JUDGMENT N.U. Beg, C.J. - This is an appeal under Order XLIII, rule 1 (r) of the Code of Civil Procedure by Sri Gopal Behari Kapoor, President, Kasganj Municipal Board, district Etah. The appellant in this appeal, Sri Gopal Behari Kapoor, had filed a writ petition in this Court being Writ Petition No. 3736 of 1966. Respondent No. 1 in the writ petition was the District Magistrate Etah; respondent No. 2 was Sri L. R. Lahri, Civil Judge, Etah; and respondents Nos. 3 to 20 were members of the Municipal Board, Kasganj. The case of the petitioner as set out in the writ petition was that the meeting of the Municipal Board of which he was the President was scheduled to be held on the 17th of October, 1966, for consideration of a no-confidence motion against him. The requisition for the aforesaid meeting purported to bear the signature of Sri Ram Singh a member of the Board. The meeting was going to be presided over by Sri L. R. Lahri, Civil Judge, Etah, who, according to the petitioner, was not a properly appointed judicial officer. The main relief claimed by the petitioner in the said writ petition was that a writ be issued directing the District Magistrate, Etah, not to convene the meeting to be held for the purpose of considering the no-confidence motion against the petitioner without deciding the question whether the requisition was signed by Sri Ram Singh or not. The petitioner by means of a separate application. prayed for an interim order directing the respondents not to hold the proposed meeting. This writ petition was admitted by a Bench of this Court on the 4th of October, 1966, on which date the said Bench passed the following order: "Issue notice. The meeting fixed for the 17th of October, 1966, on the basis of the notice dated the 14th of September, 1966, shall not be held until further orders of this Court." 2. The application for interim relief came up for hearing on the 14th of October, 1966, before Asthana, J. who passed the following order on that application: "Heard learned counsel for the par-ties. One of the points raised in this application is that the Presiding Officer who has been appointed by the District Magistrate to preside at the meeting is not competent to preside at that meeting. One of the points raised in this application is that the Presiding Officer who has been appointed by the District Magistrate to preside at the meeting is not competent to preside at that meeting. There is also a dispute about the signature of one of the members to the requisition for calling a meeting of no-confidence. I think in these circumstances the proper order would be to allow the meeting to be held on the 17th of October, 1966, as schedule.l. Let the meeting be held on that date. Till further orders of this Court the Presiding Officer shall not send a copy of the minutes of the meeting together with the copy of the motion and the result of the voting thereon to the District Magistrate and to the President." 3. The writ petition came up for hearing be-fore Satish Chandra, J. on the 9th of December, 1966. On that date the petition could not be heard but the learned Judge passed an order, the relevant portion of which runs as follows: "I have heard learned counsel. Since the hearing cannot proceed today, in my opinion this is not a fit case for the continuance of the stay order granted on the 14th of October, 1966. That order is, therefore, vacated." 4. Dissatisfied with the said order, Sri Gopal Behari Kapoor, the petitioner, filed the present appeal in this Court on the 24th of December, 1966, under Order XLIII, rule 1 (r), C. P. C. This appeal was fixed for admission before us today. 5. We are of opinion that this appeal deserves to be dismissed summarily on the preliminary ground that it is not maintainable. As the learned counsel for the appellant stated before us that a number of similar appeals have been admitted by other Benches in this Court, we propose to give reasons in support of our view in some detail. It has been urged that the order passed by the learned single Judge vacating the interim order was an order under Order XXXIX, rule 4, C. P. C. and an appeal against that order was provided for under clause (r) of order XLIII, rule 1, C. P. C. It has been stressed that proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution are civil proceedings, and will be governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. Reference is made to Section 117 of the Code of Civil Procedure which says that, save as provided in Part IX or Part X or in the rules, the provisions of the Code shall apply to High Courts. In this connection a reference is also made to Section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and it is urged that Orders XXXIX and XLIII are not excluded by the said provision and are, therefore, applicable to a High Court exercising its original civil jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 6. Having given our consideration to this argument we find it difficult to accept it. Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for appeals from original decrees. Section 104 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for appeals from orders. The particular orders against which an appeal lies under the Code of Civil Procedure are specified in Order XLIII, rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A perusal of the various provisions relating to appeals from decrees and appeals from orders would indicate that the appeals envisaged in the Code of Civil Procedure are appeals from a lower court to a higher court, and not from one Judge of a court to another Judge of the same Court. The judgment or order of a Judge of the High Court is an order of the High Court. An order of a single Judge of the High Court is no less an order of the High Court than an order of a Bench or a Full Bench of the High Cm Kt. No doubt there are provisions for appeals from the order of a single Judge to a Division Bench. The provisions for such appeals are, however, to be found not in the Code of Civil Procedure, but in clause 10 of Letters Patent or in Chapter VIII, rule 5 of the Rules of this Court. These appeals are not controlled by the provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. An express provision is made in Section 4 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. clarifying the position. that nothing in the said Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any special or local law in force or any special jurisdiction conferred. These appeals are not controlled by the provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. An express provision is made in Section 4 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. clarifying the position. that nothing in the said Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any special or local law in force or any special jurisdiction conferred. The law contained in the Letters Patent and Chapter VIII, rule 5 of the Rules of this Court would come under the category of special law and would, therefore, not be affected by the provisions of the Code. The present appeal is neither' a Letters Patent appeal nor a special appeal under Chapter VIII, rule 5 of the Rules of this Court. It is an appeal under Order XLIII, rule 1 (r) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Applying the principles enunciated above to the present case it cannot be held to be maintainable. 7. A reference to the case law on the point would support the same view. In the case of Mohd. Sherif v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1961 Alld. 82 a learned single Judge had vacated an interim injunction in a pending second appeal. A special appeal was filed, and it was contended before a Bench of this Court that the order of the single Judge was appealable under Order XLIII. The reply of the Bench to the question as to why such an order should not be appealable is contained in the following observation in the judgment: "The simple answer is that Order 43 of the Code is not applicable to orders passed by the High Court." 8. In the case of Lalji Tendon v. Sripat Rai, A.I.R. 1958 Alld. 105 a Division Bench of this Court held that Section 104 of the Civil Procedure Code contemplates appeals from one Court to the Court to which appeals are preferred from its decrees. The Code of Civil Procedure does not contemplate an appeal from an order of a single Judge of the High Court to another Bench of the same Court. Similarly in Vishnu Pratap v. Smt. Revati Devi, A.I.R. 1953 Alld. The Code of Civil Procedure does not contemplate an appeal from an order of a single Judge of the High Court to another Bench of the same Court. Similarly in Vishnu Pratap v. Smt. Revati Devi, A.I.R. 1953 Alld. 647 a Division Bench observed as follows: "It is true that Orders 40 and 43 both apply to the High Court but the question here is whether Order 43 makes provision for an appeal from one court to another or it is intended to cover cases of an appeal from one judge to a bench of the same Court........ Part VII, Civil Procedure Code deals with appeals and Section 96 provides that an appeal against a decree passed by a Court shall lie to a Court authorised to hear appeals from the decisions of such Court. Clearly Section 56 contemplates two separate courts, one being authorised to hear appeals from a decree passed by the other. While Section 96 deals with original decree, Section 104, Civil Procedure Code deals with orders, not being decrees, and the orders that are appealable are set out under Order 43, C. P. C. The question of an appeal from one Court to another Court is no doubt governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure but the provisions for appeal from one Judge of a Court to a bench of the same court is not provided for by the Code and must be governed by the Letters Patent." 