JUDGMENT : Sikri, J. 1. These appeals are directed against the judgment, dated January 15, 1965, of the High Court of Assam and Nagaland, allowing, in part the petition filed by Raghava Rajgopalachari, appellant in Civil Appeal No. 1562 of 1966, hereinafter referred to as the petitioner and declaring that "the petitioner continued in service from 13th May, 1947 (the date of his suspension) to 29th June, 1954 and for this period he will get his full pay. He is to go on pension with effect from 13th June, 1953. The subsistence allowance already drawn by the petitioner will have to be adjusted towards pay or pension as the case may be." 2. The relevant facts for appreciating the points raised before us are as follows :- The petitioner was in the employment of the Government of Assam, his services were lent to the Government of India on deputation. In April 1945, he was posted as Assistant Iron and Steel Controller at Kanpur. On December 31, 1945, he was promoted Deputy Iron and Steel Controller, Kanpur Circle, Kanpur. On September 21, 1946 the petitioner proceeded on leave. On May 13, 1947, he was suspended from service by the Government of India. On March 2, 1949, a charge-sheet was filed against him. He was due to retire on June 30, 1953. On July 23, 1953, a notification was issued continuing his service in the establishment under the Government of Assam after the date on which he attained superannuation till such time as the prosecution against him in the Court of law was finalised. On November 30, 1953, he was convicted by the Sessions Judge. He filed an appeal before the High Court and while the appeal was pending, by order dated March 17, 1954, he was dismissed from service with effect from November 30, 1953, "on ground of criminal convictions". The Allahabad High Court confirmed the petitions' conviction under Sections 161 and 467 Indian Penal Code and the sentences, imposed by the Trial Court in that behalf. His conviction under Section 120B Indian Penal Code and under Rule 81(4) read with Rule 121 Defence of India Rules was set aside and he was acquitted of the said offences. With certificate obtained from the High Court the petitioner appealed to this Court. His conviction under Section 120B Indian Penal Code and under Rule 81(4) read with Rule 121 Defence of India Rules was set aside and he was acquitted of the said offences. With certificate obtained from the High Court the petitioner appealed to this Court. This Court by judgment reported as R.R. Chari v. State of U.P., 1963-I SCR 121, dated March 28, 1962, allowed the appeal. 3. On July 5, 1962, the petitioner applied to the Government of Assam asking for full pay under Rule 54 of the Assam Fundamental Rules. On January 12, 1963, the Government of Assam passed the following order :- "No. PG. 62/62/41- The Order issued vide the Deptt. Notification No. PG-27/53/14, dated 17th March, 1954 dismissing Shri R.R. Chari from Government service is hereby vacated. The date of superannuation of Sri Chari and the manner of regularising his absence from duty from the date of suspension, Shri R.R. Chari from Government service is hereby vacated. The date of superannuation of Sri Chari and the manner of regularising his absence from duty from the date of suspension, upto 28th March, 1962 is under consideration." 4. The petitioner filed a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution (Civil Rule No. 36/63) before the High Court of Assam, praying that the State of Assam be directed to pass orders under Rule 54 of the Fundamental Rules. It was not disputed before the High Court that Fundamental Rule 54 was attracted in the case and the only question debated was whether the State would be directed to pass orders expeditiously or not. The High Court directed the Government of Assam to pass necessary orders under Rule 54 of the Fundamental Rules by January 31, 1964. It was not disputed before the High Court that Fundamental Rule 54 was attracted in the case and the only question debated was whether the State would be directed to pass orders expeditiously or not. The High Court directed the Government of Assam to pass necessary orders under Rule 54 of the Fundamental Rules by January 31, 1964. On January 28, 1964, the Government of Assam passed the following order :- "In continuation of this Department Notification forwarded under the above-quoted Memo and the D.O. letter referred to above, I am directed to say that in view of the reserved nature of the Hon'ble Supreme Court's Judgment Shri Chari's acquittal by the Supreme Court could not be considered as honorable and as such, the Governor of Assam is pleased to order that the period of his suspension from 13th May, 1947 to 16th March, 1954 should be regularised under F.R. 54(b) and treated as on duty for the purpose of leave, increment and pension and Shri Chari be given 50 per cent of his pay and allowances during the said period, subject to adjustment of the subsistence allowance already drawn. The Government of Assam is also pleased to order that Shri Chari should be considered as having gone on pension with effect from 17th March, 1954 and on and from that date he will be entitled to pension as admissible under the rules." 