NIRANJAN DASS v. GULZARI LAL — 1967 DIGILAW 53 (DEL)

( 1 ) THIS appeal has been placed before us pursuant to my order dated 9. 11. 1966. It is directed against the order of the Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act, at Delhi, dated 12. 6. 1963 dismissing the petition of Niranjan Dass appellant claiming a sum of Rs. 15,000. 00 by way of damages and compensation for injuries suffered as a result of accident which took place on 17. 8. 1958. The facts may now be stated. ( 2 ) NIRANJAN Dass petitioner-appellant along with his wife came to Delhi from Ambala in a bus on 17. 8. 1958 and after getting down near the Delhi Railway Station, he hired a scooter No. DLD 6870 owned by Harbans Lal, respondent No. 2 and driven by Gulzari Lal No. 1, an employee of the owner, for carrying the appellant to New Delhi. The scooter was driven from Delhi Railway Statian towards the Fountain of the Chandni Chowk and on towards the Red Fort. While proceeding in Chandni Chowk a four-seater motor rickshaw No. D. L. C. 5427 driven by Santokh Singh, respondent No. 3, and owned by Teja Singh, respondent No 4 which was coming rashly and negligently from the opposite direction of Red Fort towards the Fountain, dashed against the right side of the scooter driven by Gulzari Lal in which the appellant and his wife were seated. On account of this collision, the appellant received multiple injuries. This accident, according to the appellant, was due to the fact that both the vehicles, in question were driven negligently and without due care and caution in a crowded street like Chandni Chowk. The claim was of course filed after the prescribed period of limitation but this point has not been canvassed and, therefore, it does not survive for any discussion. ( 3 ) THE claim was resisted by the respondents and the pleadings of the parties gave rise to the following issues : 1. Whether respondent No. 2 was the owner of the scooter No. DLD 6870 when the accident occurred ? 2. Whether the scooter No. D. L. D. 6870 was driven by respondent No. 1 during the course of his employment or control of respondent No. 27 3. Whether accident took place on. account of the negligence of respondents Nos. 1 and 3 ; if so, of which of them ? 4. 2. Whether the scooter No. D. L. D. 6870 was driven by respondent No. 1 during the course of his employment or control of respondent No. 27 3. Whether accident took place on. account of the negligence of respondents Nos. 1 and 3 ; if so, of which of them ? 4. To what amount of compensation the petitioner is entitled to and from whom ? 5. Whether the vehicle No D. L. C. 5427 belonging to respondent No. 3 was insured with respondent No. 5 at the time of accident ? It may be pointed out that Messrs. Premier Insurance Company, Ltd. , respondent No. 5, was impleaded on the ground of being the insurers of the two vehicles in respect of third party risk. Issues Nos. 1 and 2 were conceded before the Tribunal by means of a statement dated 24. 5. 1963 and were, therefore, decided against respondents Nos. 1 and 2 Under issue No. 5, it was found that vehicle No D. L. C. 5427 owned by Teja Singh and driven by Santokh Singh was not insured on the date of the accident though it was insured with the insurer, respondent No. 5, right from 148. 1956 to 13. 8. 57 and then again up to 13. 8. 1958. After a gap of four days, this four seater motor rickshaw was again insured with the same insurer with effect from 18. 8. 58 to 17. 8. 1959. Under issue No. 3, the Tribunal found itself unable to hold that the accident was caused due to rash and negligent driving of Gulzari Lal or Santokh Singh. Santokh Singh and Gulzari Lal, according to the learned Tribunal, tried to shift the blame on each other and there being no independent evidence which, in the view of the Tribunal, must have been available in a busy place like Chandni Chowk in support of rash and negligent driving either of the one or the other driver, the Tribunal felt that it was not possible to come to a satisfactory finding on this issue. The only evidence, according to the impugned order, is of the appellant and of his wife Mrs. Vishan Devi. Mrs. The only evidence, according to the impugned order, is of the appellant and of his wife Mrs. Vishan Devi. Mrs. Vishan Devi, according to the Tribunal, did not say anything about the negligent or rash driving of Gulzari Lal and she merely stated that the accident had taken place due to the negligence of the driver of the motor rickshaw because he was driving it at a high speed and was also talking with the occupants of his vehicle. This, in the view of the learned Tribunal, was a factor which militated against reliance on Mrs. Vishan Devi s testimony. Regarding the appellant, it is observed in the impugned order that he had appeared