ORDER Satish Chandra, J. - The Petitioner is a tenant of 76-A, Boundary Road, Meerut Cantt. since about 1947. Respondent No. 2, Suit Kaushalya Devi, purchased this house in August, 1965. She wanting this house for her personal residence made an application for permission to sue for the eviction of the Petitioner u/s 14 of the UP Cantonment (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1952. That application was after contest rejected on 26-11-1965 on the ground that the need of the landlord was not genuine. It appears that thereafter the landlord made an application Under Rule 9 of the UP Cantonment (Control of Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1954. Thereupon the Commandant passed an order on 4-6-1966 directing the Petitioner to vacate the accommodation Under Rule 9 because the landlord who had purchased the accommodation in August, 1965 requires it for her personal use. The Petitioner filed objections before the Administrative Commandant, a copy whereof is annexure 3 to the writ petition. These objections were rejected on 25-6-1966. The order deals with one of the objections only and holds that the conditions of Section 14 of the Act are different to Rule 9 and are not applicable to an application Under Rule 9. It required the Petitioner to take action for vacating the accommodation under the earlier order. The Petitioner prays that these orders be quashed. 2. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner has submitted that Rule 9 was not at all applicable to the case of the Petitioner and that in any event Rule 9 was ultra vires the rule making powers conferred on the Central Government by Section 23 of the Act. 3. The first question is as to the interpretation of Rule 9 which reads as follows: 9. 3. The first question is as to the interpretation of Rule 9 which reads as follows: 9. Certain accommodation to be allotted by the Officer commanding the station after consultation with landlord: (1) Where a landlord desires to let out a portion of accommodation, any portion of which was not let out previously, the officer commanding the station shall make the allotment,-- (a) if the landlord himself is living in any portion of the accommodation, in accordance with the wishes of the landlord, and (b) if the landlord does not live in any portion of the accommodation, in accordance so far as may be, with his wishes: Provided always that the officer commanding the station shall, at any after such allotment, on being satisfied, on application by the landlord, that the landlord requires the accommodation bonafide for his own personal occupation, direct the allottee to vacate the accommodation within such reasonable time as may be fixed in this behalf by the officer commanding the station. (2) If the accommodation referred to in Sub-rule (1) falls vacant at any time subsequently as a result of the tenant vacating it, the officer commanding the station shall, on application by the landlord, allow him to occupy the same for his own residence. For the application of the proviso to Sub-rule (1) three conditions have to coexist, (1) that the landlord desires to let out a portion of the accommodation, (2) that any portion of such accommodation had not been let out previously and (3) that the officer commanding is satisfied that the landlord requires the accommodation bonafide for his own personal occupation. Then he can direct the allottee to vacate the accommodation within a reasonable time. In the instant case the Petitioner's allegation that he was the tenant of 76 A Boundary Road has not been controverted. There is no suggestion that he was a tenant of only a portion of this house. Further even in the counter-affidavit it is admitted that the Petitioner was a tenant from the year 1948. There is no averment in the affidavits or in the impugned order that any portion of the accommodation under the tenancy of the Petitioner was not let out prior to the creation of the tenancy in favour of the Petitioner. Thus the first and the second conditions are non-existent. 4. There is no averment in the affidavits or in the impugned order that any portion of the accommodation under the tenancy of the Petitioner was not let out prior to the creation of the tenancy in favour of the Petitioner. Thus the first and the second conditions are non-existent. 4. The proviso applies to an accommodation which has been the subject-matter of an allotment under Sub-rule (1) of Rule 9. The use of the 'such' in the opening part of the proviso makes that clear. Under the proviso there is no power to direct any and every allottee to vacate an accommodation. A person who is occupying an accommodation under an order of allotment issued Under Rule 9(1) alone can be dealt with under the proviso and directed to vacate the accommodation. Sub-rule (a) is not applicable to the instant case on the facts. Moreover, the Petitioner became a tenant in 1947 or 1948. The rules came into force on or about 20-3-1964. They were framed Under the UP Cantonment (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1952. The Act cannot be said to be in operation prior to 16-1-1952 when the UP Cantonment (Control of Rent and Eviction) Ordinance was first promulgated. This Ordinance was repealed by the Act. It is, therefore, clear that the Act or these rules were not in existence when the Petitioner became a tenant in 1947. It cannot be said that the Petitioner was holding under an order of allotment much less under an order of allotment made under Sub-rule (1) of Rule 9. The Petitioner, therefore, was not governed by the proviso to Rule 9 and could not be directed to vacate the accommodation. 5. Some stress is laid by learned Counsel on the allegation in paragraph 3 of his counter-affidavit that the Petitioner was occupying the aforesaid bungalow "after its allotment" in the year 1948. It was urged that this allegation has not been controverted in the rejoinder. The allegation by itself is vague. It does not convey the idea that the allotment spoken of in this paragraph is an allotment Under Rule 9 of the rules or under this Act of 1952. There is no reference to any law which may have been in existence in 1948 and which requires the commencement of a tenancy by an allotment order. Learned Counsel has not been able to show me any such law. There is no reference to any law which may have been in existence in 1948 and which requires the commencement of a tenancy by an allotment order. Learned Counsel has not been able to show me any such law. This allegation therefore, cannot bring the case within the purview of Rule 9. 6. In the result, the petition succeeds. The impugned order dated 4-6-1966 is quashed and the Respondents are directed not to act in virtue thereof. The Petitioner will have his costs.