JUDGMENT S.N. Singh, J. - This appeal arises out of a suit instituted by the plaintiff respondent for a declaration of his title to the property in dispute and for permanent injunction. Plaintiff's case was that he was the owner of the house built on the land detailed at the foot of the plaint. It was alleged that the defendant claimed the said land as part of plots Nos. 650 and 651 which had been acquired by the Government of India in the year 1915 for B. N. W. Railway. Plaintiff respondent did not admit that the site of the house was ever acquired by the Government or that the defendant was the owner of the same. It was alleged that in the year 1943 Governor General in Council representing the 0. T. Railway instituted Suit No. 531 of 1943 against Bachai Dubey and another for possession over certain plots including the disputed land and the said suit was decreed. It was further alleged that in execution of that decree the decree-holder wanted to dispossess the plaintiff's father from the land in suit which was resisted. An application under Order 21, Rule 97, C.P.C. had been filed but the same was dismissed. A revision against that order also failed. Thereafter the defendant appellant did not file any regular suit. It was further alleged that the Estate Officer of the Government had illegally treated the land as public premises and had directed the ejectment of the plaintiff from the land in suit. The order of the Estates Officer is said to be illegal and void hence the present suit for injunction. This suit was contested by the defendant. The defendant admitted that Suit No. 531 of 1943 against Bachai Dubey had been instituted and decreed and it was also admitted that in execution of that decree there was resistance by the plaintiff's father and an application under Order 21, Rule 97, C.P.C. had been rejected and the revision against that order had failed and that no suit had been instituted challenging the order of dismissal. The defendant asserted that in proceedings under Section 4 of the Public Premises Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants Act 1958 plaintiff was ejected from the land in suit and it was said that this order bound the plaintiff and that the civil court had no jurisdiction. The defendant asserted that in proceedings under Section 4 of the Public Premises Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants Act 1958 plaintiff was ejected from the land in suit and it was said that this order bound the plaintiff and that the civil court had no jurisdiction. The trial court dismissed the suit on the finding that the civil court had no jurisdiction and that the suit was barred by Section 10 of the Public Premises Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants Act 1958. An appeal was preferred against this decision and the lower appellate court has reversed that judgment and decreed the plaintiff's suit on the finding that the Government has not proved that plots Nos. 650 and 651 in which the disputed property is said to lie is the property of the Union of India. The second finding of the learned Judge is that the house in dispute is not part of plots Nos. 650 and 651. Thirdly it has been found that the property in dispute is not such to which Public Premises Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants Eviction Act applies. Lastly it has been found that on the evidence on the record plaintiff's title to the house in dispute had been clearly established. The defendant has come up in appeal to this Court. The short point for decision in this appeal is as to whether the civil court has jurisdiction to entertain such a suit. It this point is decided in favour of the plaintiff respondent then there will be no difficulty in dismissing the appeal. The finding given by the lower appellate court about the title of the plaintiff is clear and categorical. It has been contended on behalf of the appellant that the civil court's jurisdiction in the present case is barred by Section 10 of Act XXXII of 1958 (Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act) which hereinafter will be referred as the Act. It was submitted that the Tribunal constituted under the Act had jurisdiction to decide the question of title and reading Sections 5 and 10 of the Act it was clear that the jurisdiction of the civil court was barred. Emphasis was laid by the learned counsel on the very wide language used in these sections. It was submitted that the Tribunal constituted under the Act had jurisdiction to decide the question of title and reading Sections 5 and 10 of the Act it was clear that the jurisdiction of the civil court was barred. Emphasis was laid by the learned counsel on the very wide language used in these sections. Reliance was placed on a decision of the Punjab High Court vide Hari Kishen Das v. Union of India through the Secretary Ministry of Defence, New Delhi, A.I.R. 1961 Pun. 98. As against this submission of the learned counsel for the appellant it was argued by the learned counsel for the respondent that civil court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit and that the Tribunal constituted under the Act could not assume jurisdiction by wrongly deciding the question of jurisdiction. Reliance was placed on the case of The Queen v. The Commissioner for Special purposes of the Income Tax, (1888) 21 QBD 313 at 319-320. I have considered the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and am inclined to accept the submissions of the learned counsel for the respondent. This question of jurisdiction of the civil court has been considered by the Supreme Court in various decisions and it had been laid down that statute ousting jurisdiction of civil court must be strictly construed vide Abdul Waheed Khan v. Bhawani, A.I.R. 1966 SC 1718 para 9. "The exclusion of the jurisdiction Civil Courts to entertain civil causes will not be assumed unless the relevant statute contains an express provision to that effect, or leads to a necessary and inevitable implication of that nature. The mere fact that a special statute provides for certain remedies may not by itself necessarily exclude the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to deal with a case brought before it in respect of some of the matters covered by the said statute." Vide Firm of Vital Subbayya Chetty and Sons v. State of Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1964 SC 322 at 323 para 6. Even where the jurisdiction of the civil court is excluded it has been held by the Supreme Court that this exclusion of jurisdiction of the civil court would be subject to two limitations. Even where the jurisdiction of the civil court is excluded it has been held by the Supreme Court that this exclusion of jurisdiction of the civil court would be subject to two limitations. First, even if jurisdiction is so excluded, the civil court had jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act