ORDER Gyanendra Kumar, J. - Mr. R.C. Verma, with his usual ability, has raised a point of jurisdiction which was never agitated either before the Magistrate or before the Sessions Judge. However, the point, being one of jurisdiction, can be raised even at the revisional stage in this Court. In the instant case, the Applicants were convicted by Sri Bishal Chand Jain, Special Magistrate I Class, Saharanpur by his judgment and order dated 10-12-1965. The conviction was under two counts. u/s 427 IPC the accused were sentenced to a fine of Rs. 75/- and in default to undergo three months R.I. each, but u/s 352 IPC, they were sentenced to a fine of Rs. 25/- and in default to undergo 20 days R.I. each. Shri Jain had admittedly tried this case summarily. 2. The contention of Mr. R.C. Verma is that summary powers could not have been legally conferred on Shri Jain, inasmuch as he was not a Magistrate of I Class within the meaning of Sub-clause (b) of Section 260(1) Code of Criminal Procedure. The relevant words of the section are: 260. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Code,-- (a)... ... ... ... (b) any Magistrate of the first class specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government, (c)...may if he or they think fit, try in a summary way all or any of the following offences: ... ... ... ... 3. It is not disputed that the offences in question are those which could be tried summarily, if Shri Jain had specially been empowered in that behalf by the State Government in a legal manner. In this connection, Mr. Verma has invited my attention to the provisions of Sections 12 and 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. u/s 12 it has been provided that the State Government may appoint as many persons as it thinks fit, besides the District Magistrate, to be Magistrates of the first, second or third class in any district outside the presidency towns. The State Government may further, from time to time, define local areas within which such persons may exercise all or any of the powers with which they may respectively be invested. 4. On the other hand Section 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure speaks of conferment of powers of a Magistrate of the first, second or third class on any particular person or persons, possessing requisite qualifications. 4. On the other hand Section 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure speaks of conferment of powers of a Magistrate of the first, second or third class on any particular person or persons, possessing requisite qualifications. Such Magistrates are called 'Special Magistrates'. The argument is that u/s 12, a particular number of persons are appointed as Magistrates of the first, second or third class in a particular district, while u/s 14 only the powers of the first, second or third class Magistrates are conferred upon some specified persons, who are called Special Magistrates, but they are not appointed as Magistrates within the meaning of Section 12. Mr. Verma contends that unless and until a person is appointed as a Magistrate, he cannot enjoy summary powers u/s 260 Code of Criminal Procedure. The argument, though plausible, is without substance, for Clause (2) of Section 14 itself provides that Special Magistrates "shall be appointed for such term as the State Government may by general or special order direct". Thus it is abundantly clear that the Special Magistrates are also appointed by the State Government for a specified term and they are as good Magistrates as anybody else, enjoying the first, second or third clasp powers as the case may be. 5. Section 260 Code of Criminal Procedure relates to summary trials. It is noteworthy that Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 260 says that "any Magistrate of the first class specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government" may try in a summary way all or any of the specified offences. The term "any Magistrate" is very wide and obviously includes a Special Magistrate, a Judicial Magistrate, a Railway Magistrate, a Sub-Divisional Magistrate, etc. It cannot be argued, therefore, that a Special Magistrate, enjoying first class powers, is excluded from the ambit of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 260 Code of Criminal Procedure. In this connection Mr. Varma has invited my attention to two cases, viz. Paras Nath Singh v. State of UP and Ors. 1960 AWR 327 and Ajaib Singh v. Gurbachan Singh and Ors. AIR 1965 SC 1619 . In Paras Nath Singh's (supra) case the Petitioner was ordered by the Tehsildar to be ejected from a certain land on the ground that it had vested in the Gram Samaj, so that he was only a trespasser thereon. 