Judgment HEGDE, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal by special leave is directed against the decision of the High court of Judicature at Bombay in criminal review application No. 763/64 in its file. Therein the High Court not only confirmed the conviction of the appellant by the addl. chief presidency magistrate, third court, bombay under sections 304-A and 337 indian Penal Code, but enhanced the sentence of fine of Rs. 2,000 imposed on him under section 304-A to six months simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 200. 00. ( 2 ) BEFORE the learned presidency magistrate, the appellant was tried under two charges viz. under section 304-A Indian penal Code for causing the death of Kumari kunda Atmaram Naik by rashly and negligently driving his car in the Netaji Subhash road at about 5. 30 p. m. on February 15, 1964 and under section 337 Indian Penal code for causing hurt to Kumari Vidya atmaram Naik by that very act. The learned magistrate found him guilty under both the charges. Under section 304-A, indian Penal Code, he sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000, in default to suffer six months rigorous imprisonment. Under section 337 Indian Penal Code he sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs. 200. 00, in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for two months. The High Court in exercise of its revisional powers enhanced the sentence as mentioned above1. In the suo motu proceedings taken by the High Court the appellant contested the legality of his conviction. But the High Court rejected his contentions. ( 3 ) THE prosecution case is as follows : on the evening of February 15, 1924, kumari Kunda Atmaram Naik aged about 21 years and her younger sister Kumari Vidya atmaram aged about 10 years had been to the University Club House at B. Road, netaji Subhash Road, also known as marine Drive to attend some function. As there was some time for the function to commence, the two sisters decided to go to marine Drive sea face. As they were crossing the road through the pedestrian crossing, immediately to the north of B. Road, they were knocked down by the appellant who came driving his car from the south, as a result of which both the sisters were injured. They were immediately removed to the hospital. As they were crossing the road through the pedestrian crossing, immediately to the north of B. Road, they were knocked down by the appellant who came driving his car from the south, as a result of which both the sisters were injured. They were immediately removed to the hospital. The younger sister had sustained only minor injuries whereas the elder sister had sustained fracture of the pelvis among other injuries. Consequently there was hemorrhage as a result of which she died on 17. 2. 64. ( 4 ) IT is not denied that it was the appellant who knocked down the two sisters. It is also not denied that Kumari Kunda naik died and Kumari Vidya was hurt as a result of the incident referred to earlier. Therefore, the only question for decision is whether the prosecution has succeeded in establishing that at the time of the occurrence the appellant was driving his car in a rash or negligent manner or so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life or personal safety of others. If he is guilty under section 304-A, Indian Penal code, it necessarily follows that he is also guilty under section 337 Indian Penal Code. So we shall first examine whether the conviction under section 304-A Indian Penal code is valid. Its validity was seriously challenged before us. ( 5 ) AS mentioned earlier, according to the prosecution when the occurrence took place, the two sisters were crossing the road through the pedestrian crossing marked out immediately to the north of B. Road. This fact of the prosecution case is fully supported by the evidence of P. W. 1, Kumari vidya. Her evidence that they crossed through that pedestrian crossing was not even challenged in cross-examination. Her evidence on this point is corroborated by the observations made by P. W. 5, the investigating officer who went to the scene very soon after the occurrence. He noticed a pair of tyre marks to the north of the northern pedestrian crossing (the crossing with which we are concerned) and they ended in the northern pedestrian crossing. The appellants version that the girls were crossing the road in front of B. road is unsupported by reliable evidence or circumstance. On this point both the courts below have accepted the prosecution case. No case is made out to disturb that finding. The appellants version that the girls were crossing the road in front of B. road is unsupported by reliable evidence or circumstance. On this point both the courts below have accepted the prosecution case. No case is made out to disturb that finding. ( 6 ) THE regulations framed by the Commissioner of police under the Bombay police Act define the respective duties of pedestrians and drivers of cars at the pedestrian crossings. Rule 4 of the rules framed under that act and published in the Maharashtra government gazette part I dated the l2th September 1963 (at p. 1316) provides :" (A) pedestrian crossing shall be denoted by means of transverse broken lines, (b) prohibitions in regard to pedestrian crossings (i) no driver of a vehicle shall have precedence over a pedestrian who is actually on the carriage way at