N. G. SHELAT, J. ( 1 ) * * * * ( 2 ) AS already pointed out hereabove the question relating to the fraud alleged in the suit no longer now survives. The only point that remains to be considered is as to whether the decree passed by the Court in Civil Suit No. 817 of 1956 is invalid so as to treat it as nullity and that way unenforceable against plaintiff-appellant as alleged by him. The contention made out by Mr. Patel the learned advocate for the appellant is that sec. 13 (1) of the Act makes it obligatory on the part of the Court to feel satisfied that the landlord reasonably and bona fide required the suit premises for his personal use and occupation under sec. 13 (1) (g) and unless it is so shown the decree directed to be passed by the Court in pursuance of the consent terms arrived at between the parties would be invalid and nullity. It was then pointed out by reference to the endorsement or the order passed therebelow that the Court had not applied its mind and mechanically as it were it appears to have directed the decree to be drawn up in terms of compromise as the parties had presented the same. His emphasis was that the order does not show in the first place any such words about the learned Judge having satisfied himself about the requirements contemplated under sec. 13 of the Act before a decree for eviction was passed and secondly by reason of use of words hence ordered to be recorded after the words parties agreed when read out. According to him the learned Judge ordered it to be recorded as they admitted when it was read out to them. Now it is clear and over which there is no dispute that the procedure to be followed in suits or matters arising under the Act have to be one as laid down in Civil Procedure Code 1908 and that includes the provisions contained in Order 23. It would therefore followed that the provisions contained in Order 23 Rule 3 would govern any such suit filed under this Act though no doubt the Court was one constituted under the special Act for the purpose contemplated therein. It would therefore followed that the provisions contained in Order 23 Rule 3 would govern any such suit filed under this Act though no doubt the Court was one constituted under the special Act for the purpose contemplated therein. Order 23 Rule 3 Civil Procedure Code provides as under :where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit the Court shall order such agreement compromise or satisfaction to be recorded and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the suit. As against this provision we find no provision under the Act which says otherwise or lays down any other mode of passing a decree in respect of any such agreement or compromise arrived at between the parties in any such suit. As soon as any such agreement or compromise arrived at between the parties to a suit is placed before the Court with a request to pass a decree in terms thereof what the Court is required to consider for its satisfaction two things. The first is as to whether the adjustment arrived at by any agreement or compromise is a lawful one and secondly whether it relates to the subject matter of the suit. If that agreement or compromise were found to be unlawful the Court has every right to refuse to pass any decree in terms thereof. Similarly if any of the terms of the agreement or compromise were found to be not relating to the subject matter of the suit it would be justified in declining to pass 8 decree in relation thereof. Once these two conditions are considered by the Court and the Court is satisfied it is obligatory on the Court to pass a decree in terms of that compromise or agreement in so far as it relates to the suit. Beyond that we find nothing which forbids the Court from recording any such adjustment in a suit. It is from this point of view that we have to consider in the first place as to whether the compromise as per Ex. Beyond that we find nothing which forbids the Court from recording any such adjustment in a suit. It is from this point of view that we have to consider in the first place as to whether the compromise as per Ex. 37 contained any such terms which were not lawful or beyond or outside the scope of the subject matter of the suit. ( 3 ) NOW it is clear that any party to a suit has absolute right to give up any claim or adjust in such a manner as he thinks best. But if he wants a decree to be passed in persuance of any such adjustment between the parties in a suit it can only be done provided it does not offend against any of the provisions of the Act under which any such suit is filed or that it is unlawful in any other manner. This Act no where prohibits or forbids any person from arriving at such a settlement between the parties and obtain a decree in terms thereof. The contention of Mr. Patel is that it violates the provisions of the Act inasmuch as as the Court which passed the order directing a decree to be drawn up in terms of compromise failed to apply its mind for satisfying itself that the landlord was reasonably and bona fide in need