ORDER : P.V. Dixit, J. 1. Order passed by the learned District Judge, Jabalpur, overruling the petitioner-Corporation's objection to the competency of an appeal preferred by the non-applicant under section 149 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 (hereinafter called the Act), against an order passed by the Municipal Commissioner, Jabalpur, on 23rd November 1964 in proceedings for assessment of property-tax and conservancy-tax in respect of a house and a latrine belonging to the opponent. Before Municipal Commissioner, the non-applicant objected to the imposition of conservancy-tax on the ground that the house owned by him was without a latrine. He also raised the objection that while determining the annual rental value of the house, 10% depreciation had not been allowed and that the rate at which the land was valued was excessive. All these objections were rejected by the Municipal Commissioner. Thereupon the non-applicant preferred an appeal before the District Judge, Jabalpur, under section 149 of the Act. In the memorandum of appeal, the non-applicant assailed the decision of the Municipal Commissioner not only with regard to the imposition of conservancy-tax, but also on the question of deduction of depreciation allowance in the calculation of the annual rental value of the house and the rate at which the land was valued. However, it seems that before the learned District Judge the applicant-Corporation, misconceiving the appeal as one directed only against the determination of the Commissioner only in regard to conservancy-tax, raised the objection that under section 149 of the Act an appeal against the assessment of conservancy-tax was not competent. The learned District Judge, taking the view that the expression "as to the amount of tax assessed" occurring in section 149(1) was wide enough to include any tax including conservancy-tax, held that the appeal was competent. 2. In my opinion, the conclusion of the learned District Judge that the appeal preferred by the non-applicant is competent is no doubt correct. But the view expressed by him that under section 149(1) an appeal lies against an order of assessment of conservancy-tax is wrong. Section 149 of the Act, in so far as it is material here, is as follows-- 149. But the view expressed by him that under section 149(1) an appeal lies against an order of assessment of conservancy-tax is wrong. Section 149 of the Act, in so far as it is material here, is as follows-- 149. (1) If any dispute arises as to the liability of any land or building to assessment or as to the basis or principle of assessment or as to the amount of tax assessed, an appeal shall lie from the decision of the Municipal Commissioner to the District Court, whose decision shall be final. (2) Such appeal shall be presented to the District Court within thirty days from the date of the order passed under section 148 and shall be accompanied by an extract from the register of objections containing the order objected to. (3)................ (4) No appeal shall be admitted under this section unless an objection has been preferred under section 148. ********* It is manifest from sub-sections (2) and (4) that an appeal under the first subsection lies against an order passed under section 148, and no appeal can be preferred under section 149(1) unless the person aggrieved had preferred an objection under section 148. The lodging of objections under section 148 and an order under that section disposing of the objections, are, therefore, prerequisites for the filing of an appeal under section 149(1). Now, a bare reading of sections 135, 138, 143, 144, 145, 146 and 147 of the Act is sufficient to show that the objections, which a person can prefer under section 148, are objections to the determination of the annual value of the land or building for the purposes of assessment of property-tax. Those objections do not in any way cover or include objections to the assessment of conservancy-tax. The Act itself recognises a distinction between a property tax and a latrine or conservancy-tax as is evident from clauses (a) and (b) of section 132(1) of the Act which deals with the imposition of property-tax and a latrine or conservancy-tax. The distinction between a property-tax and a conservancy-tax is that whereas the property-tax is attracted merely by reason of the fact of existence of the land or building and is computed with reference to the gross annual letting value of the land or building, the conservancy-tax is imposed for a direct service rendered by the Corporation, namely, cleaning by the Corporation of latrines, privies etc. The foregoing analysis of section 149, and of the earlier sections already referred to is sufficient to show that under section 149(1) of the Act an appeal lies against the decision of the Municipal Commissioner only on the question of the assessment of property-tax. In such an appeal, the appellant can question the liability of any building or land to assessment of property-tax or the basis or principle of assessment of property-tax or the amount of the property-tax assessed. The learned District Judge fell in error in construing the expression "tax-assessed" with reference to the definition of "tax" given in section 5(56-a) of the Act. The word "tax", as defined by section 5(56-a), no doubt includes any toll, rate, cess, fee or other impost leviable under the Act. But as is clear from the opening words of section 5, the definition meaning prevails only if there is nothing repugnant in the subject or context indicating that the words defined have a different meaning. Here, having regard to the provisions in sub-sections (2) and (4.) of section 149 and the provisions preceding section 149 already referred to, there can be no doubt that the word "tax" used in the expression "as to the amount of tax assessed" occurring in section 149 means only the property-tax and no other tax. 3. The learned District Judge was, therefore, in error in thinking that the appeal preferred before him as against the determination of the Commissioner on the question of conservancy-tax was competent. Under section 149(1), no appeal lay against that determination. But as in the appeal filed by the non-applicant the determination of the Municipal Commissioner on the question of annual rental value and the rate of valuation of the land has also been challenged the appeal in regard to those matters is competent. In the decisions in Manohar v. Corporation of City of Nagpur (1) and Corporation of the City of Jabalpur v. Krishnarao Shevde (2), a view similar to that taken by me has been expressed in connection with section 130 of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948, and section 136 of the City of Jabalpur Corporation Act, 1948. It is needless to add that in the appeal filed by the non-applicant the decision of the Municipal Commissioner on the question of assessment of conservancy-tax cannot be assailed. The result is that this petition fails and is dismissed with costs. It is needless to add that in the appeal filed by the non-applicant the decision of the Municipal Commissioner on the question of assessment of conservancy-tax cannot be assailed. The result is that this petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee is fixed at Rs. 75.