This is a Second Appeal filed by the heirs of Pratap Chandra Bal and his wife Hemalata Bal of Radhakishorepur, Udaipur Sub-Division, Tripura State, against the judgment and decree of the District, Judge of Tripura, dated 18-8-59, allowing Title Civil Appeal No. 139 of 1956 and decreeing in part Title Suit No. 135 of 1954 on the file of the Subordi­nate Judge, Tripura at Agartala by declar­ing the appellants' title to half of the suit land and directing them to possess the same through the first respondent Dajendra Garo of Radhakishorepur said to be their "korfa” tenant and dismissing the appellants' claim regarding the remaining half of the suit land. (2) The case of the appellants is, brief­ly, as follows: An area to the extent of 2 drones, 10 kanis and 21/4 gandas of land, described in the Schedules 1 and 2, is covered by Jote No. 400 of Mouja Mag Pushkarini of Radhakishorepur Police Station, Udaipur Sub-Division ' in Tripura State. The land was in the Khas possesison of the State. The appellants' parents Pratap Bal and Hemalata Bal took settlement of the land in jote right in the name of Hemalata Bal in or about 1329 T. E. (corresponding to 1919 A. D.) The jote car­ried an annual rent of Rs. 50/10/4 and cess of Rs. 3/2/9 making Rs. 53/13/3 pies. They leased out the land to the first respondent on "adhibhagh", that is, for half share of the produce deliverable to the jotedars by the first., respondent as "bargadar". The first respondent cultivated the suit land as "bar­gadar" for 3 or 4 years. In or about 1352 T. E. (1942 A. D.) the land was requisitioned for military purposes. It was de-requisitioned in 1357 T. E. (1947 A. D.). The original jotedars died during the said period. The first respondent received compensation for the crop for the first year of occupation by the military. But, for the subsequent years f the appellants received the crop compensation. Alter the lands were de-requisitioned, they were settled in "barga" with one Fari-duddin Choudhury. The latter sub-leased the land, to the first respondent Dajendra Garo for rent of 19 maunds of paddy. But, for the subsequent years f the appellants received the crop compensation. Alter the lands were de-requisitioned, they were settled in "barga" with one Fari-duddin Choudhury. The latter sub-leased the land, to the first respondent Dajendra Garo for rent of 19 maunds of paddy. But, the first respondent dispossessed the appel­lants in the month of Magh, 1356 B. S. cor­responding to 1359 T. E., that is, 1949 A. D. So, the appellants filed the suit for declara­tion of their title to the suit land and for recovery of khas possession of. the same. They also claimed mesne-profits. (3) The second respondent Majmani Garo, Is the wife of the first respondent Dajendra Garo. Their case is that the suit land was covered by jungles when the appellants' parents took settlement of the same from the Government, that they found it impos­sible to reclaim the land that the first res­pondent agreed to reclaim it at his own cost, subject to the condition that the first res­pondent should get half of the land, that is, 11/4 drones from the original jotedar and that he should possess the remaining half of the suit land in "korfa" right under the original jotedar at a rent of Rs. -/8/- per kani. It is also the case of the respondents ., that if Pratap Bal and his wife wanted to sell away the half portion of the land under the korfa tenancy of the first respondent, the first respondent should be given the option to buy the land at the prevailing ' market rate less Rs. 10/- per kani, that, according to the arrangement, the first respon­dent cleared the jungles and became the owner of half the land, and "korfa" tenant in respect of the other half under the jote­dars, that, according to the arrangement be­tween the parties, he paid rents to the Gov­ernment on behalf of the jotedars, that he perfected his title to the same by adverse possession, that Fariduddin Choudhury did not possess the land at any time and that the appellants are not entitled to claim any relief. . (4) The Subordinate Judge held that the first respondent failed to prove his case and the agreement under which he claimed half the land and korfa right in respect of the re­maining half and that the case of the appel­lants regarding their jote right, possession and dispossession