JUDGMENT Yashoda Nandan, J. - These are five connected writ petitions praying for a writ of certiorari quashing the orders of the Consolidation Officer, the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) , the Deputy Director of Consolidation and the Joint Director of Consolidation. Since most of the questions raised are common in these five petitions, I propose to dispose them of by a common judgment. 2. It is alleged in the petitions that plot No. 358 was in the cultivatory possession of Raj Narain, who is the petitioner in Civil Misc. Writ No. 1446 of 1963, plot No. 77 was in the cultivatory possession of Bans Lal and Smt. Ruprani, the petitioners in Civil Misc. Writ No. 1444 of 1963, plot No. 1811K was in the cultivatory possession of Chandra Shekhar, the petitioner in Civil Misc. Writ Nu. 1630 of 1963, plot No. 108 and plot No. 141 were in the cultivatory possession of Farago, the petitioner in Civil Misc. Writ No. 1620 of 1963 and plot No. 78 was in the cultivatory possession of Shyam Sunder, the petitioner in Civil Misc. Writ No. 1445 of 1963. During consolidation proceedings when C. H. Form No. 5 was issued under Section 8 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, the name of opposite party Smt. Sushila Devi was entered as the Sirdar of the above mentioned plots and the petitioners names were entered as Asamis of the different plots claimed by them. Different objections were filed by the petitioners under Section 9 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act by which they claimed to have become Sirdar of the plots in dispute. The case set up by Raj Narain, Bans Lal, Smt. Ruprani, Chandra Shekhar and Parago was that the respective plots in respect of which they claimed to be in possession had been sub-let to them by Smt. Sushila Devi as well as her other co-sharers namely Gayidliar Prasad Dixit and his sons Kishan Prasad, Chhotey Lal and Raj Bahadur. They claimed that since all the land-holders were not disabled persons within the meaning of Section 157 of U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951, they had become Adhivasi and those rights subsequently matured into Sirdar rights. They claimed that since all the land-holders were not disabled persons within the meaning of Section 157 of U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951, they had become Adhivasi and those rights subsequently matured into Sirdar rights. They asserted that the entry of their names as the Asamis in C. H. Form No. 5 was incorrect and they should be recorded as Sirdar and the name of Smt. Shushila Devi as Sirdar should be expunged. Shyam Sunder, the petitioner in Civil Misc. Writ No. 1445 of 1963, further claimed_ that he had been in adverse possession of plot No. 78 from 1360 fasli and that since no suit for his ejectment had been filed under Section 209 of U.P. 'Act No. 1 of 1951 he had under Section 210 of the Act become Sirdar by operation of law. The objections were contested by Smt. Sushila Devi, who is one of the opposite parties in all the petitions. She alleged that she was at the relevant time the sole land-holder of the plots in dispute and since she was a 'disabled' person as contemplated by Section 157 of the U.P. Zaminclari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, the status of the petitioners was that of Asamis and the entries in C. H. Form No. 5 were correct. 3. The petitioners' objections were dismissed by the Consolidation Officer by an order dated 30th September. 1961. The Consolidation Officer held that the suits filed by Smt. Sushila Devi against the petitioners under Section 202 of U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951 had not been finally decided and consequently the decrees therein did not operate as res judicata in the present dispute. The Consolidation Officer further held that Smt. Sushila Devi was the sole land-holder of the disputed plots and since she was a 'disabled' person within the meaning of Section 157 of the Act the petitioners were merely Asamis and not Sirdars. So far as the claim put forward by Shyam Sunder was concerned the Consolidation Officer held that he was in adverse possession only against Umrao, who was the Asami of the plot in respect of which Shyam Sunder had pit forward his claim and he would acquire no rights larger than Umrao himself and could not become a Sirdar. So far as the claim put forward by Shyam Sunder was concerned the Consolidation Officer held that he was in adverse possession only against Umrao, who was the Asami of the plot in respect of which Shyam Sunder had pit forward his claim and he would acquire no rights larger than Umrao himself and could not become a Sirdar. The orders of the Consolidation Officer were upheld by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in appeals filed by the petitioners. Aggrieved by the orders of the Deputy Director of Consolidation, the petitioners filed revisions before the Joint Director of Consolidation, who by a composite order dated 1st February, 1963, dismissed the revisions upholding the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation. Dissatisfied by these orders, the petitioners have invoked the powers of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 4. Sometime prior to the year 1940 Smt. Sushila Devi had filed an application under Section 4 of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act, 1934. The application was forwarded to the Special Judge by the