JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS is a second appeal by the plaintiff from the dissident judgment of the first appellate Court setting aside the decree in his favour allowing his suit for vacant possession by ejectment of the defendants tenants from certain agricultural lands. The questions for decision are the following : on jurisdiction, whether section 168 (4) of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue code gives exclusive jurisdiction to the Sub-Divisional Officer in the manner set out in section 257 of the Code, or whether this provision notwithstanding, the landlord claiming the benefit of one of the headings in section 168 (2) can sue in the civil Courts for the ejectment of the occupant; secondly, whether the defendants are prevented from getting occupancy rights under section 185 by the operation of section 168 (2) ; and thirdly, whether in view of section 189 (1)the landlord is now debarred from going to any Court after the lapse of one year from the commencement of the Code. ( 2. ) THE facts of the case are broadly speaking common ground. The plaintiff-appellant is an Inamdar holding certain lands in Inam. Actually there seems to have been some disputes between him and his co-shares-Inamdars which went up to the Courts. Ultimately it was decided that the lands in suit should be taken away from the co-sharer and given to the plaintiff. A delivery of possession was also ordered by the revenue Courts. At this stage a complication arose. The land was not vacant or in the cultivation of the co-sharer Inamdar, but was occupied by the defendants who had all the time been cultivating and paying rent to the co-sharer Inamdar. While the plaintiff wanted vacant possession of these lands the position taken by the defendant was that he was entitled only to what is called symbolic or constructive possession ; in other words, the right to receive the rent and not to take physical possession. At the first instance the revenue authorities concerned tried to give vacant possession; but later on, on a reference to the Inam Commissioner the tehsildar was advised that what was meant by the order for possession was that the plaintiff should get constructive possession that is only the right to receive rent and not actual physical possession. Accordingly the defendants were put into possession and the plaintiff came to the civil Court. Accordingly the defendants were put into possession and the plaintiff came to the civil Court. While the original litigation was between the co-sharer Inamdars, the present one between the successful co-sharer and the tenants on the land is of a very narrow scope, namely, whether in view of section 185 of the Revenue Code which came into force during the pendency of the litigation the defendants had become occupancy tenants. The next stage would be that the occupancy tenant becomes the Bhumiswami after certain payments and formalities but that apparently has not yet been reached. The trial Court held that the defendants had not become the occupancy tenants and accordingly decreed the suit. It also held that the civil Courts were competent to hear a case of this kind. The appellate Court on the contrary was not prepared on the merits to find that section 168 (2) did in the instant case prevent the accrual of occupancy rights. The plaintiff landlord was no doubt blind and in that sense disabled. But that disability in the opinion of the appellate Court did not prevent him from cultivating the land. More than this the appellate Court held that the only forum which a landlord in the position of the plaintiff could approach is the Sub-Divisional Officer. Accordingly he dismissed the suit. ( 3. ) THE general picture is clear enough. For many years this land has been in the cultivating possession of the defendants but apparently it was the plaintiffs co-sharers that had inducted them. There also seems to have been some litigation between these co-sharers and the present defendants all of which has no direct bearing on the controversy before us, namely, whether or not the defendants have acquired occupancy rights by the operation of section 185 of the Land Revenue Code. This question as such was not even the subject-matter of the previous litigation for the obvious reason that it was before the commencement of the Code. Before the revenue authorities themselves this question came up indirectly when the Tehsildar sought a clarification from the inam Commissioner who in his turn advised that only symbolic possession, that is to say, the right to receive rent should be given to the plaintiff. Therefore, the previous litigation whatever its effect does not conclude this question. ( 4. Before the revenue authorities themselves this question came up indirectly when the Tehsildar sought a clarification from the inam Commissioner who in his turn advised that only symbolic possession, that is to say, the right to receive rent should be given to the plaintiff. Therefore, the previous litigation whatever its effect does not conclude this question. ( 4. ) AT the time of the filing of the