JUDGMENT Gangeshwar Prasad, J. - This is an appeal against the judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court dismissing a writ petition filed by the appellant for quashing an order of the Joint Director of Consolidation passed in revision under Section 48 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. 2. Virendra Singh and others who were cosharers in the proprietary rights of a village held certain plots of land as their Khudkasht and the dispute relates to those plots. On July 30, 1945 Virendra Singh and others executed a deed of lease in respect of the said plots in favour of Sher Singh appellant for a period of ten years, and on September 1, 1945 they executed a sale deed respecting their proprietary interest in the plots in favour of Nihal Singh and Kale Singh, brothers of the appellant, and also the Chajjoo Singh. In 1946 Jai Kumar Singh and Roop Kumar Singh respondents Nos. 2 and 3 (hereinafter called the respondents) , who were cosharers in proprietary rights, brought a suit for preemption in regard to the sale deed impleading as defendants not only the vendors and the vendees but also Sher Singh appellant and claiming actual possession of the plots in dispute. The case of the respondents preemptors was that the deed of lease was fictitious and that in reality it formed part of the transaction of sale. The vendees and the appellant contested the suit and pleaded, inter alia, that the lease was genuine and the respondents were not entitled to actual possession. The trial court decreed the suit in entirety and its decree was affirmed by the first appellate court. The respondents deposited the amount required to be deposited by them under the preemption decree and it was withdrawn by the vendees. A second appeal was, however, preferred by the appellant and this Court by its judgment dated April 13, 1953 dismissed the suit against the appellant on the ground that the civil court had no jurisdiction to grant the relief of possession against the appellant who claimed to be a tenant and the dispute between the parties relating to the lease was left open. Thereupon the respondents filed a suit under Section 209 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act against the appellant. The suit was dismissed by the trial court and by the first appellate court. Thereupon the respondents filed a suit under Section 209 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act against the appellant. The suit was dismissed by the trial court and by the first appellate court. A second appeal was then filed in this Court by the respondents, but the appeal was stayed because consolidation proceedings had started in the village in which the plots in dispute are situate. Since the name of the appellant was recorded against the plots, the respondents filed an objection under Section 9 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act praying that the name of the appellant be expunged and their own names be entered against the plots as Bhumidhars. The objection was rejected by the Consolidation Officer. The order of the Consolidation Officer was upheld by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation in first appeal and also by the Deputy Director Consolidation in second appeal. The respondents thereupon filed a revision, and it was against the order passed by the Joint Director of Consolidation in the revision that the writ petition of the appellant was directed. The Joint Director held that the deed of lease executed in favour of the appellant was fictitious and was part of the transaction of sale with the result that possession of the appellant would be deemed to be possession of the vendees. He further held that, on the basis of the preemption decree obtained by them, the respondents took over proprietary as well as Khudkasht rights of the vendees in the plots in dispute and upon the enforcement of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act they became Bhumidhars thereof under Section 18 of the said Act. On the question of limitation raised in the case the Joint Director found that the respondents were entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, that in computing the period of limitation the time taken in the proceedings before the civil court should be excluded, and that a suit under Section 209 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act having been filed within limitation the appellant had not acquired an" right in the disputed plots by lapse of time. The revision was accordingly allowed by the Joint Director with the finding that the respondents were Bhumidars of the plots in dispute and the appellant had acquired no right therein. The revision was accordingly allowed by the Joint Director with the finding that the respondents were Bhumidars of the plots in dispute and the appellant had acquired no right therein. In his writ petition the appellant challenged the jurisdiction of the Joint Director to give the above mentioned finding of fact and also the correctness of his other conclusions. The learned single Judge, however, dismissed the writ petition on the short ground that on the finding recorded by the Joint Director the appellant was never in possession of the disputed plots on his own behalf and consequently had acquired no rights in the plots and had no locus standi to maintain the petition. His judgment does not indicate that any argument as to the jurisdiction of the Joint Director to record the said finding of fact was advanced before him. We have, how-ever, heard the learned counsel for the appellant on the question of jurisdiction as well. 3. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that although the revision against the order of the Deputy Director was decided by the Joint Director subsequently to the coming into force of Act VIII of 1963, it was governed by the old Section 48 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act as laid down in the Full Bench decision of this Court in Prem Chandra v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Barabani, 1966 ALJ 641 and, consequently, it was not open to the Joint Director to record any finding of fact and he acted without jurisdiction in interfering with the order of the Deputy Director by doing so. It is true that the Joint Director gave his own finding on the central question involved in the case, viz., whether the deed of lease in favour of the appellant was fictitious and really formed part of the sale transaction. But, it would be seen, the Deputy Director in his judgment in second appeal had not recorded any clear finding on that question and the appeal was dismissed by him on the ground that the respondents having never been in actual possession the plots in dispute never became their Khudkasht and they did not, therefore, acquire therein the rights of a Bhumidhar. All that had been said by the Deputy Director regarding the fictitious character of the lease was: `No doubt there appears to be something fishy about the transaction of lease and sale deed which were executed in the names of close relations being real brothers.' It is obvious that a definite finding as to the fictitiousness or otherwise of the deed of lease cannot be spelled out from the above sentence, and this at least cannot be denied that the Deputy Director had not affirmed the finding of the Settlement Officer that the deed of lease was not a fictitious document, and he entertained doubts regarding its genuineness. A second appeal, before the Deputy Director lay both on question of fact and on question of law and it was, therefore, incumbent upon him to record a clear finding on a question which was vital for the determination of the rights of the parties and on which, as we will later show, the decision of the other questions involved in the dispute depended. The Joint Director formulated in his judgment the issues which required decision and the first issue was: "whether the Patta in favour of Sher Singh was fictitious? If so its effect. 'In dealing with the above issue the Joint Director first observed that the issue had not been given by the Deputy Director the importance which it deserved and then said that the Deputy Director appeared to have given a finding against the lease but had wrongly ignored the effect of that finding. The Joint Director, therefore, proceeded on the basis that in holding that the deed of lease was fictitious he was affirming the finding of the Deputy Director. However, it cannot be urged that the Joint Director recorded a finding contrary to the finding recorded by the Deputy Director. The correct position appears to be that while the Deputy Director only expressed doubts regarding the genuineness of the deed of lease and recorded no definite finding on that matter the Joint Director arrived at the positive conclusion that 'the lease was fictitious and part of the sale transaction.' 4. The question is whether the Joint Director acted without jurisdiction in arriving at the above conclusion. The answer, in our opinion, is clearly in the negative. The question is whether the Joint Director acted without jurisdiction in arriving at the above conclusion. The answer, in our opinion, is clearly in the negative. It is true that the old Section 48 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act conferred upon the Director of Consolidation the power to revise an order' of the Deputy Director, Consolidation only when the latter appeared to have exercised jurisdiction not vested in him by law or to have failed to exercise jurisdiction so vested or to have acted in the exercise of his jurisdiction illegally or with substantial irregularity. But the situation in the instant case was obviously covered by the above provision and justified the use by the Joint Director of the power conferred thereby. 5. If the law requires a court to give its own finding on a question of fact and that question is of such a nature that it vitally affects the ultimate decision of the dispute before it the court acts in the exercise of its jurisdiction with substantial irregularity in omitting to give its finding on that question. The omission may be deliberate or may be due to an inadequate comprehension of the importance of that question in the determination of the controversy between the parties, but if it properly arises and the rights of the parties depend upon the answer to it, there can be no doubt that omission to record a definite answer to the question would amount to exercising jurisdiction with substantial irregularity. We may refer in this connection to M/s. Rama Nand Vijay Prakash v. M/s. Gokul Chand Gian Chand, A.I.R. 1951 Simla 189, Dominion of India v. Gurprosod Rama Gupta, AIR 1949 Calcutta 679, Koppa Anki v. Ponnapalli Venkata Subbayya, A.I.R. 1925 Mad. 884, Muthu Karuppa Kone v. Veerabhadra Kons, A.I.R. 1916 Mad. 583, Maheshwari Prasad Bhagat v. Mahadeo Roy, A.I.R. 1939 Patna 216 and Madhuri Jha v. Awadh Chaudhury, A.I.R. 1935 Patna 454. These decisions relate to Section 115 of the C. P. C. but the language of the old Section 48 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act was similar to the language of Section 115 of the C. P. C. and it made revisional powers exercisable in situations similar to those in which they are exercisable under the latter provision vide Parahu v. Deputy Director of Consolidation U.P. At Gorakhpur, 1964 ALJ 240. The question whether the deed of lease was fictitious was, as will presently appear, the fundamental question in the case and since that question had been left undecided by the Deputy Director it cannot be doubted that the Joint Director had the jurisdiction even under the old Section 48 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act to revise the order of the Deputy Director by giving his own finding thereon. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the Joint Director had no jurisdiction to record the finding that the deed of lease was fictitious and part of the sale transaction has, therefore, no force and it must be rejected. 6. The result of the finding given by the Joint Director is clear. The deed of lease having been fictitious and part of the sale transaction it did not have the effect of creating any interest in the appellant or divesting Virendra Singh and others of any fraction of their rights in the plots in dispute. The object for which the device of having a deed of lease executed had been resorted to was that even if a preemption suit was brought and decreed the vendees might be able to retain actual possession of the plots sold to them. The vendees thus acquired under the sale all such interest in the disputed plots as the vendors had, unencumbered by the tenancy which was fictitiously shown as having been created. It may here be mentioned that although the deed of lease in favour of the appellant purported to be for a period of ten years the tenancy, if real, would have been a hereditary tenancy under the law despite the period mentioned in the lease. 7. It is not in dispute that the plots were Khudkasht of the vendors, and the next question for consideration is whether they became Khudkasht of the vendees as a result of the sale. Before answering that question, however, its bearing on the controversy in the present case has to be explained. 7. It is not in dispute that the plots were Khudkasht of the vendors, and the next question for consideration is whether they became Khudkasht of the vendees as a result of the sale. Before answering that question, however, its bearing on the controversy in the present case has to be explained. The contention on behalf of the respondents was that all such rights as the vendors had in the plots passed to the vendees, that by virtue of the preemption decree the respondents became substituted as vendees in place of the persons in whose favour the sale deed had been executed with the result that the plots became their Khudkasht, and that since their right to obtain possession was intact and had not been lost by lapse of time they held the plots as Khudkasht on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting and thus became Bhumidhars thereof under Section 18 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. On behalf of the appellant, on the other hand, it was urged that Khudkasht of the vendors could not become Khudkasht of the vendees or, as a result of the preemption decree, Khudkasht of the respondents, and that as the respondents had never cultivated the plots they never held them as Khudkasht and did not therefore, acquire the rights of a Bhumidhar. We may now proceed to discuss the question posed in the beginning of this paragraph. 8. On the date of the execution of the sale deed of 1946, the U. P. Tenancy Act of 1939 (hereinafter called the Act) was in force. Although the expression 'Khudkasht' was in common use even before the enforcement of the Act it had not been defined in any earlier enactment. Section 3 (9) of the Act defined Khudkasht as 'land other than Sir cultivated by a landlord, an under-proprietor or a permanent tenure-holder as such either himself or by servants or by hired labour'. Although the expression 'Khudkasht' was in common use even before the enforcement of the Act it had not been defined in any earlier enactment. Section 3 (9) of the Act defined Khudkasht as 'land other than Sir cultivated by a landlord, an under-proprietor or a permanent tenure-holder as such either himself or by servants or by hired labour'. Shri K. L. Misra, learned counsel for the appellant, urged that under the above definition a land could be Khudkasht of a landlord only so long as it was cultivated by him (using the word 'cultivated' for cultivated in one of the ways mentioned in the definition) , and that no land could be Khudkasht of a landlord at any point of time unless it was at merely describe a particular kind of land that time cultivated by him. According to the contention of the learned counsel, Khudkasht was merely descriptive of a certain condition or state of things in regard to a land and it was not a right which could be passed. to a transferee of the land by means of a transfer. In other words, the land could not at any time be Khudkasht of the transferee unless he himself cultivated it and the continuance of that condition or state of things which imparted to it that character. This argument has firstly to be examined in the light of the provisions of the Act. 9. The definition of Khudkasht given in the Act was certainly as it was bound to be, in the nature of a description but the Act left no room for doubt that if a land acquired the character of Khudkasht certain rights came to inhere in it on that basis. Under Section 6 (b) read with Section 16 (4) certain Khudkasht lands could acquire the character of Sir in a particular situation. Under Section 26 certain kinds of Khudkasht became the subject of exproprietary tenancy in the situations mentioned therein. The effect of sub-sec. (2) of Section 180 was that if a cosher in the properietary rights in a plot of land took or retained possession of such