Collector. Scat. Sushila Devi appears to have claimed that she was the exclusive proprietor of the entire zamindari property to which the Sit plots in dispute appertained. From a copy of the order of the Special Judge dated 28th April, 1940, which has been filed as an annexure, it appears that Gajadhar Prasad, father-in-law of Smt. Sushila Devi, and three of his sons Krishna Prasad, Raj Bahadur and Chhotey Lal, filed claims under Section 11 of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act claiming that they had a half share in the zamindari property. Under Section 11 sub-sec. (3) of U.P. Act No. XXV of 1934, the Special judge determined that Smt. Sushila Devi was the sole proprietor of the entire zamindari property to which the plots in dispute appertained. No appeal admittedly was filed against this order by any one. From the judgment of the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) , which has been filed as an annexure to the petition, it appears that in the course of proceedings under the Encumbered Estates Act, the entire share in village Rudauli where the disputed plots were situate was transferred to the creditors and Amaldaramad was effected in the Khewat. From the judgment of the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) , which has been filed as an annexure to the petition, it appears that in the course of proceedings under the Encumbered Estates Act, the entire share in village Rudauli where the disputed plots were situate was transferred to the creditors and Amaldaramad was effected in the Khewat. Later on proceedings for ex proprietary tenancy were started on the report of the Patwari and the S.D.O. ordered Smt. Sushila Devi alone to be the ex proprietary tenant of the Sir area in village Rudauli including the plots in dispute. On the basis of this order Smt. Sushila Devi's name was recorded as a tenant. The joint Director of Consolidation placing reliance on this order of the Special Judge took the view that the Special judge's order in the Encumbered Estates Act proceedings with regard to the title of Smt Sushila Devi has a binding effect on the petitioners in the present proceedings also. In the view that the Joint Director took, he dismissed the revisions filed by the petitioners. 5. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the order of the Joint Director of Consolidation was vitiated by an error of law apparent on the face of record in as far as lie had taken the view that the order passed in the Encumbered Estates Act proceedings was conclusive of the question as to whether the plots in dispute were the Sir of Snit. Sushila Devi exclusively or Gajadhar Prasad and others were co-sharers with her. It was urged that admittedly the petitioners were neither parties to the proceedings under the Encumbered Estates Act nor they could have been parties to the proceedings and consequently the petitioners could not be bound by the decision of the Special Judge. It was submitted that the order of the Special judge was not an exception to the general rule that a judgment is not evidence against persons not parties or privies thereto and it could in no case he treated as conclusive evidence against the petitioners on the question as to whether Smt. Sushila Devi was the sole land-holder of the disputed plots or not. It was further contended that the joint Director seems to have accepted the contention advanced on behalf of Smt. Sushila Devi that by reason of Section 47 of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act the petitioners were debarred from challenging the determination of the Special judge that Smt. Sushila Devi was the sole proprietor of the Khewat to which the Sir plots in dispute appertained and this view was also patently erroneous. It was submitted that Section 47 of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act had no application to the case of the petitioners who could not have taken part in proceedings under that Act. 6. On the other hand, it WaS contended on behalf of Smt. Sushila Devi that since the order of the learned Special Judge led to the determination of the status of Smt. Sushila Dei as the sole proprietor of the Khewat to which the disputed plots appertained, it was in the nature of a judgment in rem and bound the entire world including the petitioners. No authority was cited in support of the proposition that a decision under Section 11 of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act is a judgment in rent. Learned counsel appearing for Smt. Sushila Devi however placed reliance on a passage from Phipson on Evidence (page 1344, paragraph 1343. 1963 Edition), which runs as follows, in support of the contention that a judgment that lead to the determination of a person's status had the character of a judgment in rem: - "As applied to judgments, the terms in rein and in person-a" which are adopted from, though not belonging to, the Roman. Law, have never been clearly defined in reference to our own or any other system. A judgment in rent has been described as 'an adjudication upon the status of some particular subject-matter by a tribunal having competent authority for that purpose', a definition which, though seemingly the best that can be framed upon a difficult subject, as imperfect in that it fails to distinguish between territorial and ex-territorial status, besides including in its terms matters which are not properly classed as judgments in rem e.g., inquisitions and criminal convictions. It has also been defined as 'a judgment by a court having special jurisdiction over the subject-matter'. such judgments, however, only operate in rent if they alter status.