ORDER Satish Chandra, J. - The Petitioner wants that the decree dismissing his suit u/s 209 of the UP ZA and LR Act be set aside. 2. The land in dispute is situate in Pargana and Tahsil Shahabad, district Rampur. The UP ZA and LR Act was extended to the land in dispute on 26-1-1956. On 22-10-1955, the Petitioner filed a suit for declaration and an injunction in the civil court against Jagan Respondent No. 6. With effect from 26-5-1956, the jurisdiction to try suits for ejectment u/s 209 of the UP ZA and LR Act was transferred to the revenue court. On 11-8-1956, the Petitioner moved an application for amendment of the plaint and ultimately the suit was decreed on 19-11-1957. The Defendant went up in appeal. The case was remanded back on 23--12-1958, on the ground that the issue of sirdari should be referred to the revenue court. Ultimately on 21-4-1960, the suit was dismissed by the civil court on the finding that the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit for possession, presumably because the jurisdiction had been transferred to the revenue court. 3. Five days later, that is on 26-4-1960 the Petitioner filed the present suit u/s 209 of the UP ZA and LR Act in the relevant revenue court. The suit was contested on many grounds. The trial court held that according to the Petitioner's own allegation the Defendant had taken forcible possession on 27-11-1955, that is to say prior to the corning into force of the UP ZA and LR Act on 21-6-1956. Relying on a decision of this Court in Bhawani Tewari v. Ram Bhawan Tewari 1962 RD 277 it held that the suit was not maintainable u/s 209 because the taking of possession by the Defendant happened before the enforcement of the Act. It also held that the suit was time barred. The Plaintiff went up in appeal which was dismissed by the Additional Commissioner on the sole finding that the suit was not maintainable. The Board of Revenue has confirmed this view and dismissed the Petitioner's second appeal. For the Petitioner it was urged that in view of the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Bodhi Lal and Ors. v. Board of Revenue and Ors. The Board of Revenue has confirmed this view and dismissed the Petitioner's second appeal. For the Petitioner it was urged that in view of the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Bodhi Lal and Ors. v. Board of Revenue and Ors. Writ Petition No. 1144 of 1960 decided on 2-2-1966 the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Bhawani Tewari's (supra) case does not any longer hold the field. 4. Section 209 makes a person taking or retaining possession of a land forming part of the holding of the bhumidhar or sirdar otherwise than in accordance with the law for the time being in force, liable to ejectment on the suit of the bhumidhar or sirdar. Takru, J. in Bhawani Tewari's (supra) case held that two conditions must co exist before a suit can be maintained u/s 209(1) that the person should have taken or retained possession of a land forming part of a holding of a Bhumidhar otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the law for the time being in force and (2) that where the land forms part of the holding of the bhurnidhar the said 'taking' or 'retaining' should be without his consent. Takru, J. referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Gita and Ors. v. Charan Singh AIR 1961 SC 960. There is no such case in the reports. His Lordship obviously referred to Bhinka and Ors. v. Charan Singh 1959 AWR 440 SC: AIR 1961 SC 960. The latter case interpreted the expression 'taking' or 'retaining' as occurring in Section 180 of the UP Tenancy Act. The learned Single Judge observed: It was held in that case that the word 'taking' applies where a person takes possession otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of law for the time being in force, i.e. to say that the possession is illegal ab initio, whereas 'retaining' applies where possession is, initially, in accordance with the provisions of law for the time being in force, but subsequently becomes illegal. If the dispossession of the Plaintiff was initially illegal it would be a case of taking alone and not retaining. If the dispossession of the Plaintiff was initially illegal it would be a case of taking alone and not retaining. It such dispossession took place prior to the coming into force of the UP ZA and LR Act, that is to say before the Plaintiff became a bhumidhar, the bhumidhar could not maintain a suit u/s 209 because the taking could not possibly be-without the consent of the bhumidhar--the bhumidhar not being in existence at the time of the taking. In that case the same person, namely the Plaintiff, was the tenure-holder both at the time of the taking as well as on the date of the suit. 5. The Supreme Court decision in Bhinka's case (supra) came up for consideration in a Division Bench case of Bodhi Lal and Ors. (supra) mentioned above. V. Bhargava, J. (as he then was) observed that the proposition laid down by the Supreme Court was meant for cases where the right of ejectment vested in the same person from whom possession was taken and against whom possession was retained. In that case possession was taken against the Gaon Sabha. His Lordship observed that no doubt the Gaon Sabha's right to sue for ejectment had to be based on the act of taking of possession. The Gaon Sabha could not consequently institute the suit on the basis that possession was being retained, but that position would not obtain in relation to the successors or transferees. In relation to these, the only act which could cause grievance was the continuing to retain illegal possession. The right to sue would, therefore, accrue to them because of that cause of action, namely retaining the possession. For such persons the requirements of Section 209 would be clearly satisfied. 6. His Lordship also observed that the Supreme Court did not intend to lay down that a person cannot be sued at all for retaining possession of land if at the inception the possession taken by that person was contrary to law. The Legislature did not intend that an anomalous position should come into existence, namely of permitting civil courts to decide suits which were intended to be decided by the revenue courts. 7. In that case the Plaintiffs were the transferees from the Gaon Sabha. His Lordship observed that the Defendants to the suit could not be said to have taken possession without the consent of the Plaintiffs. 7. In that case the Plaintiffs were the transferees from the Gaon Sabha. His Lordship observed that the Defendants to the suit could not be said to have taken possession without the consent of the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiff had no right in the land at that time. In that situation the Defendants continuing to remain in possession without the consent of the Plaintiff after he became a sirdar, would be tantamount to retaining possession without the consent of the sirdar. Thus, if the acquisition of rights as a bhumidhar or sirdar takes place subsequent to the initial taking of possession contrary to law, the sirdar can sue u/s 209 Clause (a), on the cause of action that the Defendant was retaining possession without his consent. In Bodhi Ram's (supra) case this principle was enunciated in relation to the successors of the transferees. 