of the premises and that a decree passed in terms of the compromise would not cause greater hardship to the tenant as required under sec. 13 of the Act. Those considerations in my opinion arise when it has to decide those issues in the case and not while recording any such compromise in a suit. Sec. 13 of the Act does not say so that the Court has to consider these issues at the time of considering whether it should pass a decree under Order 23 Rule 3 of Civil Procedure Code. It has to go by these provisions and if he does not find it any way unlawful it has to record the same if it relates to the suit. Such an order when passed it operates as an estoppel by record and parties are even estopped from contending contrary to what they have agreed to in the consent terms. It raises an estoppel just In the same way as a judgment after the Court has exercised its judicial discretion. Such an order when passed it operates as an estoppel by record and parties are even estopped from contending contrary to what they have agreed to in the consent terms. It raises an estoppel just In the same way as a judgment after the Court has exercised its judicial discretion. In Bhaishanker Nanabhai v. Keshavji and Co. I. L. R. 36 Bombay 263 it was held that a consent decree had to all intents and purpose the same effect as res-judicata as a decree passed per invitum and this notwithstanding the words in sec. 11 of the Civil Procedure Code has been heard and finally decided. The point has been set at rest by the Supreme Court in Shanker Sitaram v. Balkrishan Sitaram (1955) 1 S. C. R. 99 Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have observed at p. 107 as under :it is well settled that a consent decree is as binding upon the parties there as to a decree passed by invitum. The compromise having been found not to be vitiated by fraud misrepresentation misunderstanding or mistake the decree passed thereon has the binding force of res judicata. Now on ground of fraud this decree cannot be vitiated and thus unless it is shown that it was unlawful in any manner it stands and binds the parties. As I said above it does not violate any provisions of the Act and there is nothing unlawful about it. ( 4 ) APART from that if we were to consider the point raised by Mr. Patel it is not that the Court is required to state every thing as to how it felt satisfied before passing any such order. No sooner the Court passes an order directing the decree to be drawn up in terms of compromise it can always be presumed that it had applied its mind and was satisfied about the resonableness of the same as well apart from the same being lawful. Now in the present case it is no doubt true as already stated above that no specific words have been mentioned by the Court showing that it is satisfied about the reasonableness of the requirement contemplated under sec. 13 of the Act before a decree of eviction in whatever terms it came to be passed. Now in the present case it is no doubt true as already stated above that no specific words have been mentioned by the Court showing that it is satisfied about the reasonableness of the requirement contemplated under sec. 13 of the Act before a decree of eviction in whatever terms it came to be passed. But it is to be remembered that the agreement between the parties was arrived at after the evidence was fully recorded by the Court and at the time when the suit was kept for hearing arguments. Obviously therefore the Court had before its mind not only the rival contentions of the parties but also the evidence led by them before it. But even apart from that position the compromise itself was read out to the parties before the Court and on being asked they had admitted the same. The learned Judge would therefore easily know as to the terms arrived at between the parties in relation to the dispute in the suit. The very first clause of the consent terms at Ex. 37 which has been already set out here above shows that a long period of about 4 years and 9 months was given to the defendant for vacating the premises and handing over the same to the defendant-landlord. He did not perhaps require full protection against his eviction either because he may not succeed or because the landlord needed the same and to avoid hardship to the tenant in finding out other premises agreed to give such time for the same. Another indication about having been conscious about his right as tenant in respect of the premises is found in clause 7 thereof. By that he binds his landlord to let out the same premises to him in case he is required to let out after obtaining possession thereof. It was only after he declined to take those premises that the landlord would be entitled to let it out to some other person. These two terms of the compromise arrived at between the parties make it abandantly clear that the effect of provisions contained in sec. 13 (1) (g) and sec. 13 (2) of the Act were amply before the parties as also before the Court before it directed the decree to a drawn up in terms of compromise. These