- 7. It has also been defined as 'a judgment by a court having special jurisdiction over the subject-matter'. such judgments, however, only operate in rent if they alter status.- 7. He also placed reliance on the following passage occurring in Best of Evidence by Phipson (Eleventh Edition, page 576) : "And, therefore, as we have seen, if the person whom it is sought to affect by a judgment was neither party nor privy to the proceedings in which it was given, it is not in general even receivable in evidence against him.............. ................. .................. An important exception to this rule exists in the case of judgment in rem; i.e. adjudication pronounced upon the status of some particular subject-matter, by a tribunal having competent authority for that purpose. Such judgments the law has, from motives of policy and general convenience, invested with a conclusive effect against all the world. At the head of these stand judgments in the Exchequer, adjudications of a Court of Admiralty on the subject of prize, & c. In certain instance, also, judgments as to the status or condition of a party are receivable in evidence against third persons, although they are not conclusive. Thus, in an action against an executor sued on a bond of his testator, a commission finding the testator lunatic at the time of the execution of the bond is prima facie evidence against the plaintiff though he was no party to it. And by analogy to the general rule of res inter alios acta, judgments and judicial proceedings inter alios are receivable on questions of a public nature, and in other cases where the ordinary rules of evidence are departed from Judgments not in rem are said to be judgments in personam." 8. It was further contended that the proceedings under the Encumbered Estates Act which lead to the determination of a scheme for liquidation of the debts of the applicant under Section 24 of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act were in the same class as a suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure and adjudication under the Provincial Insolvency Act and consequently operated as res judicator not only as regards the parties to the proceedings but the entire world. 9. 9. In the alternative, it was contended that it was open to the petitioners who claimed their title as sub-tenants under Gajadhar Prasad Dixit and the brothers of the deceased husband of Smt. Sushila Devi to file a claim under Section 11 of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act to the effect that Smt. Sushila Devi was not the sole proprietor of the Khewat to which the disputed plots appertained and since they failed to make such a claim the determination of the Special Judge, that Smt. Sushila Devi was the sole proprietor thereof, which determination had the effect of a decree by reason of Section 11 (4) of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act barred the claim put forward by the petitioners that they were sub-tenants under Snit. Sushila Devi, Gajadhar Prasad Dixit and others. 10. The orders of the Joint Director of Consolidation was also supported on the basis of Section 47 of the U.P. Encumbered. Estates Act and it was contended that by reason of that provision the petitioners could not in these proceedings raise the plea that Smt. Sushila Devi was not the sole proprietor of the Khewat concerned because that in effect amounted to a challenge to the determination of the Special Judge under Section 11 of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act. 11. In my opinion there is no force in either of these contentions. The word 'status' as used by Phipson and other writers has, in my opinion, been used in the same sense as the expression 'legal character' used in Section 41 of the Indian Evidence Act. I am fortified in this view by the decision of a Special Bench of the Madras High Court In the Matter of P.C. Venkataramayya Pantulu, A.I.R. 1931 Mad. 441. The expression 'legal character' has not been defined in any Statute. Its meaning has to be understood in the light of the principles relating to judgments in rem which the Legislature must have had in view in framing Section 41 of the Indian Evidence Act. In construing the significance of that expression a Division Bench of the Madras High Court has observed in Rama-Krishna v. Narayana, LLR (1916) 39 Mad. 80. "We take it that a man's legal character is the same thing as a man's status. In construing the significance of that expression a Division Bench of the Madras High Court has observed in Rama-Krishna v. Narayana, LLR (1916) 39 Mad. 80. "We take it that a man's legal character is the same thing as a man's status. A man's status or legal character is constituted by the attributes which the law attachis to him in his individual and personal capacity, the distinctive mark or dress, as it were, with which the law clothes him apart from the attributes which may be said to belong to normal humanity in general". 