ORDER D.S. Mathur, J. - This is a Second Appeal by Ram Sheo Singh against the decree of the Additional Civil Judge of Jaunpur, allowing the appeal of Ram Naresh Singh and two others, Plaintiffs, and thereby decreeing their suit for possession. 2. The Plaintiffs' case, in brief, is that the disputed plots Nos. 2375 and 2376 were the sir of Sita Ram and Ram Narain Singh and they mortgaged them with Babu Nandan Singh, father of Ram Sheo Singh, Defendant No. 1. The plots were so mortgaged in 1337-F. (1929), and possession was delivered to the mortgagee. On 30-4-1947 Ram Narain Singh as Karta of the family executed a permanent lease in favour of the Plaintiffs, on payment of a compensation money of Rs. 2,000/- . A sum of Rs. 600/- only was paid before the Sub-Registrar at the time of the registration of the lease, and the balance was left with the lessees for payment to the creditors including the legal representatives of Babu Nandan Singh, mortgagee. All the Defendants Nos. 1 to 7 are the legal representatives of Babu Nandan Singh, mortgagee. The plots were mortgaged with Babu Nandan Singh under two unregistered mortgage-deeds executed on the same day for consideration of Rs. 99/15/- each. The Plaintiffs' case is that after the execution of the permanent lease they paid Rs. 200/- to the Defendants, took back the unregistered documents, and possession of the mortgaged plots was also delivered to them. The Plaintiffs thus asked for a perpetual injunction to restrain the Defendants from interfering with their possession and, in the alternative, a decree for possession was prayed for. 3. The case of the Defendants, on the other hand, is that they held the plots in their own rights, and not as mortgagees. In fact, the alleged mortgages were denied. It was also denied that Rs. 200/- was paid in satisfaction of the mortgage money. They claimed to be in possession as "Bhumidhars" and thus not liable to ejectment. 4. The Munsif recorded the finding that the plots in dispute were usufructuarily mortgaged with the father of the Defendants; but as after the redemption of the mortgage, i.e. payment of mortgage-money, the Defendants continued in possession in 1356 F. and 1359 F. they became Adhivasis and later Sirdars. On this ground the suit for possession was dismissed and naturally no injunction was granted. On this ground the suit for possession was dismissed and naturally no injunction was granted. The lower appellate court was, however, of the opinion that as there was no delivery of possession, the Defendants continued to hold the laud as mortgagees. They were thus held liable to ejectment and the Plaintiffs were granted the decree for possession. 5. The lower appellate court did not record a finding as to whether the mort gage money had or had not been paid to the Defendants in 194-8, as alleged. However, in view of the fact that the right to redeem was not barred by limitation and the rights of the mortgagees were extinguished only on the enforcement of the UP ZA and LR Act (to be referred hereinafter as the Act), the Defendants were ordered to be dispossessed from the land. 6. Section 14 of the Act determines, with effect from the date of vesting, the rights of the mortgagee and the mortgagor irrespective of whether the mortgage-debt has or has not been could. Consequently, for purposes of the present proceeding, it is not necessary to finally adjudicate upon the question of the alleged payment of the mortgage-debts in 1948. 7. Sub-section (1) of Section 14 lays down that subject to the provisions of Sub-section (2) a mortgagee in possession shall with effect from the date of vesting, case to have any right to hold or possess the mortgaged land. In case the land was in the personal cultivation of the mortgagee on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting and it was the sir or Khudkasht of the mortgagor on the date of the mortgage, the same is, for purposes of Section 18, deemed to be the sir or Khudkasht of the mortgagor or his legal representative. The effect of these two provisions is that the mortgagee ceases to have any right to hold or possess the land, while such land, if it was the sir or Khudkasht of the mortgagor on the date of the mortgage, is deemed to be his sir or Khudkasht: But if the land was not the sir or Khudkasht of the mortgagor on the date of the mortgage, the mortgagee can, on payment of the prescribed amount, become a hereditary tenant entitled to hold and possess the land. The proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 14 further lays down that if the mortgagee fails to pay the prescribed amount within the time allowed, he shall lose all rights in the land which shall be deemed to be vacant land and the mortgagee can be ejected in a suit u/s 209 instituted by the Gaon Sabha or the Collector as if he Were