Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan — 1967 DIGILAW 31 (RAJ)

MODI (Actg), C.J.—This is a group of 16 writ applications challenging the validity of Notification No. F. (12) Lab./63, dated the 31st July, 1965 (Ex. 3) published in the Rajasthan Gazette Extraordinary dated the 31st July, 1965, having been issued by the Rajasthan State under the Minimum Wages Act (No. 11) of 1948, hereinafter called the Act, purporting to revise the minimum rates of wages for employees employed in the Mica Mines throughout the State of Rajasthan in accordance with the schedule given thereunder. This notification, as stated therein, was made under sec. 3 read with sub-sec. (2) of sec. 5 of the Act by the respondent State in pursuance of notification No.LWI(1) 2(20) 58, dated the 27th June, 1960 of the Ministry of Labour and Employment of the Government of India by which the President of India acting under Art. 258(1) of the Constitution had delegated to the State Government functions of the Central Government to review and revise the minimum rates of wages for employees employed in mica mines situated in this State. The several petitioners in these writ petitions are employers engaged in the business of mica mining, that is, the manufacture and sale thereof in the various mines situated in this State. 2. The material facts leading up to these writ applications may shortly be stated as follows. To start with, the respondent State had fixed minimum wages for workmen employed in mica mines throughout Rajasthan by a notification dated the 29th March, 1952. This notification came to be challenged before this Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 58 of 1955 (N.K. Jain vs. The Labour Commissioner, Rajasthan), and by its decision dated the 27th August, 1956, which is reported as ILR (1957) VII Rajasthan 74, that notification was held to be invalid inasmuch as the committee which was appointed by the State under sec. 5(1) of the Act to advise it in the matter of the fixation of the rates in question had not been lawfully composed in accordance with certain essential requirements of sec. 9 of the Act, and consequently the notification of 1952 was struck down. I shall have occasion to refer to this case at some length hereafter. 3. Thereafter, by another notification, dated the 24th April,f 1959, the State again fixed the minimum rate of wages for workmen employed in mica mines in this State (See Ex. 1). 9 of the Act, and consequently the notification of 1952 was struck down. I shall have occasion to refer to this case at some length hereafter. 3. Thereafter, by another notification, dated the 24th April,f 1959, the State again fixed the minimum rate of wages for workmen employed in mica mines in this State (See Ex. 1). In the Schedule given under this notification, only one category of worker was specified, namely, an "adult worker", and his minimum wages were fixed at Rs. 1/5/- per day exclusive of weekly days of rest. Then again, by a further notification dated the 31st July, 1965 (Ex, 3) which is now impugned before us, the State Government revised the rates for the class of workmen with which we are concerned throughout the State of Rajasthan under 26 different categories as specified in the Schedule given in the said notification. 4. As a preliminary step to this last-mentioned notification, the State Govt. had on the 17th May, 1962, in the first instance appointed a Committee consisting I of five members, (and it is entirely unnecessary to say anything about its composition as it came to be changed before it started working) to inquire into the conditions prevailing in the employment in mica mines and to advise the State Government in the matter of revision of the rates of wages fixed by the last-mentioned notification dated the 24th April, 1959. This notification was, however, superseded by another notification dated the 26th November, 1952, by which although the total membership was maintained as before, its personnel was almost wholly changed except with respect to one of its members who happened to be a representative of the employers, and it was ordered to consist of two representatives of the employers as well as two of the employees, and Professor K. S. Mathur, Head of Department of Economics Degree Classes, Government College, Ajmer, was appointed an independent member and its chairman and a serious dispute has been raised before us about its composition with which we shall deal at its proper place. This committee submitted its report to the Government who, it was admitted during the course of arguments before us, referred it for further advice to the Advisory Board constituted under sec. 9 of the Act. This committee submitted its report to the Government who, it was admitted during the course of arguments before us, referred it for further advice to the Advisory Board constituted under sec. 9 of the Act. It was also admitted that this Advisory Board in the first instance appointed a Sub Committee to go into and further consider the report of the wages committee, which sub-committee consisted of Shri T. C. Jain, Dy. Labour Commissioner being a member of the Advisory Board, but its remaining three members were not members of the Board at all. One of these Shri S.C. Mathur, M.P., Bhilwara, was a member of the wages committee and another member thereof Shri U.S. Bhatnagar, Labour Officer, Bhilwara, was a non-member secretary of that Committee but was likewise not a member of the Advisory Board, and the remain-ing member Shri S. K. Sharma, mining Engineer, Bhilwara was also not a member of the Advisory Board nor was he in any manner connected with the primary committee. This sub-committee, in its turn, submitted its report to the Advisory Board which is Ex.6 making certain changes in the structure of wages recommended by the wages committee. 5. The matter thus came up before the Advisory Board which consisted of 21 members in all, eight of whom were employers representatives and a like number as employees representatives, and the remaining five were all Government Officers appointed as independent members, one of whom belonged to the department of Industries and Supplies and the remaining four were officers connected with the Labour Department and one out of these latter being the Secretary of the Labour Department in the State Government was nominated as its Chairman in his capacity as an independent member. The Board, then, as it says in its proceedings of the 7th May, 1965 (Ex. 8), considered the recommendations of the wages-committee and the sub-committee and submitted its report, and the wage-structure recommended by it is contained in Ex. 8 wherein it suggested an alternative scale of minimum wages according as the linking of dearness allowance with the consu-mer-price-indices was to be accepted by the State Government or not. The Govt., however, seems to have accepted the wage structure recommended by the Board on the without-linking basis as an all inclusive minimum rate of wages per month for the various categories of workmen mentioned in the schedule given under that notification Ex. The Govt., however, seems to have accepted the wage structure recommended by the Board on the without-linking basis as an all inclusive minimum rate of wages per month for the various categories of workmen mentioned in the schedule given under that notification Ex. 3 which is now impugned before us as illegal and inoperative in law. 6. In enforcement of the said Government notification, certain claims were in the normal course of things filed by the Labour Enforcement Officer before the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Kotah, against some of the petitioners, and consequently, proceedings came to be commenced before that Officer against some of them under sec. 20 of the Act, and it is contended that these proceedings are also, illegal because the notification Ex. 3 is itself illegal. It is in these circumstances, prayed by the petitioners that this Court be pleased to issue a writ or order quashing the notification Ex. 3 as illegal and inoperative and a further writ, order or direction be also issued declaring that all proceedings taken in consequence of the said notification do stand quashed and that the respondent State and the other three respondents namely the Regional Labour Commissioner, the Labour Enforcement Officer, Bhilwara, and the Assistant Labour Commissioner Kotah be restrained from taking any proceedings whatever hereafter in pursuance of the said notification. 7. These applications have been opposed by the State. 