Judgment :- The Writ Petitions coming on for hearing on Friday the 11th day of August, 1967, Tuesday the 12th day of September, 1967 and this day upon perusing the petitions and the affidavits filed in support thereof the orders of the High Court, dated 15-12-1964, 15-12-1964, 29-12-1964 and 6-1-1965 and made herein and the counter affidavits filed herein and the records relating to the order in (i) S. No. 46/64 C.O.R. No. 58/64, dated 27-11-1964 (ii) S. No. 40/64, dated 2-11-1964 (iii) S. No. 37/64 C.O.R. No. 60/64, dated 2-12-1964 and (iv) S. No. 17/64 C.O.R. No. 67/64, dated 31-12-1964 on the file of the respondent in all the petitions herein and comprised in the return of the respondent in all the petitions herein to the Writ made by the High Court, and upon hearing the arguments of Mr. A. Shanmugavel, Advocate for the petitioner in each of the petitions and of Mr. G. Ramaswamy, Advocate for Central Government Standing Counsel on behalf of the respondent in each of the petitions the court made the following order : 2.In all these four petitions, which were heard together, one common point of law affecting the principles of natural justice arises, though the background against which the petitions have been filed as well as the petitioners are different. I will take up first for consideration Writ Petition No. 2115 of 1964 as the facts in that case can be taken as typical of the rest. 3.The petitioner is a licensee of a Match Factory in Ramanathapuram district. Under the Rules for levy of excise duty on matches manufactured in India, each pack of matches has to be affixed with banderols, which have to be purchased from the Excise authorities and affixed to the boxes in the manner prescribed by the Rules. 3.The petitioner is a licensee of a Match Factory in Ramanathapuram district. Under the Rules for levy of excise duty on matches manufactured in India, each pack of matches has to be affixed with banderols, which have to be purchased from the Excise authorities and affixed to the boxes in the manner prescribed by the Rules. Rule 68 of the Rules framed by the Central Government under the relevant enactment, Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, prescribes the manner of affixing such banderols in the following terms : "Manner of affixing banderols Every banderol shall be so affixed that - the words and figures on the banderol specifying the maximum (a) number of matches covered by the banderol are legible; the box of booklet cannot be opened without tearing the (b) banderol; where it is affixed to a box, the ends of the banderol are (c) covered by factory's label : Provided that when the box bears an advertisement in addition to the factory's label, the banderol may, with the approval of the proper officer affix in such a way that it passes over the factory's label on the one side of the box and its ends are covered by the advertisement label on the other." * When the premises of the petitioner were inspected by the Sub-Inspector of Central Excise in connection with an application by the petitioner for clearance of the match boxes and for release of the banderolled matches, it was found that there was a stock of 92 bundles of 5 gross each, of matches affixed with banderols. Out of them, when four bundles were examined, five match boxes were affixed with torn banderols and one match box was affixed with Trade Labels on both sides. A further examination of the remaining bundles revealed that 44 match boxes inclusive of the above said five were affixed with torn banderols in two boxes the Trade Labels were affixed on both sides. This was considered by the Department as a serious irregularity and a notice was issued to the petitioner, the licensee mentioning the fact that 44 match boxes were found affixed with 'cut banderols' and asking him to show cause why his licence should not be suspended under Rule 181(1) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, for contravention of the relevant condition of the licence. Before the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, the authority who issued the above said notice the petitioner pleaded that the affixture to torn banderols in 44 match boxes was due to the carelessness of the workers in affixing the banderols, and was only a mistake, and that this plea of mistakes could be accepted and the enquiry dropped. It was also mentioned in this reply that the finding of only 44 match boxes with torn labels must be treated as due to a mistake when it is taken into consideration that a large number of 92 bundles, each bundle containing 5 gross of match boxes, had been checked without the discovery of any similar defect. But the Assistant Collector of Central Excise thereafter come to the conclusion that the explanation offered by the licensee was not convincing, that the irregularity was of a serious nature, that the licensee was not fit to hold the Central Excise licence and that his continuance as a licensee of match factory poses grave risk to Government interests and is detrimental to revenue. In addition to the order of the confiscation of 16 bundles which contained the match boxes with the cut-banderols as well as a penalty of Rs. 100/- which had been already imposed on the licensee, his licence was suspended for six months. 4.The actual order suspending the licence passed by the Assistant Collector was, however, framed as follows : "I suspend 1.4 licence No. 160/62 held by Shri C. Sanjeevi of Jaya Match Industries, Padanthal under Rule 181(1) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, for a period of 6(six) months with effect from 16-12-1964. N. B. - This order of suspension has been passed with the prior approval of the Collector of Central Excise, Madras" * 5.The petitioner has attacked the above order in this writ petition and has sought for the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the above order. 