a person in possession of the land otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this Act. 8. Section 14 thus determines the rights of the parties irrespective of whether the mortgage money has or has not been paid. Whether the mortgagee can recover the whole or a part of the mortgage debt can be raised in a different proceeding, and not in a suit for ejectment u/s 209 of the Act. 9. The proviso to Section 14(2) of the Act makes it clear that the possession of the mortgagee not paying the prescribed amount within the time allowed is as trespasser, and not as a licensee. When the mortgagee has no right to hold or possess the land from the date of vesting, his possession shall be as trespasser and not as licensee. Observations made to the contrary by the Board of Revenue in Baijnath Tewari v. Baldeo etc. 1965 R.D. 171 cannot be said to lay down the correct law. 10. Both the courts below have recorded the finding that Babu Nandan Singh and his legal representatives were in possession of the land as mortgagees and that on the date of the mortgage it was the sir of the mortgagors. These findings are not against the law and hence cannot be challenged in second appeal. Consequently, by virtue of Section 14 of the Act, with effect from the date of vesting, the Defendants-mortgagees became persons not entitled to hold the land their possession shall be as trespassers. At the same time the land can unless there exists a provision to the contrary, be deemed to be the sir of the mortgagors, and if Section 18 is applicable, they would become bhumidhars. 11. The effect of the permanent lease granted to the Plaintiffs in 1947 now deserves to be looked into, to find out what effect it has an the rights of the mortgagors and the lessees. The permanent lease could not affect the rights of the mortgagee. 11. The effect of the permanent lease granted to the Plaintiffs in 1947 now deserves to be looked into, to find out what effect it has an the rights of the mortgagors and the lessees. The permanent lease could not affect the rights of the mortgagee. Section 17 of the Act provides that any land which was sir of an intermediary on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting but was held on the same day by a tenant on Patta Dawami or Istamrari shall not, for the purposes of Section 18, be deemed to be the sir of such intermediary. In the instant case, the permanent lease or Patta Dawami was executed in 1947, but possession was not delivered to the lessees. Two points that arise for consideration are whether such a lease is valid, and secondly, whether the lessees can, on the above date, be deemed to hold the land on Patta Dawami or Istamrari. 12. The term 'lease' has been defined in Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act to mean a transfer of a right to enjoy such property, made for a certain time, express or implied, or in perpetuity, in consideration of a price paid or promised, or of money.... Where there is no delivery of possession at the time of the transfer and the transferor fails to deliver possession, it is open to the transferee to sue for performance of the contract, that is, for delivery of possession. This rule can be applied to leases also, which are one form of transfer of some of the rights in the property. Consequently, a lease not accompanied with the delivery of possession is not invalid. 13. Section 17 of the Act refers to land held on Patta Dawami or Istamrari, and not land in possession of or in the occupation of a tenant on such a lease. Three distinct terms have throughout been used in the Act. They are "possession", "held" or "deemed to be held". When the legislature used three distinct terms, they must be deemed to have had the intention to assign different meaning to each word or term. This shall be an additional ground for holding that a person not in possession can be regarded to hold the land. They are "possession", "held" or "deemed to be held". When the legislature used three distinct terms, they must be deemed to have had the intention to assign different meaning to each word or term. This shall be an additional ground for holding that a person not in possession can be regarded to hold the land. The meaning of the word "held" used in Section 9 of the Act came up for consideration before a Full Bench of this Court in Buddhan Singh and Anr. v. Nabi Bux and Anr. 1961 AWR 452 . It was observed that the word "held" referred to a title that had a legal origin. Reference was made to the meaning of this word contained in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Vol. II (1952 3rd Ed.). The meaning assigned to the word in this Dictionary is: There is a material difference between a holding and an occupation. A person may hold, though he does not occupy. There is no reason why the same meaning be not assigned to the word "held" used in Section 17 as in Section 9. Further, when there is some difference between "possession" and "held", a person can be deemed to hold the land even though not in actual possession. What is necessary is that he should have a right to possess the land and once such a right exists, he is a person entitled to hold the land. In this view of the matter, the Plaintiffs were persons who held the sir of the mortgagors on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting on Patta Dawami. The ingredients of Section 17 are fulfilled with the result that the plots in dispute cannot, for the purposes of Section 18, be deemed to be the sir of the intermediary. 