ORDER S.D. Khare, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the prayer is that by means of a writ in the nature of certiorari the order dated 26th May, 1964, passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court (I), Kanpur, be quashed and he may be directed not to proceed with the further hearing of Miscellaneous Case No. 63 of 1963 started by Opposite Party No. 1 against the Resident Engineer of the petitioner company. 2. This petition was filed in the year 1964 when the petitioner company being an undertaking for the supply of electricity in the City of Allahabad, was doing its business here, Shri Mohammad Ghaus, Opposite Party No. 1, was employed by the petitioner company as a draughtsman and was placed in the grade of Rs. 110-8-150 - EB-160-10-200. The petitioner company had refused to allow him to cross the efficiency bar on the ground of his unfitness. The claim of Opposite Party No. 1, however, was that he should have been allowed to draw salary in the scale of Rs. 150-10-200 without the operation of any efficiency bar as he had been wrongfully detained at that stage for a long number of years without any just cause. 3. There were several electricity undertakings run by Messrs. Martin and Co. Ltd. and the petitioner company was one of them. The Governor of Uttar Pradesh appointed the U. P. Labour Enquiry Committee, more popularly known as Nimbkar Committee, on the question of the revision of scales and wages of pay in the electricity undertakings run by Messrs. Martin and Co. Ltd. The recommendations of the aforesaid Committee were ordered to be implemented by the Government of Uttar Pradesh, Labour Department, under Order No. 317 (L)/XVIII dated March 15, 1948. The Government also appointed a Conciliation Board by its Order No. 1366 (TD)/ XVIII-103 (ST)/48, dated July 2, 1948, whose Chairman was Shri R. S. Nimbkar, and the other members of the Board were Mr. R. Robinson for the employers and Shri B. K, Mukerji, M.L.A., for the employees for the purposes of deciding all points arising out of or involving the interpretation of any of the provisions of the Government Order dated March 15, 1948. R. Robinson for the employers and Shri B. K, Mukerji, M.L.A., for the employees for the purposes of deciding all points arising out of or involving the interpretation of any of the provisions of the Government Order dated March 15, 1948. The findings arrived at by the Conciliation Board were enforced by the Government of Uttar Pradesh by its Labour Department Notification No. 1809(TD)(1)/XVIII-103 (TD)/48, dated 11th August, 1948, issued under sub-section (2) of Section 6 read -with Sections 3 and 21 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The award of the Conciliation Board was to bind the undertaking and its employees for a period of six months from the date of the order in the first instance but was to remain in force for such longer period as the Government may prescribe. By a subsequent award the previous recommendations of the Nimbkar Committee were clarified and it was held that the draughtsman at Allahabad was entitled to get the grade fixed by the Nimbkar Committee's recommendations. The grade was Rs. 110-8-150-EB-160-10-200. Although the Government of Uttar Pradesh did not by any subsequent order extend the enforceability of the award, the workmen in the Allahabad undertaking continued to be paid salaries according to the scales prescribed under the said award. The Opposite Party No. 1, Shri Mohammad Ghaus, was getting a salary of Rs. 150 per month in the year 1948. However, he could not cross the efficiency bar. The petitioner company on several representations made by him took the view that his quality of work was not satisfactory and therefore, they were not prepared to let him cross the efficiency bar. The last representation made by Opposite Party No, 1 was rejected by the petitioner company on the 31st of January, 1963. Thereafter Shri Mohammad Ghaus filed an application under the provisions of Section 6-H (2) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and the same was registered as Miscellaneous Case No. 63 of 1963. In that application he stated that the employers had illegally and without jurisdiction withheld the increments due to him from 1-4-49 and the employers by not allowing him to cross the efficiency bar since the year 1949 had acted unfairly and in violation of the principles of natural justice. He claimed that up to 1-8-1963 he was entitled to get an additional sum of Rs. He claimed that up to 1-8-1963 he was entitled to get an additional sum of Rs. 7,450 as his wages (vide Annexure D to the petition). The petitioner company took preliminary objections in regard to the maintainability of the aforesaid application under Section 6-H (2) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. It took the stand that there was no award or settlement under the provisions of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act on the basis of which an application under Section 6-H (2) of the Act could be entertained. The Presiding Officer of the Labour Court (I), Kanpur, by his order dated 26th May, 1964, rejected the preliminary objection. Hence this petition. 