as a defence witness in a criminal case against Gulzari Lal and there he had admitted that the accident was not due to any rash or negligent act of the accused Gulzari Lal, who is respondent No. 1 in the present proceedings. "gulzari Lal", so observes the learned Tribunal in the impugned order, "also deposed that it was not due to rash or negligent act on his part that the accident was caused. " From this the Tribunal has concluded that it can be said as an admitted case of the parties as between the appellant and Gulzari Lal that the latter was not responsible for the accident at all. The Tribunal thus found no occasion to go into the question of the neglect or default of Gulzari Lal. After excluding Gulzari Lal s liability on this premise, the Tribunal proceeded to consider the case of Santokh Singh, respondent No. 3. While dealing with this case again, the Tribunal has emphasised that the evidence on this point was also that of the appellant and his wife Vishan Devi, A. W. 5. The lady. however, was not able to give the definite distance from which she saw the Sikh gentleman driving the motor rickshaw and she merely stated that it may have been 3 to 4 paces from the scene of the accident. According to the learned Tribunal, the lady could not have judged the speed of the other vehicle from such a small distance. According to the learned Tribunal, the lady could not have judged the speed of the other vehicle from such a small distance. In regard to the testimony of Niranjan Dass, the Tribunal expressed itself in the following words : "there is not a word in the statement of Niranjan Dass except that motor cycle rickshaw hit against the scooter occupied by him and his wife, that it was by the rash or negligent driving of Santokh Singh that the accident was caused and how Santokh Singh was negligent. His latter statement that the accident took place due to the negligent driving of the scooter by its driver Gulzari Lal as also by the negligent driving of motor rickshaw by its driver Santokh Singh cannot be accepted in face of his previous sworn statement before the criminal Court, as recorded in copy Exhibit R 3. He cannot be allowed to say things at his convenience, exculpating Gulzari Lal in the statement Exhibit R. 3 while inculpating him here in this Court of the charge of rash and negligent driving. " It is this approach coupled with the absence of site plan prepared by the investigating officer of the police agency which induced the learnedTribunal to decide issue No. 3 against the appellant. Under issue No. 4, the learned Tribunal came to the conclusion that for permanent disability, pain and suffering undergone both physical and mental, loss of enjoyment of life, incapacity of work and shortened expectation of life, a sum of Rs. 4,000. 00 would be fair and appropriate compensation. He did not award anything on account of expenses of treatment because of want of accounts and undependable evidence. As observed earlier, in the final result, the claim was disallowed. ( 4 ) ON appeal in this Court, we have been taken through the entire evidence on the record and the learned counsel for the parties have addressed elaborate arguments in support of their respective contentions. The appellant s learned counsel has argued that the entire approach of the Court below to the case is unpractical and it ignores that in cases of accident like the present, it is ordinarily difficult to expect the witnesses to give evidence with meticulous accuracy as if they had watched the happening with the object of reproducing it later. The appellant s learned counsel has argued that the entire approach of the Court below to the case is unpractical and it ignores that in cases of accident like the present, it is ordinarily difficult to expect the witnesses to give evidence with meticulous accuracy as if they had watched the happening with the object of reproducing it later. It is further added that in such cases, the probabilities and the attending circumstances are, as a general rule, of greater importance for throwing light on the value of oral testimony. ( 5 ) I may at the outset point out that negligence in cases like the present usually consists in failure to exercise due care in a case in which a duty to take care exists. If the possibility of danger emerging is reasonably apparent, then to take no precaution is negligence and in running down accidents when two parties are so moving in relation to one another as to involve risk of collision, each owes to the other a duty to move with due care and this is true even if they are in control of vehicles. This duty of diligence which word is intended to be used as co-relative of negligence is to be measured by such degree of skill and care as is requisite in the circumstances which the party said to be in fault knows, or would know if it thought about it, for the purpose of safeguarding the interests of the potential plaintiff. It is in this background that I now advert to the evidence in the case. ( 6 ) MRS. Vishan Devi wife of Niranjan Dass plaintiff-appellant, appearing as Public witness 5 has deposed about the front wheel of the four-seater motor rickshaw coming from the opposite direction striking against the foot of her husband, who along with the witness was travelling in the scooter in question at 2 P. M. on 17. 