JUDGMENT Yashoda Nandan, J. - The petitioner claims to be an owner of a piece of land measuring 37' x 46.09' situate on Phoolganj Road in the town of Auraiya, district Etawah. 2. It is stated in the petition that on the fringe of the aforesaid land of the petitioner to the north, south and west certain shops had been constructed which belong to private persons and the open land in front of the shops is utilised for parking carts and thetas which bring goods to the shop-keepers. Some of these shops admittedly belonged to grain-dealers. A site-plan of the land in question and its neighbourhood has been filed by the petitioner. The petitioner gave a notice of his intention to erect certain buildings on his land mentioned above. It was accompanied by a plan of the proposed constructions. The President of the Municipal Board by an order dated 17th May, 1962, refused permission to sanction the plan for constructions over the plot belonging to the petitioner. The petitioner appealed against the order of the Municipal Board under Section 318 of the U.P. Municipalities Act - hereinafter referred to as the Act. The appeal was heard by the Additional District Magistrate (Judicial) , who by his order dated 13th November, 1962, dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved by the orders of the President of the Municipal Board, Auraiya, and the Additional District Magistrate (Judicial) , the petitioners has invoked the powers of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ of certiorari order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the order of the President dated 17th May, 1962, and the order of the Additional District Magistrate (Judicial) dated 13th November, 1962. There is also a prayer for a writ of mandamus, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the Municipal Board, Auraiya, and the President of the aforesaid Municipal Board to sanction the plan of the petitioner for construction on the land belonging to him. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has made two submissions in support of this petition. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has made two submissions in support of this petition. He firstly submitted that under Section 180 of the Act, it was the Municipal Board alone which had the power either to refuse or grant sanction for any work of which notice under Section 178 of the Act had been given and the order of the President refusing sanction to the petitioner was thus without jurisdiction. On an examination of the relevant provisions of the Act, I find that there is no merit in the contention and it must be rejected. 4. It is no doubt true that Section 180 of the Act is to the effect that subject to the provisions of any bye-law the board may either refuse to sanction any work of which notice has been given under Section 178 or may sanction it absolutely or subject to condition mentioned subsequently in the section. 5. The mere use of the expression 'board' he Section 180 does not to my mind justify the contention that it is the 'board' as such which must consider the notice under Section 178 and pass an order under Section 180. The word 'board' is defined in Section 2, sub-sec. (1) of the Act as follows: - "2 (1) 'Board' means a municipal board and shall include, in any case where a power is expressed as being conferred or a duty as being imposed on a board, a committee appointed by a board and any member, officer or servant of a Board authorised or required by or under this Act to exercise the power or perform the duty." 'Thus if the President of the Board who is an officer of it is authorised by or under the Act to exercise the power contemplated by Section 180, the President is for the purpose of Section 180 the Board. Section 111 of the Act is as follows: - "111 (1). The powers, duties and functions specified in the second column of schedule I, with the exception of those against which an entry is shown in the third column of that schedule, may be exercised, and shall be performed or discharged, by a board or by resolution passed at a meeting of the Board and not otherwise." It is not necessary to advert to sub-sec. (2) of Section 111 which is not relevant for the purpose of this petition. (2) of Section 111 which is not relevant for the purpose of this petition. Thus only such powers, functions and duties have to be performed by the Board by a resolution passed at a meeting of the Board which are specified in the second column of Schedule I and in respect of which no entry is shown in the third column of that Schedule. An examination of Schedule I shows that Section 180 is not one of the provisions mentioned in second column of Schedule I. Thus the power under Section 180 need not be exercised by the Board itself. Section 50 of the Act runs as follows: - "50. The following powers, duties and functions of a Board may be exercised, and shall be performed or discharged, by the President of the Board and not otherwise, namely - (a) (b) (bb) (c) (d) (e) all other duties, powers and functions of a Board with the -exception of (i) where there is an executive officer, those vested in an executive officer, by Section 60 and where there is a medical officer of health, those vested in the medical officer of health by Section 60-A. (ii) those specified in the second column of Schedule 1, and (iii) those delegated by the Board under Section 112." 