ORDER K.B. Asthana, J. - This is a Plaintiffs appeal. As landlords of an accommodation in the city of Bareilly, the Plaintiffs brought a suit against Defendant Respondent as tenant for ejectment and recovery of Rs. 103/- as arrears of rent. The Plaintiffs alleged that the Defendant was the tenant in the premises in dispute on a monthly rent of Rs. 30/- ; that the Defendant by opening a radio workshop in the Baithak of the accommodation used the premises let out to him for a purpose inconsistent with the purpose for which the premises were taken on rent, that the Defendant had illegally sub-let the premises in dispute to one Kanhaiya Lal who was in possession of the same as sub-tenant that by an order under the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act the accommodation was let to the Defendant and that the Plaintiffs had duly served upon the Defendant a notice u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, terminating the tenancy and calling upon the Defendant to vacate the accommodation. It was prayed that the Defendant be ejected from the premises and further a decree for recovery of rent of Rs. 103/- as arrears of rent be passed. The defence was that the Defendant was a tenant in the accommodation in dispute but he had neither used the accommodation for a purpose inconsistent with the purpose for which it was let out nor did he sublet the accommodation. It was pleaded that Kanhaiya Lal was the real uncle of the Defendant and stayed in the accommodation in dispute with the Defendant. It was further pleaded that no notice u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act terminating the tenancy was ever received by the Defendant. It may be mentioned that the Plaintiffs had not impleaded Kanhaiya Lal as Defendant in the suit. 2. The learned Munsif on the evidence on record found that no notice u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act terminating the tenancy and calling upon the Defendant to quit was served on the Defendant; that the Defendant by carrying on the repairs of radio sets in the Baithak of the accommodation had not put that accommodation to a purpose inconsistent with the residential purpose for which the accommodation in dispute was let and that the Defendant had not sublet the accommodation in dispute to Kanhaiya Lal. The result was that while the suit of the Plaintiff for recovery of a sum of Rs. 103/- as arrears of rent due was decreed, the suit of the Plaintiff for ejectment of the Defendant was dismissed. On appeal by the Plaintiffs the learned Judge of the lower appellate court affirmed the findings recorded by the learned Munsif and dismissed the appeal. 3. The Learned Counsel for the Appellants urged that the learned Judge of the court below had legally erred in arriving at his conclusions on all the crucial questions involved in the suit. It was submitted; (1) that the court below ignored the presumption applicable to a registered letter carried by post in arriving at the conclusion that the Plaintiffs failed to prove the service of the notice u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act; (2) that the Baithak in the accommodation let out was used by the Defendant for running a work-shop for repairing radios which was inconsistent with residential purpose and the court below ought to have held that the Defendant used the premises let out for a purpose inconsistent with residential purpose and (3) that the court below made an erroneous approach to the question of sub-letting in calling upon the Plaintiffs to prove affirmatively by cogent evidence that there was a contract of tenancy between the Defendant and Kanhaiya Lal and that Kanhaiya Lal actually paid rent to the Defendant. In this connection, it was also submitted that it being the Defendants definite case that Kanhaiya Lal was living with him on account of relationship being a real uncle, the Defendant could not succeed on any other evidence he having failed to prove that Kanhaiya Lal was his real uncle. 4. I do not think that any of the contentions raised by the Learned Counsel for the Appellants has any force. That a registered letter would be deemed to have been delivered to the addressee in due course is only a rule of presumption. The presumption can be rebutted. In the instant; case I find that the Plaintiffs sought to rely upon some signature on the acknowledgment due form and asserted that it was the signature of the Defendant who had received the registered envelop duly addressed to him which contained a notice terminating his tenancy and asking the Defendant to quit as required by Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Both the courts below arrived at concurrent finding chat the acknowledgment due did not bear the signature of the Defendant. The statement of the Defendant that he never received any registered letter containing any notice terminating the tenancy and asking him to quit has been believed. The presumption thus stood clearly rebutted. Essentially the finding that no notice u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was served on the Defendant is one of fact. It cannot be interfered in second appeal. 