8. 1958. They both fell out and sustained injuries. Her husband remained in Hospital for about 4 months. She has deposed that the accident was due to the negligence of the driver of the motor rickshaw who was talking to the occupants of his rickshaw and driving at a high speed. In cross examination, all that has been sought to be elicited from her is that she saw the Sikh gentleman driving the motor rickshaw from a short distance. In cross examination, all that has been sought to be elicited from her is that she saw the Sikh gentleman driving the motor rickshaw from a short distance. She could not give the distance with any definite precision, but when pressed, she replied that it might be two or four paces. Her statement seems to me to be straightforward and frank possessing a ring of truth because in those circumstances, it is almost impossible for any normal human being to give any meticuculously precise idea of the distance. The learned Tribunal below has also not seriously discredited her statement but has merely questioned the soundness of her judgment by observing that sitting in a closed vehicle, she could not have judged the speed of the motorcycle rickshaw from such a short distance. I am wholly unable to appreciate this observation and indeed it seems to betray an unpractical and unrealistic approach on the part of the learned Presiding Officer to the question before him. He seems to have ignored that in view of the nature of the accident, he had to carefully scrutinise the explanation offered by the two drivers who were in the best position to explain how the unfortunate accident occurred, and then to form his opinion as to who was to blame, both or either, and in the latter case, which one of the two. The testimoney of Mrs. Vishan Devi and her husband must be evaluated by keeping in view the basic consideration that they were not calm and calculated spectators of a performance, details of which they were expected to narrate later, but were travelling in a scooter and were suddenly the victims of an accident. Their testimony has therefore, to be considered from a broad point of view seeing how far they are supported by the probabilities of the case. Niranjan Dass has appeared as P. W. 6 and his statement also appears to me to be straightforward about the occurrence in question. He has imputed negligence to both the drivers of the scooter and the motor cycle rickshaw. In his cross examination by Mr. T. C. Bami Advocate, he was asked if he had made a statement in the criminal Court at Gulzari Lal s trial that the accident had taken place because of rash and negligent act of Santokh Singh and not that of the accused Gulzari Lal. In his cross examination by Mr. T. C. Bami Advocate, he was asked if he had made a statement in the criminal Court at Gulzari Lal s trial that the accident had taken place because of rash and negligent act of Santokh Singh and not that of the accused Gulzari Lal. The witness did not remember if he had made such a statement. His attention was drawn to a certified copy of the earlier statement said to have been made by him, whereupon he explained that he had been taken to the Court on a cot with his right leg under plaster and that he could not remember if he had made the statement imputed to him. It is noteworthy that the original statement was not got summoned and the witness was not confronted with the original statement, with the result that there was no proper legal proof of the said statement. Apart from the above question and answer, nothing else has been elicited in his cross examination by the respective counsel for the two drivers which could be construed to cast any unfavourable reflection on his credibility or on the truth of his testimony. As a matter of fact, cross-examination of Niranjan Dass by Mr. H. S. Singha has brought out quite clearly that Chandni Chowk is a big business locality and to quote his own words "there is sufficient and most probably considerable traffic in the said locality. " This factor, in my view, imposed on thetwo drivers concerned all the greater obligation to drive cautiously and slowly so as to avoid untoward incidents, The learned Tribunal has, in my opinion, dealt with this matter in a somewhat