JUDGMENT ABHYANKAR J.-This is a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution by which the petitioner challenges an order of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal holding that the opponent No.4 Shanti, widow of Gangaram, was a tenant of field survey No. 31, 33 acres and 15 gunthas, revenue Rs 21 situate at mouza Kelzara in Kelapur taluq of Yeotmal district. The Tribunal has confirmed order of the Sub-Divisional Officer who had reversed the order of the Naib-Tahsildar in favour of the petitioner. The question arose for decision as a result of the reference made by the civil Court to the Tenancy Naib-Tahsildar under section 125 of the New Tenancy Act. The petitioner has filed a suit in the civil Court claiming possession of this field and the suit is registered as Civil Suit No. 23 of 1959 in the Court of the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Kelapur. The petitioners case in the snit appears to be that the field was taken on lease by one Gangaram, the husband of respondent No.4 Shanti, on foot of a kabuliyat, dated 23-4-1951. Gangaram claimed to be a protected lessee. The petitioner served a notice under section 9 (1) of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act (hereafter referred to as the Leases Act) on 29-11-1954 on Gangaram intimating to him that his rights as a protected lessee were terminated with effect from the commencement of the next agricultural year, i.e. from 1-4-1955. The notice was received by Gangaram on 4-12-1954 but he did not take any steps contesting the notice on any ground as provided in sub-sections (3), (4) and (5) of section 9 of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act. According to the petitioner, therefore, Gangaram ceased to be a tenant of the field on and after 1st of April 1955. The petitioner issued another notice to Gangaram on 7-4-1956 informing him that he was a trespasser and that he would be sued in ejectment if he failed to deliver possession within eight days of the receipt of this notice. Gangaram did not deliver possession and the petitioner issued another notice by way of abundant caution. He issued a third notice on 15-12-1956 against the said Gangaram. This notice was refused by Gangaram but Gangaram did not take any other proceedings even after this. Thereafter the petitioner filed a suit claiming possession. Gangaram did not deliver possession and the petitioner issued another notice by way of abundant caution. He issued a third notice on 15-12-1956 against the said Gangaram. This notice was refused by Gangaram but Gangaram did not take any other proceedings even after this. Thereafter the petitioner filed a suit claiming possession. In the meanwhile Gangaram died sometime in September 1957 and the suit had been filed against his two widows, his two sons Pralhad and Maruti and one Ramaji son of Fakira. 2. The contesting defendants have raised a contention before the civil Court that Gangaram was a tenant and a protected lessee of the land and after the death of Gangaram they have continued in possession and acquired the status of protected lessees in respect of this land. As a contest regarding the status of the defendants was raised, the civil Court referred two questions under section 125 of the new Tenancy Act to the Tahsildar, Kelapur. These questions were as follows: (1) Was the field in suit leased by Narayan Nagorao to one Gangaram on behalf of and as agent of the plaintiff in the year 1951-521? (2) Are the defendants Nos. 1 to 4 tenants of the plaintiff in respect of survey No. 31 in suit under the provision of Bombay Tenancy Act 99 of 19581? 3. It may be mentioned that the defendants claimed to be tenants under the provisions of the new Tenancy Act, i.e. Bombay Act No. 99 of 1958. 4. The Tahsildar, who held an enquiry into the matter, came to the conclusion that the defendants were not the tenants within the meaning of section 6 (1) of the New Tenancy Act and, therefore, answered issue No.2 accordingly. Be, however, held that the lease was given to Gangaram in 1951-52 on behalf of the petitioners predecessor-in-title. Along with this reference the petitioner had started another proceeding for deleting the name of Shanti, i.e. one of the widows of Gangaram from the list of tenants prepared under section 8 (1) of the new Tenancy Act. Under section 8 (3) of the new Tenancy Act, both these enquiries were held simultaneously and were disposed of by common order by the Tahsildar. In view of his decision that the defendants were not tenants, the Tahsildar held that none of them was entitled to be shown as tenant in the list. 5. Under section 8 (3) of the new Tenancy Act, both these enquiries were held simultaneously and were disposed of by common order by the Tahsildar. In view of his decision that the defendants were not tenants, the Tahsildar held that none of them was entitled to be shown as tenant in the list. 5. Against this order, Shanti, one of the widows of Gangaram, and one of his sons, by name, Maruti preferred an appeal before the Sub-Divisional Officer. Before that authority, several questions were raised on either side but the, Sub-Divisional Officer preferred to rest his conclusions only on the questions whether the defendants could be said to be tenants and what was the effect of notice under section 9(1) of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, 1951, issued by the petitioner against Gangaram. The Sub-Divisional Officer