4. The main grounds on which this petition is based are:- (1) that under the provisions of S. 6-H (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a claim regarding the promotion of a workman from a lower to a higher grade, (2) that the order of the Government having come to an end after a lapse of six months fixed under the said order and it not having been extended by the Govt, of Uttar Pradesh, it was no longer enforceable under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, and (3) that the provisions of Section 6-H (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, did not give jurisdiction to the Labour Courts to decide claims for wages which may be clearly barred by time under the ordinary law of limitation and also under the Payment of Wages Act, 5. In the counter-affidavit which was filed by Opposite Party No. 1 most of the facts mentioned in the preceding paragraphs were not disputed. It was, however, alleged that the Opposite Party No. 1 had been placed in the grade of Rs. 110-8- 150-20Q and that no efficiency bar was provided at the stage of Rs. 150. It was further stated that the petitioner company in its written statement before the Labour Court had not raised the plea that there was any efficiency bar at the stage of Rs. 150. It was further alleged that the contention that the work of Opposite Party No. 1 was unsatisfactory was not correct. It was, therefore, contended that the Labour Court had to decide the dispute between the parties under Section 6-H (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 6. 150. It was further alleged that the contention that the work of Opposite Party No. 1 was unsatisfactory was not correct. It was, therefore, contended that the Labour Court had to decide the dispute between the parties under Section 6-H (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 6. The fact that Opposite Party No. 1 was correctly placed in the grade of Rs. 110-8-150-160-10-200 in the year 1948 and had there been no efficiency bar at the stage of Rs. 150, he would have become entitled to draw his first increment after the stage of Rs. 150 in the year 1949 remains undisputed. An important point for consideration, therefore, is whether or not an efficiency bar existed at the stage of Rs. 150 in the grade of Rs. 110-8- 150-160-10-200. A perusal of the Nimbkar Committee report (vide Annexure I to the writ petition) will make it clear that an efficiency bar was provided for draughtsmen at the stage of Rs. 150 in the grade of Rs. 110-8-150-160-10-200. It shows that a draughtsman in his sixteenth year of service could get a salary of Rs. 150 and in the seventeenth year of service could get a salary of Rs. 160 provided he crossed the efficiency bar at the stage of Rs. 150. 7. The averments made in the affidavit filed in support of the petition clearly show that in between the years 1949 and 1963 several representations had been made by Opposite Party No. 1 against his being stopped at the stage of efficiency bar at Rs. 150. Those averments have not been specifically controverted in the counteraffidavit. The order passed by the Resident Engineer of the petitioner company on the last representation made by Opposite Party No. 1 will also clearly indicate that the efficiency bar did exist at the stage of Rs. 150 and the Opposite Party No. 1 had been agitating against his being stopped at the stage of efficiency bar. The order of the petitioner company conveyed to Opposite Party No. 1 by means of a letter dated 31st January, 1963 (Annexure C to the writ petition) reads as follows:- "With reference to your letter dated 19th January, 1963, we advise that your increment was withheld at efficiency bar since the year 1949 as the standard of your work was not satisfactory. In this connection we advise that we are not at all satisfied with your present work. A few months ago you were charge- sheeted for misconduct as per clause 18 (7) of the Standing Orders and you were warned for the misconduct. Recently, you used very objectionable language in your application dated 17-11-1962 and you were also warned for using insulting and threatening language. The management, therefore, does not find any justification for revising its decision in view of your unsatisfactory record and conduct. We, however, assure you that in case your conduct and work improve, we would be pleased to reconsider your case for permitting you to cross the efficiency bar." 8. In his application (copy Annexure D) made to the Labour Court, the Opposite Party No. 1 took the plea that in the award the grade of a draughtsman was fixed in the scale of Rs. 