8. Now the principal grounds which have been pressed before us to assail the notification in question on behalf of the petitioners may be summarised as follows— (1) Although notification No. 3 was issued by the State purporting to revise the wages of workmen in mica mines, it was really not a notification revising the wages but it really fixed them for the first time for the various kinds of workmen mentioned in the notification. This, it was contended, the State had no jurisdiction to do, as authority had been delegated to it by the President acting under Art. 250 of the Constitution by the notification dated the 27th June, 1960, referred to above, merely to revise and review the minimum rates of wages for such employees, but authority to fix wages for the first time had never been delegated to it, and consequently the notification No. 3 is wholly invalid and inoperative. (2) The procedure followed in fixing the rates was and is grossly defective in the following vital aspects: (i) the Wages Committee as finally appointed under sec. 9 of the Act must have consisted of an equal number of the representatives of employers and of employees, and, apart from them, must have consisted at least of one independent person as chairman thereof. But the appointment of Shri S. C. Mathur as a representative of the employers thereon, it was strongly contended, was wholly illegal as he was not an employer at all nor an owner of mica mines nor was he interested in the mica mines industry at the relevant time, nor had he been ever selected by the employers as their representative. Secondly, the appointment of Professor K. S. Mathur who was the Head of the Department of Economics Degree Classes, Government College, Ajmer, as the Chairman was also vehemently challenged to be illegal as he being a Government Officer could not be said to be an independent person. The composition of this Committee was, therefore wholly vitiated according to sec. 9. (ii) Again, there was and is no order of the Government appointing the bub-Committee which sat in judgment on the wage-proposals made by the Wages Committee, and, therefore, it was a wholly unauthorised body. Even assuming, as contended for by the respondent State, that the Sub-Committee" was appointed by the Advisory Board to assist it in the formulation of these proposals, it was urged that this body must have consisted of some out of the members of the Advisory Board itself. It was not constituted, and, on the other hand, it was composed of outsiders with the exception of only one member namely Shri T. C.Jain who was Deputy Labour Commissioner. Inasmuch as the Advisory Board was obviously influenced by the recommendations of this Sub-committee, the former had acted with grave irregularity and impropriety, and consequently its deliberations were fundamentally vitiated. It was not constituted, and, on the other hand, it was composed of outsiders with the exception of only one member namely Shri T. C.Jain who was Deputy Labour Commissioner. Inasmuch as the Advisory Board was obviously influenced by the recommendations of this Sub-committee, the former had acted with grave irregularity and impropriety, and consequently its deliberations were fundamentally vitiated. (iii) Furthermore, the constitution of the Advisory Board was, it was argued, also vitiated, because it had no independent member at all inasmuch as the persons who were appointed to function as "independent members" thereof were all government officials mostly connected with the department of labour who could not be expected to be unbiased in the matter of fixation of wages for labourers and, in any case, could not be expected to act independently of the policy of the Government in this matter, and further the appointment of the Secretary to the Government in the Labour Department of the State as Chairman of this Board as an independent person was wholly misconceived as he could not by any means be accepted as "independent" in the very nature of things, and consequently the constitution and composition of the Advisory Board was entirely illegal and the decision of the Government based on the recommendations of such a body could not but be tainted with illegality. (3) Lastly, it was urged that the rates fixed by the Government on the recommendations of the Advisory Board vide notification No. 3 were so high that the industry could not afford to shoulder the burden thereof, and it was urged in this connection that the authorities concerned should have taken into consideration the capacity of the industry to pay the rates which were fixed under the notification, and in having not taken this factor into consideration in the fixation of minimum wages, the wage-structure recommended by all these bodies including the Advisory Board was bad and deserves to be set aside. 9. All these contentions have been opposed by the State, and I now propose to deal with each one of them in the order in which I have set them out above. 10. Taking up the first contention first, I am not quite sure that this was not a case of revision of rates of minimum wages within the meaning of the Act as there was an earlier notification of 1959 Ex. 10. Taking up the first contention first, I am not quite sure that this was not a case of revision of rates of minimum wages within the meaning of the Act as there was an earlier notification of 1959 Ex. 1 fixing the rates of wages of workmen in this industry (See notification dated 24th April, 1959, in this connection). Now it is true that under that notification minimum wages were fixed in a somewhat rough and ready fashion as for an adult worker on a certain wage, and a further detailed division or classification of the various categories of workers was not thought fit to be made at that time. Even so, what was done subsequently may conceivably and by no means improperly be considered as revision. But assuming though not accepting that it was not a revision as such, but was an initial fixation of minimum wages for such work, our attention has been invited to the notification of the Government of India No. 374 dated 21st February, 1952 published in the Gazette of India dated March 1, 1952, at page 345 thereof. This notification reads as follows: "In exercise of the powers conferred by cl. This notification reads as follows: "In exercise of the powers conferred by cl. (1) of Article 258 of the Consititution, the President hereby entrusts to the Government of Rajasthan with their consent the functions of the Central Government under the Minimun Wages Act 1948 (XI of 1958) in so far as such functions relate to the fixation of minimum rates of wages payable to employees in mica mines and in stone and marble quaries situated in the State of Rajasthan and to the appointment of claims officers under sec.20 of the said Act to hear and decide all claims arising out of payment of less than the minimum rate of wages to the said employees." By a subsequent notification dated the 27th June, 1960, published in the Gazette of India dated the 2nd July, 1960, Part II page 192, the Government of India made it clear that notwithstanding the entrustment to the State Government with the functions of the Government of India relating to the fixation of minimum rates of wages and the review and revision thereof for employees employed in the mica mines situated within the Rajasthan State, among certain other States with which we are not concerned, the Central Government may itself exercise such functions either generally or in any particular case or class of cases. It is no bodys case that the Central Government has taken any action in pursuance of this subsequent notification and fixed minimum rates of wages for workmen employed in the mica mines. The notification only made it clear that the Central Government also retained in tact its own power to fix minimum wages in this behalf if it so considered fit, in spite of the entrustment made in this connection to the State, but, in the absence of that Government embarking upon such a step, the State Government certainly appears to me to have the authority to not only review and revise mini- mum wages fixed for workmen in the industry in question but also to fix them in the very first instance. The State Government was, therefore, perfectly within its authority even to fix the rates of minimum wages for this class of workmen under Sec. 3 of the Act, and consequently I over-rule the petitioner objection on this score as wholly untenable. 11. The State Government was, therefore, perfectly within its authority even to fix the rates of minimum wages for this class of workmen under Sec. 3 of the Act, and consequently I over-rule the petitioner objection on this score as wholly untenable. 11. This brings us to the second head of objections under which the composition of the Wages Committee (apart from the sub-committee) and the Advisory Board have been hotly assailed before us. The principal objection raised as regards the composition of these bodies is that they were vitiated because of the Government officers having been appointed as independent members and/or as Chairman thereof. 12. Now so far as this contention is concerned, I confess that the point is not free from a certain amount of doubt or difficulty. This question has engaged the consideration of some of the High Courts in our country and has unfortunately been the subject of a sharp cleavage of judicial opinion. 13. The first case in this connection to which our attention has been invited is Jaswant Rai vs. State of Punjab (1). There the Punjab Government appointed a Wages Committee under Sec. 9 of the Act and one Mr. Oak who was the Labour Commissioner in that State was appointed as its Chairman. It was contended that his appointment as an independent person on the committee and its Chairman was illegal. This objection was, however, repelled by a learned single Judge of the Punjab High Court, holding that it was not laid down anywhere in the Act that an official of the Government could not be nominated as a member of the Committee or that only a non-official could be considered to be an independent person, and further that an independent person in the given content meant a person who was neither an employer nor an employee in the particular employment for which minimum wages were required to be fixed implying thereby that a Government officer would not fall within either of these categories. 