seems to have taken the view that in spite of service of notice under section 9 (1) of the Leases Act which purported to determine the protected status of Gangaram, the petitioner not having taken any action under section 19 of that Act for ejectment of Gangaram from the field, Gangaram continued to be tenant especially in view of the coming into force of Ordinance No. IV of 1957 which was followed by an Act. The Sub-Divisional Officer has also referred to section 164 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenne Code and his observations in paragraph 8 of the order seek to suggest that he treated Gangaram or his successors in title, i.e. the defendants to be ordinary tenants under section 167 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code on the date the Ordinance came into force. On this view of the matter, the Sub-Divisional Officer held that as ordinary tenants their tenure extended till the end of the agricultural year 1958-59 and, therefore, they were the tenants on the land on 30-12-1958. He has, therefore, held that the defendants must be deemed to be tenants under section 6 of the new Tenancy Act. It may be mentioned that it does not appear to be the case of any of the tenants before the Tahsildar that they claimed the status of a protected lessee because of the provisions of section 167 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code. The petitioner thereafter challenged the reversing order of the Sub-Divisional Officer in a revision petition before the Tribunal. The petitioner thereafter challenged the reversing order of the Sub-Divisional Officer in a revision petition before the Tribunal. The Tribunal has confirmed the decision of the lower authorities that Gangaram was a protected lessee from the petitioners predecessor-in-title and had acquired the status of a protected lessee by reason of his cultivation as a tenant under the kabuliyat in the year 1951-52. Dealing with the question whether the tenancy was terminated by notice under section 9 (1) given on 29th November 1954 and the two subsequent notices, dated 7-4-1956 and 15-12.1956, the Tribunal has observed in paragraph 3 as follows:- "These two notices may be ignored 8S it cannot be seriously argued that they resulted in the termination of the lease." In this sentence, reference is to the notices, dated 29-11-1954 and 7.4.1956. As regards the notice, dated 15-12-1956, the Tribunal took the view that it was impossible to hold that this notice could have been served on Gangaram inasmuch as the endorsement of refusal of the notice apparently showed that the notice was received back on the same day on which it was despatched though the addressee was staying at a place 37 miles from Yeotmal at a village called Sawali. The Tribunal held that in view of denial of service by the opponents, it was necessary for the petitioner to examine the postman to establish that a. notice was in fact refused by the addressee. As there was no such evidence the tribunal held that there was not enough proof of service of notice, dated 15-12-1956. Thus, on the question whether an effective notice was given and served on Gangararn, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the termination of tenancy by notice was not established by the petitioner. 6. The Tribunal has also taken the view that the status of a protected lessee under the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, 1951, could not be determined merely by a notice under section 9 (l) of the Leases Act. In support of the contention of the petitioner that a valid notice duly served according to section 9 (1) of the Leases Act effectively terminated the lease of a protected lessee the petitioner relied upon two Division Bench decisions of this Court in Tarabai v. Bombay Revenue Tribunal, Nagpur (1) and Ramchandra v. Manabai (2). In support of the contention of the petitioner that a valid notice duly served according to section 9 (1) of the Leases Act effectively terminated the lease of a protected lessee the petitioner relied upon two Division Bench decisions of this Court in Tarabai v. Bombay Revenue Tribunal, Nagpur (1) and Ramchandra v. Manabai (2). But the Tribunal has preferred to take the contrary view on its interpretation of the observations of the Full Bench decision reported in Jayantraj Kanakmal v. Hari Dagdu (1). After quoting a passage from paragraph 8 of the decision the Tribunal observed as follows:- "We, therefore, think that the matter is now placed beyond the pale of controversy and it cannot be said that the notice under section 9 (1) of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act results in automatic termination of the tenancy." 7. In view of these findings, the Tribunal confirmed the, decision of the Sub-Divisional Officer though on entirely different grounds but modified the order regarding correction of the entry in the list under section 8 (1) by directing that only the name of one of the widows of Gangaram, namely, Shanti, should be included in the list of tenants under section 8 (1) of the new Tenancy Act. 8. This petition came up for hearing before another Bench consisting of Honble the Chief Justice and one of us (Abhyankar J.) in the last week. It was found that no appearance was entered on behalf of the opponents and some of the questions, which were raised, were important enough. It was, therefore, requested that somebody should appear amicus curiae and Mr. S. V. Natu, Advocate of this Court, agreed to appear for the respondents. Accordingly, the hearing was adjourned and we have heard today counsel on both sides on the questions which have been raised for decision in this case. 9. In our opinion, only two questions arise for decision in this case:- (a) Whether a valid notice terminating the tenancy of Gangaram is proved to have been given under section 9 (1) of the Act? (b) If such a notice is shown to have been given during the life-time of Gangaram, what is the effect of such a notice on the right of Gangaram or his successors in claiming the status of a tenant or a protected lessee? 