such crossing. The driver or rider shall stop before reaching the crossing till such pedestrian has crossed the carriage way provided that there is no policeman controlling traffic at or near such crossing or no signal is installed. . . " Admittedly the pedestrian crossing in question was denoted by means of transverse broken lines. There was no policeman controlling traffic, nor any signal installed at that place. Hence, the appellant had a duty to look ahead and see whether there was any pedestrian in the crossing and if there was one to wait till he crossed the carriage way. There is no doubt that he was grossly negligent. From the tyre marks noticed by the investigating officer it is clear that the appellant did not notice the girls till he was very near the crossing though he could have easily seen them, as proved by the evidence of Public Witness 2 who was driving his masters car at that very time and going in the same road and in the same direction as the appellant. The appellant evidently noticed the girls when he was hardly 40 feet from the crossing. Then he appears to have applied his brakes. But that was too late. The road in question is a broad and straight one and there was no question of any difficulty about visibility. ( 7 ) THE prosecution has tried to establish that the appellant was driving his car at a very high speed. Then he appears to have applied his brakes. But that was too late. The road in question is a broad and straight one and there was no question of any difficulty about visibility. ( 7 ) THE prosecution has tried to establish that the appellant was driving his car at a very high speed. P. W. 2 Rupsingh sundersingh, a professional driver, who was also taking his masters car in the same road and in the same direction in which the appellant was going but on a different lane, deposed that at about the time of the occurrence, the appellant was driving his car at a speed of about 40 miles per hour. The high Court after weighing all the evidence on the point has come to the conclusion that at the time of the occurrence, the appellant might have been driving his car at a speed of about 35 miles an hour. From the evidence afforded by the tyre marks, it appears that most likely the speed was less than 35 miles an hour. The speed prescribed for Netaji Subhash Road is 35 miles. No separate speed was prescribed in respect of pedestrian crossings. So on the finding of the High Court the appellant had not exceeded the prescribed speed limit. Driving a car in the Marine Drive, at a speed of 35 miles per hour by itself cannot be said to be a rash driving. It was not said that at about the time of the accident the traffic on the road was very heavy or there were any other circumstances requiring a reasonable person to drive at a lesser speed. The courts below after a careful examination of the evidence on record have come to the conclusion that the appellant was guilty both under section 304 A and section 337 indian Penal Code. This was evidently on the basis that he was grossly negligent. From the facts established it is clear that the conduct of the appellant was not that of a reasonable or prudent man. He had failed to discharge the duty imposed on him by law, viz. to look out for pedestrians in the pedestrian crossings as a result of which he had caused the death of one person and caused hurt to another. We are satisfied that he was guilty of gross negligence. Therefore, he was rightly convicted under section 304a Indian Penal Code. to look out for pedestrians in the pedestrian crossings as a result of which he had caused the death of one person and caused hurt to another. We are satisfied that he was guilty of gross negligence. Therefore, he was rightly convicted under section 304a Indian Penal Code. ( 8 ) THIS takes us to the question of sentence. The trial magistrate after considering the various aspects of the case came to the conclusion that it was not necessary in the interests of justice to impose on the appellant a sentence of imprisonment. He thought that the ends of justice would be met by imposing a heavy fine on him. The high Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction has altered the sentence as mentioned above. What sentence should be imposed in a given case is essentially within the discretion of the trial Court. The high Court would not be justified in interfering with that discretion unless it is satisfied that the sentence imposed by the trial court is unduly lenient or in other words grossly inadequate. In Alamgir and another v. State of Bihar1, this Court explained the law on the point thus :"it is unnecessary to emphasize that the question of sentence is clearly in the discretion of the trial judge. It is for the trial judge to take into account all the relevant circumstances and decide what sentence would meet the ends of justice in a given case. The High Court undoubtedly has jurisdiction to enhance such sentence under section 439 of the code of Criminal Procedure ; but this jurisdiction can be properly exercised only if the High Court is satisfied that the sentence imposed by the trial judge is unduly lenient or, that, in passing the order of sentence, the trial judge had manifestly failed to consider the relevant facts. . . It would not be right for the appellate Court to interfere with the order of sentence passed by the trial court merely on the ground that