6.It is urged that on a question of fact, the authorities should have found out that this is not really a case of "Cut-banderols" being affixed to the match boxes, but only "torn" banderols, the tearing having occurred accidentally during the pasting of the banderols, and that on such circumstances there was no room at all for the inference about fraud or thereby any consequent loss, to the Government, of revenue. This plea was stoutly resisted by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-department and he urged that an examination of the relevant match boxes would bear out the contention of the Department that this was a case of affixture of cut-banderols and not merely accidentally torn banderols. But the actual match boxes seized were not produced before me in all these petitions, and what was shown before me was only samples of matches seized in some of these cases. On this disputed question, it is not possible for me, in these writ petitions, to come to a definite conclusion, because this relates to a question of fact for the appreciation of authorities. In fact, under the Rules, there is both provision for an original order to be passed by the Assistant Collector, as well as a further appeal to the higher authorities and it will be a matter for the consideration of those authorities as to the correct view to be taken on the question whether the match boxes in these cases were deliberately affixed with cut-banderols involving an ultimate loss of revenue or whether the banderols accidentally got torn, at the time of pasting. 7.But, however, the petitioner is on a much firmer ground when he contends that by seeking approval of the Collector of Central Excise, Madras before passing the aforesaid order of such suspension, the punishing authority who is also the enquiring authority, viz., the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, had surrendered his individual judgment to that of a superior officer. I have extracted above the relevant order, and it clearly says that the Assistant Collector, Central Excise, had obtained the prior approval of the Collector of Central Excise, Madras before passing the order of suspension. For supporting this procedure, the Department has referred to Instruction 21(b)(ii) and (iii) of the Basic Manual of Departmental Instructions of Excisable Manufactured Products. Learned Counsel appearing for the Department states that this provision in the Manual was intended more as a protection to the licensee to ensure that a severe punishment is not awarded to him by way of suspension etc. solely on the responsibility of the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, the enquiring Officer, without getting the prior approval of the Collector of Central Excise who might in a proper case give a direction to the Assistant Collector that the punishment was too severe. solely on the responsibility of the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, the enquiring Officer, without getting the prior approval of the Collector of Central Excise who might in a proper case give a direction to the Assistant Collector that the punishment was too severe. But, on the other hand, it is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, that there is no such restriction in regard to the actual operation of the instructions and that, on the other hand, the punishing authority, in order to put himself on the right side of his Administrative superior, would, in all cases, submit the records of enquiry after he had come to a finding, to the superior officer for the necessary direction approving an order of suspension and that approval for an order of suspension will be given by the superior officer without giving a fresh opportunity to the licensee to show cause against the punishment proposed to be imposed. It would be really a punishment inflicted on the direction of the superior officer without the licensee having had an opportunity to make a representation, whether in writing or orally, before that superior officer against the quantum of punishment. That such a result can naturally follow from the provisions of Instruction 21 of the Manual mentioned above cannot be gain said, and that on every occasion, when the punishing authority surrenders his individual Judgment in the matter of punishment to the superior officer and suspension is ordered without the licensee having an opportunity of giving an explanation before the superior officer about the quantum of the punishment, there will be, to that extent, a contravention of the principles of natural justice. Further, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that under Instruction 21(b)(ii), persistent misdemeanour involving serious losses of revenue is stated to be the occasion for resorting to punishment of suspension, but not in a case like the present one, where the misdemeanour had occurred only once. But that would be an argument which would be relevant when the appropriateness of the punishment in this case comes up for consideration. But that would be an argument which would be relevant when the appropriateness of the punishment in this case comes up for consideration. But the issue now raised is not so much a question of the appropriateness of the punishment, but the legality of the order of punishment inflicted in the manner stated above, without complying with the requirements of the principles of natural justice.8.There are ample authorities in support of the view that this kind of dual responsibility either at the stage of the finding of guilty or at the stage of deciding