10. (b) If such a notice is shown to have been given during the life-time of Gangaram, what is the effect of such a notice on the right of Gangaram or his successors in claiming the status of a tenant or a protected lessee? 10. The notice given by the petitioner on 29-11-1954 is reproduced in the paper book and is to be found at page 39. It does not appear to have been denied that this notice was duly served on Gangaram. That notice specifically states that the petitioner has decided to cultivate the field personally after the end of the agricultural year 1954-55 on 31-3-1956, and it further says that, therefore, the petitioner is giving him this notice under section 9 (1) so that Gangarams rights as a protected lessee in the field, if any, are terminated by the commencement of the next agricultural year. In face of this statement in the notice, we fail to see how the Tribunal could have taken the view that the notice, dated 29-11-1954, may be ignored as it cannot be seriously argued that it resulted in the termination of the lease. Nothing has been shown to us to justify such a conclusion. The notice, in terms, says that the protected status is terminated with effect from the beginning of the agricultural year following, i.e. from 1-4-1954 and, in our opinion, all the requirements of a valid notice under section 9 (1) are satisfied by this notice. The notice is proved to have been delivered on 4-12-1954, i.e. not less than three months before the commencement of the next agricultural year. The reasons for termination are given and there is an adequate description of the area in respect of which it is proposed to terminate the lease. The notice also states that the landholder requires the land for cultivating it personally. In view of these necessary averments in the notice it could not have been held that the notice was not a valid notice under section 9 (1) of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act. 11. The subsequent notices, which have been placed on record, cannot possibly be construed as a waiver of the previous notice. In the notice, dated 7.4-1956, the petitioner has clearly averred that possession of Gangaram is without any right, and in this notice there is a demand for restoration of possession to the petitioner. 11. The subsequent notices, which have been placed on record, cannot possibly be construed as a waiver of the previous notice. In the notice, dated 7.4-1956, the petitioner has clearly averred that possession of Gangaram is without any right, and in this notice there is a demand for restoration of possession to the petitioner. In the third notice, dated 15-12-1956 also, there is a clear averment that, though in the mutation proceedings, Gangaram was shown as a protected lessee, the petitioner had taken steps for setting aside the said mutation without prejudice to the rights of the petitioner to deny that he was not a tenant or a protected lessee in this or any other proceedings. By way of abundant caution this notice has been given and the notice requires Gangaram to hand over possession at the end of the agricultural year 1956-57. 12. The Tribunal has held that the last notice could not have been served on the addressee Gangaram because there was an endorsement of refusal of the same date on which the notice is alleged to have been issued. It was stated by the learned counsel, who appeared for the petitioner before the Tribunal that no such question was argued as there was no appearance on behalf of the opponents even before the Tribunal and he had no opportunity to show that the conclusion of the Tribunal was erroneous. The Sub-Divisional Officer has noticed a similar argument urged before him in paragraph 4, of this order. The argument before the Sub-Divisional Officer was that the certified copy of notice (meaning the notice dated 15-12-1956) shows that the notice, dated 15-12-1956, was served on the same day by refusal which is an impossibility. In paragraph 5 of the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer, the argument of the petitioner on this point is also noticed and the reply was that the date of refusal of the notice, namely, 15-12-1956, was a clerical error and nothing adverse could be inferred from it as in other certified copy there was nothing suspicious. It is not clear from the material that is placed before us whether the original acknowledgment, which bore an endorsement of refusal, was produced before the Revenue Court. It is not clear from the material that is placed before us whether the original acknowledgment, which bore an endorsement of refusal, was produced before the Revenue Court. What appears to have been shown are the certified copies of these acknowledgments, and probably there were two such certified copies, one giving a date of refusal as 15-12-1956 and another not