superficial manner and has wrongly discredited Niranjan Dass s statement. The learned Tribunal has also drawn an adverse inference against the petitioner appellant because of non-production of the site plan prepared by the investigating officer investigating the criminal case arising out of the accident in question against Gulzari Lal and Santokh Singh. It is somewhat difficult to understand why this inference should have been raised against the petitioner appellant and not against the defendant respondents. It is somewhat difficult to understand why this inference should have been raised against the petitioner appellant and not against the defendant respondents. In face of the nature of the accident, it was perhaps as much for the defendants as if not more for the petitioner appellant to produce the site plan to explain the circumstances in which the accident occurred so as to exclude rashness and negligence on the part of the drivers. The learned Tribunal seems to be in error in this regard as well. The criticism levelled by the learned Tribunal against the petitioner appellant s evidence would thus seem to us to be ill merited. ( 7 ) THE testimony of Baldev Mitter R. W. 1, to which our attention has been drawn by the counsel for the parties, makes an interesting reading. This witness has betrayed excessive zeal in trying to help Santokh Singh and to condemn Gulzari Lal and also to depict Niranjan Dass as guilty of negligence. The fact that in spite of professing to be an eye witness of the entire occurrence and to have witnessed it with great thoroughness, he was not produced as a witness in the criminal trial, seems to me, in the absence of cogent explanation, to throw considerable doubt on the truth of his testimony. Significantly enough it is also admitted by him that he had been examined by the investigating agency under section 161, Criminal Procedure Code. The learned Tribunal has surprisingly enough not cared to advert to the production by the defendants of an unsatisfactory witness of this type in their attempt to defeat the petitioner appellant s claim. Baldev Mitter has, it may be pointed out, stated in his statement that permissible speed for vehicles in the area in question is 10 miles per hour. Now Santokh Singh appearing as R. W. 2 has admitted that he was driving his vehicle at the time of the accident at the speed of 10 or 12 miles per hour, though Baldev Mitter would have us believe that the motor cycle rickshaw was coming at that time at such a low speed that it looked as if he was going to stop it. No comment is required to discredit Baldev Mitter s testimony for this part of his statement is eloquent enough to betray his zeal in minimizing Santokh Singh s responsibility. No comment is required to discredit Baldev Mitter s testimony for this part of his statement is eloquent enough to betray his zeal in minimizing Santokh Singh s responsibility. Santokh Singh; appearing as R. W. 2 has deposed that Gulzari Lal was trying to overtake a tonga and Niranjan Dass, the inmate of Gulzari Lal s scooter, had his right arm and right leg bulging out of the scooter. He admitted that Niranjan Dass right leg was fractured because of collision with his motor cycle rickshaw. Now if he had actually seen the right leg bulging out of the scooter, then, even assuming it to be correct, it was, in my view, his duty to keep his vehicle at a safe distance from the scooter, particularly when he was driving in a crowded locality like Chandni Chowk. Santokh Singh has also in his attempt to blame Gulzari Lal also deposed that Gulzari Lal was driving his scooter at a speed of about 18 to 20 miles per hour. He has also admitted that at the time of the accident, there was great traffic at the place of the occurrence. Gulzari Lal appearing as R. W. 3 has blamed Santokh Singh and the latter has blamed the former, which, to an extent, is suggestive of the guilt of both. Gulzari Lal has estimated the speed at which Santokh Singh was driving to be 12 or 15 miles per hour. The permissible speed in Chandni Chowk, according to him is five miles per hour. Gulzari Lal has added that after his acquittal in the criminal case, Santokh Singh was challaned. The foregoing discussion relating to the evidence on the record seems, in my view, to suggest that both the drivers were guilty of negligence and rashness and were accordingly responsible for the accident in question. The learned Tribunal below has neither evaluated the evidence with the requisite care nor has it kept in mind the principles of law applicable in appreciating the evidence in such cases of accident. It may at this stage be pointed out that Gulzari Lal was convicted in the trial Court but was acquitted on appeal by the learned Additional Sessions Judge on 25. 2. 