ORDER 1. This is a revision by the defendant against the order dated 15-3-1966, passed by the II Civil Judge (Class I), Bilaspur, in Miscellaneous Judicial Case No. 39 of 1965, restoring the suit to file (namely, Civil Suit No.3-B of 1965), which had been dismissed in default on 15-9-1965 at 2.20 p.m. 2. The respondent filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 5,500 against the petitioner on the basis of a Chitthi. The relevant hearing was fixed for 15-9-1965 for the purpose of framing issues. On that date, the respondent could not appear in person. Therefore, he had probably instructed his counsel Shri S.C. Bhaskar, advocate to appear. The said Advocate was busy with a committal case, namely, Criminal Case No. 1129 of 1965, in the Court of Additional District Magistrate (Judicial), Bilaspur. The order-sheet dated 15-9-1965 indicates that Shri Bhaskar was representing the accused and evidence in that case was recorded by the committal Magistrate from 11.30 a. m. to 2 p. m. It appears that in the meantime, the hearing of the suit was called and as none was present it was dismissed in default at 2.20 P. M. 3. On the very next day the petitioner's counsel himself filed an application for restoration of the suit to file along with an affidavit wherein it was alleged that the counsel himself was busy in committal proceedings relating to a session trial and when after completing his work in the committal Court he went to the civil Court, he found that the suit had already been dismissed in default. On that allegation he claimed restoration of the suit to file. According to his allegation he had been to the civil Court in the early hours before 11.30 a.m.. As he found the presiding officer busy, he approached Shri Choubey, the court-reader and informed him that he will be busy in the committal proceeding and will come to the civil Court as soon as that work is over. 4. The present petitioner opposed the restoration on the grond that there was no sufficient cause. 5. On behalf of the respondent, evidence was led consisting of the testimony of Shri S. C. Bhaskar, Advocate (A.W. 1), the court-reader Shiv kumar Choubey (A.W. 2) and the respondent himself as (A.W. 3). 4. The present petitioner opposed the restoration on the grond that there was no sufficient cause. 5. On behalf of the respondent, evidence was led consisting of the testimony of Shri S. C. Bhaskar, Advocate (A.W. 1), the court-reader Shiv kumar Choubey (A.W. 2) and the respondent himself as (A.W. 3). On behalf of the petitioner he examined himself as his sole witness as N. A. W. 1 to assert himself that the case was called three or four times and thereafter it was dismissed ill default on 15-9-1966. 6. The trial Judge, however, disbelieved the plaintiff's evidence. It was observed that the plaintiff had failed to prove that his counsel was busy in the committal proceedings till 2 P. M. The conclusion of the trial Judge was that upon the material on record, no sufficient cause had been made out by the plaintiff. In spite of that fact the learned Judge held that the Court had ample power to restore the suit in exercise of inherent powers. This is patently incorrect in this connection I may only refer to the pronouncement of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Manoharlal Chopra Vs. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Hiralal, AIR 1962 SC 527 wherein their Lordships have laid down that inherent powers are not to be exercised contrary to the specific provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. In that view their Lordships laid down that if the question of stay of a suit was squarely governed by section 10 of the Civil Procedure Code the Court could not in exercise of inherent powers stay such a suit. However, their Lordships also hid down further that if the matter was not squarely covered by the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code and the Court found it necessary to exercise analogous powers in the interest of justice, it could do so in exercise of inherent powers. From that point of view, their Lordships laid down that even apart from rules 1 and 2 of Order 39 of the C.P.C. the Court could grant an injunction staying trial of a suit in exercise of inherent powers. From that point of view, their Lordships laid down that even apart from rules 1 and 2 of Order 39 of the C.P.C. the Court could grant an injunction staying trial of a suit in exercise of inherent powers. Therefore, what is to be remembered is that the inherent powers of the Court are not to be exercised so as to contravene specific provisions of the C. P. C. But they may be exercised in the interest of justice where a case may not be squarely covered by the specific provisions of the procedural law and the Court finds it necessary to resort to analogous powers. Thus, in this light, there can be no doubt that if a case is not squarely covered by Order 9, rules 9 and 13, or Order 41, rule 19, C. P. C., the Court can still