JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - The petitioner wants that the order dated 10th March, 1967 removing him from the Presidentship of the Municipal Board, Auraiya, district Etawah under Section 48 of the U.P. Municipalities Act be quashed. 2. The material portion of the order runs as follows: - "I am directed to say that your explanation dated June 21, 1966, to the charge-sheet issued with G.O. No. 17701XI-A8281 1965, dated June 4, 1966 has been considered by Government and has been found unsatisfactory. You have failed in the performance of your duties and have been guilty of misconduct in the discharge of your duties. The Governor has, therefore, been pleased to remove you from the Presidentship of the Municipal Board, Auraiya, (District Etawah) with immediate effect under clause (a) and clause (b) of sub-sec. (2) of Section 48 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, (U.P. Act No. II of 1916) ". 3. One of the points raised by the petitioner is that the order contravenes the ex-press provisions of Section 48 by not stating the reasons for the action taken and mentioned in it. Sub-sec. (2-A) of Section 48 states: - " After considering any explanation that may be offered by the President and making such inquiry as it may consider necessary, the State Government may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, remove The President from his office:" Under sub-sec. (2-B) of Section 48 the order passed by the State Government under sub-sec. (2-A) is final and cannot be questioned in any court. An order under sub-sec. (2-A) can be passed on any one of the grounds mentioned in sub-sec. (2-A) . A charge-sheet containing many charges was served upon the petitioner. The charge-sheet sought to bring the case within clause (A) as well as (B) of sub-sec. (2) of Section 48. Clause (B) itself contains eight sub-clauses giving various grounds upon which a President can be proceeded against. The petitioner had seriously disputed the correctness and validity of the charges and had filed an elaborate explanation. It is undeniable that many points of substance arose for consideration and determination by the State Government. The impugned order mentioned above only states that the .explanation has been found unsatisfactory. That, in my opinion, is not recording the reasons for the action of removing the petitioner. It is undeniable that many points of substance arose for consideration and determination by the State Government. The impugned order mentioned above only states that the .explanation has been found unsatisfactory. That, in my opinion, is not recording the reasons for the action of removing the petitioner. It is a statement of the conclusion reached by the State Government after a perusal of the petitioner's explanation. Sub-sec. (4) of Section 40 of the Municipalities Act entitles the State Government to remove a member of a Municipal Board and when such action is taken, "reasons therefore shall be placed on record". 4. This provision was considered by this Court in the-case of Abdul Rashid Khan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, 1961 ALJ 467. It was held that that phrase only meant that the order by which a member was removed has to be self contained and should itself state the reasons for the action of removal. The provision was held mandatory and its violation would make the order void. The same provision came up for interpretation in Mahboob v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, Writ No. 4003 of 1966, decided on 3rd May 1967 by Mr. Justice Satish Chandra, wherein the decision in Abdul Rashid Khan's' use was followed. It was further pointed out that there was a well known distinction between stating the conclusion and stating the reasons for it. it was observed: - "For the respondents it was, however, urged that the impugned order does not state the reasons. The ultimate finding was that the petitioner was unfit to continue as a member. This was based on the ground that the petitioner's explanation was found unsatisfactory and that the petitioner was guilty of misconduct and of causing loss to the funds of the Municipal Board. These were the grounds on which the finding is based. I am unable to agree. The Supreme Court in Collector of Manghyr v. Keshav Prasad, A.I.R. 1962 SC 1694 emphasised in paragraph 15. "There are two matters, which though somewhat inter-related are nevertheless distinct and separate. One is the conclusion of finding of the Collector that the state of circumstances set out in Section 5-A (1) exists, and the other the reasons why and the grounds upon which the Collector reaches that conclusion". 5. "There are two matters, which though somewhat inter-related are nevertheless distinct and separate. One is the conclusion of finding of the Collector that the state of circumstances set out in Section 5-A (1) exists, and the other the reasons why and the grounds upon which the Collector reaches that conclusion". 5. The Court further observed, "To suggest that by a recital of the nature of the repairs required to be carried out and employing the language of Section 5-A (1) the officer has recorded his reasons for invoking Section 5-A is to confuse the recording of the conclusion of the officer with the reasons for which he arrived at that conclusion". 6. These observations are apposite to the present case. The mere recital of the language of the statutory provision is not the recording of reasons. They are themselves the findings or conclusions. The case of Re Pyser and Mills' Arbitration is also in point. Section 12 (1) of the Tribunals and Inquiries Act required a tribunal giving a decision to furnish a statement of the reasons for the decision. Megaw, J. observed at p. 818 that, "The whole purpose of Section 12 of the Tribunals and Inquiries Act, 1958, was to enable persons whose property or interests were being affected by some administrative decision or some statutory arbitration to know, if the decision was against them, what the reasons for it were". He then held, (page 616), "Now Parliament having provided that reasons shall be given, in my view that must clearly be read as meaning that proper, adequate, reasons must be given; the reasons that are set out, whether they are right or wrong, must be reasons which not only will be intelligible, but also can reasonably be said to deal with the substantial points.that have been -raised, Further on it was observed (at page 617), "I do not want it to be thought for a moment that I am saying that any Minor or trivial error, or failure to give reasons in relation to every particular point that has been raised at the hearing, would be sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court. Far from it. Far from it. There must be something wrong and inadequate in the reasons that are given in order to enable the jurisdiction of this court to be invoked." Judged by these standards the impugn ed order cannot be held to state the reasons for the action. Similar view was expressed in Indra Prakash v. State of U.P., (1963) 1 All.E.R. 612, wherein it was said that the requirement of Section 30 Municipalities Act, that reasons must be stated would be satisfied only if it is .mentioned why .and how the explanation is incorrect. In the instant case the order purports to state the conclusion and does not give the reasons for it. It was urged that the language of Section 48 is different from that of Section 40 or Section 30, which came up for interpretation in the earlier, decisions mentioned above. Under Section 30, the order together with the reasons therefor has to be published in the official gazette. Under Section 40, sub-sec. (4) when action is taken, the reasons therefor are to be placed on record. This was interpreted to mean that the reasons ought to be mentioned in the order itself. Under Section 48 the recording of the reasons in writing is a condition precedent to the action of removal.. The language in Section 48 in my opinion, is stronger than either Section 30 or Section 40. Under Section 48 the reasons must be stated in the order by which the President is removed from his office. If the reasons are not so recorded, the provision is not complied with. 6. In my opinion, the provisions of sub-sec. (2-A) of Section 48 like Section 30, for reasons mentioned in the case of Indra Prakash cited above are mandatory in character. Their violation will render the impugned action totally void. 7. The petition is entitled to succeed on this point. Under the circumstances, it is not necessary to go into the merits of the other pleas raised in the petition. 8. The petition, therefore, succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 10th Mar 1, 1967 removing the petitioner from t post of the President is quashed. The petitioner will be entitled to his costs.