of the suit land is true. . (4) The Subordinate Judge held that the first respondent failed to prove his case and the agreement under which he claimed half the land and korfa right in respect of the re­maining half and that the case of the appel­lants regarding their jote right, possession and dispossession of the suit land is true. He decreed the suit with costs and also held that the appellants are entitled to a sum of Rs. 2,304 towards mesne profits at the rate of 6 maunds of paddy per kani, the price of which was fixed at Rs. 8 per maund. (5) The first respondent carried the mat­ter in appeal to the District Court in Tri­pura in Title Appeal No. 139 of 1956. The learned District Judge reversed the findings of the Subordinate Judge and upheld the case of the first respondent herein that he got independent title to half of the land and korfa right to the other half. He also held that the first respondent perfected his title to the former half by adverse possession. So, he allowed the appeal with costs and declared the title of the plaintiffs-appellants^ herein to the other half of the suit land and directed that they should possess the same through the first respondent, who was held to be their korfa tenant and dismissed their suit regarding the other half. Hence, the second appeal by the defeated plaintiffs. (6) The first question, which arises for determination in the second appeal, is whe­ther the findings of fact given by the Dis­trict Judge cannot be upset and whether therefore his finding about the truth of the agreement set up by the first respondent has to be accepted. The learned counsel for the respondents relied on a number of rulings in this regard based on S. 100 and S. 101 C. P. C. They are Basiram Saha v. Ram Ratan, AIR 1927 PC 117; Ramji Patel v. Rao Kishoresingh, 33 Cal WN 893= (AIR 1929 PC 190); Sahebrao Narayanrao v. Jaiwantrao Yadaorao, AIR 1933 PC 171; Mohammad Ahmad Kidwai v. Chairman, Improvement Trust, Lucknow, AIR 1958 All 353 (FB); Deity Pattabhiramaswamy v. S. Hanumayya. AIR 1959 SC 57 and Raruha Singh v. Achal Singh, AIR 1961 SC 1097 . AIR 1959 SC 57 and Raruha Singh v. Achal Singh, AIR 1961 SC 1097 . The learned counsel for the respondents further contend­ed that the findings of fact of the first ap­pellate Court can be up set only when the first Appellate Court commits a substantial! error or defect in procedure, which has re­sulted in error or defect in the decision of the case on the merits and relied on Balunki Rout v. Kunja Bahari Deb, AIR 1927 Pat 209 (FB), and Arjan Singh v. Kartar Singh, AIR 1951 SC 193 . But, in the present case the findings of fact of both the courts be­low are not concurrent. Besides, a perusal of the judgment of the District Judge shows that it is perverse , self contradictory, incon­sistent and stands self condemned. So, even though findings of fact of the lower appel­late Court are normally binding in the Second Appeal, they cannot be upheld in the present case in view of the perversity of the judgment, as can be seen presently. (7) The learned District Judge states in his judgment (vide page 16 of the certified copy of the judgment) that the counsel for the appellants-plaintiffs argued that the title of their predecessors in title to the suit land was an admitted fact, that the jote stood in the names of the appellants' parents, that unless the first respondent was able to prove his story of agreement under which he claim­ed half the land directly under the Govern­ment and the remaining half in "korfa" right under the appellants, he could not resist the claim of the appellants for recovery of khas possession, that there was undoubtedly much substance in this contention and that, there­fore, he proceeded to discuss the evidence to ascertain whether the first respondent had been able to prove his story of agreement or not. Ext. 2 Khatian (Record of Rights), which was finally published on 25-5-1358 T. E., shows that the old Touji No. 112 cor­responding to the serial No. 400 of Tenancy list relates to the land in question and that they stood in the names of Pratap Chandra Bal and Hemalata Bal. Ext. 2 Khatian (Record of Rights), which was finally published on 25-5-1358 T. E., shows that the old Touji No. 112 cor­responding to the serial No. 400 of Tenancy list relates to the land in question and that they stood in