This is a second appeal filed by the defendants 8 to 10 in Title Suit No. 194 of 1955 on the file of the Munsiff, Kailasahar, against the judg­ment and decree of the District Judge in First Title Appeal No. 99 of 1956 on his file dismissing with costs the appeal filed by them against the judgment and decree of the Munsiff decreeing the Title Suit No. 194 of 1955 filed by the first respondent for delivery of possession of the plaint first schedule land. 2. The facts of the case involving a long drawn out litigation which led to the institution of this second appeal are as follows:- (a) There is a Taluk No. 36, situate in mouja Kamrangabari under Pargana Bhi-tar Kailasahar, about 16 drones in extent, which stood in the names of Ramananda Singh, Sri Krishna Deb and Nabin Chan­dra Deb. 36/4 is a Kharija Taluk out of the same being 1 drone, 9 kanis, 13 gan­das and 3 karas in extent. (b) Khariia Taluk No. 36/4 belonged to Kuttasa Fakir. He possessed the same through his tenants namely, the defen­dants 1, 2, the father of the defendants 13 and 14 and the father of the third de­fendant. They executed Ext. 4, Kabuli-yat dated 10th of Bhadra, 1353 T. E. in his favour. Under Ext. A dated 30th Bhadra, 1333 T. E. an extent of 3 drones, 7 kanis, 10 gandas and 3 karas of land in Taluk No. 36 was sold to the defen­dants 1, 2, the father of the defendants 9 and 10, father of the defendants 13 and 14 and others. Under Ext. B, Kabala dated 11-10-1333 T. E. an extent of 2 drones, 7 kanis, 13 gandas and 2 karas of land was purchased by the second de­fendant, the father of the defendants 9 and 10 and the father of the defendants 13 and 14 in the same Taluk No. 36. (c) No. 36/4 carried an annual rent of Rs. 6/6/9 pies with cess of Rs. 2/6/9 pies. It was sold by the Government for the rea­lisation of the arrears of land revenue due for the Ashad kisti of 1348 T. E. The first respondent-plaintiff purchased the same on 28-9-1348 T. E. and the sale was confirmed on 9-4-1349 T. E., as can be seen from Ext. 1 _sale certificate. 6/6/9 pies with cess of Rs. 2/6/9 pies. It was sold by the Government for the rea­lisation of the arrears of land revenue due for the Ashad kisti of 1348 T. E. The first respondent-plaintiff purchased the same on 28-9-1348 T. E. and the sale was confirmed on 9-4-1349 T. E., as can be seen from Ext. 1 _sale certificate. On the strength of the sale certificate the first respondent obtained symbolical deli­very of the land on 10-12-1349 T. E. as per Ext. 2. (d) But, the tenants in possession of Kharija Taluk No. 36/4 did not vacate the land. So, the first respondent-plain­tiff filed Suits Nos. 19 of 1353 T. E. and 25 of 1353 T. E. on the file of the Mun­siff's Court, Kailasahar, against the de­fendants 1, 2, father of the third defen­dant and father of the defendants 13 and 14 and others. The suits were decreed ex parte as per Ext. 5 against all of them on 17-8-1353 T. E. (e) The fourth defendant in the above Suits 19 of 1353 T. E. and 25 of 1353 T. E. namely, Nabadwip Chandra Singh applied under Order 9 Rule 13 Civil Procedure Code in 1354 T. E. or 1355 T. E. to set aside the decree passed against him. The suits were re-number­ed as Title Suits Nos. 19 of 1353 T. E., 25 of 1353 T. E., 20 of 1358 T. E. and 31 of 1358 T. E. There is dispute between the parties as to whether the ex parte decree was set aside not only as against Nabadwip Singh but also against the other defendants in those suits. Accord­ing to the appellants, it was set aside only as against Nabadwip Singh. But, according to the first respondent-plain­tiff it was set aside against all. This question will be subsequently considered. The Munsiff decreed the suit against Nabadwip Singh on contest and ex parte against the other defendants on 22-1- 1359 T. E. as per Ext. 8. (f) On the basis of the above decree dated 22-1-1359 T. E., the first respon­dent-plaintiff applied for delivery of possession of the suit land on 1-2-1359 T. E. and obtained delivery of it on 2-2-1359 T. E. as can be seen from Exts. 9 and 10. 