JUDGMENT : Ismail, J.—According to the Appellant, on 20.7.1965 the Appellant was proceeding along the Peters Road and as there was a rickshaw on the platform, she got down into the road and walked about 4 ft. At that time a motor cycle came from behind and knocked her down and stopped about 2 or 3 ft. away. As a result of this, she had fractured her right leg and consequently she had to be taken to the hospital and treated there. As against this, the case of the Respondents was that the motor cycle was driven by an Assistant Development Officer of the 1st Respondent, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Madras, and as he was proceeding along the Peters Road, he found the Appellant suddenly running across the road and in order to prevent an accident, he swerved to the right and still the Appellant dashed against the rear wheel of the motor cycle and fell down. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Madras, relying upon the evidence of the Assistant Development Officer, who was examined as R.W.I, concluded that there was no negligence or rashness on the part of P.W. 1 and consequently the Respondents were not liable to pay any compensation to the Appellant. He also gave a finding as to the amount of compensation he would have awarded, if he had come to the conclusion that the Respondents were liable. According to him, the Appellant could not be entitled to anything more than Rs. 1,000/-for the injuries sustained by her. In the result, he dismissed the petition filed by the Appellant on the basis of his finding that no negligence or rashness on the part of R.W. 1 was established. It is against this order that the present appeal has been filed. The learned Counsel for the Appellant challenged the findings of the Tribunal both with regard to the rashness and negligence on the part of R.W. 1, and with regard to the quantum of compensation determined by the Tribunal. 2. The Casualty Medical Officer of Royapettah Hospital, where the Appellant was treated, was examined as P.W. 1. He had given a detailed account of the injuries sustained by the Appellant and he had stated that in his opinion the injuries could have been caused as alleged and the speed of the motor cycle should have been fairly high. 2. The Casualty Medical Officer of Royapettah Hospital, where the Appellant was treated, was examined as P.W. 1. He had given a detailed account of the injuries sustained by the Appellant and he had stated that in his opinion the injuries could have been caused as alleged and the speed of the motor cycle should have been fairly high. In the cross-examination he had stated that when the Petitioner (appellant) had run fast and hit against something and fallen with some force, the injury would have occurred. Consequently as far as this witness is concerned, the injury could have been the result of either of the two alternatives, namely, R.W. 1 riding the motor cycle at a high speed and knocking down the Appellant or the Appellant having run fast and hit against the motor cycle and having fallen. The question is, which of the two alternatives is likely to be probable on the facts disclosed in this case. R.W. 1 had stated that the Appellant was on the road and she was 4 or 5 ft. from the left platform, while he himself was about 6 or 7 ft. from the left side of the road and when he saw the Appellant for the first time she was 10 ft. away from him and according to him he was going at a speed of 15 miles per hour. If this evidence of R.W. 1 is to be analysed, if the Appellant and R.W. 1 were on the same spot, the distance between the two would have been only 2 ft. and on the basis of this evidence of R.W. 1 it must be inferred that before R.W. 1 could cover a distance of 10 ft. at a speed of 15 miles an hour, the Appellant should have covered a distance of 2 ft. and knocked against the motor cycle. If that possibility is assumed, then the Appellant could not be said to have run fast. At the same time, there is one other aspect of the evidence of R.W. 1. According to R.W. 1, after hitting against the wheel, the Petitioner fell down on the right side of the motor cycle. and knocked against the motor cycle. If that possibility is assumed, then the Appellant could not be said to have run fast. At the same time, there is one other aspect of the evidence of R.W. 1. According to R.W. 1, after hitting against the wheel, the Petitioner fell down on the right side of the motor cycle. If the story of R.W. 1 is to be accepted, since the Petitioner came from the left side of R.W. 1, after hitting the rear wheel of the motor cycle, she could not have fallen to the right side of R.W. 1. If at all, she could have fallen to the left side of R.W. 1 or behind the motor cycle. But under no circumstances she could have fallen on the right side of R.W. 1, with the result the possibility of the Appellant sustaining injuries as a result of her running fast and hitting against something and falling with some force has to be ruled out. If this is ruled out, the only other alternative is that R.W. 1 must have been coming in the motor cycle at a fairly high speed and should have knocked down the Appellant. The attention of the Tribunal was drawn to this aspect of the evidence of R.W. 1. Still the Tribunal observed, "If the Petitioner had come in contact with the end of the motor cycle it was likely that she would have fallen only on the right hand side of the motor cycle and not on its left hand side". I am unable to agree with this reasoning of the Tribunal. Even if the Appellant had come into contact with the end of the motor cycle she would have fallen only behind the motor cycle and not to the right of the motor cycle. It may be significant to note that R.W. 1 himself admitted in his evidence that he was convicted with regard to this accident and was fined Rs. 100/- after contest. Therefore, after considering the evidence placed before the Court and taking into account the probabilities of the case, I am of the opinion that the accident must have occurred as a result of the rash driving on the part of R.W. 1. On this finding it must be held that the Respondents are liable to pay compensation to the Appellant 3. On this finding it must be held that the Respondents are liable to pay compensation to the Appellant 3. The next question is, what is the amount of compensation to which the Appellant is entitled. The tribunal referred to the fact that the Appellant is aged about 60, as estimated by R.W. 1, and she was found to be of defective vision, when she gave evidence. Taking this circumstance into account, the Tribunal held that if at all, the Appellant was entitled to nothing more than Rs. 1,000/- for the injuries sustained by her. 4. The learned Counsel for the Appellant contends that the quantum of compensation to which the Appellant is entitled will have to be determined under several heads, such as, physical pain and mental anguish suffered by the Appellant, loss of emoluments suffered by her and the expenses incurred by her. The Tribunal has fixed Rs. 1,000/- only in relation to the ground of physical pain and mental agency suffered by the Appellant. The learned Counsel for the Appellant drew my attention to several decisions where higher amounts have been awarded under such a head in claims for payment of compensation. In my opinion, the amount fixed in one case cannot be considered to be a conclusive guide for the purpose of fixing the amount in another case. In each case, the amount is fixed taking into account the special facts and circumstances of that case. As far as the present case is concerned, the learned Counsel for the Appellant did not bring to my notice any special features which will make the fixation of Rs. 1,000/-by the Tribunal as inadequate. All that the learned Counsel repeatedly pointed out was that the Appellant being an aged lady, the fracture in her case would take 5 to 6 months for cure, as stated by P.W.I. On the other hand the Appellant herself had stated that because of the injury sustained by her she was not able to go to work for a period of 8 months. But these features may not go to enhance the fixation of Rs. 1,000/- under the head of physical pain and mental agony. However, there was the claim that the Appellant could not attend to her normal work for a period of 8 months and she was earning a sum of Rs. 50/- per month, made up of Rs. But these features may not go to enhance the fixation of Rs. 1,000/- under the head of physical pain and mental agony. However, there was the claim that the Appellant could not attend to her normal work for a period of 8 months and she was earning a sum of Rs. 50/- per month, made up of Rs. 15/-being the salary in cash and Rs. 35/- being the value of "the food supplied to her by the employer. Thus, for a period of 8 months the Appellant would have lost Rs. 400/- under the head of loss of emoluments and this amount the Appellant is entitled to by way of compensation. 5. In this view, reversing the order of the Tribunal, I hold that the Respondents herein are liable to pay a compensation of Rs. 1,400/- to the Appellant made up of Rs. 1,000/- as compensation for physical pain and mental agony and Rs. 400/- being the loss of emoluments suffered by the Appellant during the period of S months. The appeal is allowed to this extent. There will be no order as to costs in this appeal.