the names of Pratap Chandra Bal and Hemalata Bal. So, as rightly postu­lated by the District Judge, the onus lies on the first respondent to prove the story of agreement and his own independent title to half of the suit land and his alleged "korfa" right to the other half as pleaded by him. Vide also Barkat All v. Basant Nunia, 21 Cal WN 175-(AIR 1917 Cal 79) where it was held that the record of rights, in which the plaintiff's name was mentioned, raised a presumption in his favour and shifted the onus on the defendants to establish affirma­tively that the plaintiff had been out of pos­session for more than the statutory period. (8) The learned District Judge then con­sidered the evidence let in by the first res­pondent to prove his case of agreement and his own title to the suit land. Firstly, he considered the evidence of the first respon­dent and that of his witnesses D. Ws. 2 and 3 (Hashan Ali and Moffijuddin), who all de­posed that the land was full of jungles when Pratap Bal and Hemalata Bal obtained settle­ment of the land from the Government, that Pratap Bal found it impossible to reclaim the land, that he approached the first respon­dent who is a hillman and entered into an agreement with him that the first respondent should reclaim the land at his own cost and become the owner of half the land and pos­sess the remaining half as "korfa" tenant of Pratap Bal on payment of rent at the rate of Re -/8/- per kani and that the first respondent should pay rent on behalf of Pratap' Bal to the Government. The,Dis­trict Judge then referred to a vital discre­pancy in his previous evidence as per Ext. 5 before the Land Acquisition Officer, when the land was requisitioned by the Military authorities in 1352 T. E. The first respon­dent stated in Ext. 5 that when he entered into agreement with Pratap Bal, Debendra Garo, Meena Garo and Boro Sing Garo were present. But his case in the present suit and his evidence in it is that D. Ws. 5 that when he entered into agreement with Pratap Bal, Debendra Garo, Meena Garo and Boro Sing Garo were present. But his case in the present suit and his evidence in it is that D. Ws. 2 and 3 (Hasan Ali and Moffijuddin), but not De­bendra Garo, Meena Garo and Boro Sing Garo were present. The learned District Judge states at page 18 of the certified copy of the judgment that there is no denial of the fact of existence of such a vital dis­crepancy. Yet, he proceeded to believe their evidence. This is a vital discrepancy which belies the evidence of not only the first res­pondent but of D. Ws. 2 and 3 (Hasan Ali and Moffijuddin), who were never present when the alleged agreement took place. (9) The second discrepancy pointed out by the District Judge himself is that the first respondent stated before the Land Ac­quisition Officer that he was paying rent of Rs. 20 from the very first year of the sub­tenancy, that at that rate the rent could not be Re -/8/- per kani for the "korfa" land and that therefore this is also another discrepancy. (10) Thirdly, the District Judge refers to Ext. 2 Khatian, which shows that the first respondent stated before the Survey authorities when the land was surveyed that he purchased the entire land orally and that the neighbouring jotedars also corroborated him by alleging that he purchased the land. But his case in the suit is quite different. His case is that he got half the land independent­ly towards consideration for reclaiming the forest and the other half under a "korfa" right. The learned District Judge states at page 22 of the certified copy of the judg­ment that the entry in the remarks column in Ext. 2 was not written by the first res­pondent and that he was not responsible for the same. Again, the District Judge relies on the same entry and states that the first respondent set up his ownership of the suit land and that his claim was supported by the oral testimony of his neighbours. Thus the remarks column Ext. 2 shows that the first respondent claimed the entire land under an oral purchase. He could not have written that column because the record was prepared by Government officials. Thus the remarks column Ext. 2 shows that the first respondent claimed the entire land under an oral purchase. He could not have written that column because the record was prepared by Government officials. The re­asoning of the District