JUDGMENT S.D. Singh , J. - The Additional Sessions Judge, Budaun, has recommended that the conviction of the applicant Munna Lal under Section 7 read with Section 3 of the essential Commodities Act, X of 1955, and the sentence of one month's rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 500/- awarded to him thereunder and the order of forfeiture of food grains mentioned in Ex. Ka. I be set aside. 2. On 18th July, 1964, the Tahsildar received information that Munnalal was storing food-grains in contravention of the provisions of the U.P. Food grains Dealers Licensing Order, 1964. He along with the Supply Officer, Sri O- B. Dixit, and the Senior Marketing Inspector, Sri Tej Pal Singh, raided the god own which was supposed to be that of Munnalal and found 24 bags of peas weighing 26 quintals and odd and two bags of wheat weighing one quintal and odd stored therein. Sri Tej Pal Singh prepared a recovery memo (Ex ka. 1) and placed the entire stock in the charge of Munnalal himself under the supurdginama. Ex. Ka. 2. Munnalal's statement was recorded by him and he admitted in this statement to the following effect : "The house was searched and 24 bags of peas, 14 bags of muster and two bags of wheat were found. I purchase grains in the village and sell it in the city. Peas were purchased by me in the village for being sold. I will sell it when I get proper opportunity for it, I have not yet taken licence for the sale of grain. When others obtain licence I will also obtain it." Munnalal was prosecuted in due course on the basis of a report made by the District Supply Officer, which is Ex. Ka. 8. The first information report prepared in the case is Ex. Ka. 6. 3. Munnalal was tried summarily under Section 12-A of the Essential Commodities Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act. Munnalal admitted before the Magistrate that his statement was recorded when the articles in question were recovered from his house and that he had no licence for the same, but he alleged that he is a cultivator meaning thereby that the grains were his own produce. He denied that he is dealing in food-grains and also offered to file a written statement which he did. He denied that he is dealing in food-grains and also offered to file a written statement which he did. The main allegations in this written statement are that the food-grains which were found in his godown belonged to several persons, each one of whom stocked six bags there. Munnalal also denied that he made any statement before the District Supply officer and alleged that his thumb marks were obtained on several papers meaning thereby that the documents which are Exs. Ka. 2 to Ka. 4 in this case were subsequently written on those blank papers on which his thumb marks were obtained. 4. The Magistrate believed the prosecution case against the applicant that he was a dealer in food-grains, that he stored foodgrains for the purpose of sale, that he was owner of the entire stock found with him and consequently he had transgressed the provisions of the U. P. Foodgrains Dealers Licensing Order, 1964. 5. The applicant Munnalal having been convicted and punished as aforesaid went up in revision to the Sessions Judge and the Additional Sessions Judge who heard the revision thought that the order could not stand and has consequently made this reference to this Court. 6. Having heard learned counsel for the applicant, and gone through the judgment of the Magistrate and the Additional Sessions Judge, I find that no case is mace out for interference by this Court. The Sessions Judge has pointed out certain minor flaws in the preparation of the prescribed form for the record of summary trials. There is a slight mistake in it no doubt in column no. 1 which relates to the date of the commission of the offence. The Magistrate has put down the date "2.10.1964" when in fact the search was taken on 18th July, 1964, and 18th July, 1964 should have been mentioned as the date of commission of the offence. No prejudice has, however, been caused to the applicant on that account, He knew the date on which the search was taken and the stock of food grains was found with him and he could not have by any means been misled by this wrong mention of the date against column no. 1. 7. Column no. 2 is meant for the date of report or complaint. 1. 7. Column no. 2 is meant for the date of report or complaint. Against this column also the Magistrate mentions the date "2.10.1964" and the Sessions Judge thought that this date is also wrong and should have been 19th Aug., 1964, on which date the District Supply Officer reported the matter to the police. 2nd October, 1964, is however the date on which the District Supply Officer's report was received at the Police station and the first information report (Ex. Ka. 6) was prepared on the basis thereof. This column relates to the date of report or complaint and as the Sessions Judge himself points out that this was not a complaint case, it was the date of the report which was required to be mentioned in column no. 2 and the Magistrate was not at all wrong when he put down 2 October 1964 against this column as against 19th August, 1964 on which date the district Supply officer is supposed to have sent 1 is complaint. Then the Session Judge points out that the Magistrate has put down the name of Sri O.B. Dixit, the District Supply Officer, against the column meant for the "name of the complainant, if any". The Sessions Judge points out that this was a case on the basis of a police report and there was no complainant in the case and the position of Sri O. B. Dixit was at best that of an informant. It is surprising that the Sessions Judge should have confused his own observations in respect of column 2 and 3. While dealing with entry against column no. 2 he thought that it was the date of the complaint which should have been put down and while dealing with column no. 3. he said that this was not a complaint case and there was no complainant in this case and the name of Sri O.B. Dixit was not to be mentioned in it. The name of Sri O.B. Dixit could have, however, been mentioned as complainant against column no. 3 even if the word "complainant" is understood in the sense in which it is supposed to have been used in the Code of Criminal Procedure. The name of Sri O.B. Dixit could have, however, been mentioned as complainant against column no. 3 even if the word "complainant" is understood in the sense in which it is supposed to have been used in the Code of Criminal Procedure. He may not have made a formal complain within the meaning of Section 4 sub-section (h) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but all the same he was the person who moved the machinery of law for the prosecution of Munnalal; and if, therefore, the name of Sri O. B. Dixit was noted by the Magistrate against column no. 3, no such irregularity or illegality was committed by him as may I have induced the Sessions Judge to I have taken notice of it. 8. These are the only irregularities I which are said to have been committed I by the Magistrate and preparing the I prescribed form and the Sessions Judge I thought that they vitiate the proceed- I ings. The Sessions Judge referred to a j decision of this Court reported in Roop Chand v. State, AIR 1956 Allahabad 399 ( 1) In that case, however, the irregularity noticed was that even the offence which is required to be mentioned in column no. 5 was not put down by the Magistrate. That makes a material difference. That was case where it could not be said what was the offence for which the accused was prosecuted and consequently prejudice was caused to him in standing his trial. That is not the case here and the decision in Roop Chanel v. State supra does not consequently apply. 