JUDGMENT : Das, J. - Plaintiffs are the Appellants against a reversing judgment arising out of a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession. 2. Sukru Mali was the original owner of the suit-property. After Sukru's death, his daughter Radhamali inherited the property. Plaintiff No. 2 is the son of Radha, and Plaintiff No. 1 is the son of Plaintiff No. 2. 3. It is the case of the Plaintiffs that by an unregistered deed of gift (ext. 2), Radha gave away all her properties including the suit-land to Plaintiff No. 1 who got his name mutated and remained in possession of the same. The Defendant in Asar 1957 trespassed upon the said land and forcibly dispossessed the Plaintiffs. Hence the Plaintiffs filed the suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession. 4. During the pendency of the suit, Plaintiff no 2 father of Plaintiff No. 1 applied to be added as a Plaintiff on the ground that as the next reversioner, he is entitled to inherit the suit-property after the death of Radha who died in the meantime. This petition was allowed and despite opposition by the Defendants, he was added as Plaintiff No. 2 in the suit. The Defendants however were allowed to file additional written statement. 5. The Defendants are the three sons of Durjodhan Rana. Their case is that Radha had borrowed some paddy from their father and as security for the said loan executed a usufructuary mortgage-bond, ext. H on 8-3-1939 in his favour. She again borrowed from him some cash and paddy on 12-4-1941 on the strength of a simple money bond (ext. G). In order to redeem the mortgage loans and other loans which she had previously incurred from other creditors, she sold the suit-land to their father on 5-4-1943 by sale-deed, ext. E. To the said sale-deed, the Plaintiff No. 2 was a consenting party and he signed the sale-deed in token of such consent. As such he had no right to challenge the alienation made by Radha. They also challenged the validity of the deed of gift, ext. 2 and contended that in any event it cannot enure beyond the lifetime of Radha. They also pleaded adverse possession. 6. As such he had no right to challenge the alienation made by Radha. They also challenged the validity of the deed of gift, ext. 2 and contended that in any event it cannot enure beyond the lifetime of Radha. They also pleaded adverse possession. 6. The learned Munsif found (1) that Plaintiff No. 1 did not acquire any title, by virtue of the deed of gift from Radha a limited owner; (2) The sale under ext. E, by Radha to Durjodhan was not for legal necessity and was not supported by consideration; (3) Plaintiff No. 2 has not been proved to be a consenting party to the alienation and (4) Plaintiff No. 2 being the next reversioner, he passed a decree in his favour for recovery of possession. 7. Plaintiff No. 1 did not prefer any appeal in so far as the finding against him regarding the gift-deed, ext. 2 is concerned, and the matter rested there. 8. The Defendants filed an appeal and the appellate court held that there was legal necessity for the sale to the tune of Rs. 400/. and Plaintiff No. 2 though did not execute the sale-deed, nor was a party to the sale, had consented to the alienation as the next reversioner and as such, it is binding on Plaintiff No. 2. He found the Defendants to he in possession since 1943 the date of their purchase. He accordingly dismissed the Plaintiffs' suit. Hence this appeal by the Plaintiffs. 9. The main contentions of Mr. Sinha learned Counsel for the Appellants, may be stated thus: (i) There is no evidence in support of the fact that the Appellant who admittedly is the next reversioner was a consenting party to the alienation. (ii) There is no proof of legal necessity and no finding that Radha who is an illiterate lady had executed the sale-deed being fully aware of its contents, and in any event. (iii) The sale under ext. E has not been proved to be a genuine transaction, as there is no mention of the area or rental in the sale-deed. 10. That prior to the execution of the sale-deed, ext. E, Radha also had executed a usufructuary mortgage-bond (ext. H) in respect of 3.40 acres of land and had also borrowed some paddy on 18-10-1939 from Durjodhan cannot be disputed. From ext. 10. That prior to the execution of the sale-deed, ext. E, Radha also had executed a usufructuary mortgage-bond (ext. H) in respect of 3.40 acres of land and had also borrowed some paddy on 18-10-1939 from Durjodhan cannot be disputed. From ext. H it appears that it was agreed that the mortgages will be in possession for ten years and the mortgagor will take back the property in 1950.: From ext. G a simple bond, it appears that she again borrowed a sum of Rs. 38/ - and some paddy from Durjodhan on 12-4-1941. It appears from the recitals in the sale-deed, ext. E dated 5-4-1943 that she sold the suit-property to release some property which were subject to mortgage (Bhoga Bandhak Jami Muktakaribaku) and also to pay up some loans. The consideration was for Rs. 1000/. Thus, the purpose of the sale was to release some property which was the subject-matter of a mortgage and to pay Borne previous debts. In view of the previous loans as is evident from exts. G and H, it cannot be doubted that she had some mortgage-loans and other loans, and the necessity for the sale cannot therefore be completely ruled out. No doubt, there is some discrepancy regarding the quantum of consideration as it is stated in the document and as is disclosed in the evidence. In ext. E it is stated that a sum of Rs. 1000/ - was paid in cash on the date of sale, but at the stage of evidence RH. 350/ - was said to have been paid in cash and the balance admitted towards previous loans. The learned appellate Court took the discrepant evidence into consideration and held that payment of consideration to the tune of Rs. 400/ - had been established. For this, he relied upon the evidence of d. ws 4 and 5. True, while making calculations the appellate Court appears to have committed some arithmetical errors but that is not enough to annual the transaction in its entirety. The appellate Court, however, while taking notice of the discrepancy in the amount of consideration upheld the transaction of sale in ext. E on the ground that the Appellant, the next reversioner, was himself a consenting party to the alienation. 