JUDGMENT D.P. Uniyal, J. - These two connected revisions arise out of an application under Section 66 of the U. P. Muslim Waqfs Act 1960. 2. A suit was filed by certain persons for a declaration that they were mutwallis of Waqf Altaf Husain. They also prayed for a perpetual injunction restraining the defendants who claimed to be members of the Managing Committee of the Waqf, from dispossessing them. The suit was filed on 6-4-1963. On that very day an application for injunction was moved and an ad interim order was passed by the Munsif restraining the defendants from interfering with the plaintiffs' possession. This order was later confirmed on 23-4-1963. Subsequently on 20-5-1963 the plaintiffs applied that notice be sent to the Shia Board, Lucknow regarding the suit filed by them. Notice was accordingly issued and 5-7-1963 was fixed for the appearance of the Shia Board and for filing a writ-ten statement. The Shia Board put in appearance in court on 4-7-1963 and made an application that the injunction order passed by the court be declared void under Section 66 (3) of the Act. The Munsif rejected the application on 14-8-1963. Civil Revision No. 147 of 1964 has been filed by the Shia Board against the said order. 3. Meanwhile the defendants filed an appeal against the injunction order and the Civil Judge dismissed the appeal and confirmed the injunction order on 30-5-1963. On 9-7-1963 the Shia Board applied for vacating the order confirming the injunction and the same was allowed by him on 6-9-1963. Against this order the plaintiff; have filed the connected revision No. 1209 of 1963. 4. It was contended for the Shia Board that the injunction order passed by the Munsif was void as it was made in the absence of a notice under sub-sec. (1) of Section 66 of the Act. It was pointed out that Section 66 (1) was mandatory and provided that the court shall issue notice to the Board at the cost of the party instituting the suit or proceeding. (1) of Section 66 of the Act. It was pointed out that Section 66 (1) was mandatory and provided that the court shall issue notice to the Board at the cost of the party instituting the suit or proceeding. Section 66 of the U. P. Muslim Waqfs Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) , so far as material, reads: Section 66 "(1) In every suit or proceeding relating to the title to waqf property or the right of mutwali, the court shalt issue notice to the Board at the cost of the party instituting such suit or proceeding, (2) (3) In the absence of a notice under sub-sec. (1) any decree or order passed in the suit or proceeding, shall be declared void if the Boards within one month of its becoming aware of such suit or proceeding, applies to the court in this behalf. (4) ................." 5. It is not disputed that title to waqf property was involved in the suit filed by the plaintiffs. It is also not in dispute that the order of injunction had been obtained behind the back. of the Board without causing a notice to be issued in accordance with Section 66 (1) . 6. It was argued for the plaintiffs that Section 66 (3) was not attracted as a notice had been issued to the Board regarding the suit filed by the plaintiffs. It will be noticed that although the suit was filed on 6-4-1963 the plaintiffs did not apply to have the notice issued until after the injunction order had been confirmed by the Munsif. The injunction order was, therefore, clearly in violation of the provisions of Section 66 (3). 7. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs maintained that the injunction order was neither a decree passed in the suit nor an order made in the proceeding and that the legislature by enacting sub-sec. (3) of Section 66 had made a distinction between a decree passed in a suit and an order passed in a proceeding under the Act. It was said that the expression 'suit' was used in contra-distinction to 'proceeding' and that . the words 'decree or order' in sub-sec. (3) of Section 66 had made a distinction between a decree passed in a suit and an order passed in a proceeding under the Act. It was said that the expression 'suit' was used in contra-distinction to 'proceeding' and that . the words 'decree or order' in sub-sec. (3) should be read disjunctively in the sense that only a decree in the suit or an order in the proceeding under the Act could be declared void if no notice in respect of such suit or proceeding was caused to be issued to the Board. In my opinion there is no warrant for the proposition advanced by the learned counsel. 8. Section 72 of the Act provides that the procedure to be followed by the tribunal appointed under Section 70 shall be the same - as is provided under the Code of Civil Procedure in regard to suits. By Section 76 the award of a tribunal is final and conclusive and has the force of a decree and is executable as a decree of a civil court. The scheme of the Act goes to show that the phrase."any decree or order passed in the suit or proceeding" in Section 66 (3) has to be construed in its ordinary and natural meaning and, therefore, a decree or order whether passed in the suit or in the proceeding would be equally covered by Section 66 (3) of the Act. So that if an order is made in a suit in the absence of a notice to the Board it would be a nullity as being void under the Act. Inasmuch as the injunction order was passed without issuing any notice to the Board the same became void under Section 66 (3). 9. It was next urged by the learned counsel that the injunction order having been upheld in appeal by the Civil Judge the order of the Munsif became merged in the appellate order and the Munsif ceased to have any jurisdiction to entertain an application to have it set aside. If the order passed by the Munsif became void by virtue of Section 66(3) then in law it would be deemed to be a nullity. It is a fundamental principle that if a decree or order passed by a court is a nullity its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon. It is a fundamental principle that if a decree or order passed by a court is a nullity its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon. Vide Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paszuan, A.I.R. 1954 , S.C. 340. The application of the Shia Board to the Munsif to have the injunction order set aside should have been allowed and the Munsif had acted illegally and with material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction in not setting aside the injunction order passed by him. Once an order is treated as a nullity it is of no consequence that it had been upheld in appeal. 10. Lastly it was urged that the order passed by the Civil Judge holding that the injunction order was void was without jurisdiction in that the application of the Board for setting aside the said order was beyond time. The appellate order up-holding the injunction granted by the Munsif suffered from the same vice as the order passed by the Munsif. Once it is held that the Munsif had no jurisdiction to pass the injunction order the appellate court would have no jurisdiction to affirm such an order and the appellate order would automatically fall through by reason of its being without jurisdiction. 11. For the reasons given above, I am of opinion that Civil Revision No. 147 of 1964 filed by the Shia Board must succeed and Civil Revision No. 1209 of 1963 filed' by the plaintiffs must fail. I accordingly allow Civil Revision No. 147 of 1964 with costs and dismiss Civil Revision No. 1209, of with costs. C.R.No. 147 of 1964 allowed and C.R.No. 1209 of 1963 Dismissed.