ORDER S.N. Singh, J. - This appeal arises out of a suit instituted by the Plaintiff Appellant on the allegation that he was the owner in possession of plot Nos. 1000, 1003 and 1025 and alleged that their ancestors had made extension on the benap land adjoining these plots and had acquired the same rights in that benap land as in the above three plots. The Defendant owned another adjoining plot No. 1004 and had applied to the revenue authorities for grant of the disputed land to him for putting up gaushalas. It appears that this application was refused on the objection of the Plaintiffs, but on appeal to the Commissioner, a portion of the land as shown in the map of the Amin dated 7-3-1954 in AMU. Naya No 31 of 1953 was granted to the Defendant. The Plaintiff preferred an appeal to the Commissioner but the grant was maintained after a slight variation. The claim in the instant suit made by the Plaintiff was that the alleged grant was invalid as they had a right of extension and had also right of easement over that land. 2. This claim of the Plaintiff was contested by the Defendant who alleged that the Plaintiff's ancestors had never cultivated the land and that the grant made in favour of the Defendants did not interfere with the Plaintiff's right. Plaintiff's right of extension of cultivation from the three plots of the Plaintiff's was denied. It was alleged that the three plots of the Plaintiff's were on different levels from the disputed land and that the level of the plot in dispute was the same as that of the Defendant's plot No. 1004. 3. The learned Munsif found that the Plaintiff's ancestors had not made any extension on the land in suit and they were not in possession of any portion of it. It was, however, held that Plaintiff had a right of extension over the disputed land by virtue of the three plots, as mentioned above held by them. It was also held that the Defendant had equal right of extension from the land in dispute. Accordingly he set aside the grant made to the Defendant and dismissed the rest of the Plaintiff's suit, which was, it appears, for injunction. 4. It was also held that the Defendant had equal right of extension from the land in dispute. Accordingly he set aside the grant made to the Defendant and dismissed the rest of the Plaintiff's suit, which was, it appears, for injunction. 4. The Defendant preferred an appeal before the District Judge and the Plaintiff filed a cross appeal against that part of the decision which went against the Plaintiff. The lower appellate court allowed the Defendant's appeal and dismissed the cross appeal of the Plaintiff on the finding that by Notification No. 3098/XXVI-3 of Kumaun Commissionership according to which it was ordered that no extension was to be made in any village of the four Districts of Naini Tal, Almora, Garhwal and Tehri Garhwal for extension of cultivation except for horticulture under certain conditions as such the Plaintiff could not have made the extension. 5. The Plaintiff has come up in appeal to this Court. It has been contended on behalf of the Appellants that since the case of the Plaintiffs was covered by Section 11(b) of the Kumaun Nayabad and Waste Lands Act, 1948, the lower appellate court erred in dismissing the suit. The contention of the learned Counsel is that the Plaintiff had a right of extension which would be materially affected by the grant; on the contrary it was submitted on behalf of the Respondents that the word "extension" used in Section 11(b) means the extension in existence, that is to say if the Plaintiff had already made any extension and that had been materially affected, then it would have been a case covered by Section 11(b) not otherwise. It was submitted that the words used are "his extension" and not "his right of extension." 6. I have considered the respective submissions of the learned Counsel for the parties and in my opinion learned Counsel for the Respondent is correct in his interpretation of this section. It cannot be disputed that the benap land belonged to the State and the State had a right to make a grant. The State in this particular case made a grant after considering the rights of the parties and having regard to their convenience, when parties were heard and their convenience considered, the claim of the Plaintiff cannot be granted unless it has been strictly made out within the four corners of Section 11. The State in this particular case made a grant after considering the rights of the parties and having regard to their convenience, when parties were heard and their convenience considered, the claim of the Plaintiff cannot be granted unless it has been strictly made out within the four corners of Section 11. Section 11(b) reads as follows: That the grant would materially affect his prescriptive or easement rights or his extension. 7. It is significant to note that where the right was considered to have been materially affected the word "right" was used but so far as extension is concerned, it is said "his extension" and not "right of extension". On the findings recorded by the lower appellate court and in view of the Notification it has to be accepted that the Plaintiff had not made any extension by the time when the grant was made, as such the learned District Judge was right in dismissing the suit. 8. In view of what has been said above this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with costs.