Judge at one time that the remarks column does not bind the first respondent and again at another time stating that it is evidence of his ownership of the land are inconsistent, irreconcilable incongruous and perverse. Ext. 2 belies the claim of the first respondent for the entire land. (11) Fourthly, the first respondent issued a notice Ext. E dated 15-8-1351 T. E. through the Munsiffs Court in Udaipur to Pratap Bal stating that he reclaimed the land about 10 years prior to 15-8-1351 T. E. and set up the agreement as pleaded by him in the present case. Ext. D shows that the notice was served upon Pratap Bal and that it was recorded on 15-12-1351 T. E. Then, the Dis­trict Judge refers to the evidence and the subsequent conduct of the parties at page 21 of the certified copy of the judgment. The District Judge states that the first respon­dent alleged in paragraph 18 of his written statement and also in his evidence that Pra­tap Bal approached the first respondent for compromise, that the first respondent agreed to possess the land on half sharing system and that there was a further talk of execu­tion of a kabuliat by the first respondent in favour of Pratap Bal. So, this negatives the story of the first respondent that he be­came the owner of half of the land. But, on the other hand, this supports the appellants' case that the first respondent was in posses­sion of the land when it was requisitioned by the military authorities on sharing sys­tem "adhibarga" The learned District Judge then goes on to point out that it is nobody's case that any kabuliat was actually executed and then the admission of the first respon­dent and his consent to hold the land on "adhibhag" basis at the request of Pratap Bal does not negative the story of the agree­ment as set up by him. This reasoning of the District Judge is again perverse and shows that it is absolutely an inconsistent reasoning which cannot be upheld (12) Fifthly, the learned District Judge states that in the certificate proceedings (Exts. This reasoning of the District Judge is again perverse and shows that it is absolutely an inconsistent reasoning which cannot be upheld (12) Fifthly, the learned District Judge states that in the certificate proceedings (Exts. B and C) the first respondent must have been added as a certificate debtor, as he was in possession of the land in his own right But at the same time he states that his addition in the certificate proceedings was in accordance with section 6 of the Tri-pura Public Demands Recovery Act (Act IV of 1326 T. E.) Section 6 lays down that if the certificate debtor died prior to the issue of a certificate then his heirs or the persons in possession of the property, for which the rent is in arrears shall, in the discretion of the Collector be included in the category of a certificate debtor So, the fact that the first respondent was impleaded is not incon­sistent with the appellants' case that he was their "bargadar" (13) Sixthly, the learned District Judge states at page 28 of the certified copy of the judgment that the appellants' names were mutated on 23-12-1950 A D (vide Ext. 1), but that under Ss 9 and 10 of the Tripura Tenancy Act of 1296 T. E. their names should have been mutated within six months from the date of the deaths of the jotedars and that the fact that their names were sub­sequently mutated on 23-12-1950 A D. was immaterial. Under S. 11 of the said Act, their rights shall be extinguished only as against the Government. But, the Government did not exercise their right. On the other hand, they recognised the appellants (as jotedars. Then, the District Judge goes on to reason that if the legal consequence as contemplated by S. 11 followed and that if the point was pressed to its logical conclu­sion, it would lead to an inconsistent result, because the first respondent claims "korfa" rig; it under the appellants' jote right in res­pect of half the land. The learned District Judge did not pursue the point and left it there. So. The learned District Judge did not pursue the point and left it there. So. if he is to hold that the appel­lants have no jote right to half the land, then it follows that the first respondent could not have "korfa" right under them with respect to the said half of the land and his decree that the appellants should hold possession of the same