160-10-200 per mensem but the applicant had been put on a fixed salary of Rs. 150 per mensem since 1-4-1948 and against all principles of natural justice and against the terms of the award in question he had not been paid his annual increments and the act of the petitioner company was mala fide and amounted to victimisation. All these assertions were denied by the petitioner company in their reply (copy Annexure E). It is to be noted that Opposite Party No. 1 cleverly omitted to mention that he had been stopped at the stage of Rs. 150 because the petitioner company regarded his work to be unsatisfactory but in order to bring his case under Section 6-H of the U. P, Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, had concealed the fact of there being an efficiency bar at the stage of Rs. 150. It must be in these circumstances that in the reply to his application, the petitioner company could not make any mention of the efficiency bar. However, that was not material because Opposite Party No. 1 could not succeed before the Labour Court unless he could prove in what particular scale he had been placed by the petitioner company on the basis of the Nimbkar award. 9. The result is that I find that there was an efficiency bar at the stage of Rs. However, that was not material because Opposite Party No. 1 could not succeed before the Labour Court unless he could prove in what particular scale he had been placed by the petitioner company on the basis of the Nimbkar award. 9. The result is that I find that there was an efficiency bar at the stage of Rs. 150 in the scale of pay in which Opposite Party No. 1 was appointed by the petitioner company and the petitioner is not debarred from making that assertion at this stage. 10. The next question to be considered is whether on the basis of the undisputed facts of the case and the finding given by me in the preceding paragraph the Opposite Party No. 1 was entitled to move an application for arrears, of pay under Section 6-H of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act without first obtaining an order from the Labour Court that he had been victimised and wrongfully detained at the stage of the efficiency bar either from the year 1947 or from ony subsequent date. It is abundantly clear that for the determination of an industrial dispute the Opposite Party No. 1 could go to the Labour Court only under Section 4-K of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act after his case had been referred to it by the State Government on the finding that an industrial dispute existed. 11. Section 6-H of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, reads as follows:- "(1) Where any money is due to a workman from an employer under the provisions of Sections 6-J to 6-R or under a settlement or award, or under an award given by an adjudicator or the State Industrial Tribunal appointed or constituted under this Act, before the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1956, the workman may, without prejudice to any other mods of recovery, make an application to the State Government for the recovery of the money due to him, and if the State Government is satisfied that any money is so due, it shall issue a certificate for that amount to the Collector who shall proceed to recover the same as if it were an arrear of land revenue. (2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money, the amount at which such benefit should be computed may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be determined by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the State Government, and the amount so determined may be recovered as provided for in subsection (j). (3) For the purposes of computing the money value of benefit, the Labour Court may, if it so thinks fit, appoint a Commissioner in prescribed manner who shall, after taking such evidence as may be necessary, submit a report to the Labour Court and the Labour Court shall determine the amount after considering the report of the Commissioner and other circumstances of the case." It is almost in the same terms as S, 33-C of the Central Industrial Disputes Act (Act No. XIV of 1947). The scope of S. 33-C of the Central Act has been considered in the various rulings of the Supreme Court. The leading case is of the Central Bank of India Ltd. v. P. S. Rajagopalan, A.I.R. 1964 SC 743. It was held that for purposes of making the necessary determination under Section 33-C (2), it would, in appropriate cases, be open to the Labour Court to interpret the award or settlement on which the workman's rights rest. When the Labour Court is given the power to allow an individual workman to execute or implement his existing individual rights, it is virtually exercising execution powers in some cases, and it is well settled that it is open to the executing Court to interpret the decree for purposes of execution. It is, of course, true that the executing Court cannot go behind the decree nor can it add to or subtract from the provisions of the decree. These limitations apply also to the Labour Court, but like the executing Court the Labour Court would also be competent to interpret the award or settlement on which a workman bases his claim under Section 33-C (2). 