ORDER R.S. Pathak, J. - A number of agricultural plots were held by two brothers, Chhotu and Godhu. On April 7, 1942, Raghubir Singh, the fourth Respondent, was taken in adoption by Godhu and a deed of adoption was executed. Subsequently, it seems that an agreement took place between Chhotu and Godhu pursuant to which a registered deed dated July 24, 1942 was executed purporting to cancel the deed of adoption. Thereafter, two suits were filed by Raghubir Singh before the learned Additional Munsif, Ghaziabad, one in respect of the agricultural plots and the other in respect of a house, for a declaration that as the adopted son of Godhu he was entitled to a half share in the property. The trial court dismissed both the suits. Raghubir Singh appealed against the decrees in the two suits. During the pendency of the appeals, proceedings were commenced under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and as a result the proceeding in the appeal respecting the agricultural plots was stayed. The appeal relating to the house was heard by the learned Civil Judge and he allowed the claim of Raghubir Singh in respect of a half shar in it on the finding that Raghubir Singh was the adopted son of Godhu. A second appeal by Chhotu before this Court was dismissed summarily. 2. In proceedings u/s 9 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act Raghubir Singh filed an objection asserting that as the adopted son of Godhu he was entitled to be entered as a co-tenure-holder in respect of the agricultural plots along with Chhotu. The objection was contested by the Petitioners, who claimed that they were the sole tenure-holders of the land by virtue of a transfer from Chhotu who, they contended, was the sole Bhumidhar of the land. The Consolidation Officer upheld the objection of Raghubir Singh. An appeal by the Petitioners was allowed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and he dismissed the objection filed by Raghubir Singh. In second appeal, the Deputy Director of Consolidation by his order dated February 17, 1962 set aside the order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and restored that of the Consolidation Officer. An appeal by the Petitioners was allowed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and he dismissed the objection filed by Raghubir Singh. In second appeal, the Deputy Director of Consolidation by his order dated February 17, 1962 set aside the order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and restored that of the Consolidation Officer. He held that the issue whether Raghubir Singh was the adopted son of Godhu had been decided in his favour by the civil court and was binding upon the Petitioners as transferees from Chhotu and therefore the Consolidation Officer was right in allowing the objection entered by Raghubir Singh. The Petitioners applied in revision and the Joint Director of Consolidation by his order dated September 18, 1962 dismissed the revision application. The Petitioners pray for certiorari against the orders of the Deputy Director of Consolidation and the Joint Director of Consolidation. 3. It is not disputed between the parties that Raghubir Singh, in the two suits filed by him, impleaded Chhotu only as Defendant and the Petitioners were not parties to the suits. It is also not disputed that the transfer by Chhotu in favour of the Petitioners preceded in point of time the institution of the two suits by Raghubir Singh. The point for consideration is whether the finding by the learned Civil Judge, in the suit relating to the house property, that Raghubir Singh was the adopted son of Codhu, operates as res judicata and bars the trial of that issue in the consolidation proceedings. The Petitioners contend that as they were not parties to the suit and as the transfer in their favour by Chhotu took place before the suit was instituted, a finding on that issue against Chhotu was not binding upon them. It is urged that Chhotu having parted with his interest in the land could not represent that interest in the suit filed subsequently and accordingly any finding in the suit could not affect the Petitioners as the owners of that interest. Now it is clear from what the Privy Council said in AIR 1948 168 (Privy Council) that where an alienation had been made before the institution of a suit, to which the alienor was a party, any finding in that suit against the alienor cannot bind the alienee who has not been impleaded as a party to the suit. Now it is clear from what the Privy Council said in AIR 1948 168 (Privy Council) that where an alienation had been made before the institution of a suit, to which the alienor was a party, any finding in that suit against the alienor cannot bind the alienee who has not been impleaded as a party to the suit. The alienee, it was pointed out, did not claim under a party to the former suit who could be said to have represented his interest in that suit but under a person who subsequently became a party and at the time of the suit did not represent the alienee's interest. Reference may also be made to a decision of this Court in Mt. Katori Vs. Om Prakash and Another, AIR 1935 All 351 where Niamatullah, J. held that a decision obtained against a mortgagor after the execution of a mortgage deed could not operate as res judicata against the mortgagee if the mortgagee was not a party to the suit and the mortgagee cannot be considered to be litigating under the same title as the mortgagor did in the earlier suit. These decisions support the contention of the Petitioners. 