indicating the date of refusal at all. If any adverse inference is to be drawn as to the valid service of notice or refusal, the proper course would have been to send for the originals of these documents. It does not appear that any such attempt was made. We are not, therefore, in a position to find that the finding of the Tribunal merely based on the endorsement of one copy that the notice could not have been sent on a day and refused on the same day, be upheld in view of the extreme paucity of material on this aspect of the matter. Moreover, it is clear that the notice, dated 15-12-1956, was not a notice really terminating the protected lease. That notice was given long back on 29-11-1954 and if that notice validly terminated the tenancy, it is not clear as to how Gangaram could continue to claim the status as a tenant merely because he continued in possession. There is no overt act established on the part of the petitioner which recognised Gangaram as a tenant. In fact, the subsequent notice clearly showed that Gangaram was all along treated as a trespasser. We, therefore, hold that the petitioner has proved that a valid notice was sent to Gangaram and received by him as provided by section 9 (1) of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act. That notice is the notice dated 29-11-1954, as well as the notice dated 15-12-1956, though the second notice was unnecessary. 13. The next question that arises for consideration is whether on receipt of a notice under section 9 (I) of the Leases Act, Gangaram lost his status as a protected lessee. The notice was served in 1954 and again in 1956. At that time, the new Tenancy Act was not on the Statute Book. 13. The next question that arises for consideration is whether on receipt of a notice under section 9 (I) of the Leases Act, Gangaram lost his status as a protected lessee. The notice was served in 1954 and again in 1956. At that time, the new Tenancy Act was not on the Statute Book. The argument that a tenant to whom notice was given under section 9 (I) of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, continues to be a tenant, is principally founded on the provisions of the new Tenancy Act which came into force in this region on 30-12-1958. If such Act was not in force, we find it difficult to hold that it could be seriously contended that in spite of the service of a valid notice under section 9 (I) of the Act, a tenant who received such a notice could still claim to continue to enjoy the status of a protected lessee in spite of the service of a valid notice. Unless, therefore, something is found in the provisions of the new Act which, either by fiction or by positive provisions, revive the position of such a tenant it must be held that the tenancy, once terminated, deprives the ex. tenant of all his rights under the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act. 14. The learned counsel, who was invited to appear on behalf of the respondents to assist this Court, has relied upon certain observations of the Full Bench decision in Jayantraj Kanakmal v. Hari Dagdu (1) in support of the pro. position that a proceeding commenced by a notice under section 9 (1) of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act does not come to an end until there is an order for possession under section 19 of that Act or under the corresponding provisions of the new Tenancy Act by virtue of section 132 (3) (a) of the new Tenancy Act. In Jayantrajs case (I), the following observations are to be found in paragraph 10 at pages 640 and 641 where the scheme of section 9 of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act is examined; "This section did not contemplate any application being made by the landholder to tile Revenue Officer. The only application to the Revenue Officer provided for by this section was an application by lessee under sub-section (3). The only application to the Revenue Officer provided for by this section was an application by lessee under sub-section (3). On such an application, the Revenue Officer had to hold an inquiry and thereafter decide the application. The opening words. If under sub-section (4) the lease of a protected lessee is terminated in sub-section (5), indicate that the order which the Revenue Officer had to make in case be held that the notice under sub-section (I) of section 9 was bona fide, was an order terminating the lease of the protected lessee. The only order which the Revenue Officer could make under section 9 is an order on the application made by the lessee under sub- section (3). It is, therefore, clear that if the Revenue Officer, after holding the inquiry contemplated under sub-section (4), came to the conclusion that the notice was valid, he had to make an order for the termination of the lease." Further at pages 641 and 642, in paragraph 13 after referring to sections 8, 9, 9-A and 19, the Full Bench has observed as follows: "Various provisions of the Act, to which I have referred, sections R, 9, 9-A and 19, clearly show that an application under section 19 did not start a separate proceeding, but that it was an application made in a proceeding initiated under section 8 or section 9." 