JUDGMENT S.D. Khare, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the prayer is that the orders dated November 14, 1962, and April 22, 1963, passed by opposite parties 2 and 3, be quashed by a writ in the nature of certiorari, and the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1961, U.P. Act No. 1 of 1961, be declared as ultra vires and inoperative. 2. U.P. Act No. 1 of 1961 has already been declared by this court to be intra vires-vide Sri K.N. Agarwala v. State of U.P. and another, Civil Misc. Writ No. 2147 of 1961, connected with Civil Misc. Writ No. 2633 of 1962, decided on July 26, 1963. The petition has, therefore, been pressed so far as the other relief claimed is concerned. 3. The petitioner is the recorded tenure holder of several holdings situate in village Geondi, tahsil Mahoba, district Hamirpur. Some of these holdings were bhumidhari and the others were sirdari in character. The area of all the holdings was much in excess of the ceiling fixed under Act No. 1 of 1961. In reply to the notice which was issued to the petitioner under Section 10 of U.P. Act 1 of 1961 the reply given by him was that there was a family arrangement amongst the members of the family, that a partition had taken place and that the land which was in possession of the family was not in excess of the ceiling. Exemption was also claimed in respect of certain land as threshing floor and grove. The petitioner relied on an unregistered document dated July 1, 1959 and the mutation report dated August 27, 1959. The Prescribed Authority, Mahoba, opposite party No. 3, and on appeal the II Civil Judge, Banda, opposite party No. 2, held that the document evidencing the family arrangement could not be taken into consideration as it was unregistered and that the alleged partition had not been given effect to till August 20, 1959. Both the authorities, therefore, did not take into consideration the alleged family arrangement. They further held that the alleged threshing floor was actually under cultivation and, therefore, could not be exempted and there was no grove on any part of the holding. 4. Both the authorities, therefore, did not take into consideration the alleged family arrangement. They further held that the alleged threshing floor was actually under cultivation and, therefore, could not be exempted and there was no grove on any part of the holding. 4. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that opposite parties 2 and 3 should have relied upon the unregistered family settlement to prove that the family had become separate in status and that in any case they should have allowed at least two acres of land for threshing floor over and above the land which had been given to the petitioner for cultivation under U.P. Act No. 1 of 1961. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner. In my opinion there is no force in any of the contentions raised by the petitioner, and this writ petition must fail. 6. Section 6 of U.P. Act No. 6 of 1961 provides for exemption of certain land from the imposition of ceiling. The relevant portion of Section 6 reads as follows :- "Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, land falling in any of the categories mentioned below shall not be taken into consideration for the purposes of determining the ceiling area applicable to, and the surplus land of, a tenure holder- .... .... .... (iii) land, not exceeding two acres in area, used for cattle-shed, compost pits, threshing floor or for such other purposes as may be prescribed." 7. In case the petitioner had been using any land as threshing floor, then such land, not exceeding two acres in area, could be exempted from the imposition of ceiling and must not have been taken into consideration for the purposes of determining the ceiling area applicable to, and the surplus land of, the tenure holder. However, the finding of fact arrived at by the II Civil Judge (opposite party No. 2) is that the land alleged to be threshing floor was actually under cultivation of the petitioner. It is evident that the land which was under cultivation could not be exempted under Section 6 of U.P. Act No. 1 of 1961. 8. However, the finding of fact arrived at by the II Civil Judge (opposite party No. 2) is that the land alleged to be threshing floor was actually under cultivation of the petitioner. It is evident that the land which was under cultivation could not be exempted under Section 6 of U.P. Act No. 1 of 1961. 8. The case of Mahendra Singh v. Attar Singh, 1967 RD 191 is an authority for the proposition that the bhumidhari rights are special rights created by U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951 and these new rights are solely to be governed by the provisions of that Act. The notions of Hindu Law or Mohammadan Law which would be applicable to other property not governed by any special law cannot be imported into the rights created by that Act. What has been said about the bhumidhari rights in that case will apply with equal force to sirdari rights also. 9. In U.P. Act No. 1 of 1961 the term 'family' has been defined in clause (e) of Section 3 of the Act, which reads as follows :- 3. In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context 'Family' means as consisting of the holder of a holding and any or all of his following relations, not being separate rights; (i) wife or husband, as the case may be; (ii) dependent father and dependent mother; (iii) son and son's son, as long as they are un-separated from the holder; (iv) wife or widow of the persons mentioned in sub-clause (iii); (v) daughter and un-separated son's daughter, as long as they are unmarried; Provided that where a relation falls under the above clause in more than one family, he shall nevertheless be a member of only one family in accordance with his choice or if he is under any disability in accordance with the choice of the person legally authorised to do so on his behalf. Explanation :- For the purpose of this clause, a son of son's son shall be deemed to be separate where land is recorded separately in his name or where his separate share has been declared under a family settlement, either registered or acted upon, prior to the twentieth day of August, 1959, or by a decree of court passed prior to or in a suit pending on the twentieth day of August, 1959, or where separate land has been assigned to him under Section 12-B of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, or the separation of his share has been accepted under the U.P. Large Land Holdings Tax Act, 1957." 10. The sons of the tenure holder could, therefore be regarded to be separate from their father qua that holding provided (1) there was a registered family settlement prior to August 20, 1959, or (2) the same had been acted upon prior to August 20, 1959. The other contingencies mentioned in the Explanation will not apply to the facts of the present case. The findings of the Prescribed Authority Mahoba and the II Civil Judge, Banda (opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3) are that there was no registered family settlement and that the alleged family settlement, which was unregistered, had not been acted upon prior to August 20, 1959. In the circumstances the sons could not be deemed to be separate from the tenure holder for the purposes of the Act. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the case of Mst. Rukhmabai v. Lala Laxminarayan and others for the proposition that even an unregistered document can effect separation in status. That ruling will not apply to the facts of the present case for the simple reason that the point to be considered in the present case is altogether different. The case of Mst. Rukhmabai related to the separation status between members of a Hindu joint family possessing joint family property. The present case would be governed by the provisions of U.P. Act No. 1 of 1961 and not of Hindu Law for determining whether or not the sons had ceased to be members of the "family" of the tenure holder. 12. Even in case a different view was possible, it would not be a fit case for interference in exercise of the writ jurisdiction. 12. Even in case a different view was possible, it would not be a fit case for interference in exercise of the writ jurisdiction. The Prescribed Authority, Mahoba, and the II Civil Judge, Banda (opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3) had jurisdiction to decide also the legal aspect of the matter, and their findings cannot be interfered with even if another view could be taken on the aforesaid point of law. 13. In the result the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs.