JUDGMENT : Sikri, J. - (3rd October, 1967). 1. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the High Court for the State of Punjab in Civil Revision No. 564 of 1963, filed under section 15(5) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act (East Punjab Act III of 1949) hereinafter referred to as the Act whereby the High Court allowed the revision and dismissed the appellant-landlord's application for ejectment. 2. In order to appreciate the contentions raised before us it is necessary to give the relevant facts. The appellant, Mohan Lal hereinafter referred to as the landlord-filed an application on July 21, 1962, for ejectment of Kasturi Lal under section 13 of the Act on various ground's, one of them being that his shop, situated near Mandi Mai Loni, Ludhiana, which waset to Kasturi Lal, respondent hereinafter referred to as the tenant was closed for the last six months. The relevant part of section 13(2) which enables ejectment on this ground is as follows : "13(2) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf. If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the applicant, is satisfied. (v) that where the building is situated in a place other than a hill station, the tenant has ceased to occupy the building for a continuous period of four months without reasonable cause." The tenant in his written statement denied that the shop had been closed for the last six months. He stated that the "shop never remained closed, but on the other hand shop was continuously used." 3. The Rent Controller framed two issues : (1) Has the tenant ceased to occupy the building for a continuous period of 4 months prior to the institution of the application ? (2) If so, had the tenant a reasonable cause for not so occupying the building ? 4. Both parties led oral evidence before the Rent Controller. The landlord categorically stated that the tenant bad shifted his business from the shop in dispute to the leather market near Clock Tower, and that it was after the institution of the application that the tenant re-opened his shop and commenced business in crockery in that shop. 4. Both parties led oral evidence before the Rent Controller. The landlord categorically stated that the tenant bad shifted his business from the shop in dispute to the leather market near Clock Tower, and that it was after the institution of the application that the tenant re-opened his shop and commenced business in crockery in that shop. He further stated that no electric bill for the shop came for the intervening period except the meter charges and he produced the electric bills. The tenant in his evidence insisted that the shop was never closed. He stated : "In this building we have been selling shoes throughout and upto now also. It is for the last six months that crockery business has also been introduced in this building. It is wrong that the shop was closed and no work was done therein during the period from January 1962 to July 1962." He further stated that he and his younger brother, Kidarnath, had been carrying on business in the shop. He produced some accounts of the business. In cross-examination he admitted that the account books did not indicate any payment for electricity for the period from January to July 1962. He further stated : "During January 1962 to July 1962 I have been clearing my stocks because I wanted to shift over to crockery business. During this period I did not purchase any shoes." 5. The Rent Controller, after examining the evidence, came to the conclusion that the tenant did not actually use the shop for his business purposes during January 1962 to July 1962, and kept it closed. He further held that the tenant had shifted his business in January 1962 to his new shop in leather market and kept the shop closed until he started crockery business therein in partnership with a son of Acharaj Lal, RW-1. He further held that the tenant had not advanced any reason for not so occupying the shop during the period in question. Accordingly, he allowed the application and ordered the tenant to vacate the shop within 90 days of the order. The tenant appealed to the Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority referred to the accounts produced by the tenant and came to the conclusion that many entries in the account books were fictitious and the accounts did not support the version of the tenant. He held that the entries in the ledger, Ext. The tenant appealed to the Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority referred to the accounts produced by the tenant and came to the conclusion that many entries in the account books were fictitious and the accounts did not support the version of the tenant. He held that the entries in the ledger, Ext. R 5, had been fabricated to show that the business continued in the premises even after the tenant started the other business in the other part of the town. He further found that the accounts showed that no expenses in this business were incurred after January 1962 as was being done in the previous months. He, therefore, agreed with the findings of the learned Rent Controller that the premises remained unoccupied for a continuous period of more than four months immediately preceding the filing of the ejectment application. Apparently, before him it was not urged by the tenant that he had any reasonable cause for not occupying the shop. 6. The tenant then filed a revision under section 15(5) of the Act. Section 15(5) reads as follows : "15(5) The High Court may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party or on its own motion