5. The Petitioner was not satisfied with this order and on March 14, 1964, he filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the Assam High Court praying, inter alia, that the order of the Government of Assam dated January 28, 1964, be quashed or recalled and not given effect to and for directing the State of Assam to pass orders for the payment of full pay and allowances of the petitioners as admissible under the Rules for the whole period of forced absence from duty. The High Court allowed the petition and gave the declaration set out above. Both the State of Assam and the petitioner having obtained certificate of fitness from the High Court have filed appeals against its judgment. 6. The High Court allowed the petition and gave the declaration set out above. Both the State of Assam and the petitioner having obtained certificate of fitness from the High Court have filed appeals against its judgment. 6. The learned counsel for the State contends that the High Court erred in holding that Fundamental Rule 54 did not apply to the circumstances of the case and secondly, that the High Court erred in holding that the order July 23, 1953, continuing the services of the petitioner was abortive and the petitioner must be taken to have retired with effect from June 30, 1953. In reply the learned counsel for the petitioner supports the judgment of the High Court and submits in the alternative that even if Fundamental Rule 54 was attracted, it was a case of honorable acquittal within Fundamental Rule 54(a). In the petitioner's appeal, the learned counsel contends that the petitioner was entitled to full pay and allowances up to March 28, 1962. 7. In our view it is no longer open to either side to contend that Rule 54 of the Fundamental Rules is not applicable to the case of the petitioner. The High Court by its order dated December 5, 1963 in Civil Rule 36 of 1963, directed the State of Assam to pass necessary orders under made by the Advocate General on behalf of the State. The point, it appears to us, is res judicata and cannot be re-opened. It is not a case of estoppel on a point of law, as held by High Court. If Rule 54 applies, the question arises whether the case of the petitioner is covered by clause (a) or clause (b) of the Rule. The Rule reads as follows :- "F.R. 54 when the suspension of a Government servant is held to have been unjustifiable or not wholly, justifiable; or when a Government servant who has been dismissed, removed or suspended is reinstated; the revising or appellate authority may grant to him for the period of his absence from duty. The Rule reads as follows :- "F.R. 54 when the suspension of a Government servant is held to have been unjustifiable or not wholly, justifiable; or when a Government servant who has been dismissed, removed or suspended is reinstated; the revising or appellate authority may grant to him for the period of his absence from duty. (a) If he is honourably acquitted, the full pay to which he would have been entitled if he had not been dismissed, removed or suspended and by an order to be separately recorded any allowance of which he was in receipt prior to his dismissal, removal or suspension, or (b) If otherwise such proportion of such pay and allowance as the revising on appellate authority may prescribe. In a case falling under clause (b) the period of absence from duty will be treated as period spent on duty. In a case falling under clause (b), it will not be treated as a period spent on duty unless the revising or appellate authority so direct". 8. Mr. Bindra contends that clause (b) applies because the petitioner was not honourably acquitted within the meaning of clause (a). The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that clause (a) applies because he was honourably acquitted. The Note and the Administrative Instructions appearing under the Rule seem to show that the words 'honourably acquitted mean acquitted to blame or that the Government servant has been fully exonerated. This also seems to be the meaning which has been ascribed to this expression in some reported cases. In Robert Stuart Wauchope v. Emperor, (1934)61 ILR Cal. 168, Lord Williams, J. observed :- "The expression "honourably acquitted" is one which is unknown to Courts of justice. Apparently it is a form of order used in Courts martial and other extra judicial tribunals. We said to our judgment that we accepted the explanation given by the appellant, believed it to be true and considered that it ought to have been accepted by the Government authorities and by the Magistrate. Further we decided that the appellant had not misappropriated the monies referred to in the charge. It is thus clear that the effect of our judgment was that the appellant was acquitted as fully and completely as it was possible for him to be acquitted. Further we decided that the appellant had not misappropriated the monies referred to in the charge. It is thus clear that the effect of our judgment was that the appellant was acquitted as fully and completely as it was possible for him to be acquitted. Presumably, this is equivalent to what Government authorities term "honourably acquitted." In R.P. Kapur v. Union of India, AIR 1964 SC 787 , Wanchoo, J. as he then was, used the expression thus :- "Even in case of acquittal, proceedings may follow where the acquittal is other than honourable." 