two terms of the compromise arrived at between the parties make it abandantly clear that the effect of provisions contained in sec. 13 (1) (g) and sec. 13 (2) of the Act were amply before the parties as also before the Court before it directed the decree to a drawn up in terms of compromise. In fact one could easily say that the defendant had himself requested the Court to pass the decree in accordance with the terms of their compromise on the strength of his own admission and on that basis the Court would be justisfied in directing the decree to be drawn up in terms of the compromise. The satisfaction required of the Court even if it was necessary-was there and once the decree is passed it cannot be challenged on any such ground; It does not become unlawful on that account. It cannot be called a nullity in law and it binds the parties as much as any other decree passed invitim does in law. ( 5 ) MR. Majmudar the learned advocate for the respondent invited a reference to a decision in the case of Popatlal Ratansey v. Kalidas Bhavan 59 B. L. R. p. 860. In that case a tenant had filed an application for fixation of standard rent for the premises leased to him by his landlord under sec. 11 of the Act. The landlord had on the other hand filed a suit for possession on the ground that the tenant was in arrears of rent and that he had sublet the premises. The trial Court fixed the standard rent at Rs. 40. 00 per month in the application made of the tenant and in the suit filed by the landlord it passed a decree directing the tenant to hand over possession thereof. Both the parties preferred appeals against those decisions and while they were pending the parties agreed that the standard rent of the suit premises was Rs. 91. 00 per month instead of Rs. 40/- fixed by the Trial Court and the landlord gave up his claim to recover possession of the suit premises. Both the parties preferred appeals against those decisions and while they were pending the parties agreed that the standard rent of the suit premises was Rs. 91. 00 per month instead of Rs. 40/- fixed by the Trial Court and the landlord gave up his claim to recover possession of the suit premises. When the settlements were submitted to the Court for passing orders in terms thereof the Court considered that the agreement was quite fair and just and on being satisfied that there was nothing unlawful about it it passed a decree in terms thereof Thereafter the landlord filed a suit to recover possession of the premises from the tenant alleging that the tenant had failed to pay the rent and was in arrears of it. The tenant contended that he was not in arrears of rent as the standard rent of the suit premises was Rs. 40. 00 per month as previously fixed by the Court and that be had paid rent at that rate. On the question whether the consent decree which was passed in appeal would operate as a bar to the tenants contention in this suit that the standard rent for the premises was Rs. 40. 00 and not Rs. 91. 00 per month it was held that in the circumstances of the case between the present parties who were also parties to the appeals the determination of the standard rent as embodied in the consent decree passed in the appeals would constitute a bar of res judicata and would estop the tenant from contending that the standard rent should not be Rs. 91. 00 per month as fixed by the consent decree and it should be Rs. 40. 00 per month as fixed by the Court. In the judgment at page 866 it has been observed that it is true that under the Act if a dispute arises between the patties regarding standard rent it is the Court or the Controller under the Bombay Rent Restriction Act 1939 or the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947 who is to determine that dispute. But there is nothing in the Act which prevents a tenant from abandoning the dispute at any stage of a proceeding and agreeing that the rent proposed by the landlord should be decided to be the proper standard rent. But there is nothing in the Act which prevents a tenant from abandoning the dispute at any stage of a proceeding and agreeing that the rent proposed by the landlord should be decided to be the proper standard rent. If the tenant says at any stage of the proceeding that the landlords figure might be accepted as the fair figure of the standard rent there Is no prohibition imposed by the Act forbidding the Court from passing a decree upon that footing. It is always open under the law to the parties in suit to settle the dispute by an agreement and if they do so settle it and if it appears to the Court that the settlement is fair and just and not unlawful in any manner or against the provisions of the statute the Court accepts the settlement and passes a decree upon it. These observations could as well apply to any such suit arising under sec. 13 of the Act for after all parties at dispute have every right to settle the same by an agreement and all that the Court is required to see that it is not against any law or against the provisions of the Act before it