8. (f) On the basis of the above decree dated 22-1-1359 T. E., the first respon­dent-plaintiff applied for delivery of possession of the suit land on 1-2-1359 T. E. and obtained delivery of it on 2-2-1359 T. E. as can be seen from Exts. 9 and 10. (g) In the meanwhile, the defendants mi the above suits carried the matter in appeal to the District Judge in Civil Ap­peal No. 24 of 1359 T. E. which was re­numbered as 3 of 1950 A. D. The first respondent-plaintiff filed a petition in the District Court stating that the then de­fendant No. 4 Nawadwip Singh was not a necessary party, as he had no interest in the suit and that the decree against him might be set aside. The other ap­pellants filed a petition in the District Court that the ex parte decree passed against them on 22-1-1359 T. E., as per Ext. 8, was illegal as the ex parte de­cree passed against them on 17-8-1353 T. E. as per Ext. 5 was not set aside and was still alive. The District Judge found the same to be correct as can be seen from Ext. 11, copy of his order dated 31-1-1951 A. D. and set aside the ex parte decree against them passed on 22-1-1359 T. E. Ch) The first respondent-plaintiff filed E. P. 32 of 1951 A. D. on 20-5-1951 for delivery of possession of the suit land on the basis of the decree, dated 17-8-1353 T. E. and obtained possession of the same on 19-6-1951 as can be seen from Ext. 14. (i) On the ground that the appellants and the other defendants disturbed the first respondent-plaintiff's possession of the suit land the first respondent start­ed proceedings under Section 144 Crimi­nal Procedure Code and obtained an order restraining them from interfering with his possession. But, as they violat­ed the order, they (including the ninth defendant herein) were punished under Section 188 Indian Penal Code. The ac­cused carried the matter in appeal and their convictions and sentences were confirmed. (j) Some of the defendants dispossess­ed the first respondent-plaintiff from the plaint schedule 2 land comprising 1 kani, 10 gandas forming part of schedule 1 of the plaint. The first respondent-plain­tiff filed Criminal Case No. 164 of 1364 T. E. against the defendants. But, the case was dismissed. (j) Some of the defendants dispossess­ed the first respondent-plaintiff from the plaint schedule 2 land comprising 1 kani, 10 gandas forming part of schedule 1 of the plaint. The first respondent-plain­tiff filed Criminal Case No. 164 of 1364 T. E. against the defendants. But, the case was dismissed. (k) So, the first respondent-plaintiff filed Title Suit No. 194 of 1955 on the file of the Munsiff, Kailasahar, to reco­ver possession of the plaint first schedule land, after declaration of his title to the same. (1) After trial, the Munsiff held that the three plots covered by Exts. 4, A and B are different plots, that the first respondent-plaintiff has title to the plaint first schedule land and that he is entitl­ed to a decree as prayed for. (m) The contesting defendants 8 to 10 carried the matter in appeal to the District Judge in Tripura in Title Appeal No. 99 of 1956. The Learned District Judge concurred with the finding of the Munsiff that the three plots covered by Exts. 4, A and B are separate plots, that the first respondent-plaintiff purchased Kharija Taluk No. 36/4 (covered by Ext. 4) in auction, that the Kharija Taluk No. 36/4 is identifiable and that he has title to recover the same. He further held that, as per Ext. 11 order dated 31-1-1951, the original ex parte decree dated 17-8-1353 T. E. stood, that though it was barred by limitation on the date of E P. 32 of 1951 A. D. under Arti­cle 182 of Indian Limitation Act, still as the said decree was executed and as the matter cannot be unsettled and as the appellants were not parties to the dec­ree, the suit is not barred by limitation. Accordingly, he dismissed the appeal with costs. Hence the present second appeal. 3. The points, which were argued and which arise for determination are:- (i) Whether the first respondent-plain­tiff's Kharija Taluk No. 36/4 is identifia­ble, whether he was in possession of it and whether the appellants dispossessed him. (ii) Whether the appellants should have moved the Certificate Officer under Sec­tion 20 of the Tripura Public Demands Recovery Act (Act IV of 1326 T. E.) to set aside the sale of the suit land. (iii) Whether the suit is barred by limitation. 4. Point (I). (ii) Whether the appellants should have moved the Certificate Officer under Sec­tion 20 of the Tripura Public Demands Recovery Act (Act IV of 1326 T. E.) to set aside the sale of the suit land. (iii) Whether the suit is barred by limitation. 