1959 and Santokh Singh was discharged by a learned Magistrate on 24,3. It may at this stage be pointed out that Gulzari Lal was convicted in the trial Court but was acquitted on appeal by the learned Additional Sessions Judge on 25. 2. 1959 and Santokh Singh was discharged by a learned Magistrate on 24,3. 1960, but at the bar no point has been sought to be made, and, in my opinion rightly so, on the basis of the orders of the criminal Courts. ( 8 ) MR. H. S. Dhir, learned counsel for the respondents, has raised another point in so far as the liability of the insurance company, respondent No. 5, as insurer of the motor cycle rickshaw in question is concerned. He has submitted that the insurance policy of this vehicle had expired on 13. 8. 58 and a fresh policy was obtained on 18. 8. 58 one day after the occurrence, with the result that on 17. 8. 1958 this motor cycle rickshaw was not insured. The company is thus not liable as insurer to indemnify the injured party. ( 9 ) THIS point raises a controversy which, on going through the material on the record we feel, casts a discreditable reflection on respondent No. 5 as also on the staff of the Court below. In paragraph 10 of the claim application dated 20. 3. 1959 Niranjan Dass petitioner appellant had pleaded that the scooter DLD 6870 was insured with respondent No. 5 under a certificate of insurance No. 163074 valid up to 24. 10. 1958 and the motor cycle rickshaw No. DLC 5427 was insured with respondent No. 5 under certificate of insurrance No, 126139 upto 13. 8. 1958 and further renewed under the certificate of insurance bearing No. 178480 valid upto 17. 8. 1959. This plea was admitted by respondents Santokh Singh and Teja Singh in the written statement dated 30. 12. 1959, as also by Gulzari Lal with respect to their respective vehicles. We find on the record a written statement dated 28. 8. 1959 by respondent No. 5 at pages 195 to 199 of the record in which the factum of insurance of the motor cycle rickshaw DLC 5427 on 17. 8. 1958 is denied and it is pleaded in paragraph 10 that the vehicle was insured under policy No. 32720/h for the period 14. 8. 1956 to 13. 8. 1957 and it was renewed up to 13. 8. 8. 1958 is denied and it is pleaded in paragraph 10 that the vehicle was insured under policy No. 32720/h for the period 14. 8. 1956 to 13. 8. 1957 and it was renewed up to 13. 8. 1958 under certificate No. H 126139. Subsequently, it was reinsured under policy No. 58247 for the period 18. 8. 1958to 17. 8. 1959 under certificate No. H. 178480. Thus, according to this plea, this vehicle was not insured on 17. 8. 1958, the day of the accident. We may now turn to the relevant pleadings of the parties and the relevant part of the record. Niranjan Dass s. replications to the written statements of respondents Nos. 1 to 4 are dated 2. 2. 1960 and to that of respondent No. 5 is dated 12. 2. 1960. In paragraph 10 of the replication to the written statement of respondent No. 5, it is pleaded as follows "para 10 in so far as it admits the facts detailed in para 10 of the petition are admitted correct while the rest of the allegations are not admitted correct and are denied. Facts of para 10 of the petition are reaffirmed as correct. " Issues were framed on 12. 5. 1960 and there was no issue settled or claimed on the question of the motor cycle rickshaw concerned being not insured on 17. 8. 1958. The application dated 5. 2. 1963 filed on behalf of respondents Nos. 3 and 4 in the Court below stated, so far as relevant for our purpose, as follows : "that on or about 31. 12. 1959, a written statement signed and verified by Mr. A. U. Menon, Branch Manager, for and on behalf of Respondent No. 5 was filed in court and placed on the record. The petitioner filed a replication to the said written statement on 4. 2. 1960. 2. That in the said written statement of the respondent No. 5 para No. 10 ran as under: That para 10 of the application is admitted in so far as the vehicle in question were insured with the respondent No. 5. It is however confined and limited to the terms of the policy of the vehicle in question which is up to Rs. 4,000. 00 in maximum for bodily injury only. It is however confined and limited to the terms of the policy of the vehicle in question which is up to Rs. 4,000. 00 in maximum for bodily injury only. It is however denied that both the vehicles were driven in rash or negligent manner or that the drivers of both were negligent. " I have reproduced the exact words as contained in the application. This application proceeded further tostate that on 4. 2. 1963 the applicants concerned, on inspecting the record found that the said written statement was missing and was replaced by another written statement signed and verified by one Mr. K. Ramaswami, Zonal Manager, purporting to be signed and verified at Kanpur on 28. 