accepts the settlement as fair and just and passes a decree. In the case before us the plaintiff-tenant had sought for protection under sec. 13 (2) of the Act by saying that there would be greater hardship if he would be evicted along with his contention about his landlord not bona fide and reasonably requiring the suit premises. The settlement arrived at between them was in respect of both the points that arose in the suit and they were entitled to do so and since they were not in any way violating the provisions of the Act itself or against any other law in force the Court had no other option but to pass a decree in terms of settlement under Order 23 Rule 3 of Civil Procedure Code. It was however pointed out by Mr. Patel that the words under sec. 13 of the Act are if the Court is satisfied and in sec. 11 similar words are not there. It was however pointed out by Mr. Patel that the words under sec. 13 of the Act are if the Court is satisfied and in sec. 11 similar words are not there. Sec. 11 Clause (1) says that in any of the following cases the Court may upon an application made to it for that purpose or in any suit or proceeding fix the standard rent at such amount as having regard to the provisions of this Act and the circumstances of the case the Court deems just. Then it sets out the clauses for enabling the Court to determine the standard rent. In order that the Court can find it to be just it has to apply its mind and be satisfied about its justness or reasonableness and that would be quite similar to the satisfaction of a Court before any decree is passed under sec. 13 of the Act. But all that arises if the decree is passed on decision on merits and cannot arise in the same manner while recording a compromise in any such suit under the Act. In my opinion that would not make any such difference and the observations made in the case can very well apply to a case falling under sec. 13 of the Act. ( 6 ) ANOTHER unreported decision of the High Court of Bombay in Civil Revision Application No. 833 of 1953 decided by Gajendragadkar J. on August 11 1954 was referred to. There in after examining the provisions of the Act it has been observed that he was unable to see how it could be contended that it was not open to the parties at dispute as to the standard rent of premises to compromise the said dispute under the provisions of the Act. Then he has pointed out that it was undoubtedly true that policy of the Act was a benevolent policy and the policy was to help the tenants. But he was unable to accept the argument that the Act either expressly or by necessary implication made it obligatory on the Court to decide the matter. Then he has pointed out that it was undoubtedly true that policy of the Act was a benevolent policy and the policy was to help the tenants. But he was unable to accept the argument that the Act either expressly or by necessary implication made it obligatory on the Court to decide the matter. In his view it would be perfectly competent to the parties to settle the dispute in regard to the standard rent and the mere fact that after the tenant had entered into an agreement in respect this dispute he had begun to feel that he had been persuaded to enter into an agreement to his prejudice would not justify the argument that the compromise agreement itself was a nullity. His observations further go to show that it was necessary to make a distinction between consent order or decrees which might be contrary to law and those which might be prohibited by law and he said that in the Act he saw no prohibition preventing the parties from settling the dispute as to the standard rent by agreement. Towards the end he has observed that the consent order passed in the matter precluded the Court from trying the same issue over again between the same parties. The similar view was taken by Mr. Justice Shah in Rajaram Balkrishan Awar v. Sardarkhan Amirkhan Pathan Civil Revision Application No. 1691 of 1955 decided on August 27 1956 The effect of these decisions is that under the provisions of the Act since there is no prohibition whatever from arriving at an agreement in relation to the fixation of standard rent the parties would be bound by the same and the Court would be justified in passing the decree in terms thereof unless it finds that it was against the provisions of the Act or in any other manner unlawful. The same principles can easily apply to any other decree passed on the basis of a compromise arrived at between the parties in respect of the dispute pending before a Court under the provisions of this Act. ( 7 ) MR. Patel the learned advocate for the appellant has referred to certain decisions with a view to show that such a decree passed under sec. ( 7 ) MR. Patel the learned advocate for the appellant has referred to certain decisions with a view to show that such a decree passed under sec. 13 of the Act on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties cannot be enforced unless it is passed after the Court had satisfied itself which according to him