4. Point (I). There are concurrent findings of the two Courts below that the plaint sche­dule No. 1 land covered by Kharija Taluk No. 36/4 is a separate 'identifiable property and their findings are support­ed by the evidence on record. (His Lord­ship after discussing evidence (Paras 5 and 6) proceeded). 7. Thus, even though Ext. 1 does not mention the boundaries of the plaint Schedule No. 1 land, it is identifiable with reference to Kharija Taluk No. 36/4 and also the boundaries mentioned in Ext. 4. I find point (i) in the affirma­tive. 8. Point (II). The Learned Counsel for the first res­pondent argued that if really the appel­lants were in possession of the plaint Schedule No. 1 land and were entitled to it, then they must have filed a peti­tion under Section 20 of the Tripura Public Demands Recovery Act (Act IV of 1326 T. E.) within 30 days from the date of the auction to set aside the sale held by the Government to realise the ar­rears of land revenue. The contention of the Learned Counsel for the appel­lants that as they were not parties to the auction proceedings they were not bound to file a petition is not correct. They could file a petition under Sec. 20 (2) of the Act even after the expiry of 30 days from the date of the sale, if there were reasonable grounds for condoning the delay. 9. Thus, the failure of the appellants to apply under Section 20 of the Act shows that the land did not belong to them. I find point (ii) in the affirmative. 10. Point (III). The first respondent-plaintiff, as al­ready stated, obtained ex parte decree on 17-8-1353 T. E. as per Ext. 5 in Civil Suit No. 19 of 1353 T. E. and 25 of 1353 T. E. for recovery of possession of the suit land. The fourth respondent in those suits viz., Nabadwip Singh filed a petition under Order IX Rule 13, Civil Procedure Code in 1354 or 1355 T. E. to set aside the ex parte decree against him. 5 in Civil Suit No. 19 of 1353 T. E. and 25 of 1353 T. E. for recovery of possession of the suit land. The fourth respondent in those suits viz., Nabadwip Singh filed a petition under Order IX Rule 13, Civil Procedure Code in 1354 or 1355 T. E. to set aside the ex parte decree against him. The Munsiff restored the suit and pass­ed a fresh decree (on contest against Nabadwip Singh and ex parte against the others) on 22-1-1359 T. E. as per Ext. 8. On 2-2-1359 T. E. the first res­pondent-plaintiff filed E. P. 4 of 1359 T. E. for obtaining delivery of the land as can be seen from Exts. 9 and 10. In the meanwhile, the defendants in the above suits carried the matter in appeal to the District Court in Civil Appeal No. 24 of 1359 T. E. which was numbered as 3 of 1950 A. D. The first respondent-plaintiff filed a petition to set aside the decree against Nabadwip Singh, as he was not in possession of the land. The other defendants contested the appeal on the ground that the earliest decree dated 17-8-1353 T. E. was alive and that the subsequent decree dated 22-1-1359 T. E. was barred by res judicata. Thus, the earliest ex parte decree dated 17-8-1353 T. E. stood. Inasmuch as the delivery proceedings in E. P. 4 of 1359 T. E. which were taken in pursuance of the decree dated 22-1-1359 T. E. were illegal on ac­count of the fact that the decree dated 22-1-1359 T. E. was set aside, the first respondent-plaintiff filed E. P. 32 of 1951 for delivery of the land and obtained de­livery of the same on 19-6-1951 as per Ext. 7. Evidently E. P. 32 of 1951 was barred by limitation, because the ex parte decree which was executed was passed on 17-8-1353 T. E. (corresponding to about 1943 A. D.) and as the ex parte decree was thus put into execution 8 years after it was passed. 11. The District Judge states in his judgment in the First Appeal in this case that though there is indication that the ex parte decree dated 17-8-1353 T. E. was set aside against all the defendants, Ext. 11. The District Judge states in his judgment in the First Appeal in this case that though there is indication that the ex parte decree dated 17-8-1353 T. E. was set aside against all the defendants, Ext. 11 shows that it was set aside only against Nabadwip Singh, that the ear­liest ex parte decree dated 17-8-1353 T. E. stood and that, therefore, E. P. 32 of 1951 was barred by limitation. But, on three grounds, he held that the exe­cution proceedings were valid. Firstly, he was of opinion that as the first res­pondent-plaintiff obtained possession of the land on 19-6-1951 A. D. as can be seen from Exts. 6, 7 and 14 and as the judgment-debtors