15. Our attention is also invited to the observations at page 643, in paragraph 15, to the following effect: "Similarly, it has been contended that this expression would not include applications under sub-section (I) of section 19, which were only for ejectment of a tenant. For the reasons, which I have already given, the proceedings under section 8 or 9 and section 19 were all parts of the same proceeding for the termination of a lease and ejectment of a tenant. For the reasons, which I have already given, the proceedings under section 8 or 9 and section 19 were all parts of the same proceeding for the termination of a lease and ejectment of a tenant. All these proceedings will, therefore, fall within the ambit of the expression for the termination of the tenancy and ejectment of a tenant in clause (a) of sub-section (3) of section 132." The learned counsel has also relied upon the provisions of section 16-B of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, 1951, in support of his argument that the only forum in which the landholder, who has issued a notice under section 9 (I), can work out his rights flowing from termination of tenancy as a result of such notice, are proceedings under section 19, before a Revenue Officer and not in a civil Court. Section 16-B is as follows: "Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no civil Court shall entertain any suit instituted, or application made, to obtain a decision or order on any matter which a Revenue Officer is by or under this Act, empowered to determine, decide or dispose of." Section 19 has the following provisions: "19 (1) A landholder may apply to the Revenue Officer to eject a protected lessee against whom an order for the termination of the lease has been passed under section 8 or 9. (2) Any protected lessee who has been dispossessed by the landholder of his land except in accordance with the provisions of this Act may, within one year from the date of such dispossession, apply to a Revenue Officer for reinstatement of possession, (31 On receipt of an application under sub-section (1) or (2), the Revenue Officer may, after making such summary enquiry as he deems fit, pass an order for restoring possession of the land to the landholder or the protected lessee as the case may be and may take such steps as may be necessary to give effect to his order." The argument is that any protected lessee, who has been dispossessed by the landholder of his land except in accordance with the provisions of this Act, has been given a right to be reinstated in possession if he makes an application within one year from the date of dispossession to a Revenue Officer. This is provided in sub-section (2) of section 19 of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, 1951. Under section 16-B, no civil Court shall entertain any suit or an application to obtain a decision or order on any matter which a Revenue Officer is empowered to determine, decide or dispose of. According to the respondents contention therefore, so long as the landholder, who has terminated the lease of a protected lessee by giving a notice under section 9 (1), can go to the Revenue Officer to claim possession from such a protected lessee or ex-lessee, the jurisdiction of the civil Court is barred. The only forum, therefore, where the lelief of possession can be claimed is a Revenue Officer under section 19 of the Act and so long as such a proceeding is not taken, relying on the observations of the Full Bench decision the learned counsel contended that the protected status or the status as a tenant is not effectively terminated by the notice under the provisions of section 9 (1) of the Act. 16. We have found it difficult to accept these contentions urged on behalf of the opponents. A perusal of section 9 of the Leases Act will show, and this position has been emphasized in the observations in the Full Bench decisions which we have quoted above, that that section i.e. section 9 does not contemplate any application by a landholder. A landholder, who gives a notice under section 9 (1) terminating the lease of a protected lessee on the ground that he needs the land for his personal cultivation, is merely required to give a notice in conformity with the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 9. After such a notice is given, no action is required to be taken by the landholder under section 9. It is the protected lessee who has been given a right to move a Revenue Officer within a month of the receipt of the notice under sub-section (1) of section 9. He can challenge the bona fide of the notice or he can urge that he should be permitted to give up some other land of the same landholder in lieu of the land mentioned in the notice and then an enquiry has to be made by the Revenue Officer in these matters. He can challenge the bona fide of the notice or he can urge that he should be permitted to give up some other land of the same landholder in lieu of the land mentioned in the notice and then an enquiry has to be made by the Revenue Officer in these matters. Under sub-section (5) of section 9, powers seem to have been given to the Revenue Officer to terminate the lease of a protected lessee in respect of a part of a land leased to him. It would also appear that if the tenants request for giving up some land other than the land in respect of which a notice is given by the landholder is accepted, then the Revenue Officer can terminate the lease in respect of that part of the land of the tenant which the tenant is prepared to give up. Thus, in an enquiry under sub-section (4) or sub-section (5) of section 9 in a given case, the Revenue Officer is empowered to pass an order terminating the lease in respect