restore a suit or an appeal to file, as was the situation in a Division Bench case of this Court in Manohar Prasad Vs. Chandulal, 1958 JLJ 315 wherein Hidayatullah, C. J. (as he then was) and Choudhary, J., observed that it would not only be the law but the duty of every Court that procedure, if it is found defective, does not harm a litigant. However, in the present case, no circumstances are established to warrant a resort to the exercise of inherent powers and the matter, in my opinion, is squarely covered by the provisions of Order 9, Rule 9 C. P. C. 7. Therefore, it was incumbent on the trial Court to see if sufficient cause was made out and if so, the Court was bound to restore the suit to file. If no sufficient cause was established, then the Court would be bound to dismiss the restoration application. This result follows from the vary wording of rule 9 of Order 9, C. P. C. and there can be no doubt about that proposition. Further, it is clear that the date for framing of issues is as much a date for a hearing. This result follows from the vary wording of rule 9 of Order 9, C. P. C. and there can be no doubt about that proposition. Further, it is clear that the date for framing of issues is as much a date for a hearing. It is not only the duty of the Court but also of the parties to see that proper issue are framed and in suitable cases the Court can proceed under Order 10, rule 1, C. P. C. Therefore, it cannot be asserted that the date fixed for framing of issues is not a hearing for the purpose of Order 9, rule 9, C. P. C. As such, the trial Court could certainly dismiss the suit in default, if the respondent or his counsel remained absent for no sufficient cause. 8. As regards the question of sufficient cause, I may observe that the learned Judge has gone rather off the mark or at a tangent in not only discarding the respondent's evidence and especially the testimony of his counsel Shri S. C. Bhaskar, A.W. 1 but also making certain observations which are wholly unjustified and out of place. Of course, it was open to the trial Judge to believe or disbelieve a witness and if he had merely done that, there could be no grievance against that action. But be has gone to the extent of criticising the sad Advocate as a liar and probably a slur to his profession. I may observe that these strong remarks are wholly unjustified and it was for that purpose that I sent for the original record of Criminal Case No. 1129 of 1965 in which the said Advocate was said to be busy from 11.30 a. m. to 2.00 p. m. The order-sheet dated 15-9-1965 in that case clearly indicates that Shri S.C. Bhaskar Advocate was appearing for the accused in the committal proceedings and the evidence was actually recorded by the Addl. District magistrate from 11.30 A. M. to 2.00 p.m. The counsel for the respondent probably may not have summoned that record in the civil Court under the impression that be as an Advocate would not be disbelieved and branded as a liar. It was in view of that fact that the trial Judge held that the plaintiff failed to prove that his counsel was actually busy in the Court of the Addl. It was in view of that fact that the trial Judge held that the plaintiff failed to prove that his counsel was actually busy in the Court of the Addl. District Magistrate from 11.30 A.M. to 2 P. M. It is open to this Court to take judicial notice of the fact as has been recorded in judicial proceedings. Therefore, after sending for the record of the said criminal case I am taking note of that fact judicially. 9. Had these facts been before the trial Judge, there can be no doubt that he would not have used such strong language against the advocate and would have not branded him as a liar. If the said advocate was busy in the Court of the comittal Magistrate from 11.30 A.M to 2 P.M., the case thereafter would have taken some time when the counsel might be free. Then he may also require some time to reach the civil Court. According to his version, he went to the civil Court at about 3 p.m. Even this statement was disbelieved by the trial Judge. He further stated that when he went to the civil Court at about 3 p.m. or so, he found that the case had already been dismissed in default. Therefore, on the next day he himself applied for restoration and later on filed an affidavit sworn by himself I am clearly of the opinion that the trial Judge went off the mark at a tangent in all together discarding all that evidence as also the affidavit and in still restoring the suit to file in exercise of inherent powers. 