JUDGMENT Lakshmi Prasad, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. Opposite party No. 4 preferred an objection under Section 9 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. Assistant Consolidation Officer, by his order dated February 14, 1963 indicated that it had resulted in reconciliation. The petitioner in whose favour stood the entry in the basic year preferred an appeal from the aforesaid order of the Assistant Consolidation Officer dated February 14, 1963, alleging that he was no party to the alleged reconciliation. The Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) allowed the said appeal by his order dated April 30, 1964 and remanded the case for disposal on merits. Aggrieved by this order opposite party No. 3 preferred a revision which was dismissed on August 10, 1964 on the ground that the case was governed by provisions of the Act as it stood prior to its amendment by U.P. Act VIII of 1963 as such no revision was competent from the appellate order dated April 30, 1964. Subsequent to the dismissal of the said revision the Consolidation Officer in accordance with the appellate order dated April 30, 1964 proceeded to decide the dispute and dispose it off by his order dated September 15, 1965 in favour of the petitioner. Opposite party No. 4 then preferred an appeal which was dismissed by an Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) by his order dated October 15, 1965. Aggrieved by this order opposite party No. 4 preferred a second appeal which was dismissed by a Deputy Director on June 20, 1966. Then he preferred a revision under Section 48 (unamended) and the same was allowed by an order dated September 27, 1966, a certified copy of which is annexure 2 to the petition. 2. The appeal which was disposed of by the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) by his order dated April 30, 1964 was preferred beyond the period of limitation. An application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was moved along with the memo of appeal. The Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) condoned the delay. 2. The appeal which was disposed of by the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) by his order dated April 30, 1964 was preferred beyond the period of limitation. An application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was moved along with the memo of appeal. The Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) condoned the delay. In the revision disposed of by the impugned order annexure 2, it was contended on behalf of opposite party No. 4 that since the new Limitation Act of 1963 had come into force prior to April 30, 1964, the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) had no jurisdiction to act under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 which alone is made applicable to the proceedings under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act by virtue of its Section 53-B. It was thus contended that the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) acted beyond jurisdiction in condoning the delay and allowing the appeal and accordingly whatever followed subsequent thereto was a mere nullity in the eye of law. This argument found favour with the Deputy Director, who after discussing the various arguments urged before him concluded in the following words :- "Under the above circumstances I am of the opinion that the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) had no right to condone the delay under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, which was not in existence, and therefore, he had no right to entertain the appeal. Therefore, the order passed by him was beyond jurisdiction and any order subsequently passed by the superior court was also beyond jurisdiction." It was on this reasoning that he set aside not only the order dated June 20, 1966 from which the revision resulting in the impugned order, was preferred but also the order of Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) dated April 30, 1964 with the result that the parties were left to the stage at which they were by virtue of the order dated February 14, 1963 passed by the Assistant Consolidation Officer. It is in these circumstances that the present petition is filed, and the material allegation in it is that the revision which was dismissed on August 10, 1964 as incompetent was not presented before the District Deputy Director. That allegation is made in paragraph 4 of the petition. It is in these circumstances that the present petition is filed, and the material allegation in it is that the revision which was dismissed on August 10, 1964 as incompetent was not presented before the District Deputy Director. That allegation is made in paragraph 4 of the petition. All that is said in paragraph 4 of the counter affidavit in relation to the contents of paragraph 4 of the petition is that the contents of paragraph 4 of the petition pertain to the record and the petitioner be put to proof. The prayer in the petition is that the impugned order dated September 27, 1966, annexure 2, be quashed. 3. The petition is opposed by opposite party No. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the contesting parties. I have not the least doubt that the view, taken by the Deputy Director that the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) had no jurisdiction to condone the delay because the new Limitation Act 1963 came into force prior to the date of the order passed by him and reference in Section 53-B of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act to Section 5 of the old Act could be of no avail is manifestly erroneous. The new Limitation Act 1963 provides in sub-section (2) of Section 29 for the application of Sections 4 to 24 to all cases for which limitation is to be computed according to the provisions of any special or local law subject to there being anything in such special or local law to exclude their application in express terms. It shall thus appear that even if the reasoning of the Deputy Director be for a moment assumed to be correct, Section 5 of the new Limitation Act which corresponds to Section 5 of the old Limitation Act, would apply to the proceedings before the consolidation authorities by virtue of Section 29(2) of the new Limitation Act since there is nothing in the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act to exclude its application. Moreover, a reference to Section 8 of the General Clauses Act would show that in the absence of anything to the contrary a reference to the provisions in an enactment of another enactment subsequently repealed and re-enacted will be construed to refer to a corresponding provision in the enactment referred to. For the sake of convenience Section 8 of the General Clauses Act may be reproduced. For the sake of convenience Section 8 of the General Clauses Act may be reproduced. It runs as follows :- "Where this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals and re-enacts, with or without modification, any provision of a former enactment, then reference in any other enactment or in any instrument to the provision so repealed shall, unless a different intention appears, be construed as references to the provision so reenacted." So there is no doubt that the view taken by the Deputy Director in the impugned order, that the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) had no jurisdiction to condone the delay because oi the new Limitation coming into force prior to the date of his order, is patently erroneous and does call for an interference by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 4. Having regard to the facts of the case as narrated earlier the impugned order appears to be palpably wrong also because it proceeds not only to set aside the second appellate order against which the revision was directed but also the order of remand dated April 30, 1964 which as a result of the order dated August 10, 1964 to which the parties submitted had become final between the parties. The contention of the learned counsel appearing for opposite party No. 4 that in so far under Section 48 (unamended) the Director had suo motu powers of interference, it was within his competence to interfere with the order dated August 10, 1964 passed by the Dy. Director with the result that he could set aside not only that order but also the order against which the revision disposed of by the order dated August 10, 1964 was directed. He argues that even though the revision disposed of by the order dated August 10, 1964 was not competent as a revision, the Deputy Director disposing it of as incompetent had jurisdiction to proceed to decide it on merits as a second appeal and it was this failure on his part which entitled the Director passing the impugned order to interfere with it (the order dated August 10, 1964) in exercise of his suo motu powers of revision under Section 48 (unamended). In my view the contention is without any substance. In my view the contention is without any substance. Having regard to the allegations made in paragraph 4 of the petition and in paragraph 4 of the counter affidavit it is obvious that the revision disposed of by the order dated August 10, 1964, could not have been treated as a second appeal since under Section 11(2) of the unamended Act a second appeal had to be presented to a District Deputy Director and it could be disposed of either by the District Deputy Director or by a Deputy Director specially authorised in this behalf by the Director. The mere fact that it was not presented to a District Deputy Director is enough to show that the Deputy Director, passing the order dated August 10, 1964, could not treat it as a second appeal. It shall thus appear that the very basis, on which the learned counsel wants to justify interference in the impugned order with the order dated August 10, 1964, disappears. I have thus no doubt that the impugned order is bad in respects more than one and deserves to be quashed outright. 5. I accordingly allow the petition with costs and quash the impugned order dated September 27, 1964, annexure 2, to the petition.