14. On a like question having arisen before the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Narottamdass vs. P.B. Gowarikar (2), a division bench of that Court dissented from the Punjab view. Dixit C.J. speaking for the court laid down that "independent persons" as used in Sec. 9 connoted persons who were independent not only of the employers and of the employees but also of the State Government. Dixit C.J. speaking for the court laid down that "independent persons" as used in Sec. 9 connoted persons who were independent not only of the employers and of the employees but also of the State Government. The learned Chief Justice was of the view that the Government were not absolutely dis-interested in a matter like this particularly when it controlled or ran a scheduled employment or employments. Reference was also made in support of this argument to Articles 42 and 43 of the Constitution which expressly enjoined inter alia that the State shall make provision for securing just and humane conditions of work and that it shall endeavour to secure by suitable legislation or economic organisation or any other way a living wage ensuring a decent standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure, social and cultural opportunities and, therefore felt persuaded to hold that the State was actively interested in wage-earners and in the matter of fixation of minimum wages in any scheduled employment. The learned Chief Justice also took note of the fact that a Government servants freedom of action and thought was limited by the fact that he was always likely to be influenced by the policy of the Government. For these reasons, the bench held that the appointment of an official as the chairman of the Board was wholly illegal, and from this the further conclusion was drawn that if the board was not validly constituted, then it did not exist in law and that any consultation with such a Board would not be a valid consultation contemplated under the proviso to sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 5. 15. The next case is D.M.M. Rao vs. State of Kerala(3). In this case, the Chairman of the Wages Committee was a professor in a certain college and as such an officer of the Government, and his appointment as Chairman of the Committee treating him as an independent person was assailed. A learned single Judge of the Kerala High Court who disposed of this case more or less preferred the view of the Punjab High Court to that of the Madhya Pradesh. The view taken in this case, put succinctly, is that the true meaning of the expression "independent person" as used in sec. A learned single Judge of the Kerala High Court who disposed of this case more or less preferred the view of the Punjab High Court to that of the Madhya Pradesh. The view taken in this case, put succinctly, is that the true meaning of the expression "independent person" as used in sec. 9 of the Act must be taken to be that such a person should be one who has nothing to do with the employers or employees in the scheduled employment in question. But where the State itself was not connected with the employers and the employees therein, there can be no valid objection to the appointment of such a person as chairman. In coming to this conclusion, the learned Judge also took into consideration the definition of the expression "independent person" in clause (i) of Sec. 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act (which is to the effect that— "a person shall be deemed to be independent for the purpose of his appointment as the Chairman or other member of a Board, Court or Tribunal, if he is unconnected with the industrial dispute referred to such Board, Court or Tribunal or with any industry directly affected by such dispute: Provided that no person shall cease to be independent by reason only of the fact that he is a share-holder of an incorporated company which is connected with, or likely to be affected by such industrial dispute; but in such a case, he shall disclose to the appropriate Government the nature and extent of the shares held by him in such company." though he himself was cautious enough to make it clear that it would not be strictly proper to accept the test laid down under the Industrial Disputes Act for the purposes of the present Act. 16. The next case is Ramkrishna Ramnath vs. State of Maharashtra (4). The appointments of two persons on the Advisory Board, No. 1 Shri P.S. Bakhale being allegedly an official in the employment of the State Government, and No. 2 Shri G.K. Dhutiya also a Government official, being the Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Bombay, as its members were challenged, and on that basis it was contended that the composition of the Board was vitiated. The learned Judges found on facts that Shri Bakhale was not a Government servant at all at the relevant time, and that Shri Dhutiya was merely a Secretary of the Board without being a member of it. These findings would seem to have been sufficient to dispose of the writ application; but the learned Judges further went on to hold that Shri Bakhale or Shri Dhutiya would still be independent as in their view that expression was used in sec. 9 of the Act in contra-distinction with persons representing employers and persons representing employees only and did not exclude Government servants from its true ambit. It further appears that there was an earlier judgment of the Bombay High Court in President, Nagpur Mudrak Sangh vs. State of Bombay(5) which took the same view and which was, therefore, binding on this bench. The learned Judges further went on to hold that even if Shri Bakhale or Shri Dhutiya did not fall within the category of independent persons still that would not vitiate the entire composition of the Board as in their opinion it was an irregularity of more or less a minor character. 17. The next case on the point is Bengal M.P.E. Union vs. Kohinoor Pictures (6) of the Calcutta High Court. The decisions in A.I.R. 1958 Punjab 425 (supra) of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in A.I.R. 1961 M.P. 182 (supra) and that of the Kerala High Court in A.I.R. 1963 Kerala 115 (Supra) appear to have been brought to its notice and the High Court preferred the view of the Kerala High Court to that of the Madhya Pradesh High Court. The learned Chief Justice Bose who delivered the leading judgment in the case held that there could hardly be any room for doubt that persons like the Labour Commissioner or the Deputy Labour Commissioner would be the most suitable persons to be consulted in the matter of fixation of minimum wages under the Act and that the expression "independent" as used in the context of sec. 9 of the Act means a person other than those who are employers and employees in relation to the scheduled employment in respect of which the minimum wages are to be fixed, and, therefore, any person who could not be characterised as an employer or employee of the particular scheduled employment would be an independent person within the meaning of the Act. The learned Chief Justice further held that merely because a person nominated to function as an independent person in the committee was a Government official was no bar to such nomination as there was no indication in the Act that a Government Official was disqualified from functioning as an independent person and further that there was no warrant for any suggestion that the Labour Commissioner would not act in a disinterested manner or that the Government in discharging its duties and functions under the Act in fixing the minimum wages was likely to take sides with the wage-earners or to act in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the employers. In this view of the matter, the learned single Judges finding that the notification of the Government fixing the minimum wages was bad because the constitution of the Advisory Committee was defective, the Labour Commissioner and the Deputy Labour Commissioner being not independent persons within the meaning of sec. 9 of the Act, was held to be erroneous and was set aside. 