12. A declaration of a legal right is something different from the declaration of a 'legal character'. The declaration of a person's right operate as against a particular person or group of persons against whom the right is claimed, whereas a man's status is some thing which defines his position not in relation to a particular person or group of persons but in relation to the rest of the world; his status distinguishes him from the rest of the world. For instance, to say that a person is not a partner of a firm is not to declare his status or legal character, it is merely to declare his position with respect to the particular firm See Punjab National Bank v. Balikram Kissenchand, AIR Cal. 225. Similarly when in proceedings under the U.P. En, umbered Estates Act a determination is made by a Special Judge under Section 11 there. of that a person is exclusive proprietor of a property and ()there claiming a share therein have no such right, all that the Special J Age does is to declare the legal right of the persons concerned, inter-se with respect to the property in dispute. The determination does not amount to the declaration of any party's 'legal character' or 'status' as against the entire world. Bower in The Doctrine of Res Judicata' (1924 Edition, Para. 209) defines a judgment in rein as follows: - "A Judicial decision in rem is one which declares, defines, or otherwise determines the status of a person or of a thing, that is to say, the jural relation of the person, or thing. Bower in The Doctrine of Res Judicata' (1924 Edition, Para. 209) defines a judgment in rein as follows: - "A Judicial decision in rem is one which declares, defines, or otherwise determines the status of a person or of a thing, that is to say, the jural relation of the person, or thing. to the world generally, and, therefore, is conclusive for, or against, everybody as distinct front those decisions which only purport to determine the jural relation of the parties to one another, and their present rights and equities inter-se, and which, therefore, are commonly terms decisions in personam." 13. I find no difficulty in holding that the order of the Special Judge wherein he held that Smt. Sushila Devi was the sole proprietor of the zamindari share in question was merely a decision which determined the personal rights of Smt. Sushila Devi and Gajadhar Prasad and others inter-se and their jural relation in respect of the property forming subject-matter of the determination. It cannot conceivably be taken to be a determination of the jural relation of the parties to it or the world generally. The declaration of Smt. Sushila Devi's title to the zamindari property in question was only against specified persons and not absolutely and such a declaration cannot be considered to be a declaration of her 'legal character' or 'status'. The contention of the learned counsel appearing for Smt. Sushila Devi that the order of the Special Judge is in the nature of a judgment in rem and binds the petitioners with regard to the exclusive title of Smt. Sushila Devi as land-holder is, in my opinion, unsustainable. 14. The next contention of the learned counsel for Smt. Sushila Devi that since the proceedings under the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act were in the nature of a scheme for the liquidation of the debts of Smt. Sushila Devi they were in the same class as a suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure or proceedings under the Provincial Insolvency Act is also, in my opinion, without substance and unworthy of acceptance. The question as to what is the effect of a judgment under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Ahmad Adan Salt v. M.E. Makhri, A.I.R. 1964 SC 107. The question as to what is the effect of a judgment under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Ahmad Adan Salt v. M.E. Makhri, A.I.R. 1964 SC 107. The appeal before the Supreme Court by special leave arose out of a suit instituted by the respondents in the Court of the District Judge, Bangalore, under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The respondents claimed to represent the Sunni Muslim population of the Civil and Military Station at Bangalore, and its such they prayed in their plaint that a scheme should be settled for the proper administration of the Jumma Masjid which is situate in Bangalore. Their case was that the Masjid in question along with its adjuncts as well as large movable and immovable properties constituted a Trust created for public purposes of a religious nature coupled with Charity, and that the Dakkhani Muslims as well as the Cutchi Memons residing in Bangalore were the beneficiaries of the Trust and had an abiding interest in its proper management, control and direction. A similar suit had been filed in 1924 (Original Suit No. 32 of 1924) in the same Court and in that suit a scheme had been framed in 1927. The respondents alleged that in that suit it was represented that the Masjid belonged mainly to be Cutchi Memons of Bangalore and that the Cutchi Memons were entitled exclusively to its management. It was on this basis that the said suit was prosecuted by consent and a scheme was drawn up by the Court after considering different schemes put before it by the respective parties. The appellants disputed the respondents' claim on several grounds and one of the grounds urged by them was that the Cutchi Memons were entitled to the exclusive management of the Masjid and its affairs and that the claim in the appeal before the Supreme Court was barred by res judicata. While deciding the question as to how far the decision in the earlier suit under Section 92 barred the subsequent claim, Gajendragadkar, J., as he then was, speaking for the Court held as