9. Coming to the merits of the case against Munnalal, the Session Judge refers to the reliance which the Magistrate placed upon the statement of Munnalal recorded by the District Supply Officer (Ex. Ka. 3). The Sessions Judge thought that the entire case turns upon this statement and that the rest of the prosecution evidence was not treated by the Magistrate as wholly reliable. I do not however, see how the Sessions Judge arrived at this conclusion. The facts which were required to be proved for the conviction of the applicant are almost admitted by him. Even in his statement before the Magistrate, which statement is recorded in brief. Munnalal admitted that the articles were stored in his house and that he had no licence for the same. The facts which were required to be proved for the conviction of the applicant are almost admitted by him. Even in his statement before the Magistrate, which statement is recorded in brief. Munnalal admitted that the articles were stored in his house and that he had no licence for the same. It does not require any proof that peas are foodgrains. Under sub-clause (2) of clause 3 of the U.P. Foodgrains Dealers Licensing Order any person who stores any foodgrains in quantity or ten quintals or more shall, unless the contrary is proved, be deemed to store the foodgrains for the purpose of sale. Unless, therefore, there is any evidence in rebuttal it will have to be presumed that the foodgrains which were found by the District Supply Officer with Munnalal were stored for the purposes of sale. 10. It was, of course, for Munna Lal to prove that foodgrains did not belong to 1 him. He produced two witnesses in support of his version and that evidence has been disbelieved by the Magistrate and no exception can be taken to his finding on that point. Even if that evidence is not disbelieved, the food-' grains were found stored in the applicant's premises and their storage at one place gives rise to the presumption aforesaid under sub-clause (2) of clause 3 of the Foodgrains Dealers Licensing Order, 1964. This sub-clause does not say that a person who stores any foodgrains belonging to him in quantity of ten quintals of more shall be deemed to have stored foodgrains for the purpose of sale. 11. All what the clause says is that any person who stores any foodgrains in quantity of ten quintals or more shall be deemed to store the foodgrains for the purpose of sale. Even if, therefore, these foodgrains belonged to another person, since they were in quantity in excess of ten quintals, the storage will be deemed for purposes of sale. 12. Even on the merits of this allegation, there is no evidence whatsoever worth being relied upon. The applicant has not even cared to produce copies of revenue records indicating that he cultivated any land during the relevant year or that the plots which were alleged to have been cultivated by him could have yielded so much produce or that they were covered with peas crop during the year. 13. The applicant has not even cared to produce copies of revenue records indicating that he cultivated any land during the relevant year or that the plots which were alleged to have been cultivated by him could have yielded so much produce or that they were covered with peas crop during the year. 13. The only small point which remains to be decided in the case is whether Munnalal was a dealer. This he admitted in his statement before the District Supply Officer (Ex. Ka. 3. But, even apart from this admission, there is evidence in the case that Munnalal is a dealer. Chhange Lal (P.W. 2), who had turned hostile and had to be cross-examined by the prosecution stated that Munnalal deals in foodgrains though in small quantity. Even on this point, therefore, there is evidence which could be the basis of a positive finding. Every fact, therefore, which was required to be proved for the conviction of Munnalal under Section 7 read with Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, X of 1955, is proved and I do not see how the Session judge thought that in convicting the applicant the Magistrate has placed entire reliance upon the statement of Munnalal before the Tahsildar and the District Supply Officer. As a matter of fact even if the whole of that statement is ignored, the findings will remain intact. The Magistrate may have said that this statement provided "the most significant evidence" in the case but the use of the words "significant evidence" docs not mean that the entire reliance has been placed upon it. The main reliance by the Magistrate has been on the evidence produced in the case and the statement (Ex. Ka. 3) has been referred to by him just in corroboration of that evidence towards the close of his judgment. 14. Even on merits the statement of Munnalal, Ex. Ka. 3, is not liable to be disbelieved. It was a voluntary statement made in the presence of the Tahsildar and the District Supply Officer. There is no reason why the District Supply Officer should have fabricated or forged the documents. To say that these three papers were signed by Munna Lal when they were blank and the entire contents of the three documents were written there subsequently is a m ere issue of lies. 15. There is no reason why the District Supply Officer should have fabricated or forged the documents. To say that these three papers were signed by Munna Lal when they were blank and the entire contents of the three documents were written there subsequently is a m ere issue of lies. 15. It was finally urged that in any case the sentence awarded is rather excessive. I do not, however, think this is so. Persons who indulge in this type of crime are parasites to the society, who blinded by their own personal gain, disregarded all rules and regulations, and yet pass on as leading or respectable members of the society. Then a person who is prepared to make and every false allegation, even against responsible officers, can hardly deserve any leniency in the matter of punishment. The punishment awarded to the applicant is by no means excessive. 16. The reference is rejected.