was not so satisfied in the present case. The first case referred to by him is of Raja Bahadur Sir Bansilal and Sons v. C. R. Desai 63 B. L. R. p. 933. He referred to the observations at page 935 which are to the following effect :even so in sec. 13 right of ejectment is conferred on the landlord if the landlord is in a position to satisfy the Court as regards the matters mentioned in sub-clauses (a) to (1) of sec. 13 (1 ). That satisfaction is to be of the Court. In that case the petitioners had applied for a certificate under sec. 13 (38 of the Act) from the Tribunal which was entitled to issue such a certificate. The Tribunal stated that the petitioners were not entitled to the certificate under sec. 13 (1) (hh) of the Act. Then the matter was taken to the High Court and It was observed that the scheme of sec. 13 of the Act does not provide for ultimate disposal of the question whether the premises consist of not more than two floors by the Tribunal mentioned in sub-secs. (3a) and (3b) of the Act. That question it is provided must be ultimately and finally decided only by the Court mentioned in the Act. Therefore a refusal of a certificate by the Tribunal on the sole ground that the petitioners property does not consist of more that two floors was found to be unjustified. This case has hardly any application to the facts of the present case as it deals with the powers of the Court as against that of the Tribunal in respect of issuing any such certificate as contemplated under the rules. Apart from that position there is no denial of the fact that if it were to decide the matter it has to be satisfied before passing any decree under any of the clauses of sec. 13 of the Act in respect of which the suit was brought. Apart from that position there is no denial of the fact that if it were to decide the matter it has to be satisfied before passing any decree under any of the clauses of sec. 13 of the Act in respect of which the suit was brought. Next case referred to by him was of Subavva Kom Sannappa Simpiger v. Dasappa Andaneppa Chiniwar 57 B. L. R. p. 261. In that case a dispute regarding rent and termination of tenancy of shop was referred to arbitration by the plaintiff who owned the shop and the defendant to whom it was let out for a year. The arbitrators gave their award and thereafter the plaintiff made an application to the Court for obtaining a decree in terms of award. The Court treated the application as a suit and passed s decree in terms of the award of the arbitrators. The plaintiff sought to execute the decree and the contention raised by the defendant was that the decree was passed without jurisdiction and that therefore the Darkhast cannot lie. That contention was negatived and when the matter was taken to the High Court it was held that decree passed by the Court was without jurisdiction and was not capable of execution. From this it was said by Mr. Patel that in the present case also the parties presented the compromise before the Court and the Court has passed an order whereby the decree was ordered to be drawn up in accordance with the terms of settlement. However the point that was before the High Court of Bombay was in respect of the jurisdiction of the arbitrators to decide the matter having regard to the provisions contained in sec. 28 of the Act. The words no other Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any such suit proceeding or application or to deal with such claim or question in sub-sec. (2) excluded a reference to the arbitration relating to recovery of possession of premises to which the Act applied. Thus the parties had chosen a different forum namely the aribitrators of their own choice to decide the dispute which could only be decided by the Court comtemplated under sec. 36 of the Act. It was that way and since the expression Court did not include any such arbitrator the award given by those arbitrators was found to be beyond their authority. 36 of the Act. It was that way and since the expression Court did not include any such arbitrator the award given by those arbitrators was found to be beyond their authority. It was that way held that in a decision in respect of the disputes that arise under the provisions of the Act between the landlord and tenant cannot be said to have been validly decided by the award given by them and that therefore Court cannot act upon it. In the present case the parties were before the Court itself acting under the Act and the settlement arrived at between the parties was presented before the Court. It was not like an award given by different persons such as the arbitrators in that case. The decision relied upon by Mr. Patel therefore would not be of any help to him. From this decision it was pointed out by Mr. Majmudar that the observations made at page 366 tend to show that the provisions contained in Order 23 Rule 3 would apply and what the Court is required to consider is whether the terms of the compromise are lawful and if so satisfied that the Court has to pass a decree in terms of compromise. ( 