12. These limitations apply also to the Labour Court, but like the executing Court the Labour Court would also be competent to interpret the award or settlement on which a workman bases his claim under Section 33-C (2). 12. It was further observed that though in determining the scope of Section 33-C of the Industrial Disputes Act care must be taken not to exclude cases which legitimately fall within its purview, it must also be borne in mind that cases which fall within Section 10 (1) of the Act (corresponding to Section 4-K of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act) for instance cannot be brought within the scope of Section 33-C. Dealing with the legislative history of the provision contained in Section 33-C of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Supreme Court observed: "The Act, as it was originally passed, made relevant provisions on the broad basis that industrial disputes should be adjudicated upon between trade unions or representatives of labour on the one hand and the workman's employers on the other. That is why Section 10 (1) which deals with the reference of disputes to Boards, Courts or Tribunals, has been interpreted by this Court to mean that the disputes which are referable under Section 10 (1) should be disputes which are raised by the trade unions to which the workmen belong or by the representatives of workmen acting in such a representative character. It was, however realised that in denying to the individual employees a speedy remedy to enforce their existing rights, the Act had. failed to give due protection to them. If an individual employee does not seek to raise an industrial dispute in the sense that he does not want any change in the terms and conditions of service, but wants only to implement or enforce his existing rights, it should not be necessary for him to take recourse to the remedy prescribed by Section 10 (1) of the Act; that was the criticism made against the omission of the Act to provide for speedy enforcement of individual workmen's existing rights. In order to meet this criticism, an amendment was made by the Legislature in 1959 by Section 20 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, No. 48 of 1950, Section 20 of this Act provided for recovery of money due from an employer under an award or decision. In order to meet this criticism, an amendment was made by the Legislature in 1959 by Section 20 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, No. 48 of 1950, Section 20 of this Act provided for recovery of money due from an employer under an award or decision. This provision filled up the lacuna which was discovered.... In 1953, the Legislature took a further step by providing for additional rights to the workmen by adding Chapter V-A to the Act, and passed an Amending Act No. 43 of 1953. Chapter V-A deals with the workmen's &claims in cases of lay-off and retrenchment. Section 25 (1) which was enacted in this chapter provided for the machinery to recover moneys due from the employers under this chapter. It is laid down, inter alia, that any money due from an employer under the provisions of Chapter V-A may be recovered in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue or as a public demand by the appropriate Government on an application made to it by the workman entitled to the said money. This was, of course, without prejudice to the workman's right to adopt any other mode of recovery. This provision shows that having created additional rights in the workman in respect of lay-off and retrenchment, the Legislature took the precaution of prescribing a speedy remedy for recovering the said amounts from their employers. This Amending Act came into force on December 23, 1953. About three years later, the Legislature passed the Industrial Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1956 (No. 36 of 1956). This Act repealed the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, No. 48 of 1950 Section 25-1 in Chapter V-A and inserted Sections 33-C (1), (2) and (3) and Section 36A in the Act. The result of these modifications is that the recovery provisions are now contained in Section 33-C and an additional provision is made by Section 36-A which deals with cases where doubt or difficulty may arise in the interpretation of any provision of an award or settlement. This Act came into force on August 28, 1956." 13. I have quoted the legislative history of the Central enactment in some detail because most of the rulings cited before me relate to Section 33-C (2) of the Central Industrial Disputes Act. 14. The scope of Section 33-C (2) is very wide. This Act came into force on August 28, 1956." 