18. The next and the last but one case to which I should like to refer in this connection is Bansilal vs. State of A.P. (7) of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. In this case, the view taken in 1961 M. P. 182 was followed and the decision of the learned single judge in Kohinoor Pictures (Pvt.) Ltd. vs. State of W. Bengal (8) which was reversed by the division bench in AIR 1958 Pun. 425 & AIR 1963 Kerala 115 was dissented from. In this case, the view taken in 1961 M. P. 182 was followed and the decision of the learned single judge in Kohinoor Pictures (Pvt.) Ltd. vs. State of W. Bengal (8) which was reversed by the division bench in AIR 1958 Pun. 425 & AIR 1963 Kerala 115 was dissented from. This is how the learned Judges summed up their views in this case: "We hold that the view of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in AIR 1961 Madh Pra 182......and of the Calcutta High Court in 1961-2 Lab LJ 741............is more acceptable and that Government Officials of the executive department, as distinct from officials engaged in judicial work or department, cannot be considered to be independent persons for the purpose of sec.9 of the Act, even though they are not directly connected with the manufactory in which the wages are to be enquired and reported on by the Committee concerned. We are also in agreement with the view of the Madhya Pradesh and Calcutta High Courts expressed in the above decisions that Government cannot be considered to be absolutely disinterested party in the matter of fixation of minimum wages." The last case to which we have adverted above but which calls for some more detailed mention is the case of our own Court reported as N. K. Jain vs. Labour Commissioner (9) though the facts there were somewhat different. In that case the composition of the Advisory Committee appointed under sec. 5(l)(a) of the Act was attacked, among other matters, on the ground that it only consisted of six of its officers and that neither the employers nor the employees in the scheduled employments were represented thereon, and, that being so, it was contended that the committee was not properly constituted as required by law, and the notification issued on the basis of its advice was invalid and inoperative in law. In deciding this case the learned Chief Justice (Wanchoo C.J. speaking for the Court) "assumed" that all the six members appointed to the Committee were independent persons but found that there was no representation of the employers or the employees on the Committee. In deciding this case the learned Chief Justice (Wanchoo C.J. speaking for the Court) "assumed" that all the six members appointed to the Committee were independent persons but found that there was no representation of the employers or the employees on the Committee. It was, therefore, held that as there was no representation of the employers or the employees in any of the scheduled employements on the Committee, it was a Committee merely in name and none in reality, and consequently the Governments notification fixing minimum rates of wagers was of no legal force and effect. In coming to this conclusion, the learned Chief Justice relying on the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Bijay Cotton Mills Ltd. vs. State of Ajmer (10) laid down as follows: "The Supreme Court held the Act valid because of the provision, among others, which required the State Government, infixing minimum wages, to take into account the advice of the Committee or the representations on its proposals. If this provision and similar provisions relating to consultation with advisory bodies had not been made obligatory, the Act would, in all probability, have been struck down. Therefore, obtaining the advice of the committee under sec. 5(a) or consideration of representations on the proposals of the State Government is the sine qua non of fixation of minimum wages without appointing a committee under sec. (1) (a) for without publishing its proposals and inviting the representation and considering them and further if the State Government were to revise the minimum rates of wages without consultation with advisory bodies provided in other sections of the Act, the notification fixing minimum rates of wages or revising them would in our opinion, be clearly against the basic provisions of the Act, and would have no force and validity." Earlier in their judgment, the learned Chief Justice referred to another Supreme Court case namely Edward Mills Co. v. State of Ajmer (11) wherein it had been observed with reference to a certain irregularity committed by the State Government in the matter of the extension of the life of the Wages Committee that it was only an advisory body and that the Government was not bound to accept any of its recommendations and so consequential procedural irregularities of that nature could not vitiate the final report which fixed the minimum wages, but distinguished that case and went on to observe that there were irregularities and irregularities and that while some irregularities may not be such as to vitiate the final notification there may be others of a fundamental character which could not but have the effect of vitiating the final order and that it did not follow from the judgment of the Supreme Court in the Edward Mills, case(supra) that irrespective of the nature of the irregularity there could be no vitiation of the final order under any circumstances. 19. This is more or less the entire case law bearing on the point which we are called upon to decide so far as it has been brought to our notice and I have been able to gather myself. And before I proceed to pronounce my own opinion thereon, I would briefly refer to the objective underlying the Act and the provisions relative to the point for determination before us. 20. Now, it is well settled that the provisions of this Act are intended to achieve the object of doing social justice to workmen employed in the scheduled employments by prescribing minimum rates of wages for them to protect them from exploitation. The employments chosen for such regulation are those in which, broadly speaking, labour is not properly organised so that it does not possess the requisite bargaining power qua employers to protect its own interests. Sec. 3 of the Act thus vests the appropriate Government with the power to fix the minimum rates of wages in any employments specified in Para I or Para II of the Schedule or in an employment which may be added to either of these parts by a notification under S. 7 and also to review and revise such minimum rates if necessary at intervals which shall not exceed five years. The next important sec. 5 which lays down the procedure for the fixation of revision of minimum wages. The next important sec. 5 which lays down the procedure for the fixation of revision of minimum wages. It provides for two methods to achieve the desired objective. The first is that the appropriate Government may appoint the necessary committees and sub committees to hold inquiries and advise it in respect of such fixation or revision. The second is that the appropriate Government may by a notification in the official Gazette publish its proposals for the information of persons likely to be affected thereby and specify a date as prescribed in the section for the proposals to be taken into consideration. It is further provided that thereafter in the case of the first method, after considering the advice of the committees or sub committees, or, in the case of the second method, after considering all representations which may have been received by it before the date specified in the notification, the appropriate Government may fix or revise the minimum rates of wages in respect of a scheduled employment, and, ordinarily speaking, such notification is to come into force on the expiry of three months from the date of its issue. A further safeguard is provided in the case of revision of rates by the Government by adoption of the second mode referred to above, and that is that in such a case it is obligatory for the appropriate Government to consult the Advisory Board. 21. Section 7 then provides for the appointment of an advisory board. It lay down that the appropriate Government shall appoint such a Board for the purpose of coordinating the work of committees and sub-committees appointed under section 5 and also for advising the appropriate Government generally in the matter of fixing and revising minimum rates of wages. Sec. 8 likewise provides for the appointment of a Central Advisory Board for coordination and consultation at a higher level, but with that we are not concerned. Sec.9 is the most important sec. for our purpose and regulates the composition of committees, subcommittees and the Advisory Board. We reproduce this sec. here; "9. Composition of committees etc. Sec. 8 likewise provides for the appointment of a Central Advisory Board for coordination and consultation at a higher level, but with that we are not concerned. Sec.9 is the most important sec. for our purpose and regulates the composition of committees, subcommittees and the Advisory Board. We reproduce this sec. here; "9. Composition of committees etc. Each of the committee, sub-committee and the Advisory Board shall consist of persons to be nominated by the appropriate Government representing employers and employees in the scheduled employments, who shall be equal in number, and independent persons not exeeding one-third of its total numbers; one of such independent persons shall be appointed the Chairman by the appropriate Govt. 22. Now it is obvious that a Wages Committee or a sub-committee or an advisory board is to consist of three types of members; those (1) representing employers and (2) representing employees, both generally in relation to the scheduled employments, and these must be equal in number and (3) independent persons not exceeding 1/3rd of the total number of the membership of the body concerned. It is further provided that the Chairman of any of these bodies must be one of such independent persons. 