call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such order or proceedings and may pass such order in relation thereto as it may deem fit." 7. A new case was then sought to be made out before the Hight Court. It was submitted on behalf of the tenant that the shop had remained closed because it took some time to shift the business from the shop in dispute to the other shop in the leather market and that, under the circumstances, there was a reasonable cause for the cessation of business. The High Court held : "Neither the Rent Controller nor the Appellate Authority however has given a finding whether such a cessation of business had been without reasonable cause although a specific issue had been framed on this question. The Rent Controller contended himself by saying that the Respondent has not advanced any reason for so not occupying the building during the period in question. The Rent Controller contended himself by saying that the Respondent has not advanced any reason for so not occupying the building during the period in question. This issue is found against him." This finding is contrary to the evidence which has been adduced by the respondent on this issue. To quote the words of Kasturi Lal, who appeared as his own witness as R. W. 3 : "During January, 1962 to July, 1962, I have been clearing my stocks because I wanted to shift over to crockery business." It was further held by the High Court that "it was a statutory duty of the Rent Controller to give a specific finding whether the non occupation of the building was due to any reasonable cause. The only evidence on the point is that of the tenant and no reason has been furnished why his explanation should not be accepted. Shifting from one business to another takes time and it follows of necessity that when new business is to be started there is a temporary phase of suspended animation. There is no evidence to show that the tenant had completely ceased his business and in any event there is sufficient evidence on the record to show that the building had not been used for a period of four months for reasonable cause." 8. The learned counsel for the appellant contends that the case set up before the High Court was contrary to the pleadings and the High Court was not justified under section 15(5) of the Act to allow a completely new case to be made out. He further contends that the High Court had misread the evidence of Kasturi Lal, and that the High Court was not entitled to disregard the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority. 9. It seems to us that the High Court misdirected itself by posing the question thus : "The sole question to determine is whether there has been any reasonable cause for the cessation of business even assuming that the shop had been about for the statutory period of four months." This question does not correctly bring out the enquiry that has to be made by the Rent Controller under section 13(2)(v). That clause of section 13 is quite plain, and the Rent Controller is required to determine two things : (1) whether the tenant has ceased to occupy the shop for a fixed period of four months ; and (2) whether this has been done without reasonable cause. The Rent Controller is not concerned with the cessation of business, as suggested by the High Court. 10. It seems to us that the High Court erred in allowing a new case to be made out before it. In the written statement, and in his evidence, the tenant had pleaded that he had not ceased to occupy the shop ; he had not set up a case that the shop was not occupied for a reasonable cause. In our view, the High Court further erred in holding that the Rent Controller had not given a specific finding whether the non-occupation of the shop was due to any reasonable cause. The facts necessary to establish any reasonable cause could only be in the knowledge of the tenant, and if he did not lead any evidence to establish those facts it was hardly the statutory duty of the Rent Controller to give a more detailed and specific finding as to reasonable cause for not occupying the shop. As stated above, before the Appellate Authority the point does not seem to have been argued at all. We are unable to find any explanation in the evidence of the tenant for not occupying the shop. The sentence quoted by the High Court from the evidence of Kasturi Lal does not give any explanation for ceasing to occupy the shop. This sentence has to be read in the light of the rest of his evidence. He was only saying that he was selling away the stocks from January, 1962 to July, 1962 in the shop in dispute, implying thereby that the shop was occupied all the time. He no where stated that the shop remained closed because there was a temporary phase of suspended animation. 11. For the aforesaid reasons we are of the view that the High Court erred in allowing the petition and dismissing the landlord's application for ejectment. 12. In the result the appeal succeeds, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the orders of the Appellate Authority and the Rent Controller are restored. 11. For the aforesaid reasons we are of the view that the High Court erred in allowing the petition and dismissing the landlord's application for ejectment. 12. In the result the appeal succeeds, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the orders of the Appellate Authority and the Rent Controller are restored. The tenant will hand over possession of the shop in dispute to the landlord within 90 days from today. The appellant will have his costs in this Court. H.L.S. Appeal allowed.