6. By reason of Section 50 (e) all the powers, duties and functions of a Board, with the exception of those enumerated in clauses (i) , (ii) and (iii) , may be performed or discharged by the President of the Board. Under Sections 60 and 60-A the Executive Officer and the Medical Officer of Health respectively do not have the power to pass orders under Section 180 of the Act. Therefore, clause (i) of sub-sec. (e) of Section 50 does not apply to the present case. As already stated, Section 180 is not one of the provisions specified in second column of Schedule I and consequently clause (ii) also has no application to the present case. There is no allegation to the effect that the power under Section 180 of the Act has been delegated by the Board under Section 111 to any other authority. Thus, I find no difficulty in holding that the President of the Board had the power to refuse permission to the petitioner to construct the proposed work. 7. There is no allegation to the effect that the power under Section 180 of the Act has been delegated by the Board under Section 111 to any other authority. Thus, I find no difficulty in holding that the President of the Board had the power to refuse permission to the petitioner to construct the proposed work. 7. It was next contended that the power of the Municipal Board to refuse permission to an owner to construct a building on his own land was limited to cases where the constructions proposed contravened any of the bye-laws of the Board. If the bye-laws of the Board were not contravened every person had a right to make construction on his own land and there was no power in the Board to refuse sanction in exercise of the powers under Section 180 of the Act. If the Board refused to sanction a proposed construction on any other ground it must be held that the power under Section 180 has been exercised on extraneous considerations and the order must be quashed. With regard to powers of the appellate authority it was contended that the power of the Additional District Magistrate hearing an appeal under Section 318 of the Act was co-terminus with the power of the Board under Section 180 of the Act. It was submitted that the appellate authority had jurisdiction to refuse sanction of a proposed construction only if it was not in consonance with the bye-laws of the Board. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, I am of the opinion that this contention is also devoid of any substance. Neither Section 180 of the Act nor Section 313 thereof indicate that the power either of the Board or the appellate authority to refuse sanction to a proposed work of which notice had been given under Section 178 of the Act is confined to cases where it is in contravention of a bye-law. Section 180 merely states that the power under Section 180 of the Act to grant or refuse sanction to a proposed work has to be exercised subject to the bye-laws. This merely means that if there is a contravention of any of the bye-laws framed by the Municipal Board it is powerless to grant sanction. Section 180 merely states that the power under Section 180 of the Act to grant or refuse sanction to a proposed work has to be exercised subject to the bye-laws. This merely means that if there is a contravention of any of the bye-laws framed by the Municipal Board it is powerless to grant sanction. But it is idle to contend that because the Board has no power to grant sanction to a proposed work which is in contravention of any of the bye-laws, it is bound to grant sanction if there is no contravention of the bye-laws. Section 183 of the Act reads as follows: "183. Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 125, a person giving notice under Section 178 shall not be entitled to any compensation for damage or loss sustained by reason of an order passed by a Board under Section 180, unless - (a) the order is passed on some ground other than the proposed work would contravene a bye-law or be prejudicial to the health or safety of the public or any persons, or (b) (c) 8. A reading of this provision of the Act clearly shows that the Board has power to refuse sanction to a proposed work on grounds than that a bye-law would be contravened. This section shows that compensation would be available to a party only if the order of refusal is passed on grounds other than that the proposed construction would be in contravention of a bye-law or that it would be prejudicial to the health or safety of the public or any person. An examination of these provisions of the Act to my mind indicates that the Municipal Board as the custodian of the health, safety and convenience of the public has been given very wide powers to refuse sanction of a proposed work. If the sanction has been refused on the ground that the construction would contravene a bye-law or that it would be prejudicial to the health or safety of the public or any other person the owner of the land, proposed to be constructed upon, would not have even a right to receive compensation from the Board. If the refusal is passed on grounds other than these, the only right a person has is the right to receive compensation. If the refusal is passed on grounds other than these, the only right a person has is the right to receive compensation. To my mind as long as the refusal is based on a ground not extraneous to the legitimate duties of the Board and as long as it is not mala fide it is not open to challenge as being invalid. 9. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in support of his submission that the Board's powers to refuse sanction to a pro-posed construction was limited to cases where the proposed construction would contravene the bye-laws relied upon an observation made by Malik, J. as he then was, in Municipal Board, Meerut v. Mohd. Zaki, AIR 1945 Allahabad 393. In this case the respondent Mohd. Zaki was refused sanction to make certain constructions. He consequently instituted a suit for recovery of damages under Section 183 of the Act against the Board and two other private individuals. The suit hail been decreed by both the courts below. No reasons had been recorded by the Board for refusing to sanction the proposed work. During the suit giving rise to the appeal in this Court, in the written statement it was pleaded on behalf of the Board that the constructions if sanctioned would have interfered with the right of light and air of defendant No. 2 Phoola. In these circumstances, Malik, J. observed that he had seen a tendency in the municipal boards to consider that they have a right to go into private disputes and refuse sanction on considerations which have nothing to do with the building bye-laws. The learned Judge further made the following observations: - "The Legislature, when it restricted the right of a person to make constructions on his own land without the sanction of the hoard, did it in the interest of the public. Every municipal board has certain building bye-laws which are framed keeping in view the sanitary and other requirements of the city. When an application for sanction is made, it is the duty of the board to see whether the proposed constructions in any way contravene the building bye-laws. If they do not it is the duty of the board to grant the sanction." 