5. On the question of inconsistent user of the accommodation let out, it appears to me that the view of the court below was that merely by carrying on repair of radio sets in the Baithak, the Defendant had not made any inconsistent use of the premises let out and the Baithak could not in those circumstances be said to have been used for any non-residential purpose. Learned Counsel for the Appellants cited a decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Varun Gupta v. Hari Raj Swarup 1967 AWR 461 in support of the proposition that opening of a repair work-shop of radio would be inconsistent with the purpose of using the accommodation let out as a residence. I do not think the decision in the case of Varun Gupta v. Hari Raj Swarup (supra) helps the Appellant on the facts and circumstances as established in the instant case. In the case cited the accommodation was let out for the purpose of carrying on dairy business but the tenant after a long number of years closed dairy business and started on a large scale repair workshop of tractors. It was on those facts that the learned single Judge held that the tenant had used the premises for a purpose inconsistent with the purpose for which it was originally let out. In the instant case, I do not find any such evidence whatsoever. By merely repairing the radios in the Baithak the Defendant had not acted in a manner as to bring a change in the Baithak so that it no longer can be said to be used for residential purpose. In the instant case, I do not find any such evidence whatsoever. By merely repairing the radios in the Baithak the Defendant had not acted in a manner as to bring a change in the Baithak so that it no longer can be said to be used for residential purpose. If what the Learned Counsel canvassed for were accepted then many advocates, doctors, or businessmen would forfeit the tenancy in residential houses when they received their clients, patients or customers, in connection of their trade, profession or business in a room earmarked for that purpose in the accommodation taken by them on rent for residential purpose. 6. There remains now the question of subletting by the Defendant to Kanhaiya Lal. No doubt the court below has recorded a finding that the Defendant failed to prove that Kanhaiya Lal was his real uncle. However, the court below had believed the evidence that Kanhaiya Lal was looking after the agricultural property of the Defendant and very often came to the city of Bareilly and stayed with the Defendant. There was no evidence on record to show that any portion of the accommodation had been separately allotted to Kanhaiya Lal by the Defendant. The oral evidence produced on behalf of the Plaintiffs to prove that Kanhaiya Lal paid rent to the Defendant has been rejected by both the courts below. Thus the circumstances which the Plaintiff has been able to establish are that Kanhaiya Lal frequently comes and stays with the Defendant in the accommodation in dispute and that he is not any blood relation of the Defendant. These facts and circumstances to my mind, are too insufficient for establishing subletting. I am conscious that it is difficult to prove by direct evidence a contract of subletting as in more cases than not it is always a clandestine affair in order to avoid forfeiture of tenancy but that does not mean that the burden which the Plaintiff has to discharge is in any way lessened. The Plaintiff has to bring in evidence which would furnish material from which a legitimate inference with certainty could be drawn that there was a relationship of lessor and lessee between the chief tenant and some other person found in possession of the premises let out. The Plaintiff has to bring in evidence which would furnish material from which a legitimate inference with certainty could be drawn that there was a relationship of lessor and lessee between the chief tenant and some other person found in possession of the premises let out. Learned Counsel for the Appellants relied upon the case of Ram Bharose v. Ajeet Kumar 1952 AWR 276 and submitted that the court below put a heavy burden on the Plaintiffs acid made an erroneous approach in assessing the evidence on record. In the case Ram Bharose v. Ajeet Kumar (supra) there was a clear finding that it was a firm of partnership with which the tenant had no connection who was in actual possession of the premises let out and from that an inference was drawn that the firm was a sub-tenant of the chief tenant. In the instant case there is no such evidence that Kanhaiya Lal was in exclusive possession of the accommodation let out or of any specific portion thereof. The only evidence is that Kanhaiya Lal when he visited Bareilly city stayed in the accommodation in question with the Defendant. The Defendant always was in actual possession of the premises let out. I think the court below rightly held that the Plaintiff failed to establish sub-letting by the Defendant to Kanhaiya Lal. 7. For the reasons given above, I do not find any force in this appeal and dismiss it with costs.