plot without the consent of the whole body of cosharers or' their agent and if no suit for his ejectment was brought under that section, he became a Khudkasht-holder on the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for such suit, and thus became immune from ejectment. Certainly, this was the result of an amendment made in the sub-section by Act X of 1947. i.e., subsequent to the execution of the sale deed with which we are concerned in the present case, but that does not affect its bearing on the question under consideration. Again, sub-sec. (2) of Section 233 of provided that in a suit for settlement of accounts under Section 230 or 231 the valuation of a certain kind of khudkasht was, for the purposes of calculating the account divisible among the cosharers as profits, to be made at the rate applicable to ex-proprietary tenants, and not, as would otherwise have been the case, on the basis of actual profits. The Act did not, therefore, merely describe a particular kind of land as Khudkasht but conferred certain benefits and provided certain immunities in respect of such land and also made the Khudkasht character of a land the basis of acquisition of Sir rights in a certain situation. It cannot, therefore, be legitimately argued that Khudkasht was merely a fact respecting a land and not also an object of a right residing in the person whose Khudkasht it was. The argument is, in our opinion, completely repelled by Section 63 of the Act which provided that landholder claiming a land as his Khudkasht could sue for a declaration of his status. The Khudkasht character of the land was, therefore, recognised as conferring upon the person whose Khudkasht it was a legal status in respect of which a declaration could be obtained from the court and the conclusion, obviously, is that by virtue of the Khudkasht character of a land the person whose Khudkasht it was had in it certain rights, which may for the sake of convenience be called Khudkasht right. It was urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that even if there was such a thing as Khudkasht right attached to Khudkasht land it was only an inchoate right which could in a certain situation or upon its continuance for a certain length of time give rise to or mature into a real and perfect right, but in itself it was not a right in the proper sense of the term. The provisions of the Act, however, negative this contention. The provisions of the Act, however, negative this contention. Khudkasht right, in a certain situation or after a certain period of time, could have led to or formed the basis for acquisition of a higher and more stable right, but it fulfilled the character of a right even while it lasted as such and it was not wanting in any of the elements which go to constitute a right in law. The four well recognised elements of a legal right are: (1) The holder of the right: (2) the act or forbearance to which the right relates, (3) the re-concerned (the object of the right) : and (4) the person bound by the duty-vide Paton's Jurisprudence from which the above classification has been quoted and Hollands Jurisprudence where the same elements have been mentioned in an amplified form. Salmond, in his Jurisprudence, has, in addition to the above four elements which he has described more elaborately and called characteristics of a legal right, mentioned a fifth characteristic also viz., every legal right has a title, that is to say, certain facts or events by reason of which the right has become vested in the owner. It is apparent that all the above mentioned four elements of a legal right were present in Khudkasht right and as the right arose on account of the fact mentioned in the definition of Khudkasht it obviously had also the fifth characteristic of a legal right described by Salmond. No significance at taches to the fact that, unlike Sir right which was defined in Section 8, Khudkasht right was no where defined in the Act. Obviously, it was made up of all such rights as were conferred by the Act in respect of Khudkasht land and its nature could be ascertained by a reference to the provisions of the Act just as the nature of Sir right, even according to the definition given in Section 8, had to a large extent to be ascertained by a reference to the provisions of the Act. 10. 10. If, then, a landlord had in his Khudkasht certain rights which were legal rights in the proper sense of the term such rights necessarily possessed, like all other legal rights, the incident of transferability, and upon the transfer of a Khudkasht by a proprietor what passed to the transferee was not merely the proprietary right of the transferor in the land but also those special rights which may be called Khudkasht right. It will be useful to remember in this connection that even the interest of a persons in possession of an immovable property without title has always been regarded as a right capable of passing to heirs and transferees, even though such an interest is liable to be terminated at any time by the entry of the rightful owner within the period of limitation. On that basis it is also well settled that periods of possession by two successive trespassers may be tacked if one derives his interest from the other, the necessary implication being that even a trespasser has an interest to pass. If a right or an interest so transient and so meagre in content as that of a trespasser is heritable and transferable there should be little doubt about the fact that Khudkasht right was a heritable and a transferable right. The question of the heritability of Khudkasht right is not involved in the present case, but since, in the absence of a statutory provision to