9. The Bench noted that Mr. Woodroffe in the course of his arguments before a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Toolsee Money Dassee v. Sudevi Dasee, I.L.R. XXVI, Cal. 361 urged: "a Judge exercising the original Civil jurisdiction of the High Court is not subordinate to the High Court; he is 'the High Court'. No appeal lies or can lie, under the Civil Procedure Code, from the decree or order of the High Court in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction, the appeal' is by virtue of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent." and this argument was accepted by the Full Bench which held that such appeals were governed by the Letters Patent and not by Section 588 (which is equivalent to Section 104, Civil Procedure Code). 10. 10. Jenkins, C. J. speaking for the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Debendra Nath Das v. Bibudhendra Mansingh, AIR 1916 Calcutta 973 observed: "A Judge of a High Court sitting alone is riot a Court subordinate to the High Court,, but performs a function directed to be performed by he High Court." 11. He held that this is a true result of the Letters Patent and the Code of the Civil Procedure, for the Code makes no provision for an appeal within the High Court, that is to say, from a single Judge of the High Court. This right of appeal depends on Clause 15 of the Charter. 12. A Division Bench of the Rangoon High Court consisting of Roberts, C. J. and Leach, J. held in Hajee S. Shakul Hamid, v. K.N. Mohamed Ibrahin, A.I.R. 1937 Rangoon 268 that Section 96, C. P. C. does not apply to appeals from decrees by a High Court in exercise of its original jurisdiction, but only provides for appeals from other Courts exercising original jurisdiction. The original side of a High Court is just as much the High Court as the appellate side, and rights of appeal are given not by the Civil Procedure Code but by clause 13 of the Letters Patent. 13. Similar view was expressed by the Madras High Court in Sabhapathi Chetti v. Narayanasanti Chetti, I.L.R. 1902 25 Mad. 555. It was held that the provision made by clause 15 of the Letters Patent for appeals from one or more Judges of the High Court to other Judges of the same court is entirely foreign to the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code relating to appeals from one Court to another. 14. The Bombay High Court has also taken the same view. Dealing with the effect of Section 117, C. P. C., Hayward, J. in Bhuta Jayatsingh v. Lakadu Dhan singh, A.I.R. 1919 Bom. 14. The Bombay High Court has also taken the same view. Dealing with the effect of Section 117, C. P. C., Hayward, J. in Bhuta Jayatsingh v. Lakadu Dhan singh, A.I.R. 1919 Bom. 1 observed: "It appears to me to follow that the natural place to find the rules governing the exercise of the appellate civil jurisdiction over the other Judges of the High Court would be the Letters Patent; while the natural place to find the rules governing the exercise of the appellate civil jurisdiction over the civil Courts of the mofussil subject to the High Court would be the Civil Procedure Code" He further observed: "It appears to me, therefore upon these considerations and authorities including that of the Privy Council that the Civil appellate jurisdiction over civil Courts subordinate to the High Court was alone in view when the Civil Procedure Codes were, by Section 632 of the Codes of 1877 and 1882 and by Section 117 of the present Code, made applicable to the Chartered High Courts by the Indian Legislature. In the same case Scott, C. J. observed: "In my opinion Section 98, like Section 104, read with Order 43, Rule I, must be taken to apply to appeals from Courts of inferior jurisdiction to the High Court, and not to appeals from one or more Judges of the High Court." 15. This Full Bench decision was followed subsequently by the Bombay High Court in Vanian Ravji v. Nagesh Vishnu, A.I.R. 1940 Bom. 216. 16. The Lahore High Court has also taken the same view in Ruldu Singh v. Sanwal Singh, A.I.R. 1922 Lah. 380. 17. On a parity of reasoning Section 96, which provides for an appeal, would not apply to decrees passed by the High Courts. No appeal could, therefore, lie from a decree of a single Judge of the High Court under Section 96. Section 104 similarly will not be attracted when a party is aggrieved by an order passed by a single Judge of a High Court. 18. The historical development of the law on the subject also indicates that Section 104, C. P. C. does not apply to orders passed by a single Judge of the High Court. or otherwise affect the appeals that may lie under the Letters Patent. 18. The historical development of the law on the subject also indicates that Section 104, C. P. C. does not apply to orders passed by a single Judge of the High Court. or otherwise affect the appeals that may lie under the Letters Patent. Under the Code of Civil Procedure of 1877 a right of appeal was conferred by Section 588 from certain specified orders, and from no other orders. 