suit (1957) there was as it were a moratorium against ejectment of tenants and sub-tenants on Inamdar lands. This was under the Madhya Bharat Maufi and Inam (Tenants and Sub-Tenants) Protection Act of 1954 which was one of the enactments repealed by the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code and simultaneously section 185 came into operation. If the instant case does not attract any of the headings in section 168 (2) then certainly the defendants have acquired occupancy tenancy: "185 (1 ). Every person who at the coming into force of this Code holds. . . . . . . . . (ii) any Inam land as a tenant, or as a sub-tenant or as an ordinary tenant. . . . . . shall be called an occupancy tenant and shall have all the rights and be subject to all the liabilities conferred or imposed upon an occupancy tenant by or under this Code. " This section 185 has been elaborately interpreted in quite a number of rulings so that it is unnecessary to set out over again the established interpretation. ( 5. ) THE plaintiffs own position is not adverse to these decisions which he accepts. But his argument is that he comes under one of the exceptions contained in section 168 (2) because in section 185 itself this exception has been clearly put down : "185 (3) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to a person who at the coming into force of this Code, holds the land from a Bhumiswami who belongs to any one or more of the classes mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 168. " For attracting section 168 the lease or grant to the tenant may have come either before or after the commencement of the Code. " For attracting section 168 the lease or grant to the tenant may have come either before or after the commencement of the Code. When it is after the commencement of the Code the position is clear enough; but when it is before, the same consequences follow in the light both of section 185 (2) set out above and section 168 (5) which is the deeming provision : "168 (5 ). Where on the coming into force of this Code any land is held on lease from a Bhumiswami who belongs to any one or more of the classes mentioned in sub-section (2), such lease shall, on the coming into force of this Code, be deemed to be a lease granted in pursuance of sub section (2 ). " No doubt the plaintiff in the instant case came with the averment that the defendants were trespassers. That of course is wrong on the findings of facts, and patently from the mere narration of the circumstances. Since the defendants are lessees the plaintiff can on evidence try to show that he being a blind person suffering from the physical disability mentioned in section 168 (2) (v)the tenant does not get occupancy rights and he - the landlord - retains the right to ask for vacant possession on the termination of the period of the lease or on the breach of conditions. Here there is a further refinement that the lease had been given by a co-sharer but by the decision of the Court the plaintiff had been assigned the position of the lessor, and again the lease is one of those year-to-year leases which can in the absence of a statutory provision to the contrary be terminated at the end of the agricultural year. The plaintiffs contention is that in the circumstances the statutory provision is not available to the tenant. ( 6. ) ON the matter of disability the tenants position is this; while the landlord has been blind for 15 or 20 years he is still not incapable of cultivating these lands. As a matter of fact though blind the plaintiff has been attending to his agriculture and his litigation. After all "personal cultivation" does not mean that the landlord should plough and harrow himself; he can do everything through servants, the essence of the personal cultivation being control and supervision. As a matter of fact though blind the plaintiff has been attending to his agriculture and his litigation. After all "personal cultivation" does not mean that the landlord should plough and harrow himself; he can do everything through servants, the essence of the personal cultivation being control and supervision. Anyway, it is asserted that the plaintiff does actually look after these operations in spite of his disability. Accordingly the defendants assert that the blindness notwithstanding they cannot be deprived of their rights under section 185 (1) because of the operation of section 168. It may be noted even here that while the trial Court accepts the former, that is the landlords view-point, the appellate Court is inclined to the latter view. Question (7 ). Jurisdiction. ( 7. ) BEFORE being called upon to pronounce either way on the question set out above, we have to be clear whether this problem is one properly cognizable by a civil Court. Section 168 itself having set out the particulars of the disability provides in sub-section (4) : "168 (4 ). Where a lease is granted in pursuance of sub-section (2) or (3), the lessee shall hold the land on such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon between him and the bhumiswami and may be ejected by an order