1960 AWR 327 and Ajaib Singh v. Gurbachan Singh and Ors. AIR 1965 SC 1619 . In Paras Nath Singh's (supra) case the Petitioner was ordered by the Tehsildar to be ejected from a certain land on the ground that it had vested in the Gram Samaj, so that he was only a trespasser thereon. The Petitioner, Paras Nath Singh, approached the High Court for a writ of certiorari, quashing the order of the Tehsildar, who had directed the Petitioner to be ejected from the land. The Tehsildar purported to have passed the order of ejectment in exercise of the powers conferred on him by Rule 115-F of the UP ZA and LR Rules. Under the said rule the order for ejectment of a trespasser is required to be passed by the Collector, which is to be executed by the Tehsildar. What had happened in that case was that the final order of ejectment itself had been passed by the Tehsildar and the Collector had never dealt with the matter at any stage, while in fact and law the jurisdiction of the Tehsildar was simply to execute the order of ejectment, when passed by the Collector. 6. It was pointed out that the Tehsildar was a Revenue Officer appointed u/s 17 of the Land Revenue Act. However, u/s 224 of the Act the State Government could confer upon any Tehsildar all or any of the powers of the Assistant Collector of the 2nd class; so a Tahsildar could be invested with the powers of an Assistant Collector 2nd Class but not with those of an Assistant Collector 1st Class. Nevertheless, the State Government had, somehow, issued a notification conferring upon all Tehsildars, the powers of an Assistant Collector 1st Class, Likewise, u/s 223 of the Land Revenue Act, the State Government had power to confer upon any Assistant Collector of the 1st Class, all or any of the powers of the Collector. Under these circumstances, Desai, J. observed: "If by virtue of these conferments of power, the Tehsildar claimed the powers of a Collector, he was entirely in the wrong. In the first place he could not be invested with the powers of an Assistant Collector of 1st Class at all as already explained. Secondly even if he could be invested, he could not thereby become an Assistant Collector of the 1st Class and could not become the Collector. In the first place he could not be invested with the powers of an Assistant Collector of 1st Class at all as already explained. Secondly even if he could be invested, he could not thereby become an Assistant Collector of the 1st Class and could not become the Collector. u/s 223 the powers of a Collector can be conferred upon an Assistant Collector of the 1st Class and not upon any other officer; even though he might have been invested with the powers of an Assistant Collector of the 1st Class. Even when Tehsildar is invested with the powers of an Assistant Collector 1st Class he remains a Tehsildar and does not become an Assistant Collector of the 1st Class; if he does not become an Assistant Collector of the 1st Class, he cannot become Collector.... There is a distinction between an Assistant Collector of the 1st Class and an officer exercising his powers. The order passed by the Tehsildar is, therefore, without jurisdiction and must be quashed. 7. From the above quotation it is abundantly clear that there could be no double conferment of powers on one and the same officer so as to pile up one fiction of law over another viz., by the first conferment of powers a Tehsildar would be deemed to be an Assistant Collector of the first class and then by the second conferment, he should be deemed to be the Collector. In fact it was specifically held by Desai, J. that a Tehsildar, who is an Assistant Collector of the 2nd Class, could not have been conferred upon even the powers of an Assistant Collector of the 1st Class. However, an Assistant Collector of the 1st Class can be conferred with the powers of the Collector. But a Tehsildar cannot first be conferred with the powers of an Assistant Collector 1st Class and then with the powers of the Collector. 8. The facts of the present case are entirely different. Here Shri Jain was first appointed as Special Magistrate of the 1st Class and later on summary powers were conferred on him u/s 260 Code of Criminal Procedure, which was quite valid, inasmuch as there was no double conferment of powers one after the other. 9. 8. The facts of the present case are entirely different. Here Shri Jain was first appointed as Special Magistrate of the 1st Class and later on summary powers were conferred on him u/s 260 Code of Criminal Procedure, which was quite valid, inasmuch as there was no double conferment of powers one after the other. 