ORDER S.D. Singh, J. - The Applicant was convicted u/s 353 of the IPC and sentenced to six months' rigorous imprisonment thereunder. He went up in appeal which was dismissed by the II Temporary Sessions Judge, Allahabad and hence this application in revision in this Court. 2. The present Applicant Buddhu and one other person, Prem, were suspected by constable Udairaj Singh (PW 3) of bringing illicit liquor in two tins in a boat from the other side of the river at Allahabad. Constable Udairaj Singh had gone to Lohaghat for serving a summons and finding a kirtan going on at Mankameshwar Ghat sat down there and it was at that place that he received information about two persons bringing illicit liquor. He tried to apprehend the two persons as they were coming out of the boat. One of the tins was thrown away in the river and the other was attempted to be emptied, but was caught hold of by the constable. The two persons finding their attempt frustrated got infuriated and gave the constable a beating with kicks and fists and even tore his uniform. The two persons could not consequently be arrested by him. He lodged a report at the police station together with the tin which contained about two bottles of liquor. An investigation followed, whereafter the two persons Prem and Buddhu were prosecuted and convicted as aforesaid. 3. It appears that Udairaj Singh did not know the two persons by name, but he came to know of their names from the person who had given information to him and the report was, therefore, made by name. The evidence against the Applicant and his companion, Prem, consists of the statements of three witnesses, Shanker (PW 1), Jaleel Ahmad (PW2) and Udairaj Singh (PW 3). While Shanker and Jaleel Ahmad named the two persons in their statements in court, Udairaj Singh only pointed out towards them and deposed that they were the persons who were bringing liquor, whom he wanted to apprehend and who assaulted him. 4. One of the points, therefore, which was raised before the courts below and also before me is that the two persons should have been put up for identification by constable Udairaj Singh. 4. One of the points, therefore, which was raised before the courts below and also before me is that the two persons should have been put up for identification by constable Udairaj Singh. The Sessions Judge has referred to a case reported in Ramnath v. State 1965 AWR 811 in which it has been held that if the evidence furnished in court by a witness is of a character on which implicit reliance can be placed, the presence of corroborative evidence in the shape of identification memo is wholly immaterial. There is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure for a suspect being put to identification first before he is prosecuted or asked to stand his trial in a court for having committed a certain offence where he is not named in the first information report. The identification proceedings are, however, taken up by the investigating agency so that the identification of the suspect at the time of identification proceedings may lend support to what they depose in court about the complicity of a particular person in a certain crime. But even when a person is put up for identification proceedings before he is prosecuted for a certain offence, the evidence which can be relied upon against him for his conviction is the evidence which is given in court and as has been observed in Ramnath v. State (supra), the earlier identification of the accused merely corroborates the evidence which is given in court. A witness will, therefore, not be treated unreliable or his evidence discarded merely because the accused in a particular case was not put up for identification. All what would happen in such a case would be that the evidence which in the case of earlier identification proceedings would be available for corroboration of the evidence given in court will not be available and if that corroborative evidence is not available the courts will examine the evidence a little more closely so as to find out whether that evidence can be relied upon even without the aforesaid corroboration. 5. In this particular case Udairaj Singh learnt the names of the two accused persons at the spot and mentioned the same in the first information report. He pointed out to them as being the persons who committed the offence and his statement is corroborated by two other witnesses Shanker (PW 1) and Jalil Ahmad (PW 2). 5. In this particular case Udairaj Singh learnt the names of the two accused persons at the spot and mentioned the same in the first information report. He pointed out to them as being the persons who committed the offence and his statement is corroborated by two other witnesses Shanker (PW 1) and Jalil Ahmad (PW 2). There is nothing in evidence to indicate that they did not know the two accused. 6. Some arguments were advanced as to the correctness of the findings about the commission of the offence by the Applicant and his accomplice Prem but that question is concluded by findings of fact recorded by the Magistrate and the Sessions Judge and the findings recorded by them cannot be interfered with in revision. 