8 ) THEN Nr. Patel invited a reference to a decision in Middleton v. Baldeek All England Law Reports Vol. 1 page 703. In that case the landlord claimed Possession of a dwelling-house to which the Rent Restrictions Act 1920 to 1949 applied from the tenant merely on the ground that the contractual tenancy had come to an end not on any ground specified by the Acts. The tenant who had deserted his wife and left her in the house which was the matrimonial home with some of his furniture admitted the landlords claim for possession and offered to give possession forthwith. At the hearing of that action the wifes application to be joined as a defendant was refused and an order for possession against the husband was made. A second action for possession of these premises was brought against that tenants wife on the ground that she was a trespasser. That second action was heard and an order was also made against her. The Court of Appeal allowed the wifes application to be joined as a party in the first action against the tenant and gave her leave to appeal. That second action was heard and an order was also made against her. The Court of Appeal allowed the wifes application to be joined as a party in the first action against the tenant and gave her leave to appeal. In appeal it was then held :where a husband had deserted his wife and the wife remained in the matrimonial home she was lawfully there and the husband remained in occupation by her; possession of a dwelling-house to which the Rent Restrictions Acts applied could only be ordered on one of the grounds specified in the Acts and a tenant could not by agreement waive the statutory protection afforded by the Acts; and therefore the orders for possession were wrongly made. Apart from not being able to know the exact nature of the provisions of those Acts it appears that the suit was filed merely for possession from a tenant only on a ground that the contractual tenancy had come to an end and not on any of the grounds specified in the Act. In that case therefore since claim for possession was not on any of the grounds specified under the Act the landlord was not entitled to get possession on any other ground and in those circumstances the tenant cannot waive any such statutory protection afforded by the Act by an agreement with the landlord In the present case the suit was filed for recovering possession on the ground of reasonable and bona fide requirement contemplated under sec. 13 (1) (g) of the Act and consequently the Court was justified to take into account the agreement arrived at between the parties even in regard to the protection awarded to the tenant under sec. 13 of the Act. At any rate there appears no bar to the passing of a decree on agreement by parties and question of any waiver of protection cannot arise. There remain two other cases referred to by Mr. Patel. The first is a case of Jagjivan Singh v. Sitaram A. I. R 1954 Rajasthan 43 and the other one is of Korch Punnen and another v. Parmeswara Kurup Vasudeva Kurup and others A. I. R. 1946 Travancore-Cochin page 1. In the latter case the High Court had to deal with similar provisions as were In the Rajasthan case and in fact the Rajasthan decision has been followed by the Travancore-Cochin High Court. In the latter case the High Court had to deal with similar provisions as were In the Rajasthan case and in fact the Rajasthan decision has been followed by the Travancore-Cochin High Court. I would therefore refer to the Rajasthan case relied upon by Mr. Patel. There It was held that so far Rajasthan is concerned the duty is cast on the Court under sec. 13 not to pass a decree for ejectment unless it is satisfied that one or the other of the conditions mentioned in that section is satisfied. In face of that provision it would not be open to a Court to pass a decree for ejectment merely because the parties agree that a decree be so passed. Of course in a tenant does not want to live in the house then he can leave it and then it would be unnecessary for the parties to go to Court. In that case the question for the decision was as to the scope and extent of sec. 26 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act 1950 By that section it was provided that no decree for eviction of a tenant from any premises in areas to which this Act extends for the time being passed before the commencement of this Act shall be executed against him as long as this Act remains in force therein except on any of the grounds mentioned in sec. 13 and under the circumstances specified in this Act. Thus even if a decree was passed in respect of any premises against the tenant the prohibition was against its execution except on any of the grounds mentioned in sec. 13. It was therefore necessary for the executing Court to see that the provisions of sec. 13 were satisfied before it can execute a decree passed by the Court. No such provisions is there in the Rent Act applicable here and the cases would therefore have no application to the facts of the present case. Appeal dismissed. .