through the first respondent is therefore, illegal. (14) Seventhly, the learned District Judge finds that the first respondent paid the rent for 1354 T. E. as per Ext. A, that he also paid rent of Rs. 336/12/9 pies as per Ext. C. and that thus his case that he was in possession of the land subject to the con­ditions of the agreement is probabilised. Ext. A shows that the rent of Rs. 50/10/4 pies due for the year 1354 T .E. was paid by the first respondent on 19-6-1357 T. E. Similarly, the arrears of rent of Rs. 336/12/9 pies said to be due for four years were paid by the first respondent, as can be seen from the endorse­ment on the reverse of Ext. C on 29-12-1357 T. E. The rent for each year including the cess was Rs 53/13/3 pies. It is suspicious that the rent for 1354 T. E. should have been paid on 19-6-135? T. E., after the land was derequisitioned If really the rent due for the year 1354 T. E. was paid on 19-6-1357 T E then the first respondent would not have paid it once again under Ext. C Under Ext C. the arrears of rent were Rs 228/1/9 pies The cess was Rs 17/9/-. The interest was Rs 99/13/- The cost was Rs 2. The total demand was Rs 336/12/9 pies It was more than the arrears of rent due for 4 years. It is. C Under Ext C. the arrears of rent were Rs 228/1/9 pies The cess was Rs 17/9/-. The interest was Rs 99/13/- The cost was Rs 2. The total demand was Rs 336/12/9 pies It was more than the arrears of rent due for 4 years. It is. however, significant that all the arre­ars were paid in 1357 T E. after the land was de-requisitioned It is the case of the appellants that the first respondent dispos­sessed the "bargadar" Fariduddin and the appellants from the suit land in or about 1359 T. E. So the payment of the arrears of rent by the first respondent in 1357 T E. is not of much consequence (15) Eighthly the learned District Judge states that for the first year after the land was requisitioned by the Military authorities, the compensation for the crops was paid to the first respondent but that for the subse­quent years the compensation was- paid to the appellants and that vet there is no war­rant for finding that the appellants must be deemed to be in possession of the land The District Judge goes on to state at page 28 of the certified copy of the judgment that the first respondent did not acquiesce in the appellants' action in taking the compensation money because he asserted his right to the compensation money, as can be seen from Ext. 5 his deposition in the Land Ac­quisition case. At the same time, the learn­ed District Judge states that, of course, the first respondent did not follow up the mat­ter and get any reference made to the Land Acquisition Judge and that however this did not imply that the first respondent ac­quiesced in the matter. This again is a fal­lacious reasoning If, really, the first res­pondent was entitled to the land and con­sequently the compensation by virtue of the alleged agreement, he would have pursued the matter by getting a reference made to the Land Acquisition Judge for a decision on his right to the compensation amount. (16) Ninthly, the learned District Judge states that the first respondent himself re­claimed the land at his cost, that he was in possession and enjoyment of the land for about 20 to 25 years (prior to the suit) and that, therefore, he perfected his title to it i by adverse possession. The question of ad­verse possession is a mixed question of fact and law. The question of ad­verse possession is a mixed question of fact and law. Though the facts found by the lower appellate Court may be accepted, the conclusion drawn from them, namely, whe­ther the possession was adverse or not, is a question of law. Vide Jogendra Nath Mukherjee v. Rajendra Nath Bhattacharjee, 26 Cal WN 890= (AIR 1922 Cal 54). So the conclusions drawn by the District Judge have to be examined. He refers to the ad­mission made by the first respondent in Ext. E, wherein he admitted that 4 or 5 kanis of land were already under actual cultivation, before he took up the reclamation of the re­maining land. So, the first respondent's case that he reclaimed the entire land is false. But, the District Judge states that even though a portion of the land was reclaimed before the first respondent took up the work of reclamation, a vast area was full of jun­gles