JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - Feeling aggrieved on the opening of a fresh route connecting Meerut with Dankaur and the grant of regular stage carriage permits for that route to respondent Nos. 3, 4 and 5, the petitioners, who are rival operations on the Meerut-Bulandshahr route, have come to this Court and pray that the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Lucknow be quashed. Many persons including respondents Nos. 3, 4 and 5 made applications for the grant of stage carriage permits on Meerut Dankaur route. They were published in the State Gazette in 1963 and 1965. The petitioners filed objections that the existing services were adequate and that there was no need to open a direct service. If a new direct service was permitted, the petitioners would' suffer severely, because a substantial portion of the route would overlap with that of the petitioners. This matter was considered by the Regional Transport Authority, Meerut at its meeting held on July 26 to 28, 1965. Item No. 3 of the agenda was : "To pronounce decision regarding recognition and classification of Meerut to Dankaur via Hapur Gulaothi Sikandrabad route and grant of permits thereon. The applicants and objectors as shown in the appendix 'N' of item No. 35 of last R.T.A. meeting held on May 6 to 8, 1965 had been heard. The Regional Transport Authority resolved : ".... After giving due consideration to the stand taken by the persons for or against the grant of permits on Meerut-Dankaur route, we are not convinced that there is any justification and need to open this route for direct bus service. We do not think that there is enough direct traffic from Dankaur to Meerut. As such it is resolved that the route Meerut to Dankaur need not be opened for direct services. The applications received for permit on this route as contained in appendix 'N' to item No. 35 of the last R.T.A. meeting held on May 6 to 8, 1965 are rejected." Aggrieved, respondent Nos. 3, 4 and 5 along with other nine persons filed appeals before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Lucknow. The Tribunal by its impugned order passed on 1-9-1967 reversed the finding of the authority below him and ordered the grant of permits to respondent Nos. 3, 4 and 5. The Tribunal held that of the Twelve appeals, six were barred by time. The Tribunal by its impugned order passed on 1-9-1967 reversed the finding of the authority below him and ordered the grant of permits to respondent Nos. 3, 4 and 5. The Tribunal held that of the Twelve appeals, six were barred by time. The other six including those of respondent Nos. 3 to 5 were within time. The latter finding is challenged at the hearing of the present petition. Rule 72 of the rules framed under the Motor Vehicles Act prescribes 30 days limitation for filing appeals. The Regional Transport Authority had issued the order refusing permits on 2-111965. The period of limitation, according to the learned counsel for the petitioners, commences from the date of the service of the order. The petitioners have not stated the date of service of the Authority's order on respondent Nos. 3 to 5. Learned counsel for the respondents informed me that the respondents 3 to 5 filed the appeals early in December, 1965. In the absence of the date of the receipt of the order, it cannot be held that the appeals were barred by time. Further, the point that the respondents' appeals were time barred and that the finding of the Tribunal on that point was wrong has not been taken in the writ petition. Since it involves determination of a material question of fact, the petitioners arc not entitled to raise such a point for the first time at the hearing. The Tribunal had held that the limitation would commence from the date of the receipt of the certified copy of the order because a certified copy of the order is required to filed along with the memorandum of appeal. The reasoning of the Tribunal appeals to me, but I need not express any final opinion on the point, because really the point does not arise. The principal question canvassed at the hearing, however, was that the order of the Regional Transport Authority was not appealable. Learned counsel urged that the Regional Transport Authority had decided that there was no justification for opening a new route. Such a decision was not appealable under any of the clauses of Section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Clause (a) of Section 64 (1) provides an appeal against the refusal of the Regional Transport Authority to grant a permit. Such a decision was not appealable under any of the clauses of Section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Clause (a) of Section 64 (1) provides an appeal against the refusal of the Regional Transport Authority to grant a permit. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the scheme of the Motor Vehicles Act contemplates three distinct stages in respect of the grant of a permit. The first is the question whether a new route ought to be opened, the second being the fixation of the number of permits which may be granted on the route and the third and the last stage being the consideration of the individual applications for the permit. The first. stage, namely, whether a new route should be opened or not is not specifically provided for by any provision of the Act. Section 47 (3) of the Act authorises the Regional Transport Authority to fix the limit of the number of permits. This, according to the counsel, includes the consideration of the first stage as well. Thus the first and the second stage may be combined in one proceeding, but as a whole the ultimate order is the fixation of the number of permits on a route. Such an order has not been made appealable under Section 64. If at all, it would be revisable under Section 64-A of the Act, but by a different authority. Learned counsel relied upon the case of Abdul Matin v. Ram Kailash Pandey, A.I.R. 1963 SC 64 to suggest that the first two stages can alone he combined in one proceeding, but they cannot be mixed up with the third stage, namely, the consideration of the individual applicants of permit and the consequent grant or refusal of the permit. An order passed at the third stage alone is appeal-able. In Abdul Matin's case it was decided that where a limit has been fixed under Section 47 (3) and thereafter the Authority proceeds to consider applications for permit under Section 48 read with Section 57, the Authority confine the number of permits issued by it to those limits and on an