11. The appellate Court, however, while taking notice of the discrepancy in the amount of consideration upheld the transaction of sale in ext. E on the ground that the Appellant, the next reversioner, was himself a consenting party to the alienation. 11. It was urged on behalf of the Appellants that there was no evidence to show that Plaintiff No. 2 was a consenting party to the alienation made under ext. E. The Appellant also wanted to disown his signature in ext. E. It is, however, clear from the evidence of D.w.4 Raghunath Behera that he was himself a witness to the sale-deed which was scribed by Chamra Gountia who explained the contents of the deed to Radha thereafter she put her thumb impression and Plaintiff No. 2 put his signature in ext. E in his presence as token of his consent to the sale. The evidence of D.w.5 Braja Behera is also to the same effect that the Plaintiff signed the sale-deed in token of his consent. D.w.4 is a Punch of the village Pahadpalli and the appellate Court, found no ground to discard his evidence. There is evidence to show that Plaintiff No. 2 was not only a signatory to sale-deed, but also had signed on the prior mortgage-deeds, exts. F dated 8-3-1939 on the strength of which Radha borrowed some 35 purugs of paddy. On the basis of this evidence, the learned appellate Court came to the finding that Plaintiff no 2. was a consenting party to the sale deed. This finding also cannot be assailed. 12. It is well-settled by authorities Rangaswami v. Macippa AIR 1918 P.C. 196 , that when the alienation of the whole or part of an estate is to be supported on the ground of necessity, then if such necessity is not proved aliunde and the alliance does not prove enquiry on his part, the consent of the reversioners as might be fairly expected to be interested in the transaction will be held to afford a presumptive proof, which if not, rebutted by contrary proof, will validate the transaction as a right and proper one. The same view was also expressed in a case reported in Hare Krishna Dhupi and Another Vs. Upendra Kumar Bhoumik and Others. It was held in this case that the consent of the presumptive reversioners does not, by itself, validate an act of alienation by the widow. The same view was also expressed in a case reported in Hare Krishna Dhupi and Another Vs. Upendra Kumar Bhoumik and Others. It was held in this case that the consent of the presumptive reversioners does not, by itself, validate an act of alienation by the widow. It simply gives rise to a presumption as to the existence of legal necessity, a presumption which the actual reversioner is always entitled to rebut. But if the actual reversioner is the same person as the one who has given consent as the presumptive reversioner, different consideration arise and he is precluded from disputing the validity of the alienations. This is on the ground that a presumptive reversioner is competent to elect to treat the alienation as operating against his spes successionis even during the lifetime of the widow and if he himself as the reversioner has given the consent, the consent already expressed by him is binding upon him. In view of this legal position and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary the document, ext. E shall be presumed to have been executed for legal necessity and is also binding upon the Appellant. The Appellant No. 1. is, therefore, precluded from challenging the sale-deed on the ground of want of legal necessity. 13. No doubt, Radha was an illiterate lady and the burden is on the Defendants to prove that she executed the document after having understood its contents. In this context again, the appellate Court has also carefully examined the evidence of the witnesses. D.w.5 has stated that after Chamra Gountia scribed the document, the contents were read over to all that were present there including Radha and Naran (Plaintiff No. 2.) Radha put her thumb impression and Naran his signature on the document. It is the further evidence of D.w.5 that he asked Radha as to why she was selling the land. She said that she is in debts and is in need of money to meet her household expenses. In view of this evidence, it cannot be said that Radha executed the document without understanding the contents thereof. This is a case where her own son was in attendance when the sale-deed, as executed and thus to it cannot be said that she was not in possession of any independent advice. In view of this evidence, it cannot be said that Radha executed the document without understanding the contents thereof. This is a case where her own son was in attendance when the sale-deed, as executed and thus to it cannot be said that she was not in possession of any independent advice. There is nothing else to show that she was in any way misled in the transaction. 14. No doubt a specific area or the rental have not been mentioned in the sale-deed, but the other descriptions of the property are there. The sale-deed clearly refers to the Khasada number, the Khewat number etc. The Khasada number has been put as 1788 and 1799 and the Khewat number has been put as 90 and Pat a number as 12. It is the case of the Plaintiff that the Defendants are in possession of the suit-property and the Plaintiffs have failed in the present suit to recover possession of the said property from the Defendants. Therefore non-description of the specific area has not in any way vitiated the sale. No doubt, the sale-deed is an unregistered document, but it is admissible for collateral purposes and the Defendants can resist the claim for recovery of possession u/s 53A of the Transfer of Property Act even on the basis of that unregistered document. See Karunakar Das Vs. Mst. Mahakuren and Others. In the result, there is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed. But in the circumstances of the case, parties to bear their own costs of this Court. Final Result : Dismissed