of a portion of the land, but all such orders can be passed only if a protected lessee moves a Revenue Officer. If the protected lessee does not move the Revenue Officer, then it does not appear that any other proceedings are contemplated under the scheme of the Act in which an occasion could possibly arise for passing an order of termination of the lease in respect of any area on the ground that a notice of terminating the lease had been given under section 9 (1) of the Act. 17. Looking to the provisions of section 19 also it would appear that a right has been given to a landholder to apply to the Revenue Officer to eject a protected lessee. The right that is given to eject a protected lessee is a conditional right. The condition is that there is an order for termination of the lease passed against such a lessee either under section 8 or section 9. A perusal of the provisions of section 8 of the Leases Act shows the several circumstances on proof of any of which, either singly or cumulatively, a Revenue Officer is entitled to pass an order terminating the lease. A perusal of the provisions of section 8 of the Leases Act shows the several circumstances on proof of any of which, either singly or cumulatively, a Revenue Officer is entitled to pass an order terminating the lease. We have also indicated above the contingencies in which an order terminating the lease may be passed even under section 9 in case the protected lessee moves the Revenue Officer after receipt of notice under sub-section (1) of section 9. Barring such cases, it does not appear that the law contemplated any other circumstances in which an order of termination of the lease can be passed by a Revenue Officer. The argument of the learned counsel for the opponents, however, is that a notice terminating the lease may have to be equated to an implied order terminating the lease where the lessee does not approach a Revenue Officer to challenge the notice or some other relief permissible under sub-section (4) or sub-section (5) of section 9 of the Leases Act. In our opinion it is not possible to accept this construction of the provisions of section 19 without considerably straining the language and doing violence to it. Sub-section (1) of section 19 expressly limits the power of a Revenue Officer to eject a protected lessee at the instance of a landholder only in those cases where there is an order for terminating a lease under section 8 or 9. If there is no such order, we find it difficult to see how the landholder in the absence of such an order of termination by the Revenue Officer is still entitled to approach him for assistance in ejecting the protected lessee merely because he has given the notice under section 9 (1) of the Leases Act terminating the lease. In fact, the termination of the relationship between the landlord and tenant is brought about not by an order of a Revenue Officer but by issue and service of a valid notice under section 9 (1) of the Act. We are reinforced in this view because of the opening words of sub-section (1) of section 9 which are in the nature of a non obstante clause: "Notwithstanding anything contained in section 8 the landholder may terminate the lease of a protected lessee”. This view has also been taken in two Division Bench decisions of this Court. We are reinforced in this view because of the opening words of sub-section (1) of section 9 which are in the nature of a non obstante clause: "Notwithstanding anything contained in section 8 the landholder may terminate the lease of a protected lessee”. This view has also been taken in two Division Bench decisions of this Court. In Tarabai v. Bombay Revenue Tribunal, Nagpur (1), the landholder had given a notice under section 9 (1) and the lessee delivered possession to him by consent. But the landholder did not cultivate the land for two consecutive years after he obtained possession and the lessee then applied under sub-section (6) of section 9 for restoration of possession. The landholder resisted this application on the ground that there was no effective termination of the lease under-section 8 (1) (g) of the Act and, therefore, the lessee had no right to restoration of possession. The Division Bench rejected this contention holding that no order of termination under section 8 (1) (g) is necessary when termination of lease is effected by notice under section 9 (1) of the Act for personal cultivation. Similar view was taken by another Division Bench in Ramchandra v. Manabai (2). In that case, the Division Bench has observed that "an application under section 9 (3) of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act is not a proceeding for termination of the lease. On the expiry of the period of notice under section 9(1) the lease stands terminated and the landholder is not required to obtain any order from the Revenue Officer. Determination of the lease by such a notice can be said to be only defeasible by a successful application under section 9 (3)." It has been further observed that "the provisions of clause (a) of sub- section (3) of section 132 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 99 of 1958, are not attracted in such a case." 18. Having carefully read the passage on which the learned counsel for the opponents has relied from the decision of the Full Bench, we do not think that they are capable of the interpretation sought to be put by the learned counsel and the inference he wants to draw