appeal or revision by an aggrieved person, the Appellate Authority or the Re visional Authority must equally be confined to the issue of permits within the limits fixed under Section 47 (3). Learned counsel urged that this showed that the stage of grant of refusal of permits to individuals was distinct and a proceeding therefor did not include a reconsideration of the question of fixing the limit. So, the order passed by the Regional Transport Authority in the instant case considered the question whether the route should be opened or not. It having come to the conclusion that it Was not desirable to do so, it naturally filed the applications of the applicants. The substantial decision was in respect of the desirability of opening a route and not the desirability or otherwise of the applicants for granting or refusing permits to them. The last sentence in the Regional Transport Authority's order that the applications are rejected was merely a consequential order to the finding that the opening of the route was not desirable. The resolution as a result was merely one under Section 47 (3) . An order granting or refusing a permit is to be passed on considerations mentioned in Section 48. The Regional Transport Authority did not apply its mind to the questions arising under Section 48, because no occasion arose for it. Consequently, the mere mention that the applications are rejected did not bring the order within the purview of Section 48. Clause (a) of Section 64 providing for an appeal against an order refusing to grant a permit contemplates an order under Section 48 alone. This argument of Mr. Kacker is attractive and plausible, but I am relieved of examining it closely, because it stands negatived by a recent decision of the Supreme Court, in Jaya Ram Motor Service v. S. Rajarathinam, Civil Appeal No. 95 of 1965, decided by the SC on October 27, 1967. In that case, the Regional Transport Authority on September 3, 1959 resolved to open a new route. It then invited applications for permit. While considering the applications for individual permits the Authority came to the conclusion that there was after all no need for opening the new route. On that ground it rejected all the applications. An appeal was taken under Section 64. The Appellate Tribunal reversed the order and granted permits. It then invited applications for permit. While considering the applications for individual permits the Authority came to the conclusion that there was after all no need for opening the new route. On that ground it rejected all the applications. An appeal was taken under Section 64. The Appellate Tribunal reversed the order and granted permits. The question raised before the Supreme Court was whether a person whose application is rejected by the Authority on the ground that there was no need for a route has a right to appeal under Section 64 (I) (a) of the Act. Shelat, J. speaking for the Court analysed the scheme of the various provisions and answered the question in the affirmative. He held relying upon Abdul Mateen's case' that once the limit is fixed, the only question before the Authority would be whether the applicant is a person fit to be granted the permit. The Authority could have acted under Section 47 (3) and modified its earlier decision fixing the limit, but if it did not rescinded its earlier order, but merely rejected the application on the ground that there was no need for a new route, the ultimate order was not an order under Section 47 (3) , but an order under Section 48 and as such it was appealable. Learned counsel for the petitioners urged that this decision would not make the order passed by the Authority in the present case appealable because here the authority had in the very first instance held that there was no need for a new service and consequently it rejected the applications. The order was purely under Section 47 (3) . In Jaya Ram's case2 the Authority rejected the applications for grant of a permit on the ground that there was no need. The reason for the refusal was held to be wrong on its merits, but since the applications for a permit had been rejected the order was held appealable. Thus the reason for the refusal of granting a permit would not be relevant to the appeal ability of the order. The order ex facie refused an application for the grant of a permit and came within the purview of Cl. (a) of Section 64 (1) . Thus the reason for the refusal of granting a permit would not be relevant to the appeal ability of the order. The order ex facie refused an application for the grant of a permit and came within the purview of Cl. (a) of Section 64 (1) . The submission that in this view every order deciding for or against the opening a new route or service or fixing a limit of permits would become appealable does not appear to be correct. If an order is passed under Section 47 (3) independently, it would not be appealable, but if it is mixed up with an order refusing to grant a permit, the latter order would not lose its incident of appeal ability. In an appeal against refusal to grant a permit, the Appellate Tribunal would be entitled to consider the merits of the reason for which the application was refused. In Jaya Ram's case2 the Supreme Court specifically held that the Appellate Tribunal was entitled to go into the merits of the reason for refusal and to consider the entire matter for itself. It was not necessary or obligatory for it to remand the matter. Learned counsel for the petitioners also relied upon a decision of this Court in Mohd. Hukman Sharif v. State Transport Authority, 1960 ALJ 626. It is not necessary to discuss it, because the Supreme Court's decision is directly on the point and has an over-riding efficacy. In my opinion, the respondents' appeals were maintainable. Learned counsel then urged that the representation of certain persons taken into consideration by the Appellate Tribunal for deciding whether it was desirable to open this new service were forged documents. The Tribunal was not entitled to take into consideration those representations. There is no allegation in the petition that this was argued before the Tribunal. The argument that the document was not reliable in view of the evidence in rebuttal or other circumstances is not an argument that the document was fictitious or forged. In the absence of a clear assertion that this point was urged before the Tribunal. I am unable to quash the order on this ground. No other point was pressed. The petition fails and is dismissed wits costs. Petition dismissed.