concerned did not raise any objection, the present appellants, who were not parties to the ex parte decree dated 17-8-1353 T. E., are not bound by it. The second ground on which the District Judge held that the appel­lants cannot raise the question of limita­tion is that they have no interest in the land. The third ground on which he held that, though the decree is barred by limitation, the appellants are still bound by the execution proceedings is that the first respondent obtained actual posses­sion of the lands on 19-6-1951. The above grounds do not stand any scrutiny. The fact that the appellants were not parties to the ex parte decree dated 17-8-1353 T. E. or that the appellants have no in­terest in the land or that the first res­pondent-plaintiff obtained delivery of the land by execution of a barred decree is of no avail in view of Section 3 of the Limitation Act, which casts a duty on the Court to dismiss any matter, which is barred by limitation, even though no plea is taken by the defendants with re­gard to limitation. Thus, the grounds given by the District Judge in his judg­ment for holding that the delivery pro­ceedings taken by executing the barred ex parte decree dated 17-8-1353 T. E. are not valid. 12. Thus, the grounds given by the District Judge in his judg­ment for holding that the delivery pro­ceedings taken by executing the barred ex parte decree dated 17-8-1353 T. E. are not valid. 12. The Learned Counsel for the first respondent, however, tried to support the finding of the District Judge on the ground that the time taken during the pendency of Civil Appeal No. 24 of 1359 T. E. corresponding to 3 of 1950 has to be excluded under Article 182 of the Limitation Act and that, therefore, the ex parte decree dated 17-8-1353 T. E. was not barred by limitation on the date of the filing of E. P. 32 of 1951 A. D. He relied on Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey, AIR 1932 PC 165, Narayanan Thampi v. Lakshmi Narayana, AIR 1953 Tra-Co 220 (FB) and Thodka-malla Venkata Laxmi Narayanarao r. Kishanlal, AIR 1961 Andh Pra 326. This contention will be correct if Civil Appeal No. 24 of 1359 T. E. i.e., 3 of 1950 was filed against the judgment and decree dated 17-8-1353 T. E. But, it was filed against the judgment and decree dated 22-1-1359 T. E. which were passed on the second occasion. So the time taken in prosecuting the appeal against the judgment and decree dated 22-1-1359 T. E. cannot be deducted in computing the period of limitation for the purpose of execution of the ex parte decree dated 17-8-1353 T. E. The District Judge also referred to this aspect of the case, though he did not cite any decision. He states in his judgment that the execution proceedings in E. P. 32 of 1951 were bar­red by limitation under Article 182 of the Indian Limitation Act, as there was no appeal against the decree dated 17-8-1353 T. E. and that the period of limita­tion of 3 years ran from the date of the passing of the decree. So the execution proceedings in E. P. 32 of 1951 are bar­red by limitation. 13. The fact that the fourth defen­dant in Civil Suits Nos. 19 of 1353 T. E. and 25 of 1353 T. E. namely. So the execution proceedings in E. P. 32 of 1951 are bar­red by limitation. 13. The fact that the fourth defen­dant in Civil Suits Nos. 19 of 1353 T. E. and 25 of 1353 T. E. namely. Nabadwip Singh filed a petition under Order 9 Rule 13 Civil Procedure Code and that the decree was set aside against him also does not avail the first respondent as can be seen from Order 9 Rule 13 Civil Pro­cedure Code, under which an application is not one for "review" within the mean-Ins of clause (3) of Article 182 of the Limitation Act and the order thereon does not give a fresh start of limitation. Vide Ramakrishna Naidu v. Srinivasalu Kaidu, AIR 1950 Mad 552 . Thus, the judgment of the District Judge that the execution proceedings in E. P. 32 of 1951 are barred by limitation is correct. But his further finding that settled matters cannot be unsettled and the other rea­sons given by him for giving the finding that they are binding upon the appel­lants are not correct. 14. For the above reasons, I find point (iii) in the affirmative. 15. In the result, this second appeal is allowed and the suit is dismissed with costs in all the three Courts. The judg­ments and decrees of the two Courts below are set aside. Appeal allowed.