9. The Supreme Court case of Ajaib Singh (supra) has also no bearing on the instant matter, inasmuch as it was held by the Supreme Court that no officer below the rank of a District Magistrate could exercise powers of detention u/s 3(2), Clause 15(i) and Section 40(2) of the Defence of India Act, 1962. It was held that the Additional District Magistrate, invested with all the powers of a District Magistrate, by virtue of Section 10(2) Code of Criminal Procedure was still not the District Magistrate in the eye of law. It was pointed out that an ADM so invested with the powers of a DM may be of the latter's rank but was still below the District Magistrate, unless he was appointed as such u/s 10(1) of the Code. I, therefore, find that the first objection of Mr. Verma is without any substance. 10. The next contention raised by Mr. Verma is that, in any case, Shri Jain, while exercising summary powers of a Magistrate of the 1st Class should have preserved his notes incorporating the substance of the evidence of the witnesses produced before him, inasmuch as an appeal under both the Sections 352 and 427 IPC could lie. In the last sentence of his judgment the Magistrate has said that the rough notes of the evidence were not being retained on the file in view of Section 263 Code of Criminal Procedure. Mr. Verma argues that inasmuch as an appeal could lie in the instant case as well, if the Magistrate had chosen to inflict a fine of over Rs. 200/- , which sentence was not excluded under the sections in question, he was bound to preserve the substance of the evidence on the record, for the benefit of the appellate court. In support of his contention Mr. Verma has relied upon State Vs. C.K. Joseph, AIR 1959 Ker 10 . 11. 200/- , which sentence was not excluded under the sections in question, he was bound to preserve the substance of the evidence on the record, for the benefit of the appellate court. In support of his contention Mr. Verma has relied upon State Vs. C.K. Joseph, AIR 1959 Ker 10 . 11. It is true that in every case it is rot possible for the Magistrate to prejudge the issue even to this limited extent whether he would ultimately inflict a sentence against which an appeal might be filed or a nonappealable sentence of fine of Rs. 200/- or below. In order to appreciate the correct position, reference may be made to the provisions of Sections 263 and 264 of the Code. Section 263 Code of Criminal Procedure lays down that in cases where no appeal lies, the Magistrate need not record the evidence of the witnesses or frame a formal charge; but he shall enter in such form as the State Government may direct, the particulars mentioned in that section. Thus Section 263 governs those cases in which an appeal would not lie at all, that is, in which the maximum fine imposable is below Rs. 200/- . On the other hand, Section 264 Code of Criminal Procedure refers to those cases which are triable summarily by a Magistrate but in which an appeal could lie, in view of the maximum sentence awardable thereunder; that is, where a fine of more than Rs. 200/- could be imposed. In such a case the Magistrate is bound to record the substance of the evidence and also note down the particulars mentioned in Section 263 Code of Criminal Procedure. However, if at the end of the trial, the Magistrate awards a nonappealable sentence of a fine below Rs. 200/- he need not retain on the file the substance of the evidence so recorded because eventually the decision becomes one where no appeal would he within the meaning of Sec 263 Code of Criminal Procedure. Thus the two Sections 263 and 264 Code of Criminal Procedure have to be read together, in harmony with each other. 12. In the instant case an appeal could lie under both the sections, if the Magistrate had chosen to inflict sentences of fine above Rs. 200/- . Thus the two Sections 263 and 264 Code of Criminal Procedure have to be read together, in harmony with each other. 12. In the instant case an appeal could lie under both the sections, if the Magistrate had chosen to inflict sentences of fine above Rs. 200/- . The judgment of the trial court shows, and it is not disputed by the Learned Counsel for the Applicants, that the Magistrate had initially recorded the substance of the evidence of various witnesses, as required by Section 264, but had not retained the same on the record when he finally inflicted sentences of fine, amounting to Rs. 75/- and Rs. 25/- only under the two counts. Thus in this I particular case, an appeal could not lie in so far as the fines inflicted were well below Rs. 200/- . In such a case it was not necessary to preserve the memorandum of evidence on the record. Moreover a perusal of the judgment of the Magistrate shows that it contains full substance of the evidence which had been recorded by him, and as such the revisional Court could consider the same to find out whether his judgment was proper. 13. The revision has no force and is accordingly dismissed. The stay order dated 18-7-1966 stands vacated.