13. I have quoted the legislative history of the Central enactment in some detail because most of the rulings cited before me relate to Section 33-C (2) of the Central Industrial Disputes Act. 14. The scope of Section 33-C (2) is very wide. The section is not confined to non-monetary benefits which could be converted in terms of money but is concerned with all kinds of benefits whether non-monetary or monetary, to which a workman may be entitled, say for example, under an award, vide Punjab National Bank Ltd v. Kharbanda, 1962-1 Lab LJ 234 : (A.I.R. 1963 SC 487). 15. However, the existence of a preexisting right is essential. Where good attendance bonus could be claimed under the terms of an arbitration award on the basis of which a decree of the Court was passed, it was held, vide Daniel Dorairaj v. B. and C. Mills Co., A.I.R. 1964 Mad 242 that it could be claimed under Section 33-C (2), Similarly, a claim for retrenchment compensation and notice pay, vide Sawat-ram Ramprasad Mills Co. Ltd., Akola v. Baliram, 1963-1 Lab LJ 400 : (A.I.R. 1963 Bom 189) could be brought under Section 33-C (2). Where a question arose as to what would be the date of future increment under an award-whether 1st April or the anniversary of the award-it was held in State Bank of India v. Selvaraj Daniel, 1964-1 Lab LJ 29 : (A.I.R. 1966 SC 1654 that the same could be determined a proceedings under Section 33-C (2). Similarly, a claim for retrenchment compensation, vide Rajasthan State Electricity Board, Jaipur v. Labour Court, Jaipur, 1966-1 Lab LJ 381 : (A.I.R. 1966 Raj 56) claim for certain basic pay, special allowance and dearness allowance payable under an award, vide South Indian Bank Ltd. v. A. R. Chacko, A.I.R. 1964 SC 1522 a claim for compensation for lay-off, vide Sawatram Ramprasad Mills Co. Ltd. v. Baliram, A.I.R. 1966 SC 616 will fall within the scope of Section 33-C (2) of the Central Industrial Disputes Act (corresponding to Section 6-H (2) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act). 16. Ltd. v. Baliram, A.I.R. 1966 SC 616 will fall within the scope of Section 33-C (2) of the Central Industrial Disputes Act (corresponding to Section 6-H (2) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act). 16. It has also been held that, as in an execution Court, disputed questions of fact, such as whether the claimant is a workman or not, whether there was retrenchment or lay-off or not and whether the workman qualifies for the grade which he claims under the terms of an award or settlement, can also be settled by the Labour Court in proceedings under Section 33-C (2) of the Central Industrial Disputes Act (corresponding to Section 6-H (2) of the U, P. Industrial Disputes Act). However, the principle that cases which fall within Section 10 (1) of the Central Industrial Disputes Act (corresponding to Section 4-K of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act) cannot be brought within the scope of Section 33-C of the Central Industrial Disputes Act (corresponding to Section 6-H of the U. P. Act) has remained unaltered. It is only where pre-existing rights can be established that Section 33-C of the Central Act (or Section 6-H of the U. P. Act) can come into play. 17. The Supreme Court in the case of A.I.R. 1964 SC 743, while indicating some of the cases which would not fall under Section 33-C (2), observed in para. 19 of its judgment as follows:- "If an employee is dismissed or demoted and it is his case that the dismissal or demotion is wrongful, it could not be open to him to make a claim for the recovery of his salary or wages under Section 33-C (2)." 18. In the present case, Opposite Party No. 1 has been stopped at the selection grade stage and unless the Opposite Part)' can establish that his detention at that stage is wrongful or mala fide, he is not entitled to claim the pay beyond the stage of the selection grade. Thus, there is complete absence of any pre-existing right in Opposite Party No. 1 and the proceedings started by him under S, 6-H of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act against the petitioner are without any jurisdiction and liable to be quashed. 19. The other questions raised by the petitioner need not be considered. 20. Thus, there is complete absence of any pre-existing right in Opposite Party No. 1 and the proceedings started by him under S, 6-H of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act against the petitioner are without any jurisdiction and liable to be quashed. 19. The other questions raised by the petitioner need not be considered. 20. The writ petition is allowed and the order D/-26-5-64 passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court (1), Kanpur and the proceedings before him in Misc. Case of 1963 against the petitioner are quashed. I pass no order as to cost.