23. A good deal of trouble has arisen in the law courts as to the precise connotation of the expression "independent persons" as used in S. 9. One view is that a person would be independent so long as he is not connected with the two contending sections namely the employers and the employees, and in this view a Government servant would always be an independent member and could be appointed as such. See A.I.R. 1958 Punjab, 425 and A.I.R. 1964 Bombay 51 (Supra). The second view is that in order that a Government official may be validly nominated as an independent member, the Government must not be interested as an employer in the particular sechduled employment in which wages are sought to be fixed. See AIR 1963 Kerala 115 and AIR 1964 Calcutta 519 (Supra). The third view seems to be that as the State is a modern multi-functioned organisation which undertakes commercial and industrial undertakings, a Government Officer (excepting those belonging to its judicial wing) cannot be considered to be an independent member. See AIR 1961 M. P. 182 and AIR 1965 A. P. 182 (Supra). 24. The question is which of these views is the more acceptable. See AIR 1961 M. P. 182 and AIR 1965 A. P. 182 (Supra). 24. The question is which of these views is the more acceptable. Unfortunately the expression "independent" has not been defined anywhere in the Act with which we are concerned. It may also be recalled that at least in one case which has been discussed above, the definition of the expression "independent" as given in the Industrial Disputes Act has been sought to be availed of. But, speaking for myself, I am extremely doubtful if that can be properly pressed into use for the purpose of interpreting this expression as used in sec. 9 of the present Act; the more so, as the definition given in the other Act is a "deeming" one. That definition, as it were, introduces a legal fiction so that it would be perfectly permissible to argue that, but for it, persons who would stand covered by the express language thereof would otherwise not have fallen within its scope. That being so, it would be going too far to accept this definition as a safe and reliable guide for assigning the same meaning to the word "independent" under the Act, Besides, there was nothing to prevent the Legislature from incorporating a like definition under the Act with which we are concerned if it wanted to do so and assign a border meaning to the word "independent" than it would naturally or normally bear in the setting in which it has been used. 25. Now as I look at the matter, it seems to me, with all respect, that sec. 9 speaks of three classes of members which in their totality exhaust the various categories of personnel who could be appointed on the several bodies under this section. The first category mentioned therein consists of the representatives of the employers, and the second of the representatives of the employees, and the number of persons to be appointed of both these categories is required to be equal. The first category mentioned therein consists of the representatives of the employers, and the second of the representatives of the employees, and the number of persons to be appointed of both these categories is required to be equal. It is further well-settled that the Act does not require that these representatives whether on the side of the employers or on that of the employees must necessarily belong to the particular employment for which minimum wages are to be fixed, and indeed they may belong to any one or more of the scheduled employments (See M/s Bhikusa vs. Sangamner A. T. B. K. Union(12) nor is it necessary that every employment in the schedule should be represented on such bodies, because if that were an indispensable requirement, the composition of these bodies would become unnecessarily unweildy. 26. This brings us to the remaining and the third element which is further required to be represented on such bodies, and that is to consist of independent persons not exceeding one-third of the total number of members of any such body, and it is further provided that the Chairman of a committee or the board under sec. 9 must be one out of such independent members. 27. Now oh a most careful and earnest consideration of the texture of sec.9 am disposed to think that the independent persons contemplated under s. 9 should he persons who are neither connected with employers or with employees in any of the scheduled employments within the meaning of the section. Suppose, the Government is an employer in the particular scheduled employment for which wages are sought to be fixed under the Act. Could it be postulated in such a case that an officer of the Government can be properly appointed as an "independent" person on any of the statutory bodies in question? The answer to this question, to my mind, should be in the negative. It is immaterial that such an officer himself is not an official connected with the particular scheduled employment. Now suppose again, the Government is an employer not in the particular scheduled employment for which wages are sought to be fixed but for one or more of the scheduled employments. The question again is whether in such a case also it can be properly accepted that any of its officers can be appointed by the Government on any of the bodies under sec. The question again is whether in such a case also it can be properly accepted that any of its officers can be appointed by the Government on any of the bodies under sec. 9 to advise it for the purpose of minimum wages under the Act as independent persons? Speaking for myself, I am extremely doubtful that that could be done. The reason is that the phrase "in the scheduled employments" qualifying employers and employees in the preceding part of the section would equally stand in the way of the Government officers being appointed as independent persons provided of course the Govt. itself happens to be an employer in any of the scheduled employments within the meaning of the Act. If the phrase "scheduled employments" as used in the case of representatives of employers and employees is to be construed generally as embracing not merely the particular employment in connection with which the wages are to be fixed but with reference to any of the employments mentioned in the schedule to the Act, then I think that the expression "independent persons" as used in the section in its normal connotation would exclude persons who are likewise connected with the Government on the assumption that it is an employer in any of the scheduled employments. Any other meaning, in my judgment, would be strained and artificial and would smack of discrimination in favour of the Government. 28. Putting the whole thing from a somewhat different angle, I would ask, to test the validity of my stand-point; Gould a person connected with an employer other than the Government, or a person connected with an organisation of the employees in any one of the scheduled employments be appointed as an independent member on any of these statutory committees or as a Chairman thereof on the mere ground that he is not connected with the particular scheduled employment for which wages are sought to be fixed under the Act ? The answer to this question, to my mind, cannot but be in the negative. By parity of reasoning I do not see how can the answer be different in the case of a Government under like circumstances. The answer to this question, to my mind, cannot but be in the negative. By parity of reasoning I do not see how can the answer be different in the case of a Government under like circumstances. I need hardly add in this connection that if the Government be not an employer in any of the scheduled employments, there could be no objection to the Government officers of the requisite calibre and experience being appointed as independent persons within the meaning of the section; but it is admitted before us that the State Government is an employer in some of these employments such as public motor transport, and construction and maintenance of roads and building operations and may be, for aught we know, in certain other employments also. Again, Government officer could of course be appointed as a representative of the Government as an employer to which there could be no objection whatever. 29. In the view which I feel persuaded to hold, therefore, I feel bound to confess, with utmost respect, that I have not found myself in agreement with the opinion expressed in some of the cases cited above that a person would be independent simply because he is a Government Officer being not connected with the contending parties, to wit, the employers and employees as such, or with the view that a Government officer could well be so appointed on any of these committees even if the Government is an employer in any one or more of the scheduled employments so long as it is not an employer in the particular employment in which wages are sought to be fixed. I should also like to add that I have not felt impressed by the difficulty adverted to in some of these cases that if such a view is taken, Government would find it almost impossible to appoint independent persons on such committees. I should also like to add that I have not felt impressed by the difficulty adverted to in some of these cases that if such a view is taken, Government would find it almost impossible to appoint independent persons on such committees. For I have no hesitation in affirming that there is no dearth of non-official talent in our vast country of which Government could certainly take advantage if only it wishes to do so, and indeed a body composed of independent persons of this class in the sense I have explained above along with the representatives of the various employers and employees in the scheduled employments would certainly inspire far greater confidence in all the parties concerned than a body packed with officials under the guise of independent persons whose independence, after all is said and done, would not be beyond suspicion with the best will in the world. I hold accordingly. 