and that, therefore, the first respondent, who is a hillman, must have reclaimed the remaining land. This is an inconsistent re­asoning. The learned District Judge then refers to the evidence of P. W. 1 (Profulla Kumar Majumdar) and P. W. 2 (Nirode Babu). who are two independent lawyers and states that their evidence shows that Pratap Bal bore a portion of the cost of reclamation. But, again he brushed aside their evidence by stating that the evidence of P. W. 2 (Nirode Babu) shows that the cost was not. really paid. The District Judge misconstru­ed Ext. E and came to a wrong conclusion affecting the merits of the case. In Ext. E the first respondent stated that he started reclamation of the land at the instance of Pratap Bal about 10 years prior to 15-8-1351 T E the date of Ext. really paid. The District Judge misconstru­ed Ext. E and came to a wrong conclusion affecting the merits of the case. In Ext. E the first respondent stated that he started reclamation of the land at the instance of Pratap Bal about 10 years prior to 15-8-1351 T E the date of Ext. E. So, he start­ed the reclamation in or about 1341 T. E. The first respondent further states that he reclaimed about 2 drones of land during the period of 10 years prior to 15-8-1351 T. E. Thus, according to him, the land was re-claimed and brought under cultivation in 1351 T. E. The finding of the District Judge that the first respondent was in possession of the land for about 20 years prior to the suit or that he perfected his title to the same is incorrect since the first respondent, ac­cording to his case, was engaged only in re­clamation of the land upto 1351 T. E. in ex­pectation of settlement in his favour. Thus he was in permissive possession upto 1351 T. E. But permissive possession is not ad­verse possession. Vide K. Ambu Nair v. Secy. of State, AIR 1924 PC 150; Secy, of State v. Debendra Lai Khan, AIR 1934 PC 23; Mt. Sheo Kali Kuar v Mt. Jaleba Kuar, AIR 1948 All 56; Kamakshya Narainsingh v. Kar-anpura Development Co., Ltd., AIR 1950 Pat 134 and Sheodhari Rai v. Suraj Prasad Singh, AIR 1954 SC 758 . As the first respondent was in expectation of the settlement from the jotedars. his possession could only be a precarious one as laid down in Sankara Pillai v. Balakrishna Pillai, AIR 1957 Kerala 141. Besides, the 10th respondent cannot tack on the period between 1352 T. E. and 1357 T. E., when the military authorities were in possession of the land,, to his period of possession, since his adverse possession, if any, started from 1351 T. E. only. (17) The learned counsel for the respon­dents argued that the appellants' predeces­sor s-in-title acquiesced in the conduct of the first respondent in reclaiming the land and that therefore their claim is barred by esto­ppel under S. 115 of the Evidence Act . He relied on Hari Bhusan v. Sheikh Abdul. (17) The learned counsel for the respon­dents argued that the appellants' predeces­sor s-in-title acquiesced in the conduct of the first respondent in reclaiming the land and that therefore their claim is barred by esto­ppel under S. 115 of the Evidence Act . He relied on Hari Bhusan v. Sheikh Abdul. AIR 1927 Cal 54; Secy, of State v. Itwari, AIR 1937 All 512; Collector of Bombay v. Muni­cipal Corporation of the City of Bombay, AIR 1951 SC 469 and Neti Gopalakrishna Gokhle v. Brahmandam Narasimham, AIR 1958 Andhra Pra 586. But, the evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 2 (Profulla Kumar Majumder and Nirode Babu) shows that the cost of re­clamation was also borne by Pratap Bal. As "bargadar" the first respondent might have reclaimed portion of the land and. as such, there is no question of estoppel. (18) There is the evidence of P. Ws. 1 to 3 (Profulla Kumar Majumder, Nirode Babu and Ramesh Chandra Dey) to show that Pratap Bal leased out the land to the first respondent on adhibarga from year to year for about 5 or 6 years prior to 1352 T. E. P. Ws. 1 and 2 (Profulla Kumar Majumder and Nirode Babu) are independent witnes­ses, being members of the Bar in Udaipur. P. W. 3 (Ramesh Chandra Dey) is a pleader's clerk. Their evidence is that Pratap Bal leased out the land to the first respondent" from year to year on "adhibarga". The learned District Judge disbelieved the evi­dence of P. W. 1 (Profulla Kumar Majum­der) on the ground that he did not know the plaintiffs