JUDGMENT : Barman, C.J. - This is an appeal against an -order of acquittal of the accused Respondent of a charge u/s 16(1)(80) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954: (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for having sold adulterated ghee which is prohibited by the Food (Health) Authority in the interest of public health. 2. On November 29, 1962 the Food Inspector, Puri Municipality issued to the accused Respondent a notice u/s 11(1)(80) of the Act whereby the Food Inspector wanted to purchase three samples of Food articles including ghee for analyses by the Public Analyst. On the same date the Food Inspector purchased ghee for price as appears from the receipt ext. 2. The report of the Public Analyst is that he received the sample of ghee obtained from the accused Respondent for analysis (properly sealed and fastened) and that he found the seal intact and unbroken; he further certified that he had caused the said sample to be analysed and declared the result of the analysis that it was adulterated (ext. 3). 3. In defence the accused Respondent, while denying the charge, stated that he sold Dalda and not ghee as alleged. A point was also taken on behalf of the accused Respondent that the seal on the sample was not compared as required by Rule 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration rules which is mandatory. 4. The prosecution case is based on the evidence of three witnesses, namely Food Inspector p.w.3 who purchased the impugned sample of ghee from the accused Respondent; he said that he separately sent the specimen impression of the seal used to the food sample in a separate memorandum to the Public Analyst. P.w.1 is an attesting witness to the notice which was served on the accused Respondent in his presence; he further said that the Food Inspector purchased, among other food articles, ghee on payment of price; the Inspector sealed and packed the sample. P.w.2 is also another attesting witness to the service of the notice on the accused. 5. The broad reasoning on which the learned Judicial Magistrate gave the accused Respondent benefit of doubt as stated in his judgment is this: The clear evidence of p.w.1 is that Food Inspector purchased Dalda ghee from the shop of the accused. P.w.2 states that accused sells Dalda ghee. 5. The broad reasoning on which the learned Judicial Magistrate gave the accused Respondent benefit of doubt as stated in his judgment is this: The clear evidence of p.w.1 is that Food Inspector purchased Dalda ghee from the shop of the accused. P.w.2 states that accused sells Dalda ghee. So the very fact that Food Inspector purchased ghee is contradicted by p.w.1. As against the evidence of p.w.3 the Food Inspector there is the contradictory evidence of p.w.1. P. w 3 states in his evidence in chief that p.w.2 has been gained over by the accused. Accepting that p.w.2 has been gained over p.w.1 is admittedly the most disinterested and independent witness. When his evidence is that Food Inspector purchased Dalda ghee from accused I am unable to put absolute reliance on the single evidence of p.w.3 to find the accused guilty of having sold adulterated ghee to the Food inspector and to convict him. At least the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt in the particular nature of the case 6. I have not been able to appreciate the reasoning of the learned Magistrate. He seems to have held that the evidence of the witnesses was not satisfactory. It passes my comprehension that the learned Magistrate should have been inclined disbelieve the evidence of the Food Inspector p.w.3 on which the prosecution relied without giving valid reasons. He is an officer or a public body charged with the maintenance of public health. That apart, there is nothing inherently improbable or absurd in the Food Inspector's testimony which would entitle the Magistrate to refuse to accept it. The Food Inspector's evidence was not in the nature of accomplice evidence so that the Magistrate might have insisted on some kind of corroboration. It is not the law that a fact cannot be proved by the evidence of a single witness. If there is nothing intrinsically unbelievable in the evidence of a particular evidence the Court can well rely upon his testimony and find the facts deposed to by him as proved. I have not been able to discover anything in the evidence of the Food Inspector p.w.3 which would entitle the Court to distrust his testimony. If there is nothing intrinsically unbelievable in the evidence of a particular evidence the Court can well rely upon his testimony and find the facts deposed to by him as proved. I have not been able to discover anything in the evidence of the Food Inspector p.w.3 which would entitle the Court to distrust his testimony. It was on similar reasoning that the Calcutta High Court set aside an order of acquittal made by the Sessions Judge and convicted the accused Respondent therein of an offence under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act The Chairman, Chairman, Suri Municipality Vs. Sisir Kumar Ghosh, . 