30. The next question is how do the principles that I have felt persuaded to accept above apply in the present case? Let us first take the Wages Committee. This committee contained of five persons. Shri Bansilal Choudhary and Shri S. G. Mathur as employers representatives and the other two Shri Gokulprasad Sharma and Shri R. G. Vyas as employees representatives, and the fifth person on it was Professor K. S. Mathur, Head of the Department of Economics, Degree Classes, Government College, Ajmer, as an independent member who was appointed as its chairman. The Labour Officer, Bhilwara, Shri U. S. Bhatnagar was appointed as Secretary of the Committee. Obviously he was not a member of the Committee. In the first place, there is dispute before us as to whether Shri S. G. Mathur was at all a genuine representative of the employers, the contention being that he never represented any employers nor was he interested in the mica mining industry at the relevant time nor pad he been selected as their representative by the employers individually or collectively. This contention was negatived by the respondent State in at least one of the cases definitely, although in the rest of the cases it was just denied only roundly. In Rajeshwar Dayal vs. Stats of Rajasthan ( Civil Misc. Writ No. 461 of 1966 ) it was stated on behalf of the State that Shri S. G. Mathur was one of the two partners of Messrs. In Rajeshwar Dayal vs. Stats of Rajasthan ( Civil Misc. Writ No. 461 of 1966 ) it was stated on behalf of the State that Shri S. G. Mathur was one of the two partners of Messrs. Jai Bharat Minerals, Bhilwara, who held a mica mining lease of about 288 acres in District Bhilwara. By a further affidavit dated the 10th January, 1967, on the side of the petitioners, it was asserted that the Jai Bharat Minerals had surrendered their mining lease on the 24th April, 1961, and that that surrender had been accepted by the Government on the 21st April, 1962, and, therefore, Shri Mathur was not holding any mica mines at the relevant time. This affidavit was further countered by a counter-affidavit filed by the officer-in-charge on behalf of the State on 11th January, 1967, that although it was correct that Shri Mathur had surrendered his above-mentioned lease before he was appointed to the Wages Committee he had obtained two other mining leases one for the mines at Dantal and the other at Sangawa and that the lease for Sangawa had been granted to him on the 11th February, 1961, which had been surrendered by Shri Mathur on the 10th November, 1964, and accepted by the Government on the 12th January, 1965, and consequently he did hold a mining lease in November, 1962, at the time of his appointment on the Wages Committee. Some of the affidavits to which I have referred above were filed during the course of arguments, a practice of which I do not quite approve. Be that as it may, I am not positively satisfied on the material which has been brought on the record that Shri Mathur could not have been appointed a representative of the employers by the Government on the Wages Committee on the date he was, that is, on the 26th November, 1962, and there this matter must remain. 31. This brings me to the other objection so far as this Committee is concerned, and that is about the appointment of the only independent member on it being professor K. S. Mathur, Head of the Department of Economics, Degree Classes, Government College Ajmer, appointed its Chairman. It is admitted that he was in the service of the State Government at the time. It is admitted that he was in the service of the State Government at the time. Having regard to the principle which I have discussed above and in view of the fact that the State Government was an employer in some of the scheduled employments within the meaning of the Schedule to the Act, I am unable to uphold the appointment of this person as valid. He was the only member on this Committee who was nominated as an independent member but was not. The result would be that there was no independent member on this committee, nor a Chairman who could be considered as independent. It seems to me that the presence of at least one independent member on the committee appointed under sec. 9 is and must be a sine qua non of its validity. This condition having not been satisfied, I am constrained to hold that the Committee was not validly constituted and was therefore of no effect and force in law. 32. I would next deal with the sub-committee. This does not appear to have been a statutory body inasmuch as no government order formulating it has been brought to our notice, and this was obviously appointed by the Advisory Board to go into and further consider the recommendations made by the Wages Committee. This sub-Committee was composed of four members as follows: (1) Shri T.C. Jain, Deputy Labour Commissioner. (2) Shri U.S. Bhatnagar, Labour officer, Bhilwara. (3) Shri S.C. Mathur, M. P. Bhilwara, and (4) Shri S.K. Sharma; Mining Engineer, Bhilwara. I will assume for the purposes of this case that it was open to the Advisory Board to have appointed a sub-committee to help it in its deliberations. I am, however, disposed to hold the opinion that the Advisory Board, if at all, could have constituted a sub-committee like this out of its own members and could not have travelled outside its own membership to validly constitute it. Thus it will be seen that of the four members thereof, Shri T. C.Jain was certainly one of its members, and his appointment, therefore, was in order. So far as we know, Shri S. C. Mathur M. P. was certainly a member of the Wages Committee; but there is nothing on this record to show that he was a member of the Advisory Board. So far as we know, Shri S. C. Mathur M. P. was certainly a member of the Wages Committee; but there is nothing on this record to show that he was a member of the Advisory Board. I am, therefore, not satisfied that his appointment to this Committee was in order. Of the two remaining members, one was Shri U. S. Bhatnagar, Labour Officer, Bhilwara. He was admittedly not a member of the Advisory Board, but was just a non-member Secretary of the Wages Committee, who had no right even to take part in the deliberations of that committee. The other member Shri S.K. Sharma, Mining Engineer, Bhilwara, was also not a member of the Board, still, he was also appointed a member of this sub-committee. As this sub-committee states in its report, Ex. 6, it reconsidered the minimum rates of wages for different categories of workmen for mica mines as fixed by the Wages-Committee and it recommended certain changes which, as stated by the Advisory Board itself in its report, it took notice of and which it seems to have adopted also in its own recommendations to the Government. As I look at the matter, the reference by the Advisory Board of Wages Committees report to the above mentioned sub-committee, constitued as it was, was fundamentally irregular proceeding. Further, it is also a serious question whether the procedure followed by it in allowing itself to be influenced by the recommendations made by a body which was wholly improperly constituted was at all warranted and legal. My answer to this question is in the negative. 33. Then we come to the constitution of the Board. The Board consisted of 21 members in all. Of these eight were employers representatives and there was an equal number of the representatives of the employees on it. The remaining five members were appointed by the Government as independent persons under sec. 9 of the Act. These were as follows: (1) Secretary to the Government, Labour Department, Jaipur—Chairman (2) Labour Commissioner, Rajasthan Jaipur -Member. (3) Deputy Labour Commissioner (Laws) Rajasthan Jaipur—Member. (4) Director of Industries and Supplies or Deputy Director of Industries and Supplies, Rajasthan, Jaipur—Member. (5). Deputy Labour Commissioner (Welfare) Rajasthan, Jaipur—Member. All these were Government Officers and out of these, four belonged to the Labour Department, and the fifth to that of the Industries and Supplies. (3) Deputy Labour Commissioner (Laws) Rajasthan Jaipur—Member. (4) Director of Industries and Supplies or Deputy Director of Industries and Supplies, Rajasthan, Jaipur—Member. (5). Deputy Labour Commissioner (Welfare) Rajasthan, Jaipur—Member. All these were Government Officers and out of these, four belonged to the Labour Department, and the fifth to that of the Industries and Supplies. The Chairman of the Board was the Secretary to the State Government in the Labour Department. I am unable to accept this panel of so called independent persons as really independent having regard to the connotation of the expression independent which I have discussed and felt persuaded to accept above and which I need not repeat at this place. Suffice it to say that the State Government being admittedly an employer in some of the scheduled employments within the meaning of the Act, its officers cannot be properly accepted as independent persons on the same criterion that a representative of an employers in any scheduled employment could not be accepted as an independent person for the purpose in view, even though he may not have had any connect on with the particular employment for which minimum wages are sought to be fixed. Besides, the appointment of the Secretary in the Labour Department as the Chairman of this Advisory Board appears to me, with all respect, to be singularly inappropriate for reasons which are not far to seek. A secretary to Government is so bound up with the executive wing of the State and its policies that he cannot normally be expected to function as a member of a statutory body like this with the requisite independence and impartiality which would be expected of him. It must follow from the foregoing discussion that this Board, constituted as it was, did not have any element of independent membership at all, and at the best it can be said to have been composed of the employers representatives and those of the employees. Such an Advisory Board, in my considered judgment, does not substantially fulfil the requirements of Sec. 9 and was and is fundamentally defective. I hold accordingly. 