of a Sub-Divisional Officer on the application of the Bhumiswami on the ground of contravention of any material term or condition of the lease or on the lease ceasing to be in force. " This is the only express provision in the Code under which the tenant of a bhumiswami disabled under section 168 (2) can be ejected at all, the presumption being that without recourse to this step even such a tenant cannot be evicted. It may be, he does not acquire occupancy rights ; but he would still be a non-occupancy tenant liable to eviction only in this manner. This is clear enough and not questioned by the plaintiff either. The only argument made on his behalf is that in addition to the Sub-Divisional Officer the civil Court has got its general jurisdiction to entertain suits for ejecting such tenants, exactly as it is competent to entertain a suit in a general case. This argument overlooks the provisions of section 257 : "257. Except as otherwise provided in this Code,. . . . . This argument overlooks the provisions of section 257 : "257. Except as otherwise provided in this Code,. . . . . no civil Court shall entertain any suit instituted or application made to obtain a decision or order on any matter which the State government, the Board, or any Revenue Officer is, by this Code, empowered to determine, decide or dispose of, and in particular and without prejudice to the generality of this provision, no civil Court shall exercise jurisdiction over any of the following matters. . . . . . . . . (k) ejectment of a lessee of a Bhumiswami under sub-section (4) of section 168. . . . . . . . . " Now this matter regarding the ejectment of a tenant of this class is one for which a revenue officer-the Sub-Divisional Officer-has been empowered by this Code to dispose of. Therefore, the jurisdiction has to be treated as exclusive unless either in section 168 itself or elsewhere in the Code there is a genera] or a particular provision making this also cognizable by the civil courts. The whole scheme of the Code is that once powers are given to a revenue authority it would be deemed to exclude those of the civil Courts unless there is something in the Code itself retaining the civil Courts powers. There being none I would hold that the power to eject any tenant under a disabled Bhumiswami such as the plaintiff claims to be is in the Sub-Divisional officer and not in the civil Court. Even on the assumption that the plaintiff is really entitled to the benefit of section 168 (2) (v) it is for him to go to the sub-Divisional Officer. Question (2) Merits. ( 8. ) LOOKED at this way it is unnecessary for this Court to pronounce on the merits of the contention of the two parties, the plaintiff that he suffers the disability mentioned in section 168 (2) (v) and the defendants answer that it is no real disability because it does not prevent him from cultivating at least some of the lands personally. In this connection it is of interest to compare this provision with the corresponding passage in section 74 of the Madhya bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act: ". . . . . . . . . In this connection it is of interest to compare this provision with the corresponding passage in section 74 of the Madhya bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act: ". . . . . . . . . or a person incapable of personally cultivating by reason of blindness or other physical infirmity. " The difference is that under the older Act the emphasis is not on a disability but on the possible consequence, namely, of incapability of personal cultivation ; in the present section there is no question of relative emphasis because "disability" alone is mentioned. Looked at that way, the line taken by the first appellate Court may not be quite sound. It is however proper for us to leave the whole problem for consideration by the appropriate revenue officer, namely, the Sub-Divisional Officer if and when the plaintiff prays for ejectment before him. Question (3 ). ( 9. ) THE third question which has been posed is that the prayer for removing the defendants and giving vacant possession should not only be made before the Sub-Divisional Officer, but should also be registered before him within one year from the commencement of the Code. Actually the suit was from before the commencement of the Code but at present when it is being ordered that this is cognizable only by the Sub-Divisional Officer more than one year has passed from the commencement of the Code. Here again, it is not necessary for this Court to decide how in the event of a fresh proceeding before the Sub-Divisional Officer that authority should calculate limitation or as for that matter, whether section 189 is applicable to a matter directly coming under section 168 (4 ). It is enough for our purposes to hold that this matter is cognizable by a revenue Court namely, the Sub-Divisional Officer. ( 10. ) ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is dismissed but for reasons other than the ones given by the District Judge. In the special circumstances there will be no order for costs. Appeal dismissed.