the contrary, heritability and transferability as incidents of a legal right ordinarily go together, we have naturally had also to consider whether Khudkasht right was heritable. Indeed, these two aspects of the right are so intimately bound up that the learned counsel for the appellant contended that Khudkasht land of a landlord did not even devolve upon his heir as Khudkasht and it could become the heirs' Khudkasht only if he re conferred that character upon the land by cultivating it. This contention too rested upon the basic contention of the learned counsel that Khudkasht was only a condition or state of things in regard to a land and was not the object of a right inhering in it. We have dealt with that basic contention and have found it unacceptable, but we may here add to our observations reference to a provision in the Act which should not be lost sight in reading the definition of Khudkasht. We have dealt with that basic contention and have found it unacceptable, but we may here add to our observations reference to a provision in the Act which should not be lost sight in reading the definition of Khudkasht. Section 3 (1) of the Act provided that all words and expressions used to denote the possessor of any right, title, or interest in land, whether the same be proprietary or otherwise, shall be deemed to include the predecessors and successors in right, title or interest of such person. The word 'landlord' in the definition of Khudkasht included, therefore, the predecessors of the landlord, and under the definition, a person could have held a land as Khudkasht without having himself cultivated it. Even in the absence of Section 3 (i) the word 'landlord' in the definition should have included his predecessors and successors in right, title or interest, but the provision made in Section 3 (i) expressly gave that wider meaning to the word. 11. If Khudkasht was, as we have found, the object of certain rights or had certain rights attached to it, it cannot be gainsaid that such rights also passed to the transferee of the Khudkasht as a necessary legal consequence of the transfer. We may only draw attention to Section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act in this connection. There was nothing in the Act to deprive a Khudkasht-holder of the capacity to transfer his interest in his Khudkasht and under Section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act the result of the transfer of Khudkasht was that the entire interest of the Khudkasht-holder passed forthwith to the transferee. In other words, the transferee became clothed with all the rights of Khudkasht-holder and the land became his Khudkasht. 12. The position in the present case thus was that upon the execution of the sale deed of September 1, 1945 the plots in dispute forthwith became Khudkasht of Nihal Singh and other vendees. What has next to be seen is whether the plots ever became the Khudkasht of the respondents. Once the plots became Khudkasht of the vendees they naturally retained their character as such so long as the interest of the vendees lasted. What has next to be seen is whether the plots ever became the Khudkasht of the respondents. Once the plots became Khudkasht of the vendees they naturally retained their character as such so long as the interest of the vendees lasted. The lease in favour of the appellant having been fictitious and executed only with the object of securing the possession of the vendees over the disputed plots in spite of a pre-emption decree, in case such a decree came to be passed, the plots never lost their Khudkasht character and they continued to be Khudkasht of the vendees till the deposit of the purchase money under the preemption decree. As a result of his finding as to the fictitiousness of the lease and the real object behind it, the Joint Director held that 'the entries in favour of Sher Singh and actual possession on the land can only be deemed to be on behalf of his brothers, the vendees', and that they 'ensure to the benefit of the vendees'. He observed that the appellant 'could be an agent for carrying on cultivation on behalf of the vendees' and ultimately concluded by saying that the possession of the appellant would be deemed to be the possession of the vendees. The conclusion reached by the Joint Director cannot be said to be erroneous, and it follows from that conclusion that so long as the title of the-vendees subsisted there happened nothing which could destroy the Khudkasht character of the plots in dispute. Did the plots then change their Khudkasht character when they passed to the respondents under the pre-emption decree ? 13. Section 4 (9) of the Agra Pre-emption Act provides that 'right of preemption 'means' the right of a person on a transfer of an immovable property to be substituted in place of the transferee by reason of such right, Evidently, therefore, on the date of the payment of purchase money, when according to Order XX, C. P. C., the respondents' title to the preempted property will be deemed to have accrued, they became substituted in place of the vendees, and since the plots were till then Khudkasht of the vendees they became Khudkasht of the respondents. 14. What remains to consider is whether the plots retained their Khudkasht character thereafter. 