34. Such an Advisory Board, in my considered judgment, does not substantially fulfil the requirements of Sec. 9 and was and is fundamentally defective. I hold accordingly. 34. To dissuade me from the logical conclusion to the findings at which I have arrived above would inevitably lead, the learned Government advocate strenuously pressed that after all is said and done, the various committees including the Advisory Board appointed under S. 9 of the Act are only advisory, and that it is absolutely open to the Government to accept their advice or not, and, that being so, even if I came to the conclusion as regards the improper constitution of the Wages Committee and the Advisory Board and the irregular procedure followed by it in conducting its deliberations, I should still hold that all these irregularities were really of no consequence and that the notification Ex. 3 issued by the State Government which it alone had the power to issue was valid and unexceptionable. 35. On having given my most careful and anxious consideration to this aspect of the case, I confess I have not felt persuaded to accept it as sound. It is correct that in the ultimate analysis it is for the Government to fix or revise the structure of wages for workmen engaged in any of the scheduled employments within the meaning of the Act. But it may usefully be recalled in this context that this power came up for challenge before the Supreme Court as being uncanalised and unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional. This is how the objection was precisely formulated in Bijay Cotton Mills Ltd. v. State of Ajmer (Supra). ".........the provisions relating to the fixtion of minimum wages are unreasonable and arbitrary. The whole thing has been left to the unfettered discretion of the appropriate Government and even when a committee is appointed the report or advice of such committee is not binding on the Government." And their lordships answer to this objection was this: "As regards the procedure, for the fixing of minimum wages, the appropriate Government has undoubtedly been given very large powers. But it has to take into consideration, before fixing wages, the advice of the committee if one is appointed, or the representations on its proposals made by persons who are likely to be affected thereby. But it has to take into consideration, before fixing wages, the advice of the committee if one is appointed, or the representations on its proposals made by persons who are likely to be affected thereby. Consultation with advisory bodies has been made obligatory on all occasions of revision of minimum wages.........In the committees or the advisory bodies the employers and the employees have an equal number of representatives and there are certain independent members besides them who are expected to take a fair and impartial view of the matter. These provisions, in our opinion, constitute an adequate safeguard against any hasty or capricious decision by the appropriate Government." It will be clear from their Lordships view that although deliberations and decisions of the wages committee and the advisory board and any other committee appointed under the Act are of an advisory character and it is for the Government to take a final decision thereon, the appointment of these bodies in the investigation and finalisation of the proposals committed to their charge has a definite legislative and practical, and if I may say so, they have a positive persuasive value of undeniable importance as the experts on the subject which no Government would or should disregard, without adequate justification. 36. That being so, the view that any defects in the constitution or the procedure followed by such bodies howsoever grave and serious are of no materiality whatever is an extreme proposition of too sweeping a character which I find myself unable to assent to. It may also be usefully remembered in this connection that a somewhat analogous case arose in I.L.R. (1957) VII Rajasthan 74(Supra) in the sense that on the Committee appointed by the Government to fix minimum wages for workmen in mica mines on that occasion, no representatives of the employers or the employees were appointed and the wages committee consisted only of officials who/it was assumed for the purposes of that case, were independent persons, and, therefore, it was held that the said committee was fundamentally defective and the notification of the Government, based as it was on the report of that committee, was struck down. I agree that it is not each and every sort of irregularity as to the composition of such bodies which can have the effect of vitiating a Government notification issued as a result of the recommendations thereof, and before such a course is taken, it must be affirmatively ascertained that the defect is of a fundamental nature and that it goes to the very root of the constitution of any of these bodies, or the procedure followed by them is grossly or vitally improper. But where such a case is established, the argument that bodies such as these are of a merely advisory character, properly speaking, cannot and should not be of any avail. As I have held above, neither the Wages Committee nor the Advisory Board had any real independent persons on its personnel, and further the Advisory Board had referred the report of the Wages Committee to an entirely unauthorised body and allowed itself to be influenced by its recommendations, a procedure which has not commended itself to me as either correct or desirable. 37. In these circumstances, I am definitely disposed to come to the conclusion that there are grave defects which go to the very root of the notification which is impugned before us and are therefore, sufficient to vitiate it. 38. The third and the last contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is that the rates fixed by the impugned notification are such that the petitioners before us having regard to the size and nature of their business could not afford to pay the same to the workers in their mines without ruining the industry itself and that the Wages Committee and the Advisory Board had fallen into serious error in not taking this factor of their "capacity to pay" into consideration, and that on this ground also we should strike down the rates fixed in the notification. The short answer to this contention is that the quantum of rates fixed under the Act is an essentially administrative matter which is not subject to judicial review and is therefore outside the purview of the courts. The short answer to this contention is that the quantum of rates fixed under the Act is an essentially administrative matter which is not subject to judicial review and is therefore outside the purview of the courts. See Vasudevan vs. State of Kerala (13), It is an entirely different matter that where the notification fixing or revising the rates may be open to challenge on the the ground of a fundamental defect of jurisdiction or of a serious error of procedure which may go to the very root of the matter in which cases it would be certainly open to the court to quash it in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226. In this state of the law, this objection has no force and is hereby dismissed. 39. The net result is that, for the reasons discussed above, I would allow these applications and set aside the notification of the Government dated the 31st July, 1965, and all further proceedings which may have been taken against any of the petitioners in pursuance thereof. Having regard to all the circumstances of the case, I would, however, leave the parties to bear their own costs in this Court. Honble Kan Singh J.