7. As regards the defence point that Rule 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration rules is mandatory, the consistent view of the majority High Courts, which it is unnecessary to deal with in details, is that it is only directory. Rule 7 is this; 7. Duties of public analyst- (1) On receipt of a package containing a sample for analysis from a Food Inspector or any other person the public analyst or an Officer authorised by him shall compare the seals on the container and the outer cover with specimen impression received separately and shall note the condition of the seals thereon. (2) The public analyst shall cause to be analysed such samples of article of food as may be sent to him by Food Inspector or by any other person under the Act. (3) After the analysis has been completed he shall forthwith supply to the person concerned a report in Form III of the result of such analysis . Form III under Rule 7(3) is this: FORM III (See Rule 7(3)) Report by the Public Analyst. Report No. I hereby certify that I,...Public Analyst for...duly appointed under the provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, received on the ... day of ..., 19... from ... a sample of ... for analysis, properly sealed and fastened, and that I found the seal intact and unbroken. I further certify that I have/have caused to be analysed the aforementioned sample, and declare the result of the analysis to be as follows: .... and am of the opinion that ... sighed this .... day of ..., 19. ... FORM III (See Rule 7(3)) Report by the Public Analyst. I further certify that I have/have caused to be analysed the aforementioned sample, and declare the result of the analysis to be as follows: .... and am of the opinion that ... sighed this .... day of ..., 19. ... FORM III (See Rule 7(3)) Report by the Public Analyst. Report No. I hereby certify that I,...Public Analyst for...duly appointed under the provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, received on the ... day of ..., 19... from ... a sample of ... for analysis, properly sealed and fastened, and that I found the seal intact and unbroken. I further certify that I have/have caused to be analysed the aforementioned sample, and declare the result of the analysis to be as follows: ...and am of the opinion that...signed this...day of..., 19.... (Signature.) Public Analyst. Address ... ... .... (Signature.) Public Analyst. Address... ... .... 8. The points urged on behalf of the accused Respondent are, in substance, these: There is nothing to show that the seal reached the Analyst intact; the receipt ext. 2 purporting to show that the impugned ghee was sold for money was not put to the accused in his Section 342 statement; the defence also relied on the statement of p, w. 3 that he (p.w.3) had not mentioned the type of ghee in, the receipt and that he only mentioned ghee; he had not enquired what kind of ghee it was. 9. In my opinion the defence contentions are not tenable. From III preferred to in Rule 7(3) in which the Public Analyst has to submit his' report does not prescribe anything calling on him to make an endorsement to the effect that he compared the deals on the container with the specimen seals sent to him. In the absence of any such column in that Form the report cannot be considered as, in any way, irregular. That apart, in the present case the evidence of p.w.3 is that he separately sent the specimen impression of the seal used to the food sample in a separate memorandum to the Public Analyst. The report of the Public Analyst ext. 3 also shows that he received from the Food Inspector a sample of ghee dated 29-11-1962 obtained from the accused Respondents for analysis "properly sealed and fastened" and that he found the seal "intact and unbroken". The report of the Public Analyst ext. 3 also shows that he received from the Food Inspector a sample of ghee dated 29-11-1962 obtained from the accused Respondents for analysis "properly sealed and fastened" and that he found the seal "intact and unbroken". On the facts of the present case, there is nothing to show that the Public Analyst did not compare the seals on the container on the outer cover with the specimen impression of the seal sent to him separately. On the other hand, while noting the condition of the seal thereon the Public Analyst found the seal "intact, and unbroken as stated in his report ext. 3. Assuming Rule 7 is mandatory, even so, in the present case there is substantial compliance with Rule 7. 10. The learned Magistrate does not appear to have considered the case from the correct perspective. Apparently the attention of the learned Magistrate was not drawn to the aspects discussed above. 11. In this view of the case, the order of acquittal passed by the learned Magistrate cannot be sustained: the order of acquittal was not justified on evidence. I accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order of acquittal passed by the learned Magistrate and convict the accused Respondent u/s 16(1)(a) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and sentence him to a fine of Rs. 500/ -; in default, rigorous imprisonment for three months. Final Result : Allowed