14. What remains to consider is whether the plots retained their Khudkasht character thereafter. On behalf of the appellant it was urged that since the appellant continued in possession, whether on his own behalf or on behalf of the vendees, and the plots were never cultivated by the respondents they could not have continued to be Khudkasht, it cannot be denied that after the accrual of the respondents' title the possession of the appellant was not on behalf of the respondents, but the question is whether the Khudkasht character of a land could be destroyed by an act of trespass. To our mind, if a land had once acquired the character of Khudkasht, it could not be deprived of that character on account of a trespass so long as the trespass was liable to be removed under the law. That an act of trespass may at once bring to an end the legal character of a land and extinguish all the legal rights inhering in it by virtue of that legal character is not a position that the law would ordinarily countenance, and, in the absence of a clear statutory provision leading to that result, it is not possible to hold that such a result was contemplated by the Act. There was nothing in the Act to suggest a result of that kind and indeed, some of its provisions relating to Khudkasht might have been rendered nugatory if that were the true legal position. For instance, even if a cosharer had become a Khudkasht holder under Section 180 (2) and thus acquired immunity from ejectment by the other cosharers he would have ceased to be a Khudkasht-holder and, consequently, become incapable of recovering possession from the dispossessing cosharers, if the other cosharers had chosen to dispossess him. A view which might have led to results of this kind cannot be accepted as correct. It seems to us that so long as a dispossessed Khudkasht-holder had the right to recover possession of his Khudkasht land, the land could not be regarded as having lost its Khudkasht character, and it was only when that right was lost that the land could be said to have ceased to be Khtidkasht. It seems to us that so long as a dispossessed Khudkasht-holder had the right to recover possession of his Khudkasht land, the land could not be regarded as having lost its Khudkasht character, and it was only when that right was lost that the land could be said to have ceased to be Khtidkasht. Section 18 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, by which the rights of a Bhumidhar were conferred in respect of Khudkasht land, itself goes to indicate that Clauses (a) of sub-sec. (1) of Section 18 speaks of Sir, Khudkasht or an intermediary's grove 'in possession of or held or-deemed to be held by an intermediary,' and this makes it obvious that an intermediary could have held a land as Khudkasht without having been in possession of it. The question whether the Khudkasht character of a land got lost on account of the possession of a trespasser came up for consideration before a learned Judge of this Court in Ishrat Husain v. Deputy Custodian, 1955 ALJ 219, and it was held that 'the mere fact that a trespasser got into possession of the Khudkasht land does not alter the character of the land.' It was further observed there that 'no authority need be cited for saying that a Khudkasht land does not cease to be Khudkasht merely because some trespasser has entered into possession of it for a short time.' With the view taken in the above case we are in complete agreement. 15. On the finding recorded by the Joint Director of Consolidation on the question of limitation it is clear that the right of the respondents to recover possession of the plots in dispute from the appellant had not been extinguished. It will be recalled that the appellant too had been impleaded as a defendant in the pre-emption suit of the respondents and a decree for actual possession had been prayed for with the allegation that the deed of lease in favour of the appellant was fictitious and part of the sale transaction: On the date of the enforcement of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act he suit stood decreed against the appellant as well by the trial court and the first appellate court. This could dismissed the suit against the appellant on the ground that a plea of tenancy having been set up by him the civil court had no jurisdiction to pass a decree for possession against him, and it left the dispute between the appellant and the respondents absolutely open. The respondents thereupon filed the suit under Section 209 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act which was stayed on account of the commencement of the consolidation operations. In these circumstances the Joint Director held that the respondents were entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act and their suit under Section 209 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms FAct was in time. The finding cannot be said to be erroneous and its correctness was not challenged before us in argument on behalf of the appellant. The right of the respondents to recover possession of the plots in dispute having through out remained intact and their remedy not having become barred by limitation, it seems to follow that the plots in suit retained their Khudkasht character till the coming into the force of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and continued to be held by the respondents thereafter as Bhumidhars, in spite of the possession of the appellant which was only that of a trespasser. 16. After considering the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant, we find that the Joint Director cannot be said to have committed any error in arriving at the conclusion that the appellant had acquired no right by lapse of time and the respondents were Bhumidhars of the plots in dispute. At any rate, there is, we think, no error apparent on the face of the record and the order passed by the Joint Director has not resulted in any injustice. The writ petition was rightly rejected by the learned single Judge. 17. The appeal fails and it is accordingly dismissed with costs.