7. It was urged on behalf of the Applicant that he was also prosecuted u/s 16(?)(60) of the Excise Act but has since been acquitted and that, therefore, on the basis of the same facts his conviction u/s 353 of the IPC cannot stand. I do not, however, find any difficulty in upholding the conviction of the Applicant u/s 353 of the IPC merely because he has been acquitted u/s 60 of the Excise Act. The two offences are quite distinct and different. u/s 60 of the Excise Act the Applicant must have been prosecuted for possession of illicit liquor and it may be that in that case it was found that he was not in possession of any such liquor. The point involved in the instant case, however, is different. Even though the Applicant was not carrying illicit liquor, Udairaj Singh could suspect that he was doing so and could take his search and if necessary even arrest him u/s 50 of the: UP Excise Act, 1910. The Applicant could not, therefore, resist any search by him or assault or use criminal force against Udairaj Singh in the discharge of his duty as a public servant at the time. 8. The Applicant could not, therefore, resist any search by him or assault or use criminal force against Udairaj Singh in the discharge of his duty as a public servant at the time. 8. It was then urged that u/s 353 of the IPC only that person is liable to be convicted who assaults or uses criminal force to any person being a public servant in the execution of his duty as such public servant and it was, therefore, argued that it is only when a public servant is assaulted in the execution of his duty as such public servant that the person who assaults for uses criminal force would be liable to be punished. In other words what was urged was that it must have been the duty of constable Udairaj Singh to search the Applicant and that unless it was his duty as such public servant to take the search, no offence will have been committed by the Applicant. Reliance for the purpose was placed upon Section 53 of the UP Excise Act IV of 1910, Sub-section (1) of which read: 53(1). Whenever a Collector or an officer of the Excise Department not below such rank as the State Government may prescribe or a police officer not below the rank of an officer incharge of a police station has reason to believe that an offence punishable u/s 60, Section 61, Section 62, Section 63 or Section 65 has been, is being or is likely to be committed in any place and that a search warrant cannot be obtained without affording the offender an opportunity of escape or of concealing evidence of the offence, he may, at any time, by day or night, enter and search such place: What was contended was that a police officer not below the rank of the officer incharge of a police station cannot enter and search a place for purposes mentioned in Section 53 and Udairaj Singh being only a constable it was not his duty as a public servant to enter any place and search the Applicant and consequently no offence was committed by the Applicant when he assaulted and used criminal force against Udairaj Singh. The expression "place" at the end of Sub-section (1) is, it was contended, to be understood in the sense in which defined in Clause (22) of Section 3 of the Excise Act. The expression "place" at the end of Sub-section (1) is, it was contended, to be understood in the sense in which defined in Clause (22) of Section 3 of the Excise Act. Under this Clause (22) "place" includes a house, building, shop, room, booth, tent and vessel; and it was therefore urged that even the boat in which the Applicant is alleged to have been bringing the liquor could not be entered into by Udairaj Singh and searched. The interpretation clauses u/s 3, however, apply unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context and it appears to me that the word 'place' in Sub-section (22) of Section 3 is not used so as to include even an open vessel such as a boat. Even though a constable may not enter and search a place u/s 53(1), there is another provision in the Act u/s 50 which has given him such power if ht finds that some offence is being committed which is punishable Under Sections 60, 62, 63 and 65. This Section 50 reads: 50. Any officer of the Excise, Police, Salt, Opium or Land Revenue Department, not below such rank and subject to such restrictions as the State Government may prescribe and any other person duly empowered in this behalf, may arrest without warrant, any person, found committing an offence punishable u/s 60, Section 62, Section 63 or Section 65; and may seize and detain any intoxicant or other article which he has reason to believe to be liable to confiscation under this Act or other law for the time being in force relating to excise, revenue; and may detain and search any person upon whom and any vessel, vehicle, animal, package, receptacle or covering in or upon which he may have reasonable cause to suspect any such article to be. 9. It was contended that a constable would not have any power to take a search even under this section as only those officers "not below such rank and subject to such restrictions as the State