10. Similarly the learned Judge was unnecessarily critical of the advocate inasmuch as he observed that it is not the business of the court-reader to enter into private arrangements with the counsel in respect of hearings of cases, I may observe that it is certainly not the task of the court reader but if a lawyer goes to the court-room and finds that the Judge is actually busy with some other case, it would be highly improper for him to interrupt the proceedings. That might, under certain circumstances, amount to contempt of Court. That might, under certain circumstances, amount to contempt of Court. Under the circumstances, the only course open to the party or his counsel is to approach the reader and apprise him of his difficulties which might be put before the presiding officer of the Court if the party or his counsel for some reason is unable to be present when the case is called on for hearing. From this point of view also the version as given by the advocate Shri S. C. Bhaskar, A.W. 1, and the court reader Choubey, A.W. 2 is in no way unnatural. In my opinion, the trial Judge was unnecessarily critical of that fact. The advocate merely informed the reader that he will be busy in a sessions case in the committal Court as evidence was to be recorded and therefore he told the reader that in case the case is called for hearing in his absence, he might inform the presiding Judge that the counsel was praying for some accommodation. 11. As such, on these facts, a clear case of sufficient cause was nude out. But, instead of applying his mind to the facts as they emerged the learned Judge went off the mark or at a tangent and came to the conclusion which could not be supportable on the material on record and be criticised the conduct of the advocate in strong language which was not at all warranted. 12. However, the learned counsel for the petitioner urged that it was not open to the revisional Court to come to a contrary finding of fact and it was within the power of the trial Judge himself to record such a finding. I may observe that that is the rule followed by this Court Findings of fact are taken as correct unless they are found to be contrary to the material on record or they are found to be patently perverse. In this connection I may only refer to the pronouncement of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M/s Misrilal Parasmal Vs. H. P. Sadasiviah and another, AIR 1965 SC 553 . In this connection I may only refer to the pronouncement of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M/s Misrilal Parasmal Vs. H. P. Sadasiviah and another, AIR 1965 SC 553 . But I am clearly of the opinion that the trial Judge did not apply his mind to the facts as they emerged and proceeded on surmises and conjectures in rejecting the evidence of the respondent and holding that the respondent had even failed to prove that his counsel was busy in the committal proceedings. In view of these strong remarks I thought it proper and in the interest of justice to send for the record of the criminal case which completely corroborates the version as given by the said advocate Shri S. C. Bhaskar, If these facts were placed before the Court, I am clearly of opinion that no Court could have arrived at the conclusion that the counsel of the respondent was telling lies, when he said that he had been to the civil Court in the early hours and informed the court-reader of his difficulty and thereafter he was busy in a criminal case almost till 2.30 p.m. or so and when he reached the civil Court at about 3. P. M. he found that the case had already been dismissed in default. 13. Even apart from this, I may refer to the rules framed by the Court relating to the method of work of the subordinate Courts in exercise of the powers conferred by Art. 227 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India read with section 23 of the Madhya Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1958. Sub-rule (1) of rule 1 lays down that the ordinary hours of sitting for all Courts shall be 11 a.m. to 5 p.m. Sub-rule (2) of that rule provides that there shall been interval (not exceeding half an hour) at about 2 p.m. It is a known fact that the subordinate Courts observe their recess period or such period between 2 and 2.30 p. m. It is interesting to note that the trial Judge dismissed the suit in default during the recess period. That was clearly an illegality. If at all, the suit could certainly be called after the recess period and then dismissed in default if none appeared. That was clearly an illegality. If at all, the suit could certainly be called after the recess period and then dismissed in default if none appeared. But its dismissal in default during the recess period is clearly contrary to the rule framed by this Court and from this point of view also the trial Judge was bound to restore the suit on the ground that a sufficient cause had been made out. 14. Although I am unable to endorse the view of the trial Judge on the mailers discussed above, I would still uphold his ultimate conclusion for altogether different reason mentioned by me above. From this point of view, although I find that the reasoning of the trial Judge is defective on both aspects, still his conclusion is supportable on a correct application of the tests. 15. As the result, this revision fails and is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs which shall be borne as incurred.