ORDER Satish Chandra, J. - This petition arises out of consolidation proceedings. The parties had properties in two villages, namely, Dharkan and Adhara in the district of Etawah. The consolidation proceedings having commenced in respect of the holding in village Dharkan, the Petitioners' father Tulsi filed objections. The title of the parties which was thus in issue, was by an agreement of the parties referred to arbitration by the Consolidation Officer on 27-11-1963. The Arbitrators gave an award on 30-11-1963 and the interested parties accepted the award and signed it. The award was filed before the Consolidation Officer, who also accepted it and declared the parties' share in the holding in that village in accordance with it. This order was passed on 30-11-1963. 2. Subsequently consolidation operations commenced in the other village Adhara. Objections, as to title were raised in respect of the holding in this village. The Consolidation Officer decided them without following the award given in the previous case. Revisions were filed, but the Dy. Director of Consolidation by his order dated 15-11-1965 held that the award will not be binding between the parties, because the consolidation officer had no jurisdiction to refer the dispute as to title to arbitration. He, therefore, held that the declaration of shares by the Consolidation Officer could not be interfered with. 3. Thereafter, the Petitioners filed a revision against the original order dated 30-11-1963 passed on the basis of the arbitration award. They prayed for condonation of delay u/s 5 of the Limitation Act. By an order dated 24-9-1966 the Dy. Director of Consolidation refused to condone the delay. He held that there was no sufficient cause for it. 4. In the present petition it has, inter alia, been urged by the Learned Counsel for the Petitioners that the award having been consented to and acted upon by the parties before the Consolidation Officer when the previous order was passed on 30-11-1963 it would operate and will be binding on the parties as an agreement between them which had been acted upon. A decree obtained on the basis of such an agreement would also operate as res judicata in subsequent litigation between the parties relating to the same source of title. In my opinion, both the submissions are sound. In Kashinathsa Yamosa Kabadi, etc. Vs. A decree obtained on the basis of such an agreement would also operate as res judicata in subsequent litigation between the parties relating to the same source of title. In my opinion, both the submissions are sound. In Kashinathsa Yamosa Kabadi, etc. Vs. Narsingsa Bhaskarsa Kabadi, etc., AIR 1961 SC 1077 it was observed: Where an award made in arbitration out of Court is accepted by the parties and it is acted upon voluntarily and a suit is thereafter sought to be filed by one of the parties ignorning the acts done in pursuance of the acceptance of the award, the defence that the suit is not maintainable is not founded on the plea that there is an award which bars the suit but that the parties have by mutual agreement settled the dispute and that the agreement and subsequent actings of the parties are binding.... Such a plea is, in our judgment, not precluded by anything contained in the Arbitration Act. 5. This dictum was followed by this Court in Ram Sahai Vs. Babu Lal, AIR 1965 All 217 . The principle enunciated by the Supreme Court is applicable to the instant case. Assuming that the Consolidation Officer had no jurisdiction to refer the matter to arbitration, yet it is apparent on the materials on the record that the award given by the Arbitrator was in fact accepted by the parties and acted upon. The award was signed by all the parties when it was filed before the Consolidation Officer and the parties agreed to it and thereupon the Consolidation Officer declared the shares of the parties accordingly. It is clear that even though the decision of the arbitrator may not operate as an award, yet that decision having been accepted by the parties and acted upon became binding inter se between the parties. As the agreement was acted upon, it will continue to bind and govern the rights of the parties. That agreement related to the properties in both the villages. It was hence binding on the parties in respect of their title over the property situate in both the villages. The Dy. Director was in error in not acting according to that agreement. 6. The parties having come to an agreement which was accepted by the Consolidation Officer, the order passed by him would operate as an order based upon consent and agreement of the parties. The Dy. Director was in error in not acting according to that agreement. 6. The parties having come to an agreement which was accepted by the Consolidation Officer, the order passed by him would operate as an order based upon consent and agreement of the parties. Such an order having become final will operate as an estoppel in subsequent litigations between the parties. The order of the Consolidation Officer dated 30-11-1963 will hence operate as binding in the proceedings relating to the second village Adhara. In this view of the matter the impugned order dated 15-11-1965 is vitiated by an error of law and is liable to be quashed. 7. The petition, therefore, succeeds in part. The impugned order dated 15-11-1965 is set aside. The Dy. Director of Consolidation is directed to restore Revisions Nos. 662 and 700 of 1965 filed before him and dispose them of in accordance with the law and in the light of the observations made above. The parties will bear their own costs.