and that he was not present when the crop was realised by Pratap Bal or his wife from the first respondent. He disbeliev­ed the evidence of P. W. 2 (Nirode Babu) on the ground that the latter was not present when the paddy was actually delivered by the first respondent to Pratap Bal. He dis­believed the evidence of P. W. 3 (Ramesh Chandra Dey) on the ground that P. W. 3's land was at a distance of 2| miles from the suit land. But, they are all independent wit­nesses and there is nothing to show why they perjured themselves. He dis­believed the evidence of P. W. 3 (Ramesh Chandra Dey) on the ground that P. W. 3's land was at a distance of 2| miles from the suit land. But, they are all independent wit­nesses and there is nothing to show why they perjured themselves. Their evidence is rendered probable, when it is read in the light of the evidence adduced by the first respondent and the various circumstances mentioned above (19) The appellants examined P. W. 4 (Md Hanif) who is the son-in-law of Faridu­ddin to show that Fariduddin cultivated the land in barga after the land was derequi­sitioned. The learned District Judge comment­ed that the appellants were not examined. He was of opinion that at least the eldest son of Pratap Bal, namely, appellant No. 4 Sunil Kanti Bal should have been examined. But, some of them might have been minors and some of them might not have been born, when Pratap Bal leased out the suit land to the first respondent. So, there is no sub­stance in the District Judge's observation that the appellants were not examined. The Dis­trict Judge further states that the appel­lants should have examined Prakash Bal, the brother of Pratap Bal and Fariduddin Choudhury. The case of the appellants is that Pratap Bal agreed to sell the land to Fariduddin Choudhury. P. W. 1 (Pratap Bal) stated that the agreement of sale took place towards the end of 1358 T. E. Accord­ing to P. W. 3 (Ramesh Chandra Dey), the negotiation took place in 1359 T. E. P. W. 4 (Md. Hanif) deposed that Pratap Bal had been to the house of the first respondent in 1359 T. E. No doubt, Pratap Bal died before 1358 T. E. So, the evidence of P. Ws. 1 to 4 about the alleged negotiation between Pratap Bal and Fariduddin Choudhury cannot be believed But. as already stated, the land stood in the name of Pratap Bal, as can be seen from Ext. A and in the name of Hemalata Bal, as can be seen from Exts. B and C and in the name of both of them, as can be seen from Ext. 2. as already stated, the land stood in the name of Pratap Bal, as can be seen from Ext. A and in the name of Hemalata Bal, as can be seen from Exts. B and C and in the name of both of them, as can be seen from Ext. 2. The burden of proving the agreement, which is the material one to be considered in the case, under which he claims independent title to the land and "korfa" right to the remaining half lies on the first respondent But, he failed to dis­charge the same (20) The learned counsel for the respon­dents argued that the Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, Act 43 of 1960, came into force in 1961. during the pendency of the second appeal in this Court, that this Court will have to take into account the said Act, that under S. 108 of the said Act, a "bargadar" is not liable to be evicted except as provided by the Act and that, therefore, even assuming that the case of the appellants is true, still the respondents cannot be evict­ed. That the Court can take into account the subsequent events is clear from Nuri Mian v. Ambica Singh, 20 Cal WN 1099= (AIR 1917 Cal 716) & Smt. Samabati Riang v. Sri Dinabandhu Das, AIR 1964 Tri 36. But, according to the appellants the first respon­dent was no longer their "bargadar" after the land was de-requisitioned. The agreement set up by him has been found to be not proved He was only a trespasser after the appellants took possession of the land on its being de-requisitioned. So, the Tri­pura Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act (Act 43 of 1960) does not apply to this case and the first respondent cannot claim any right to the suit land under the said Act. (21) For the above reasons, the judg­ment and decree of the lower appellate Court are set aside and those of the Subor­dinate Judge are restored. The second ap­peal is allowed with costs in all the Courts. Appeal allowed.