had not been complied with, or the statutory Tribunal had not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. The second is as regards the exact extent to which the powers of statutory tribunals are exclusive. "When an inferior court or tribunal or body, which has to exercise the power of deciding facts, is first established by Act of Parliament, the legislature has to consider what powers it will give that tribunal or body. It may in effect say that, if a certain state of facts exists and is shown to such tribunal or body before it proceeds to do certain things, it shall have jurisdiction to do such things, but not otherwise. There it is not for them conclusively to decide whether that state of facts exists, and, if they exercise the jurisdiction without its existence, what they do may be questioned, and it will be held that they have acted without jurisdiction. But there is another state of things which may exist. The legislature may in trust the tribunal or body with a jurisdiction, which includes the jurisdiction to determine whether the preliminary state of facts exists as well as the jurisdiction, on finding that does exist, to proceed further or do something more. When the legislature are establishing such a tribunal or body with limited jurisdiction, they also have to consider, whatever jurisdiction they give them, whether there shall be any appeal from their decision, for otherwise there will be none. In the second of the two cases I have mentioned it is an erroneous application of the formula to say that the tribunal cannot give themselves jurisdiction by wrongly deciding certain facts to exist, because the legislature gave them jurisdiction to determine all the facts, including the existence of the preliminary facts on which the further exercise of their jurisdiction depends, and if they were given jurisdiction so to decide, without any appeal being given, there is no appeal from such exercise of their jurisdiction". The Queen v. The Commissioner for Special purposes of the Income Tax1888) 21 Q.B.D. 313 at pp. 319-320 vide Addanki Tiruvenkala Thata Desika Charyulu (since deceased) and after his legal representatives v. State of Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 807 paras 26 and 27. Thus we find that in the above case the Supreme Court approved and followed the authority cited by the learned counsel for the respondent. Bearing in mind the law laid down by the Supreme Court we have to see whether the present suit was barred by Section 10 of the Act. The entire Act consists of thirteen sections. Section 1 gives the short title and extent Section 2 gives the definitions. Section 3 deals with the appointment of estate officers. Section 4 gives power to the estate officer to issue notice to any person who is in unauthorised occupation of the public premises to show cause against the ejectment. Section 5 gives power to the authority concerned to consider the objection filed in pursuance of notice under Section 4 and pass suitable orders in respect of the public premises. Section 6 deals with the disposal of property left on public premises by unauthorised occupants. Section 7 deals with the power to recover rent or damages in respect of public premises. Section 8 makes certain provisions of the Civil Procedure Code applicable in matters of summoning and enforcing attendance requiring the discovery and production of documents. Section 9 provides for an appeal from an order of the estate officer to the District Judge, Section 10 which is the barring section reads as follows: Save as otherwise expressly provide( in this Act, every order made by an estate officer or appellate officer in this Act shall be final and shall not be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceeding. Sec. 11 gives protection of actions taken in good faith under the Act. Section 12 deals with the delegation of powers by the Central Government to State Government or an officer of the State Government through notifications. Section 13 deals with the power to make rules. Sec. 11 gives protection of actions taken in good faith under the Act. Section 12 deals with the delegation of powers by the Central Government to State Government or an officer of the State Government through notifications. Section 13 deals with the power to make rules. A resume of these sections would show that the tribunal constituted under this Act was not given the exclusive right to determine the question of its own jurisdiction though in exercising powers under the Act the estate officer has primarily to be satisfied about the property being the Government property. In view of the authority cited above it appears that any decision given by the estate officer about the property being public premises cannot be considered to be conclusive and it is always open to review by the civil court. By taking a wrong view about the preliminary facts which gives jurisdiction to the estate officer he cannot assume jurisdiction. In my opinion in view of the constitution of the tribunal it is open to the civil court to see whether :1(1e property in dispute is public premises as defined in the Act or not and this is the only jurisdiction with the civil court. If the civil court comes to the-conclusion that the order passed by the estate officer is in respect of public premises then the order passed by the estate officer or the District Judge in proceedings initiated after the issue of notice under Section 4 of the Act cannot be questioned. But if the civil court comes to the conclusion that the property in dispute in respect of which the order had been passed by the Public Estate Officer was not public premises the civil court will have jurisdiction to pass appropriate orders in such a case and the jurisdiction of the civil court is not barred by Section 10 of the Act. In the present case the civil court has found that the property in dispute is not public premises as defined in the Act as such rightly passed the order under appeal. The decision cited by the learned counsel for the appellant in the case of Hari Kishan Das v. Union of India through the Secretary Ministry of Defence, New Delhi has not considered this aspect of the matter. The decision cited by the learned counsel for the appellant in the case of Hari Kishan Das v. Union of India through the Secretary Ministry of Defence, New Delhi has not considered this aspect of the matter. The Punjab High Court in that case was only concerned with the validity of the Act itself as such that authority is of no assistance in determining the point in dispute in this case. The plaintiff respondent having proved his title to the property and the defendant appellant not having proved the land to be public premises the lower appellate court rightly decreed the suit. There is no case for interference. Accordingly this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. Appeal dismissed.