirs becomes adverse to the owner of the property. In Alagiri Chetty v. Muthuswami Chetty, AIR 1940 Mad 102 it was held that a license must be held to elapse with the death of the licen­sor. Vide also Mohammed Khan v. Ram-narayan Misra, AIR 1956 Orissa 156. As against these rulings the learned Counsel for the appellant referred to Nanda Gopal v. Brij Mohan Lai, 1966 All LJ 166 at page 1434 of 1966 Yearly Digest. In the Yearly Digest the judgment was not fully reported. Vide also Mohammed Khan v. Ram-narayan Misra, AIR 1956 Orissa 156. As against these rulings the learned Counsel for the appellant referred to Nanda Gopal v. Brij Mohan Lai, 1966 All LJ 166 at page 1434 of 1966 Yearly Digest. In the Yearly Digest the judgment was not fully reported. It was held that having regard to the entire evidence on record and the circumstances of the case the possession of the sons of the original licensee over a house continued to be permissible and that, therefore, there was no question of adverse possession. It was found in that case (as can be seen from the short report) that although the express license was in the name of one person only, the implied license was found to be in favour of the other members of the family also. In the present case the story of license set up by the appellant has been found to be not true. But, even if the respondents' possession became adverse to the appellant on the death of the appellant's father, there is no question of limitation. For, the ap­pellant's father died in May, 1947 and the suit was filed in 1955 A. D. Besides, as already mentioned, nobody except the ap­pellant has any title to the buildings within the Ujjayanta Palace Compound by virtue of Ext. 17, Agreement dated 9-9-1949 A. D. and the respondents cannot claim any title to the suit building. (31) As already stated, the appellant paid court-fee under Schedule II, Cl. (5) of the Indian Court-fees Act as made applic­able to Tripura State. The expression "right of occupancy" has a definite meaning in law. The decision in Brahmayya v. Lakshminara-simham, (1893) ILR 16 Mad 310 relied on by the appellant's Counsel does not apply to the facts of this case. In that case the ap­pellant was in possession of land and his ap­peal was to establish his "occupancy right" within the meaning of the words of the Schedule II, Cl. (5) of the Court-fees Act. No right of occupancy is involved in this case. The finding of the lower Court that Cl. (5), Schedule II of the Court-fees Act applied is not correct. However, the learn­ed Counsel for the appellant contended that the case falls under S. 7 (4) (c) of the Indian Court-fees Act. (5) of the Court-fees Act. No right of occupancy is involved in this case. The finding of the lower Court that Cl. (5), Schedule II of the Court-fees Act applied is not correct. However, the learn­ed Counsel for the appellant contended that the case falls under S. 7 (4) (c) of the Indian Court-fees Act. As the appellant filed the suit for declaration and for recovery of possession, S. 7 (4) (c) of the Court-fees Act 'applies. The learned Counsel for the res­pondents, however, relied on Manik Chand Mondal v. Sudhir Kumar Mondal, 64 Cal WN 80= ( AIR 1960 Cal 420 ) in support of his contention that ad valorem court-fee is pay­able. A study of that decision shows that the prayer for declaration was omitted by the plaintiffs and that, therefore, it was held that S. 7 (4) (c) of the Court-fees Act did not apply. But, in the present case there is a prayer for declaration and for recovery of possession of the suit building. (32) No Rules were framed in Tripura under the Indian Suits Valuation Act or the Court-fees Act. So, the Courts in Tripura are guided only by the provisions of the Indian Court-fees Act as made applicable to Tripura State. That the appellant is entitled to put his own valuation under S. 7 (4) (c) of the Indian Court-fees Act, though there is a prayer for recovery of possession of immov­able property, is clear from the section it­self and also from Sathappa Chettiar v. Rama-nathan Chettiar. AIR 1958 SC 245 : In the present case the appellant mentioned in the plaint the value of the suit for the purpose of jurisdiction. He did not mention the value of the suit for the purpose of court-fees. But, inasmuch as he was entitled to value the suit as he liked under S. 7 (4) (c), Court-fees Act, he must be deemed to have valued it at an amount on which court-fee of -/8/- is payable, though it is a ridiculously low amount. (33) For the above reasons, I find point (vi) in the affirmative. (34) In the result, the appeal is allowed in part and the suit is decreed so far as the portion of the building and property in the suit occupied by the respondents 1 to 5 and 7 are concerned. (33) For the above reasons, I find point (vi) in the affirmative. (34) In the result, the appeal is allowed in part and the suit is decreed so far as the portion of the building and property in the suit occupied by the respondents 1 to 5 and 7 are concerned. The suit is dismissed so far as the portion of the suit building and property occupied by the sixth respondent is concerned. The judgment and decree of the lower Court are modified accordingly. Under the circumstances of the case I direct the parties to bear their respective costs in both the Courts. Appeal partly allowed.