19. The Code of 1877 was replaced by the Code of 1882, but the provisions relating to orders were re-enacted in the same terms. 20. The Bombay and Madras High Courts held that an appeal from an order passed by a single Judge of High Court lies only in accordance with Section 588 and not otherwise. A Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Sonbai v. Ahmeclbhai Habibhai, 9 Bom. H.C.R. 398 held that clause 15 of the Letters Patent and the Rules of the High Court, have to be read in the light of the provisions of Section 363, C. P. C., under which an appeal to the High Court from an interlocutory order made by one of the judges lies only in those cases in which an appeal is allowed under the Code of Civil Procedure. The Madras High Court took the same view in Raiagopal in Re. I.L.R. 9 Mad. 447. The Privacy Council overruled this view point. It held in Harrish Chander Chowdry v. Kali Sundari Debia, 10 I.A. at page 17 as follows: "It only remains to observe that their Lordships do not think that Section 588 of Act X of 1877, which has the effect of restricting certain appeals, applies to such a case as this, where the appeal is from one of the Judges of the Court to the Full Court." 21. After this decision of the Privy Council, the High Courts of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras held that an order not appealable under Section 588, C. P. C. may still be appealable, provided it amounted to a "judgment" within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters. Patent, vide Chappan v. Moidin Kutti, I.L.R. (1899) 22 Mad. 68, Sabhapatti Chetti v. Narayanasami Chetti, I.L.R. 1902, 25 Mad. 555, Toolsee Money Dasce v. Sudevi Dasee, I.L.R. XXVI, Cal. 361 and Secretary of State v. Jehangir, 4 Bom L.R. 342. Patent, vide Chappan v. Moidin Kutti, I.L.R. (1899) 22 Mad. 68, Sabhapatti Chetti v. Narayanasami Chetti, I.L.R. 1902, 25 Mad. 555, Toolsee Money Dasce v. Sudevi Dasee, I.L.R. XXVI, Cal. 361 and Secretary of State v. Jehangir, 4 Bom L.R. 342. But the Allahabad High Court in Banno Bibi v. Mehdi Husain, I.L.R. (1889) XI All. 375 expressed a contrary view. Sir John Edge, C. J. observed: "If the order was not appealable under Section 588 and Section 591 of the C. P. C.. it could not be appealed against under the Letters Patent of the High Court." 22. This view was affirmed by a Full Bench of this Court in Muhammad Naim-ul-lah Khan v. Ihsan-ul-lah Khan, I.L.R. (1892) XIV Alld. 226. 23. The Supreme Court in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Co., 1962 A.L.J., S.C. 1 has pointed out that in this state of affairs the legislature intervened. While enacting the Code of 1908 the legislature incorporated Section 4 and enacted in Section 104 (1) that an appeal shall lie from the orders set out therein and "save as otherwise expressly provided," in the body of the Code "or by any law for the time being in force", from no other orders. The Supreme Court observed (at page 7) : "The intention of the legislature in enacting sub-sec. (1) of Section 104 is dear: the right to appeal conferred by any other law for the time being in force is expressly preserved. This intention is emphasised by Section 4 which provides that in the absence of any specific provision to the contrary nothing in the Code is intended to limit or otherwise affect any special jurisdiction or power conferred by or under any other law for the time being in force. The right to appeal against judgments (which did not amount to decrees) under the Letters Patent, was, therefore not affected by Section 104 (I) , C. P. C. 1908". Shah, J. speaking for the Supreme Court, further observed: "Under the Code, as amended, the view has consistently been taken that interlocutory judgments (i.e. decisions though not amounting to decrees, which affect the merits of the questions between the parties by determining some right or liability) passed by single Judges of Chartered High Courts were appealable under the Letters Patent. Ruldu Singh v. Sanwal Singh, A.I.R. 1922 Lah. 380, Paramasivan v. Ramasami, I.L.R. (1933) 56 Mad. Ruldu Singh v. Sanwal Singh, A.I.R. 1922 Lah. 380, Paramasivan v. Ramasami, I.L.R. (1933) 56 Mad. 915, Vaman Ravii Kulkarni v. Nagesh Vishnu Joshi, A.I.R. 1940 Bom. 216 and Ram Sarup v. Kaniz Ummebani, I.L.R. (1937) Alld : 1936 AL.J. 1326. 