follows: - "The first point which has been pressed before us by Mr. While deciding the question as to how far the decision in the earlier suit under Section 92 barred the subsequent claim, Gajendragadkar, J., as he then was, speaking for the Court held as follows: - "The first point which has been pressed before us by Mr. Setalvad is that the present suit is barred by reason of the fact that in the earlier suit instituted under Section 92 of the Code a scheme had already been framed by a Court of competent jurisdiction and the decree by which the said scheme was ordered to be drawn binds all parties interested in the Trust. A suit under Section 92, it is urged, is a representative suit, and so, whether or not the present respondents actually appeared in that suit, they would be bound by the decree which had framed a scheme for the proper administration of the Trust. In support of this argument, reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in Raje Anandrao v. Shamrao, 1961-3 SCR 930 at p. 940 : A.I.R. 1961 SC 1206 at p. 1211, where it is observed that though the Pujaris were not parties to the suit under Section 92, the decision in that suit binds the Pujaris as worshippers so far as the ad-ministration of the temple is concerned, because a suit under Section 92 is a representative suit and binds not only the parties thereto, but all those who are interested in the Trust .................. ................... ........................ In assessing the validity. of this argument, it is necessary to consider the basis of the decisions that a decree passed in a suit under Section 92 binds all parties. The basis of this view is that a suit under Section 92 is a representative suit and is brought with the necessary sanction required by it on behalf of all the beneficiaries interested in the Trust. The said section authorises two or more persons having an interest in the Trust to file a suit for claiming one or more of the reliefs specified in clauses (a) to (h) of sub-sec. (1) after consent in -writing there prescribed has been obtained. Thus, when a suit is brought under Section 92, it is brought by two or another persons interested in the Trust who have taken upon themselves the responsibility of representing all the beneficiaries of the Trust. (1) after consent in -writing there prescribed has been obtained. Thus, when a suit is brought under Section 92, it is brought by two or another persons interested in the Trust who have taken upon themselves the responsibility of representing all the beneficiaries of the Trust. In such a suit, though all the beneficiaries may not be expressly impleaded, the action is instituted on their behalf and relief is claimed in a representative character. This position immediately attracts the provisions of explanation VI to Section 11 of the Code. Explanation VI provides that where persons litigate bona fide in respect of a public right or of a private right claimed in common for themselves and others, all persons interested in such right shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating. It is clear that Section 11 read with its explanation VI leads to the result that a decree passed in suit instituted by persons to which explanation VI applies will bar further claims by persons interested in the same right in respect of which the prior suit had been instituted. Explanation VI thus illustrates one aspect of constructive res judicata. Where a representative suit is brought under Section 92 and a decree is passed in such a suit, law assumes that all persons who have the same interest as the plaintiffs in the representative suit were represented by the said plaintiffs and, therefore, are constructively barred by res judicata from re-agitating the matters directly and substantially in issue in the said earlier suit. A similar result follows if a suit is either brought or defended under O. 1, R. 8. In that case, persons either suing or defending an action are doing so in a representative character, and so, the decree passed in such a suit all those whose Merest were represented either by the plaintiffs or by the defendants. Thus, it is clear that in determining the question about the effect of a decree passed in a representative suit, it is essential to enquire which interests were represented by the plaintiffs or the defendants. If the decree was passed in a suit under Section 92, it will become necessary to examine the plaint M order to decide in what character the plaintiffs had sued and what interests they had claimed. If the decree was passed in a suit under Section 92, it will become necessary to examine the plaint M order to decide in what character the plaintiffs had sued and what interests they had claimed. If a suit is brought under 0.1, R. 8, the same process will have to be adopted and if a suit is defended under 0. 