about the right of a landholder who has issued a notice under section 9 (1) of the Leases Act. It is clearly pointed out that the section does not contemplate an application being made by a landholder. What has been observed by the Full Bench in Jayantraj Kanakmal v. Hari Dagdu (3) in paragraph 10 is with reference to those circumstances in which an application has been made by a protected lessee under sub-section (3) of section 9 and the proceedings are initiated before a Revenue Officer. The Full Bench has observed that the only order which the Revenue Officer could make under section 9 is an order on the application made by the lessee under sub-section (3). It must, therefore, follow that if there is no application by a protected lessee under sub-section (3) of section 9 there is no occasion for passing an order under section 9. If there is no order under section 9, which cannot possibly be passed because there is no application under sub-section (3) of section 9, we fail to see how the effect of a valid notice under section 9 (1), which terminates the lease from the following agricultural year, can be ignored. We have, therefore, come to the conclusion that in these oases where a landholder has given a valid notice under section 9 (1) of the Leases Act and no steps have been taken by a protection lessee in challenging that notice or asking any other relief under the provisions of sub-sections (3), (4) and (5) of section 9 of the Act, a valid notice effectively terminates the tenancy of the protected lessee. 19. As to the ambit of section 19 also, we are clear that a landholder, who has issued a valid notice terminating the lease of a protected lessee under section 9 (1) of the Leases Act is neither required nor entitled to make an application for ejectment of a protected lessee under sub-section (1) of section 19 of that Act. The language of sub-section (1) of section 19 clearly shows that an application at the instance of a landholder to eject a protected lessee would lie only against those protected lessees whose leases are terminated by an order of a Revenue Officer either under section 8 or section 9. The language of sub-section (1) of section 19 clearly shows that an application at the instance of a landholder to eject a protected lessee would lie only against those protected lessees whose leases are terminated by an order of a Revenue Officer either under section 8 or section 9. But the Leases Act does not make a provision for making an application to a Revenue Officer for obtaining possession or ejectment of a protected lessee whose lease is terminated merely by a notice under section 9 (1) of the Leases Act in which case the lessee has not taken any steps under the provisions of sub-sections (3), (4) and (5) of section 9 of that Act. It cannot, therefore, be said that a suit filed for ejectment of such a lessee will not lie because there is a provision in the Leases Act in accordance with which the protected lessee can be ejected by recourse to such provision. As far as we can see there is no such provision in the Leases Act and, therefore, it could not be said that a protected lessee was being dispossessed by the landholder having recourse to the civil Court except in accordance with the provisions of this Act. Thus, the bar created under section 16.B of the Leases Act would not apply in the case of a landholder who has issued a valid notice under section 9 (1) of the Leases Act terminating the lease of a protected lessee and in which case the protected lessee has taken no steps under other provisions of section 9 of the Act. 20. We are fortified in the view we are taking that the landholder, who has issued notice terminating the lease of a protected lessee under section 9 (1), is entitled to file a suit for possession in view of the express provision made in section 132 (2) of the new Tenancy Act. Under sub-section (2) of section 132, any right or title or obligation already acquired, accrued and incurred before the commencement of this Act is saved in favour of such a person. Under sub-section (2) of section 132, any right or title or obligation already acquired, accrued and incurred before the commencement of this Act is saved in favour of such a person. It is not only the right that is saved but also the remedy in respect of enforcement of such a right, title and interest which is also saved and the sub-section further says that any such proceedings shall be instituted, continued and disposed of, as if this Act had not been passed. If the petitioner had acquired a right to claim possession of the field after a valid termination of the lease, it follows that the petitioner had also a right to approach the civil Court for possession of the property. That right is being enforced and is expressly saved by sub-section (2) of section 132 of the new Tenancy Act. 21. We must, therefore, hold, disagreeing with the view taken by the Tribunal, that in the instant case the lease in favour of Gangaram stood terminated by a notice given on 29-11-1954 and that Gangaram ceased to be a protected lessee after 1-4-1955. In view of this position, the proper decision on issue No.2 is the one arrived at by the Tahsildar. We, therefore, set aside the order of the Revenue Tribunal as well as the Sub-Divisional Officer and restore the order of the Tahsildar. 22. The petition is thus allowed but in the circumstances there will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.