—I have had the advantage of going through in advance the judgment just delivered by my Lord. While I am in respectful agreement with the conclusion reached by my Lord that the impugned notification is bad and has to be set aside, I have a reservation as to the precise meaning of the words independent persons occurring in sec. 9 of the Minimum Wages Act (No. 11) of 1948. I may, however, make it clear that I am giving expression to this reservation with utmost deference to the pronouncement made by my Lord and that too not without a certain degree of diffidence. As my Lord has observed, after making a critical survey of the available case law on the point with his characteristic thoroughness, the term independent has unfortunately not been defined in this Act, and if I may say so, this is by and large responsible for the cleavage of judicial opinion in the various High Courts. As the term independent has not been defined in the Act, we have to construe it in its dictionary meaning. 2. As the term independent has not been defined in the Act, we have to construe it in its dictionary meaning. 2. Websters Third New International Dictionary defines the term independent inter alia as "being or acting free of the influence of something else, not looking to others for ones opinions or for the guidance of ones conduct; not biased to act or think freely." 3. The Oxford English Dictionary also uses the term independent inter alia as "not depending on others for the formation of opinions or guidance of conduct; not influenced or biased by the opinions of others; thinking or acting, or disposed to think or act, for oneself." 4. We have, therefore, to construe the words independent persons in the context in which they occur as persons who are capable of forming their own opinions uninfluenced or biased by the opinions of others. 5. Now, whether a person is an independent person or not, will by and large depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and, in my view, it is not possible or even desirable to spell out a hide bound formula for judging a particular category of persons to be independent or not independent within the meaning of sec. 9 of the Act. The general setting of the enactment in which sec. 9 occurs has also to be borne in mind. While sec. 9 describes three categories of persons namely, persons representing employers persons representing employees and independent persons, we cannot over look the fact that inspite of its awareness of the fact that in a welfare State like ours the Government is the biggest single employer even in some of the scheduled employments, the legislature has entrusted the task of fixing minimum wages to no other than the appropriate Government (vide sec. 3 of the Act.) Not only this, the Government has been given the power to add to the list of employments contained in the schedule. Therefore, to my mind, the legislature has obviously kept in view the distinction between the functions of the Government as the Chief Executive authority of the State which may be described as Government functions as such and its activities as an employer which may properly come under the domain of commercial or trading activities of the State. 6. Therefore, to my mind, the legislature has obviously kept in view the distinction between the functions of the Government as the Chief Executive authority of the State which may be described as Government functions as such and its activities as an employer which may properly come under the domain of commercial or trading activities of the State. 6. As an instance in point I may refer to the role that the different departments of the same Government have to play in the matter of Payment of Wages Act. In the case of workers where the State is the employer, certain departmental officers are made responsible for the payment of wages and in case of non-payment of wages the officers of the Labour Department are authorised to initiate proceedings before the Payment of Wages Authority against Govt. departments even. Similarly the Government officers responsible for assessment and levy of sales-tax have even to make assessments against Government departments who are regarded as dealers in proceedings under the Sales-tax Laws. I have mentioned this only to emphasise that there is a clear demarcation between the functions of the Government which are sovereign governmental function and functions which are properly commercial in character and one cannot, therefore, unhesitatingly come to the conclusion that simply because the Government comes in as an employer in the course of its trading or commercial activities the Government or its officers when dealing with the other functions of the Government can be said to have any bias for or against any body. 7. Therefore, in my view, simply because a person is a Government servant, it should not be sufficient for holding that he is not to be considered on that score alone to be a person who is not independent for the purposes of sec. 9 of the Act. 8. The Legislature while entrusting the task of fixing minimum wages to Government has made provision for certain advisory bodies so that the Government should have the benefit of a considered opinion emerging from deliberations of representatives of all the interests concerned. 9 of the Act. 8. The Legislature while entrusting the task of fixing minimum wages to Government has made provision for certain advisory bodies so that the Government should have the benefit of a considered opinion emerging from deliberations of representatives of all the interests concerned. Independent persons contemplated therein are, to my mind, persons who should be able to express an opinion which may not suffer from any bias for either the employers or the employees and at the same time their approach is not coloured by thought that it is they who are ultimately concerned with the formulation or execution of policies underlying the Act. The purposes in making provision for the quota of independent persons in the composition of Wage Committee or Advisory Board is to ensure a properly balanced approach to the problem of evolving a just wage structure. 9. In my view, therefore, a person is not independent within the meaning of sec. 9 of the Act, simply because he happens to be a Government servant and the Government happens to be an employer in any of the scheduled employment. For seeing whether a Government servant is or is not independent one has to find out whether he can be said to be biased for or against the employers or employees, as the case may be, or is concerned with the administration of the Act itself. It is common knowledge that the Act is administered by the Government in the Labour Department and on this consideration therefore, I am inclined to hold that the officers working in the Labour Department or for that matter, the Secretary to the Government in the Labour Department persons which can not be said to be independent the meaning of sec. 9 of the Act. 10. Applying the criterion to the present matter I am unable to hold that the appointment of Professor K. S. Mathur, Head of the Department of Economics, Degree Classes, Government College Ajmer, as an independent member on the Wage Committee and also as its Chairman was bad. In consequence the composition of the Wage Committee cannot be held to be bad. Applying the criterion to the present matter I am unable to hold that the appointment of Professor K. S. Mathur, Head of the Department of Economics, Degree Classes, Government College Ajmer, as an independent member on the Wage Committee and also as its Chairman was bad. In consequence the composition of the Wage Committee cannot be held to be bad. If the matter were to stand at that and then the Government were to pass the order u/s. 3 of the Act, after considering the recommendations of the Wage Committee, the matter would have assumed a different complexion, but I find that the recommendations of the Wage Committee were super-imposed by the recommendations made by the Advisory Board. The learned Government Advocate has not been able to satisfy us as to how the recommendations of the Wage Committee were dealt with after they were submitted. From what the learned Government Advocate submitted before us at the Bar an impression was left on us that the recommendations were taken to the Secretary by an officer of the Labour Department and the Secretary, in his turn, forwarded the case to the Advisory Board. Here the Secretary has mixed up his two capacities as Secretary to the Government in the Labour Department and as Chairman of the Advisory Board. The learned Government Advocate has failed to convince us that the case was sent to the Advisory Board after obtaining the orders of the Government. Now, in the Advisory Board there were as many as three officers of the Labour Department and the Secretary to the Government in the Labour Department was the Chairman. I am in respectful agreement with my Lord that the Advisory Board was over-weighted by a complement of officers who cannot be held to be independent within the meaning of sec. 9 of the Act. The composition of the Advisory Board was, therefore, fundamentally defective. This, therefore, naturally leads me to the conclusion that there has been no consultation by the Government with a duly constituted Advisory Board and consequently the notification that was issued fixing the minimum wages was bad. 11. The result of the above discussion is that I conour in the order pronounced by my Lord for setting aside the notification of the Government dated 31st July, 1965, and all further proceedings which may have been taken against any of the petitioners in pursuance thereof.