1, R. 8, the plea taken by the defendants will have to be examined with a view to decide which interests the defendants purported lo defend in common with others. The decision of this question would be material in determining the correctness of the argument urged by Mr. Setalvad before us. Let us, therefore, examine the plaint filed in the earlier stilt of 1924. Before filing the said suit. an application had been made to obtain sanction of the Collector as required by Section 92. In that application, the petitioners had specifically averred that the Masjid in question was an ancient and important institution belonging to the Cutchi Memon Community and there were properties attached to it worth over lac of rupees; the net income from them being about Rs. 2,400/- per annum. On that basis, the petitioners claimed that they were interested in the Trust and wanted a scheme to be trained. It would thus be clear that the application for sanction proceeded on the narrow and specific ground that the Mosque belonged to the Cutchi Memon Community and the interest which the petitioners purported to represent was the interest of the Cutchi Memoir Community and no other. After permission was obtained from the Collector, the suit was filed. In the plaint, the same position was adopted. It was averred that the Mosque had been mainly founded by the Cutchi Memon Mohammedans residing at Bangalore and it was alleged that the Mohammedan communities other than the Cutchi Memon had established other independent mosques for their use and benefit and for the last over a century, the Cutchi Memons had been maintaining and managing the said mosque. The plaint further claimed that the plaintiffs as members of the Cutchi Memort 'community were interested in the proper management of the suit Mosque and that as Mohammedens and members of the said Community they had the right to perform there in their daily and usual prayers as well as funeral and other special prayers. The plaint further claimed that the plaintiffs as members of the Cutchi Memort 'community were interested in the proper management of the suit Mosque and that as Mohammedens and members of the said Community they had the right to perform there in their daily and usual prayers as well as funeral and other special prayers. Consistently with this attitude, the plaint in its prayer clause claimed, inter alia, that a scheme should be [rained safeguarding the rights and privileges of the Cutchi Memon Community. It is thus clear that the plaint, like the application for the sanction of the Collector, proceeded on a clear and unambiguous basis that the Mosque belonged to the Cutchi Memon Community and the suit was instituted only on behalf of the Cutchi Memon Community by persons who claimed to be interested in the Mosque as Cutchi Memons. There is, therefore, no doubt that the plaintiffs in the said suit did not claim and in fact, did not represent the interests of any community other than the Cutchi Memon Community. Once it is found as it has been in the present case that this basis of the claim made in the plaint was not well founded and that the Mosque belongs to all the Sunni Mohammadens of Bangalore, it would be difficult to accept the argument that the suit instituted on the narrow basis to which we have just referred can be regarded as a representative suit so far as the interest of Muslim Communities other than the Cutchi Memon Community residing in Bangalore are concerned. Those who filed the said suit expressly pleaded that no other community was concerned or interested in the said Trust and, therefore, it -would be idle for them now to contend that they purported to represent the interests of the other communities." 15. On an examination of the plaint and the written statements filed in the suit in 1924 the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the allegations made in the plaint as well as the averments made by the respective defendants in their written statements in the suit of 1924 did not justify the contention that the earlier suit was either filed by persons who could claim to represent non-Cutchi Memons, or was defended by persons who could make a similar claim. Having arrived at that conclusion, the Supreme Court went on to hold that: - "If that be so, the very basis on which the binding character of a decree passed in a suit under Section 92 of the Code rests disappears; we have already seen that the basis of the principle that a decree under Section 92 suit binds all - persons interested in the Trust, is that the interests of all persons interested in the Trust are represented in the suit as required by explanation VI to Section 11; and if that basis is absent, the decree cannot create a bar of res judicata against persons claiming interest not represented in the earlier suit." 16. From this decision, it becomes clear that a decree in a suit under Section 92 is binding in a subsequent suit only against persons whose interests were represented in the earlier suit and does not create the bar of res judicata against those whose interests were not represented in the earlier suit. In the present case as the interests of the petitioner were unrepresented in the proceedings under the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act, the determination by the Special judge cannot operate as res judicata against them. 17. The contention that proceedings under the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act result in a scheme for liquidation of the debts of the person who applies under Section 4 thereof and hence partake the character of proceeding under the Insolvency Act and should consequently be treated as a judgment in rem is equally unsound. The argument is based on the unjustified assumption that all the findings in Insolvency proceedings bind the entire world. It has been held in The Official Assignee of Madras v. The Official Assignee of Rangoon, A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 662 that an order of an insolvency court refusing to adjudicate a person insolvent on the ground