Government may prescribe", will have such powers, but it was not pointed out by the Learned Counsel for the Applicant that the State Government has prescribed any restrictions as to the rank of a police officer who may act u/s 50. The clause under this Section 50 "not below such rank and subject to such restrictions as the State Government may prescribe" will have effect only when the rank of the person who may act u/s 50 and the restrictions subject to which he may so act have been prescribed by the State Government. If the State Government has not prescribed the minimum rank of the officer who may act u/s 50, this qualifying clause would remain inoperative and any officer of the police would be entitled to exercise jurisdiction under this section. It may be noted that while in the case of exercise of jurisdiction u/s 53 the Legislature itself specifies that the police officer not below the rank of officer incharge of police station shall have certain powers, no such restriction has been placed by the legislature u/s 50. 10. The police officer acting u/s 50 may detain and search any person upon whom and any vessel, vehicle, anima package, receptacle or covering in or upon which he may have reasonable cause to suspect any prohibited article to be. If a particular article is in a vehicle or a vessel the officer acting u/s 50 of the Act will have obviously jurisdiction to enter into that vessel or vehicle and search any person or vessel or vehicle itself for purposes of Section 50. As a police officer even below the rank of an officer incharge of a police station has thus been given power u/s 50 to search a vessel or vehicle, it is reasonable to assume that the word "place" in Sub-section (1) of Section 53 has been used in a little restricted sense so as not to include a vessel or vehicle, otherwise a police officer below the rank of an officer incharge of a police station will be restrained from taking a search in or of a vessel even though Section 50 permits him to do so. What appears to be the intention of the legislature is that the roofed structures which can be locked or closed such as a house, building or a booth or a tent or even a vessel which can be so locked or closed may not be entered into or searched by a police officer below the rank of an officer incharge of a police station. The open vessels and vehicles may be searched and consequently even entered into by a police officer below that rank unless some restriction is placed upon it by the State Government. Constable Udairaj Singh had, therefore, authority u/s 50 aforesaid to detain and search any person upon whom or the vessel in or upon which he may have reasonable cause to suspect any prohibited article and if in the exercise of his powers under this Section 50, he wanted to search the Applicant or the boat in which the illicit liquor was suspected to be brought from the other side of the river, he was acting in the execution of his duty as a public servant and when he was assaulted or criminal force used against him, an offence was committed within the meaning of Section 353 of the IPC. 11. The Applicant's contention before the trial court and the Sessions Judge was that he was falsely implicated in the case as he had earlier sent a complaint against the police officials. I am not, however, satisfied that the Applicant was falsely implicated on any such account. As a matter of fact it appears that a complaint was despatched by the Applicant after the aforesaid incident had taken place so as to make out his defence if he happened to be subsequently prosecuted for the aforesaid incident. The application which was relied upon by the Applicant for that purpose has not been exhibited by the trial court, but it is a typed complaint which bears the date 29-8-1965, at the top and also at the bottom, but there is an endorsement thereon that it is posted on 30-8-1965 under postal certificate and the postal certificate which has been filed by the Applicant also bears the date 30th August. It could not at all be difficult for the Applicant to get this application typed on 30th, make it appear as if it had been typed on 29th and then post it on 30th. The cover in which this letter was received by the police authorities does not appear to have been retained, but normally it could not have been delivered till before the 31st August, or 1st September and the report in respect of this incident (Ex. Ka. 2) cannot possibly be believed to have been made because of this complaint. 12. The cover in which this letter was received by the police authorities does not appear to have been retained, but normally it could not have been delivered till before the 31st August, or 1st September and the report in respect of this incident (Ex. Ka. 2) cannot possibly be believed to have been made because of this complaint. 12. The Applicant has, therefore, been rightly found guilty u/s 353 of the IPC and the sentence of six months' rigorous imprisonment is also by no means excessive. 13. The revision is dismissed. The Applicant is on bail and will surrender to his bail bonds at once failing which necessary steps will be taken for his arrest.