24. In spite of the changes incorporated by the legislature in the Civil Procedure Code of 1908, this Court for a while continued to stick to its earlier opinion expressed in the Full Bench case of Muhammad Naim-ul-lah Khan17. The Full Bench decision was followed in Piare Lal v. Madan Lal, I.L.R. (1939) Alld. 191 : A.I.R. 1917 Alld. 325. This decision of this Court came up for consideration before a Division Bench consisting of Sulaiman, C. J. and Bennet, J. in L. Ram. Sarup v. Mt. Kaniz Umniebani, I.L.R. (1937) Alld. 386 : 1936 A.L.J. 1326 The Bench held that the opinion expressed by the Division Bench in Piare Lal's21 case has not been followed by the other High Courts, and that it was no longer necessary to refer it to a Full Bench because of changes in the law. This Division Bench case brought the view point of the Allahabad High Court in line with the other High Courts. The decision of Sulaiman, C. J. was affirmed by another Division Bench of this Court in Dhoom Chand Jain v. Chaman Lal Gupta, 1962 A.L.J. 729 where M. C. Desai. C. J. and S. N. Dwivedi, J. field that Piare Lal's21 case was no longer good law because it did not consider the effect of Section 4 introduced in the Code of 1908. They also held that Piers Lars"- decision must be held impliedly overruled by the Supreme Court in the Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Co., 1962 A.L.J. S.C. 1. 25. The question of the applicability of Section 104 has thus become well settled both negatively and positively. Section 104 does not control the appeals that lie under the Letters Patent. Sub-sec. (2) of Section 104 which provides that no further appeal will lie against an order deciding an appeal under that section, does not apply to orders passed by the High Court, and, does not preclude a further appeal under the Letters Patent. That is because Section 104 (1) specifically preserves any law for the time being in force, which includes the Letters Patent. That is because Section 104 (1) specifically preserves any law for the time being in force, which includes the Letters Patent. On the other hand, Section 104 does not apply to orders passed by the single Judges of the High Court, because a right of appeal against such orders has been dealt with by the Letters Patent, the operation whereof is expressly saved by Section 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure which says that nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit "or otherwise affect" any special or local law now in force or any special jurisdiction or power conferred by any other law. Section 104 or Order XLIII, C. P. C., cannot, therefore, either limit or otherwise affect or confer, a right of appeal from an order of the single Judge of a High Court to a Division Bench of the same Court. This special jurisdiction is not conferred or dealt with by the Code of Civil Procedure, but by the Letters Patent alone. 26. Even if the present appeal is treated to be either under clause 10 of the Letters Patent or under Chapter VIII, rule 5 of the Rules of Court, it will be incompetent. An appeal under these provisions lies against a judgment. It has been held in Sri Iftikar Husain v. Sri Sharafat Ullah, Special Appeal No. 628 of 1966, Decided on 20th December, 1961 by a Division Bench consisting of M. C. Desai, C. J. and B. D. Gupta, J. that: "An application for an interim order of stay-is not based on a right, evidently it cannot be based on a right which itself is under investigation in the main case. It is rather based on a ground of expediency, the object behind it being to preserve certain state of affairs in which the final order to be passed in the case may operate to the fullest advantage. No one can claim to have a right to a particular stay order. Therefore, an order granting or refusing an interim order of stay does not decide any question of right and does not amount to a judgment." 27. The Division Bench distinguished the Full Bench case of Glass Beads Factory v. Shri Dhar, 1960 A.L.J. 387 as not being applicable to a case where an interim order is passed or is vacated, in a pending writ petition. The Division Bench distinguished the Full Bench case of Glass Beads Factory v. Shri Dhar, 1960 A.L.J. 387 as not being applicable to a case where an interim order is passed or is vacated, in a pending writ petition. It is to be noted that in Glass Beads Factory case the order sought to be appealed against under clause 10 of the Letters Patent was an order dismissing the appeal against an order granting injunction. The order, therefore, was not an interlocutory order passed in the main case, but an order that itself finally disposed of the entire case in the High Court. The decision of the Division Bench in Iftikar Husain's23 case was followed by another Division Bench consisting of V. Bhargava and G. C. Mathur, J J. in Sri Ratan Lal Gupta v. Ulfat Rai fain. Special Appeal No. 616 of 1963 decided on 12th of November, 1963. We are in agreement with these decisions. It is, therefore, the settled view of this Court that an order granting or vacating an interim order in a pending writ petition does not amount to a judgment, and is, therefore, not appealable under clause 10 of the Letters Patent or under Chapter VIII, rule 5 of the Rules of Court. 28. In either view of the case, the present appeal is not maintainable. 29. The net result of the above discussion is that from whichever aspect the matter is viewed, the present appeal must be held to be not maintainable. 30. This appeal is, accordingly, incompetent, and dismissed summarily. Appeal dismissed.