8. 1959 and bearing the date of filing as 27. 12. 1959. That there had been such replacement was sought to be supported in the application by the averment that in the petitioner s replication reference had been made to A. V. Menon, It was further averred that the earlier written statement filed by Mr. A. V. Menon did not contain additional pleas whereas the new one filed by Mr. K. Ramaswami did contain the same. Respondent No. 5 controverted this averment by a reply dated 20. 2. 1963. The petitioner Niranjan Dass also stated in his reply that the copy of the written statement of respondent No. 5 supplied to him purported to be signed by Mr. A. V. Menon. On 1. 6. 1961, Jagdish Parshad Gupta, Clerk, Transport Authority Rajpur Road, Delhi, was examined as Public witness 4 and he deposed that DLC 5427 which on the date of the statement of the witness bore No. DLR 348, was owned by Teja Singh and was insured with respondent No. 5. The insurance policy was valid up to 13. 8. 1958 and was further renewed up to 13. 8. 1959. There was no cross-examination of this witness in regard to the insurance of the motor cycle rickshaw in question. On 20. 2. 1963, Mr. A. N. Aggarwal framed the following additional issue on the plea of the vehicle No. DLC 5427 not being insured on 17. 8. 8. 1958 and was further renewed up to 13. 8. 1959. There was no cross-examination of this witness in regard to the insurance of the motor cycle rickshaw in question. On 20. 2. 1963, Mr. A. N. Aggarwal framed the following additional issue on the plea of the vehicle No. DLC 5427 not being insured on 17. 8. 1958 : "whether the vehicle No. DLC 5427 belonging to respondent No. 3 was insured with respondent No. 5 at the time of the accident ?" ( 10 ) THE learned Subordinate Judge felt that the order of his predecessor was conclusive against the plea of replacement of the original written statement by a different one. The Court also observed that the copy of the written statement of respondent No. 5 given to the opposite parties might have been of the proposed written statement as suggested by the counsel for respondent No. 5 and not really the one actually filed in Court. It is noteworthy that on 5. 2. 1963, the evidence on behalf of respondents Nos. 3 and 4 as also on behalf of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 had been closed and the evidence of Kewal Krishan was recorded on 20. 2. 1963 after framing the additional issue and thereafter the statement of Teja Singh respondent was recorded on the subject matter of the additional issue. ( 11 ) ON the basis of what has been stated above, it is urged on behalf of the appellant Niranjan Das that the plea of the motor cycle rickshaw being not insured on 17. 8. 1958 seems to have been taken in a wholly irregular manner and should be excluded from consideration. After considering the material on the record, we do feel exceedingly suspicious of the attending circumstances in which the existing written statement of respondent No. 5 seems to find its place on the record. It is not without significance that paging of the original record of the case in the Court below soon after the written statement of respondent No. 5 (bearing pages 195 to 199) also seems to have been changed up to p. 233 whereafter p. 277 appears and thereafter p. 289. After p. 289 again we find pages 235 to 259 to bear the sense of change in the first digit. After p. 259 we find p. 291 onwards. After p. 289 again we find pages 235 to 259 to bear the sense of change in the first digit. After p. 259 we find p. 291 onwards. This position does certainly suggest that the paging of the record by the Court below has been far from regular and due attention has not been paid to this matter. This unsatisfactory position of the record does serve to excite suspicion and even though there may in fact have been no tampering with the record, the manner in which it is maintained may reasonably excite suspicion in the minds of the parties affected in the present case. ( 12 ) WE now turn to the merits of this plea. Kewal Krishan, Insurance Agent of respondent No. 5, appearing as R. W. 5/1 on 20. 2. 1963 as a witness for respondent No. 5, attempted to give evidence regarding the insurance policy in question but this was objected to on the ground that the original had not been summoned from respondents Nos. 3 and 4. Upholding this objection, the Court directed respondents Nos. 3 and 4 to produce the original policy on 19. 3. 1963 and in the event of its non production, respondent No. 5 was directed to be ready with secondary evidence. Since the additional issue was framed on 20. 2. 67, the Court gave to the parties concerned opportunity to adduce evidence thereon. On 19. 3. 