10. Similar views were expressed by the learned Judge in the case of Municipal Board, Kannauj v. Manohar La1, 1946 ALW 245. If they do not it is the duty of the board to grant the sanction." 10. Similar views were expressed by the learned Judge in the case of Municipal Board, Kannauj v. Manohar La1, 1946 ALW 245. These observations no doubt support the submission made on behalf of the petitioner. In a later decision however reported in Mahndeo Prasad v. The Government, United Provinces, AIR 1949 Allahabad 56 decided by Malik, C. J. and Bind Basni Prasad, J., Malik, C.J. commented on his decision in Municipal Board, Kannauj, in the following terms: - "In the case of Municipal Board, Kannauj v. Manohar La1, 1946 ALW 245, I have already expressed my opinion that a Municipal Board is not entitled to assume the functions of a civil Court and decide contested matters relating to rights to property when an application for permission to build comes up before it. In that case I have probably expressed myself too strongly when I said that the Municipal Board was bound to grant an application if the proposed building was in accordance with the Municipal building bye-laws. What I meant was that the Municipal Board as the custodian of the civic rights of the citizen must consider such applications on their merits and their decision must be a bona fide decision in the discharge of its duties as a body responsible for the health, sanitation, planning. etc. of the town. In every modern city, town planning is an important aspect and the consideration of the question whether a proposed building should or should not be allowed to be construed, according to the proposed plan, is one of the important functions of the Municipality which it has to discharge with due regard to its civic responsibilities. Such applications should not be disposed of on extraneous considerations which are not within the scope of the Municipal Board." 11. This latter decision clearly shows that it was not intended to be laid down by Malik, C.J. that unless the proposed constructions are in contravention of some bye-law of the Board, the Board was under a duty to sanction it. The observations made by Malik, C.J. in the Division Bench decision of Mahadco Prasad on the other hand shows that as the custodian of the civic rights of the citizen responsible for the health, sanitation, planning etc. The observations made by Malik, C.J. in the Division Bench decision of Mahadco Prasad on the other hand shows that as the custodian of the civic rights of the citizen responsible for the health, sanitation, planning etc. of the town in deciding as to whether a proposed construction should be sanctioned or not the Board should bear in mind all its powers, duties and functions. Bind Basni Prasad, J. in the same decision held -is follows: - "The Board has to exercise its discretion independently and the primary consideration before it when dealing with such applications is public health, safety and convenience or any matter relating to subjects mentioned in Sections 7 and 8, U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916 ....... "Having regard to the scheme and the policy of the Municipalities Act and the purposes for securing which bye-laws may Se framed under Section 298 in connexion with sanctioning of buildings, it is clear that the intention of the Legislature was not to arm the Municipal Board with power to refuse to sanction any work except upon the grounds of public health, safety or convenience or matters mentioned in Sections 7 and 8, U.P. Municipalities Act." These observations clearly indicate that the powers of the Municipal Board to refuse to sanction of the proposed work is not limited to cases where the bye-laws of the Board are likely to be contravened. 12. In the view I am taking I am fortified with another unreported decision of A.P. Srivastava, J. in Shanker Lal v. Municipal Board of A uraiya, Civil Misc. Writ No. 1885 of 1958 decided on 1st August 1962. The learned Judge held that as he 'read Section 180 he found, "nothing in it to show that the Board is bound to grant sanction simply because no bye-law is being contravened." He went on to hold that, "If the sanction is wrongly refused on grounds which are not covered by Section 183, the refusal may make the Board liable for damages as provided under the section." 13. In the instant case the Additional District Magistrate dismissed the petitioner's appeal on the ground that permission for construction should be refused to the petitioner on grounds of public convenience. In the instant case the Additional District Magistrate dismissed the petitioner's appeal on the ground that permission for construction should be refused to the petitioner on grounds of public convenience. He was of the opinion that the construction contemplated would result in congestion at the entrance and the public will be highly inconvenienced if the petitioner were to be allowed to raise the constructions. The ground of the refusal is not beyond the scope of the duties of the Board. 14. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned counsel appearing for opposite parties Nos. 1 and 3, in my judgment this petition Must fail and it is accordingly dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.