that he was not a member of a firm which had been declared insolvent is not a final order which conferred upon or took away from him any 'legal character' within meaning of Section 41, Evidence Act. 662 that an order of an insolvency court refusing to adjudicate a person insolvent on the ground that he was not a member of a firm which had been declared insolvent is not a final order which conferred upon or took away from him any 'legal character' within meaning of Section 41, Evidence Act. A Special Bench of the same Court in In the Matter of P.C. Venkatarana Pantulu took the view that the judgment of an Insolvency Court declaring a person as creditor of the insolvent does not confer any 'legal character' on him within the meaning of Section 41, Evidence Act, and hence the declaration does not operate as a judgment in rein. It is true that the adjudication of a person as an insolvent does operate as a decision in rein but that is so because 'an adjudication in bankruptcy not only declares but constitute the debtor a bankrupt.' I have already held that the declaration that Smt. Sushila Devi was the sole proprietor of the zamindari share conferred no 'legal character' on her. 18. The third submission of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners that since the petitioners claimed. to have been let in as sub-tenants not only by Smt. Sushila Devi but by her co-sharers they were merely claiming under Gajadhar Prasad and others and they are thus bound by the decisions under Section 11 of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act is in my view equally devoid of merit. In Nallamuthu Padavachi v. Srinivasa Aiyer, A.I.R. 1921 Mad. 576 it has been held that a lessee who claims under a title previously created by a lessor is not bound by a subsequent finding between the lessor and third parties. In my opinion, the same reasoning applies to the instant case. The petitioners who claimed in these proceedings to have been the sub-tenants not only of Smt. Sushila Devi but of Smt. Sushila Devi and her co-sharers cannot be said to have been privy to the decision by the Special Judge and thus it is not possible to hold that they were bound by the determination under Section 11 of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act on any general principle of res judicata. 19. 19. The submission advanced on behalf of opposite party No. 5 that the present claim of the petitioners was barred by reason of Section 47 of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act is also, in my judgment, without any substance. An examination of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act makes it clear that it is only a person who has any 'claim to the property' mentioned in the notice contemplated by Section 11 (1) of the Act who could make a claim under Section 11 (2) thereof. The property in respect of which the notice must have been issued in the instant case was the zamindari property to which the disputed plots appertained. The petitioners had no claim to the zamindari property in respect of which the notice under Section 11 (1). of the Act was issued and consequently could not possibly make a claim under Section 11 (2) of the Act. Thus they could not be parties to any determination with regard to the title to the zamindari. They had thus no right to appeal under Section 45 or to go up in revision under Section 16 of the Act. In proceedings under the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act they could not under any provision thereof take part in the proceedings before the Special Judge or challenge his order. In my opinion Section 47 of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act can have application only to a person who could take part in proceedings before the Civil Judge and could under Section 45 and under Section 46 question the correctness of the decision of the Special Judge. I am firmly of the opinion that Section 47 of the Act does not act as a bar to the plea raised by the petitioners. Though the facts in Avadesh Bahadur Singh v. Mt. Ram Raj Kuar, AIR 1952 Allahabad 333 were different but it supports the view that I am taking that a person who cannot take part in the proceedings under the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act is not debarred from asserting his own title in separate proceedings. 20. Though the facts in Avadesh Bahadur Singh v. Mt. Ram Raj Kuar, AIR 1952 Allahabad 333 were different but it supports the view that I am taking that a person who cannot take part in the proceedings under the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act is not debarred from asserting his own title in separate proceedings. 20. In my judgment the contention of the .counsel for the petitioners that the order of the Joint Director is patently erroneous in as far as he dismissed their revisions 'without considering their case on merits on the sole ground that the order of the Special Judge was binding on them and that Section 47 of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act barred the petitioners' claim in the proceedings giving rise to these petitions 1111.1St prevail. 21. These petitions are accordingly allowed and the order of the Joint Director of Consolidation dated 1st February, 1963, is quashed. He is directed to decide the revisions, orders passed wherein have been impugned in these petitions, on merits according to law. The ,petitioners are entitle their costs from Smt. Sushila Devi.