4. But it is urged on behalf of the Respondents that the decisions are founded upon the express terms of Section 11 of the CPC and that upon the general principles involved in the doctrine of res judicata the finding that Raghubir Singh is the adopted son of Godhu would bar a fresh decision of that issue in the consolidation proceeding. In the first place, there is nothing in the judgment in Mt. Katori's case (supra) to suggest that the decision rested upon the specific provisions of Section 11 of the Code and not upon general principles. Moreover, it seems to me to be fundamentally essential when applying the genera] principles of the doctrine of res judicata that the decision in the former proceeding should have been between the same parties as in the subsequent proceeding or in any event between parties under one of whom a party in the subsequent proceeding derives his title. When that requirement was included in the statutory provisions of Section 11, no more has been required than what the general principles necessarily envisage. 5. Chhotu had already parted with his interest in the land before the suit was instituted by Raghubir Singh. When that requirement was included in the statutory provisions of Section 11, no more has been required than what the general principles necessarily envisage. 5. Chhotu had already parted with his interest in the land before the suit was instituted by Raghubir Singh. He could not speak for the Petitioners and any thing said or done by him during the suit could not affect the interest which had already vested in them. It is difficult to comprehend how any finding against Chhotu could possibly affect the interest which had a heady passed to the Petitioners. It is open to the Petitioners in proceedings which may affect that interest to show that Raghubir Singh is not the adopted son of Codhu and the failure of Chhotu to establish that, in the suit, cannot foreclose the right of the Petitioners in that behalf. The Respondents have referred to the cases of Raj Lakshmi Dasi and Others Vs. Banamali Sen and Others, AIR 1953 SC 33 and Sunderabai Deshpande and Another Vs. Devaji Shankar Deshpande, AIR 1954 SC 82 as well as Ram Sewak v. Bahal and Ors. 1935 AWR 959 and M. Sarswati Jiwa Ram v. Ralla Ram Gonda Ram and Ors. AIR 1956 Pep 69. The law enunciated in these decisions does not affect the instant case, because in those cases either the party against whom the finding was given in the earlier proceeding was also party in the subsequent proceeding or one of the parties in the former proceeding could be said to represent the interest of the party in the subsequent proceeding. As regards the law laid down in the case of Sahu Madho Das and Others Vs. Mukand Ram and Another, AIR 1955 SC 481 , upon which the Respondents rely, all that the Supreme Court has observed is that even though the decision of the Privy Council as regards the interpretation of a document in an earlier suit did not operate as res judicata, it could be considered as a judicial precedent and it is clear that the application of a judicial precedent arises only where a de novo decision upon an issue is contemplated. 6. 6. The Respondents also say that when the appeals in both the suits were pending before the same Civil Judge and he had decided in one appeal that Raghubir Singh was the adopted son of Godhu, it was reasonable to infer that he would arrive at the same finding in the other appeal, which but for the commencement of the consolidation proceedings would also have been disposed of. It is probable that the learned Civil Judge would have arrived at the same finding in both the appeals. But that does not, in my opinion, affect the question here. Even if the appeal in respect of the agricultural plots had been allowed in favour of Raghubir Singh on the finding that he was the adopted son of Godhu, that would not have precluded the Petitioners from challenging any interference with their title in that land on the basis of the decree obtained by Raghubir Singh. It would have been open to them to contend, on the same grounds as urged here, that the finding in the appeal did not operate as res judicata. 7. In my judgment, the view taken by the Deputy Director and the Joint Director that the finding of the learned Civil Judge that Raghubir Singh is the adopted son of Godhu operates as res judicata is manifestly illegal and accordingly their orders are liable to be quashed. 8. The petition is allowed. A writ in the nature of certiorari shall issue quashing the order dated 17-2-1962 made by the Deputy Director of Consolidation and the order dated 18-9-1962 made by the Joint Director of Consolidation. The Deputy Director will now dispose of the appeal afresh in accordance with law. The Petitioners are entitled to their costs.