1963, it was stated by the counsel for respondents Nos. 3 and 4 that the certificate and the insurance policy had been lost at the time of accident. The remaining statement of the counsel was recorded in Urdu in a manner which is somewhat unintelligible. It, however, seems to suggest that some insurance policy was produced in the criminal Court and was lost by that Court. The record of this statement is quite confusing. Kewal Krishan R. W. 5/1 was accordingly recalled with his register on 19. 3. 1963 on which date he stated that DLC 5427 had been insured with respondent No. 5 on 18. 8. 1958 for one year. In cross-examination, he had to admit that the register with reference to which he had given evidence was his own which had never been checked by any officer of the insurance company. The vehicle in question had throughout been insured through him in this company. He had charged Rs. 10. 8. 1958 for one year. In cross-examination, he had to admit that the register with reference to which he had given evidence was his own which had never been checked by any officer of the insurance company. The vehicle in question had throughout been insured through him in this company. He had charged Rs. 10. 00 for insuring the vehicle for the said year but he had neither given any receipt nor had he any duplicate of the same. The Court below, unfortunately, did not care to get clarified from the witness as to what he meant by the word "duplicate" in this context. The register maintained by the witness admittedly did not contain any entry about the proposal of insurance for the year beginning 18. 8. 1958, though the witness asserted that there was a proposal which" was handed over to him on 18. 8. 1958 and was with the head office. The proposal was not brought to the Court. No entry was made in any diary regarding the said fresh proposal. According to the prevailing practice, as deposed by this witness, on receipt of money, certificate is given to the insured and neither receipt is given for the money nor are signatures of the insured obtained for the certificate. The witness expressed his inability to produce the original proposal form. The insurance policy, according to him, is not issued from the date of proposal but from the date of its issue. This statement of the witness only serves to add to the suspicion about the genuineness of the plea raised by respondent No. 5. After, the statement of this witness was recorded on 19. 3. 1963, a request was made to the trial Court on behalf of respondent No. 5 seeking permission to produce the proposal form and a certified copy of the insurance policy. As the entire evidence had been ordered to be produced on 19. 31963. , the Court granted the adjournment sought on payment of costs. On 17. 4. 1963 Kewal Krishan R. W. 5/1 was again produced and R. W. 5/2, the proposal form and R. W 5/3 a copy of the policy, filed in Court, R. W. 5/2 was, according to the witness, filled inby his clerk whose name he was unable to remember and who used to be paid Rs. 75. On 17. 4. 1963 Kewal Krishan R. W. 5/1 was again produced and R. W. 5/2, the proposal form and R. W 5/3 a copy of the policy, filed in Court, R. W. 5/2 was, according to the witness, filled inby his clerk whose name he was unable to remember and who used to be paid Rs. 75. 00 by way of salary by the witness out of his personal account and not on behalf of respondent No. 5. The witness did not keep any written record thereof nor had any receipt ever been obtained from his clerk for the payment of salary. That clerk had worked with the witness only for one year. The proposal form was admittedly not in the name of Santokh Singh and according to his evidence, the policy was issued to the person in whose name the form purported to be filled. The witness further admitted absence of any record of the receipt of premium for this policy, which, according to him, was received on 18. 8. 1958. The witness added that within 2/3 days after the accident, Santokh Singh approached him and paid the amount when R. W. 5/2 was issued. Significantly enough, the witness could not remember even the date when he had remitted to the insurance company, respondent No. 5 Rs. 10. 00 on account of the premium in question. His memory also failed him when asked about the date when the insurance policy was handed over to the party. It further failed him when asked as to who used to come to get the insurance effected. He could not recollect even the rate of insurance premium at the relevant time. He, however, explained that he had given concession for this policy. When further pressed, he stated the account to be as follow : Basic premium Rs. 35. 00 Passenger premium Rs. 12. 00 Total Rs. 47. 00 Out of this, 50 per cent was deducted as local discount and 50 per cent as no claim bonus. