JUDGMENT B.D. Gupta, J. - This is an appeal from an order of the learned 1st Additional Civil Judge of Kanpur rejecting a preliminary objection raised on behalf of the judgment debtor in connection with proceedings for execution of a decree for, among other things, pendente lite and future mesne profits. There is no controversy that the plaintiff-decree-holder, who is a deity, had been allowed to sue as a pauper. When the decree-holder applied for execution of the decree for mesne profits the objection, among others, raised on behalf of the judgment-debtor was that execution could not proceed in respect of mesne profits, regarding which the decree-holder had not yet paid any court-fee, until court-fee was paid by the decree-holder. The learned Additional Civil Judge took the view that the amount of court-fee payable on mesne profits would be a lien on the money that may be realised by execution and the decree-holder will not be allowed to receive any amount so realised until court-fee was paid, but that court-fee was not a condition precedent before execution could be proceeded with. Having beard learned counsel for the judgment-debtor-appellant we are of the opinion that the view taken by the learned Additional Civil Judge is perfectly correct and this appeal is devoid of merit. 2. Before proceeding to deal with the contention of learned counsel for the appellant on merit, we would like to observe that it is settled law that the question of payment of court-fee is primarily a matter between the Government and the person concerned and that the other party cannot question an order relating to a question of court-fee on the ground that a valuable right of that party is involved. In the ease of Mahasay Ganesh Prasad Ray v. Narendra Nath Sen, A.I.R. 1963 SC 431 it was held that as regards a question of court-fee it was not open to the other party to attack an order granting to an appellant time to enable him to make good deficiency in court-fee, even on the ground that such an order affected his valuable right to plead the bar of limitation. In the case of Sri Rathnavamanraja v. Smt. Vimla, A.I.R. 1961 SC 1299 the Supreme Corot again reiterated the principle that the question whether proper court-fee was paid or not was primarily a question between the plaintiff and the State and that the defendant who may believe, and even honestly, that proper court-fee has not been paid by the plaintiff has still no right to move the superior courts by appeal or in revision against the order adjudging payment of court-fee payable on the plaint. It appears, therefore. to be clear that the judgment debtor-appellant's grievance on the score; of non-payment of court-fee by the decree-holder is misconceived inasmuch as the judgment-debtor-appellant is not essentially interested in the question whether the decree-holder-respondent is made to pay court-fee on the amount claimed by way of mesne profits or is allowed to execute his decree for mesne profits without paying court-fee thereon. 3. Quite apart from the above consideration we have also heard learned counsel for the appellant on the merits of the question in the present case. The contention of learned counsel for the appellant is that the order declaring the decree-holder-respondent to be a pauper as a result of which the respondent was allowed to sue as a pauper cannot ensure to the benefit of the respondent in respect of the amount due as mesne profits which may be in excess of the provisional amount, if any, which may have been included in the plaint as part of the relief claimed by the respondent because the permission to sue as a pauper should be construed as confined to the relief actually put forward in the plaint. Learned counsel has urged that in an ordinary suit where the plaintiff pays court-fee on the amount provisionally claimed as mesne profits in the suit the plaintiff has to pay an additional court-fee for such amount as may, after determining the total amount due, be in excess of the provisional amount on which court-fee had already been paid. Learned counsel also referred to the provisions contained in Section 11 of the U.P. Court Fees Act, as amended by this Court. Having perused the provisions contained in Sec.and having considered the implications of an order granting leave to sue as a pauper. Learned counsel also referred to the provisions contained in Section 11 of the U.P. Court Fees Act, as amended by this Court. Having perused the provisions contained in Sec.and having considered the implications of an order granting leave to sue as a pauper. we are of the opinion that the learned Additional Civil Judge was perfectly right in his view that no question of making the decree-holder-respondent pay any court-fee at this stage arises. ' 4. Reference may be made to rule 8 of Order XXXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure. The said rule runs as follows : - "Where the application is granted, it shall be numbered and registered, and shall be deemed the plaint in the suit, and the suit shall proceed in all other respects as a suit instituted in the ordinary manner, except that the plaintiff shall not be liable to pay any court-fee (other than fees payable for service of process) in respect of any petition, appointment of a pleader or other proceeding connected with the suit." We have no hesitation in taking the view that proceedings for execution of a decree are proceedings connected with the suit in which the decree was passed and that, therefore, the present case is fully covered by the provisions contained in rule 8 of order N XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure. The decision of Kuppuswami Aiyar, J. in the case of In re.: Devata Talipulamma alias Mahalakshmamma, A.I.R. 1946 Madras 257, which has been cited by learned counsel for the appellant, far from supporting the contention of learned counsel for the appellant, lends support, in our opinion, to the view we are taking. The question which arose for consideration in the above case was as to whether a person who had been allowed to sue as a pauper was also entitled to file a revision petition under Section 115. C.P.C. without paying court-fee thereon. The argument was that the civil revision was a proceeding connected with the suit. The learned Judge met this argument by referring to the scheme of the Code of Civil Procedure. C.P.C. without paying court-fee thereon. The argument was that the civil revision was a proceeding connected with the suit. The learned Judge met this argument by referring to the scheme of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned Judge observed that the said scheme clearly showed that Order XXXIII was intended to relate only to proceedings in the court in which the suit was filed, and that in respect of proceedings subsequently instituted by way of appeal there was another provision as to how parties were to conduct those proceedings. This obviously was a reference to the provisions contained in Order XLIV of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned Judge proceeded to hold that the contention that no court-fee was payable on the petition for revision could not be accepted by reason of the provisions contained XXXIII, C.P.C. Proceedings for execution of a decree are proceedings conducted by a court which passed the decree and we find it impossible to accept that such a proceeding can be described as a proceeding unconnected with the suit in which the decree was passed. Manifestly such proceedings are proceedings connected with the suit and that being so the decree-holder-respondent cannot be held to be liable to pay any court-fee as a condition precedent to the issue of process for execution. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge is, therefore, perfectly correct. 5. This appeal is dismissed with costs.