the quantum of punishment in quasi-judicial proceedings, will lead to a failure of natural justice, if the aggrieved party is deprived of the opportunity of making representations contra to the authorities concerned, at either stage, whether it be at the stage of holding the enquiry and coming to the conclusion about the guilt or otherwise of the person concerned, or at the stage of awarding to him a punishment or inflicting on him a penalty. In Nageswara Rao v. A.P.S.R.T. Corporation (A.I.R. 1959, Supreme Court, 308) the Supreme Court dealt with a statutory provision which imposed a duty on the State Government to give a personal hearing, but the procedure prescribed by the Rules imposed a duty on the Secretary (to the Government) to hear, and the Chief Minister to decide. The Supreme Court observed that this divided responsibility was destructive of the concept of judicial hearing. 9. Mahadaval v. Commercial Tax Officer (A.I.R. 1958, Supreme Court, 667) dealt with a case under the Sale Tax Law where the Commercial Tax Officer, without exercising his own judgment in the matter of assessing the appellants, asked for 'instructions' of the Assistant Commissioner, and ultimately it was found that he did not exercise his own judgment, but faithfully followed the instructions given to him by the Assistant Commissioner without giving the appellants an opportunity to meet the points urged against them. It was held that the whole procedure was contrary to the principles of natural justice. It was held that the whole procedure was contrary to the principles of natural justice. 10.In Leela v. State of Rajasthan (A.I.R. 1966, Rajasthan, page 50) the following observations are found : "In the absence of a rule of law, the authority which decides the case must hear it itself and the authority which hears it must be the one which is capable of deciding it and if that is not so the hearing becomes more or less a farce or an empty formality. Where the hearing in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter is relegated to one authority and the power of final disposal is vested in another and the latter authority decides the case adversely to the concerned party without affording him any opportunity of hearing the procedure followed cannot be countenanced as correct and the decision must be struck down as being substantially violative of a basic rule of natural justice." * 11.A somewhat similar analogy can be found in Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act. Under that Section where a workman is to be punished or the conditions of his service are to be altered, while conciliation proceeding or an industrial dispute connected therewith is pending, the express permission of the authority before which the conciliation proceeding is pending, or approval of the Industrial Tribunal or Court has to be obtained for the action to be taken by the concerned officer. It is not necessary to go into the minute of the different provisions in Section 33 for obtaining either prior sanction in one case or post facto approval in the other. But the crucial provision is contained in Section 33(5) which states that where the necessary application is made to the conciliation officer, Tribunal or the Court, as the case may be, either for prior sanction or post-approval, that authority should hear the application and pass such order in relation to the application thereof as he deems fit. The hearing in such a case obviously includes an opportunity to the affected party to make his representations. The hearing in such a case obviously includes an opportunity to the affected party to make his representations. 12.It will be clear from the foregoing that in a quasi-judicial proceeding, the decision about the quantum of punishment is an integral part of the proceedings and the punishing authority cannot call in aid the opinion or prior approval or sanction, of some other authority for that purpose, without the aggrieved party being given an opportunity to be heard by that authority if his approval or sanction is asked for before the actual punishment is decided upon. From this point of view, the procedure adopted in this case for getting the prior approval of the Collector of Central Excise, without that officer giving an opportunity to the petitioner to make his representations was clearly opposed to the principles of natural justice. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the Department that the Rules in the Manual have no statutory force. That would be another reason why they will have to be ignored or struck down when they have operated as in these cases, to the extent of depriving an aggrieved party of the necessary opportunity for complying with the principles of natural justice. 13.One other point may be mentioned. The instructions in Para 21(b) of the Manual also deprives the petitioner of getting remedy by way of an appeal to the Collector of Central Excise, which he will be entitled to if the Assistant Collector had passed the order without getting prior approval of the Collector, but he is obliged to go all the way to Delhi to the Central Board of Revenue, because such prior approval had been obtained. 14.For all the foregoing reasons, I am of the opinion, that the orders in all the four cases cannot be supported. The same legal point discussed above in Writ Petition No. 2115 of 1964 arises in the other writ petitions also. I, therefore, allow all the writ petitions and quash the orders by issue of writ of Certiorari with costs. Advocate's fee one set, Rs. 200/- to be included in Writ Petition No. 2115 of 1964. It will be open to the Department to restore the cases to file and dispose them of on merits and in the light of the observations above.