Judgment :- 1. This appeal is by the 1st defendant in a suit for redemption of an Otti-and-Kuzhikanam evidenced by Ext. P2 dated Kanni 2,1108 (1933), which is for a term of 6 years. The suit has been decreed concurrently by the Courts below. 2. The 1st defendant, the present mortgagee the original mortgagee was his father contends that the transaction is in substance one of tenancy and therefore irredeemable and also that under S.4A of the Kerala Land Reforms Act I of 1964 as amended by the Kerala Stay of Eviction Proceedings Act, IX of 1967, he has to be deemed a tenant. Ext. P2, Otti and Kuzhikanom, says that for the consideration received by the mortgagor the mortgagee may enjoy the property under Otti-and-Kuzhikanom rights and that his plantations would be paid for, but he should not make any building or well. There is no particular provision for redemption or for sale or for realisation of mortgage money. There is a stipulation that the mortgagee should pay 101/2 fs. to the mortgagor towards tax. When it is remembered that a transaction of Otti, as understood in Travancore area where the instant transaction took place, involves as a matter of its legal incidents a right to sue for the mortgage money, a right to bring to sale the mortgage property, a tight to possess and enjoy the property and a right to redeem, the non mention of such incidents in the deed cannot be of any consequence. 3. Counsel contends that a Kuzhikanom by itself is a tenure and therefore an Otti and Kuzhikanom is a combination of mortgage and tenancy. Kuzhikanom in the State of Travancore meant only a right to compensation for plantations made on the land. It did not involve a covenant to pay rent and therefore cannot be said to constitute in itself a tenancy. Otti and Kuzhikanom is only a possessory mortgage with recognition of a right to compensation for mortgagee's plantations on the land. Even under the Land Reforms Act, 1963 (Act I of 1964) a provision entitling a mortgagee to compensation for improvements does not constitute the mortgagee a tenant entitled to fixity of tenure. A tenant may be entitled to compensation for improvements; but a person entitled to compensation for his improvements on the land need not be a tenant as defined in the Land Reforms Act. A tenant may be entitled to compensation for improvements; but a person entitled to compensation for his improvements on the land need not be a tenant as defined in the Land Reforms Act. It is therefore impossible to hold that an Otti and Kuzhikanom spells a tenancy within the meaning of the Land Reforms Act. 4. Counsel for appellant contends that the instant mortgage comes under S.4A of the Land Reforms Act. The section enacts four conditions for its applicability. It is contended that those four conditions are not cumulative but are alternative and that therefore if any one of the four conditions is satisfied the mortgagee has to be deemed a tenant under the Section. There is neither the conjunctive 'and' nor the disjunctive 'or' to correlate the different conditions mentioned in the Section. But there is clear indication in the heading of the Section that the clauses are cumulative. In Bhinka v. Charan Singh (AIR. 1959 SC. 960) question arose whether possession by virtue of an order of a Magistrate under S.145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is possession "in accordance with the provisions of the law for the time being in force" within the meaning of S.180 of the U. P. Tenancy Act, 1939. The Supreme Court observed: "It appears to us that the words 'possession in accordance with the law for the time being in force' in the context can only mean possession with tills...If there is any ambiguity.... it is dispelled by the heading given to the section... The heading reads thus: Ejectment of person occupying land without title.' 'Maxwell On Interpretation of Statutes', 10th Edn., gives the scope of the user of such a heading in the interpretation of a section thus, at p. 50: 'The headings prefixed to sections or sets of sections in some modern statutes are regarded as preambles to those sections. They cannot control the plain words of the statute but they may explain ambiguous words.' If there is any doubt in the interpretation of the words in the section, the heading certainly helps us to resolve that doubt. Unless the person sought to be evicted has title or right to possession, it cannot be said that his possession is in accordance with the provisions of the law for the time being in force .... Unless the person sought to be evicted has title or right to possession, it cannot be said that his possession is in accordance with the provisions of the law for the time being in force .... Under S.145 (6) of the Code, a Magistrate is authorised to issue an order declaring a party to be entitled to possession of a land until evicted therefrom indue course of law. The Magistrate does not purport to decide a party's title or right to possession of the land but expressly reserves that question to be decided indue course of law." Thus the Supreme Court construed the expression in the Section "possession in accordance with the law for the time being in force" in the light of the word "title" in the heading of the Section and therefore not to include possession under the provisions of S.145, Crl. P.C. Here, the heading to the Section is "Certain mortgagees of waste lands to be deemed tenants". Who those certain mortgagees are is determined by the conditions enumerated in the Section. If those conditions are alternatives, condition (a) "the property comprised in the mortgage was waste land at the time of the mortgage" would make every mortgage of a waste land a tenure within the purview of the Section. The heading shows that the Section is not to apply to all but only to certain (some) mortgagees of waste lands. The other three conditions mentioned in the Section do not refer to the mortgaged land being a waste land, and would therefore apply to all mortgages of landed property. If the conditions mentioned in the Section are alternatives, the Section would make very many mortgagees of arable lands and building sites tenants quite inconsistently with the heading of the section which limits the applicability of the section to 'certain mortgagees of waste lands' only. It is clear therefore that if the four conditions enumerated in the section are read as cumulative the Section would be consistent with its heading, and if they are read as alternatives the heading would be inconsistent with the Section and meaningless. The ambiguity, arising from the absence of a conjunctive or disjunctive word between the clauses, must then be resolved in the light of consistency with the heading of the Section. The ambiguity, arising from the absence of a conjunctive or disjunctive word between the clauses, must then be resolved in the light of consistency with the heading of the Section. Counsel pointed out that in the subsequent Section, S.64 of the Land Reforms Act, the conjunction'and' has been used to correlate the several conditions mentioned therein; but that, in may opinion, would not imply that the conjunction proper in S.4A is'or' and not'and'. The contention that the conditions in S.4A must be read as alternatives and therefore the mortgagee is the present case, who had been in possession of the property for over 30 years, though the mortgaged property may not have been a waste land, has to be deemed a tenant under S.4A of the Land Reforms Act, carries no force in my view. 5. I see no force in this second appeal, which is therefore dismissed hereby. Dismissed.