14. On a cursory reading of Sections 14 and 17, it can be said that there exists some conflict in these provisions. By virtue of Section 14(2)(a), the land is deemed to be the sir of the mortgagor, while u/s 17 it is not deemed as such. Where there exists a conflict, the Courts of law must try to harmonize them by reading all the provisions of the enactment together. The material sections of this Act are not only Sections 14 and 17 but also 18 Section 18 begins with the words "Subject to the provisions of Sections 10, 15, 16 and 17". Where there exists a conflict, the Courts of law must try to harmonize them by reading all the provisions of the enactment together. The material sections of this Act are not only Sections 14 and 17 but also 18 Section 18 begins with the words "Subject to the provisions of Sections 10, 15, 16 and 17". There is no reference to Section 14 in the whole of Section 18. Consequent y, if there is any conflict in Sections 14-and 17, the provisions of Section 17 shall, in determining whether the intermediary is or is not bhumidhar, prevail. In other words if Section 17 is applicable, the intermediary shall not become the bhumidhar of the land, even though he would have been the bhumidhar, had no permanent lease been granted. 15. On consideration of Sections 14, 17 and 18 of the Act along with Section 19 thereof, it must be held that on the date of vesting the Defendants-mortgagees were mere trespassers and the Plaintiffs to whom a permanent lease had been granted were the sirdars of the disputed plots. Further, the plots could not, for purposes of Section 18, be deemed to be the sir of the mortgagors, nor did the mortgagors become Bhumidhars of the land. 16. When the Plaintiffs were the sirdars, the plots formed part of their sirdari holding and they could, u/s 209 of the Act, sue for ejectment of the mortgagees, who were holding the land otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the law. 17. It was also contended on behalf of the Defendants-mortgagees that after the alleged payment of the mortgage money in 1948 their possession ceased to be as mortgagees and when no steps for ejectment were taken within the prescribed period, they became hereditary tenants and could not later be ejected as mortgagees. It is after the payment of the mortgage money that the mortgagor acquires the right to possession of the mortgaged property. It is not necessary that the two acts, that is, the payment of the mortgage money and the delivery of possession, should coincide. For example, if a person remits the mortgage money from a far off place, he cannot immediately take possession of the mortgaged property. It is not necessary that the two acts, that is, the payment of the mortgage money and the delivery of possession, should coincide. For example, if a person remits the mortgage money from a far off place, he cannot immediately take possession of the mortgaged property. Consequently, the possession of the mortgagee shall, even after the payment of the mortgage money, be as licensee, and not as trespasser, unless by his conduct or otherwise the mortgagee makes it clear that inspite of the payment of the mortgage money he has no intention to handover the mortgaged property. In the instant case, adverse possession was never pleaded and there is nothing to show that the Defendants were, after 1948, claiming to be in possession in their own rights, and not as mortgagees. As is often said, once a mortgagee always a mortgagee, and this rule can be applied to the instant case also. 18. To put it differently, the Defendants continued to enjoy the status of a mortgagee and such was their status on the day preceding the date of vesting also, though on the date of vesting they became trespassers liable to ejectment. The Plaintiffs being sirdars could sue for the ejectment of the Defendants, who were persons holding the land otherwise than in accordance with the law. The suit was instituted within the period of limitation and hence a decree for ejectment could be passed. 19. The second appeal has thus no force, and it is hereby dismissed. Costs of this Court easy.