8. In my opinion the same principle will equally apply where the status or capacity of a person changes by operation of law. After such change the same individual would in the eye of law be a different personality. He would be in the eye of law holding the same kind of a distinct legal character as held by a successor or a transferee. 9. The UPZA and LR Act uprooted the entire pre-existing tenures and conferred fresh rights of tenure. In Rana Sheo Ambar Singh v. The Allahabad Bank Ltd. 1961 AWR 546 SC the Supreme Court held that the legal effect of the notification u/s 4 of the UPZA and LR Act was that sir and khudkasht land and groveland would vest in the State and the intermediaries' rights and interests therein would extinguish. The bhumidhari rights which were created by Section 18 would be a new right altogether. They are special rights conferred afresh by the Act and could not be followed on the principle of substituted security by a mortgagee of the erstwhile sir or khudkasht land. The same principle applies to tenancy holdings. The various kinds of pre-existing tenancy rights were equally abolished, and fresh rights conferred on the tenure-holders. The legal consequence of this change in the law would be that a person who was a tenant would cease to be so and on the date of vesting become the holder of sirdari rights. His status changes. The various kinds of pre-existing tenancy rights were equally abolished, and fresh rights conferred on the tenure-holders. The legal consequence of this change in the law would be that a person who was a tenant would cease to be so and on the date of vesting become the holder of sirdari rights. His status changes. The capacity in which he would have a right to hold the land is completely different. 10. If a person takes possession of land appertaining to the, holding of a tenant and if subsequently by operation of law the tenancy rights become extinguished, the cause of action accruing in favour of the tenant to file a suit on the basis that possession was taken without his consent, would become extinct with the extinguishment of the title of the tenant. Thereafter when the individual acquires the status of a sirdar, the possession of the Defendant would in relation to the Plaintiff's new legal character, be one of retaining without his consent as a sirdar. The cause of action for the suit in such a case would be retaining without consent and could be enforced by a suit u/s 209. 11. In Bhawani Tewari's (supra) case it was observed that where the initial taking was prior to the coming into force of the UPZA and LR Act, the taking could not possibly be without the consent of the bhumidhar as there was no bhumidhar then in existence. As held by the Division Bench the effect of this situation would not be to make Section 209 wholly inapplicable. The necessary consequence would be that the bhumidhar could possibly have no cause of action in relation to the taking, in cases where the taking did not occur after the bhumidhari or sirdari came into existence. 12. This interpretation of Section 209 would advance the apparent intention of the legislature. It is well known that the legislature had over the years sought to bring all suits for ejectment of trespassers from agricultural land within the purview of revenue courts. Section 180 of the UP Tenancy Act was an advance over the corresponding provision of the Agra Tenancy Act of 1926. Section 180 itself was amended to obviate difficulties that had arisen owing to its interpretations by courts. Section 180 of the UP Tenancy Act was an advance over the corresponding provision of the Agra Tenancy Act of 1926. Section 180 itself was amended to obviate difficulties that had arisen owing to its interpretations by courts. Section 209 of the UPZA and LR Act also was not intended to leave loopholes because of which some classes of suit for ejectment of trespassers on agricultural land may go outside the purview of revenue courts, and thus of the Act itself, A suit for ejectment, which cannot be filed u/s 209, would have to be taken to the civil courts. It should be the endeavour of the courts to respect the legislative mandate as far as possible. The interpretation of Section 209 accepted by the Division Bench advances the intention of the legislature. That interpretation is not in line with the view taken in Bhawani Tewari's (supra) case. 13. The view expressed by me above would cause no injury to the trespasser in possession. u/s 209 even where the suit is on a cause of action for retaining possession, the period of limitation commences to run from the date of vesting. A suit on such a cause of action would lie only if it is established that the Defendant was retaining possession contrary to the provisions of law. If the Defendant had already matured rights as a hereditary tenant u/s 180(2) of the UP Tenancy Act by being in adverse possession for the prescribed period of time he would not be liable to ejectment u/s 209. The Defendant would be a hereditary tenant on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting. On the date of vesting he himself would become a sirdar. He would thus be retaining possession of the land with title and not contrary to the provisions of law for the time being in force. It may be noticed that in Bhinka's (supra) case (supra) Supreme Court held that the words "possession in accordance with law for the time being in force" in the context can only mean possession with title. So, a person who can show title cannot be said to be in possession contrary to the provisions of law for the time being in force. Such a person could not be ejected u/s 209 merely because the Plaintiff acquired a different cause of action for the suit. So, a person who can show title cannot be said to be in possession contrary to the provisions of law for the time being in force. Such a person could not be ejected u/s 209 merely because the Plaintiff acquired a different cause of action for the suit. A suit u/s 209 on the fresh cause of action, namely retaining possession would be only in such cases where the Defendant had not matured title on the date of vesting. 14. In view of the above discussion it is clear that the present suit was maintainable u/s 209 of the UP ZA and LR Act. 15. The Plaintiff had at first sued for ejectment of the Defendant in the Civil Court. That suit was dismissed on the ground that the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain a suit u/s 209 because jurisdiction had with effect from 26-5-1956, been transferred to the revenue courts. That decree of the civil court would operate as res judicata between the parties, and would make the present suit entertainable by the revenue court u/s 209. 16. The petition, therefore, succeeds and is allowed. The impugned orders of the Additional Commissioner and the Board of Revenue are set aside. The case is sent back to the Additional Commissioner for being decided on the merits and in accordance with law. The Petitioner will be entitled to his costs.