if it had tried the case it would have imposed a slightly higher or heavier sentence. . . It would not be right for the appellate Court to interfere with the order of sentence passed by the trial court merely on the ground that if it had tried the case it would have imposed a slightly higher or heavier sentence. " ( 9 ) DEALING with the question of sentence for an offence under section 304a Indian penal Code, Beaumont C. J. , speaking for the Court, observed in Emperor v. Khan- mahomed Shermahomed2 that in estimating the sentence to be passed on the accused in a case of causing death by negligence the court has to consider whether the negligent act which has occasioned the death shows callousness on his part as regards the risk to which he was exposing other persons. The severity of the sentence must depend to a great extent on the degree of callousness which is present in the conduct of the accused. ( 10 ) THE trial Court thought that the ends of justice would be met if the appellant was made to pay a heavy fine. The High Court did not give any reason for coming to the conclusion that a sentence of imprisonment is imperative in this case. The High Court appears to have been influenced by the fact that a human life had been lost. If that is so it had clearly lost sight of the fact that causing death is a necessary ingredient of an offence under section 304a Indian Penal Code. Yet the legislature in its wisdom has left it to the discretion of the Courts to punish an offence under that section either with imprisonment or with fine or both. From that it is clear that the legislature did not consider that for an offence under section 304a Indian Penal Code, a term of imprisonment is a must. On the other hand it did visualise the possibility of an offence falling under that provision being penalised by mere fine. It is highly regrettable that the incident in question resulted in the death of a young person but the High Court should not have allowed itself to be prejudiced by that circumstance. ( 11 ) AN offence under section 304a indian Penal Code may be committed either by doing a rash act or a negligent act. There is a distinction between a rash act and a negligent act. ( 11 ) AN offence under section 304a indian Penal Code may be committed either by doing a rash act or a negligent act. There is a distinction between a rash act and a negligent act. In the case of a rash act as observed by Straight, J. in Idu Begs case the criminality lies in running the risk of, doing such an act with recklessness or indifference as to the consequences. Criminal negligence is the gross and culpable neglect or failure to exercise that reasonable and proper care and precaution to guard against injury either to the public generally or to an individual in particular, which having regard to all the circumstances out of which the charge has arisen, it was the imperative duty of the accused person to have adopted. Negligence is an omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Again as explained in Nidamarti Negaghushanams case, a culpable rashness is acting with the consciousness that the mischievous and illegal consequences may follow, but with the hope that they will not, and often with the belief that the actor has taken sufficient precautions to prevent their happening. The imputability arises from acting despite the consciousness Culpable negligence is acting without the consciousness that the illegal and mischievous effect will follow, but in circumstances which show that the actor has not exercised the caution incumbent upon him and if he had he would have had the consciousness. The imputability arises from the neglect of the civic duty of circumspection. ( 12 ) AS between rashness and negligence, rashness is undoubtedly a graver offence. We have now to see whether on the facts of this case, the appellant can be held to have been guilty of rashness or negligence. Even according to the finding of the High Court, he was driving his car at a speed of 35 miles an hour, the speed permissible under the rules. No other circumstance was pointed out to show that he was driving in a reckless manner. Therefore he cannot be said to have been running the risk of doing an act with recklessness or indifference as to the consequences. But he was undoubtedly guilty of negligence. No other circumstance was pointed out to show that he was driving in a reckless manner. Therefore he cannot be said to have been running the risk of doing an act with recklessness or indifference as to the consequences. But he was undoubtedly guilty of negligence. He had a duty to look ahead and see whether there was any pedestrian in the pedestrian crossing. Law imposes that duty on him and ordinary human prudence required him to do so. It is likely that while driving the car he was engrossed in talking with his sister who was sitting by his side. By doing so, he failed to exercise the caution incumbent upon him. His culpable negligence or failure to exercise that reasonable and proper care and caution as was required of him has resulted in the occurrence. ( 13 ) FOR the offence committed by the appellant, it cannot be said that the sentence imposed by the trial magistrate is so inadequate as to justify interference by the High Court. ( 14 ) WE accordingly allow this appeal in part, set aside the order of the High court and restore that of the trial magistrate.