9. It seems to us that if on reading judgment and order which acquits as Government servant it appears to the Government or the competent authority that the Government servant has not been fully exonerated of the charge levied (sic) to come to the conclusion that clause (b) would apply and not clause (a). This conclusion is strengthened by the wide discretion given to the competent authority under clause (b). Acting under clause (b) the competent authority is entitled to give if the circumstances so warrant, the whole of the pay and allowances and also treat the whole of the period of absence from duty as period on duty. 10. In this particular case if one reads the judgment of this Court in R.R. Chari v. State of U.P. (supra) it seems that the Government was entitled to come to the conclusion that the petitioner had not been honourably acquitted within the meaning of clause (a). This Court held that in the absence of valid sanction the charges against the petitioner under Section 161 and Section 165 could not have been tried and that it rendered the proceedings against the petitioner in respect of these two charges, without jurisdiction. Accordingly, his trial in respect of these two offences was held to be invalid and without jurisdiction. Regarding the charge under Section 467 this Court held that the High Court erred in law in making a finding against the petitioner in respect of the charge under Section 467 as well as the alternative charge under the relevant Defence of India Rules because the finding of the High Court on the essential part of the prosecution story in respect of the charge under Section 467 really rested on the evidence of his compliance uncorroborated by any other evidence. This Court then considered the question as to whether a retrial of the petitioner for the offence under Section 161 should be ordered. In this connection this Court refused to order a retrial because of the following reasons :- "Two facts have weighed in our minds in coming to the conclusion that a trial need not be ordered in this case. The first consideration is that the accused has had to face a long and protracted criminal trial and the sword has been hanging over his head for 14 years. The accused was suspended in 1947 and since then these proceedings have gone on all the time. The second factor which has weighed in our minds is that though the prosecution began with a charge of a comprehensive conspiracy supported by several instances of bribery, on the finding of the High Court it is reduced to a case of bribery offered by two persons and then again the substantial evidence is the evidence of accomplices supported by what the High Court thought to be corroborating circumstances. Accordingly we hold that it is clause (b) that applies. 11. There was some argument before us as to the interpretation of the word 'otherwise' occurring in clause (b). It seems to us that the word "otherwise" means, in the context, 'in cases not covered by clause (a)." 12. If Clause (b) applies we can find no defect in the order of the Government dated January 28, 1964. It was for the Government to consider what proportion of pay and allowances should be given and what period of absence from duty should be treated as period spent on duty. 13. The learned counsel for the State sought to argue before us that the date 16th March, 1954' occurring in the order dated January 28, 1964, was mentioned due to mistake and the proper date which should have been mentioned was the date of superannuation, namely, June 30, 1953. He says that the order dated July 23, 1953 continuing the services of the petitioner after the date of superannuation was bad in view of the ruling of this Court in State of Assam v. Padma Ram Borth, AIR 1965 SC 473 . But we are unable to appreciate how he is entitled to raise the point. The Writ was brought to challenge this order. But we are unable to appreciate how he is entitled to raise the point. The Writ was brought to challenge this order. No such petition, even if it be competent, was filed by the State itself. The respondent to a Writ Petition cannot be allowed to attack its own order as a respondent. 14. In the result the appeal of the State is allowed and the appeal of the petitioner dismissed and the writ petition filed by the petitioner dismissed. 15. We were informed that pension has not been fixed yet because of the pendency of these appeals before us. We direct that pension should be fixed very early in accordance with the rules, the date of retirement to be taken as March 17, 1954 as already decided by the Government. There will be no order as to costs in these appeals. Appeals of the State allowed and Appeal of petitioner dismissed. Appeals allowed.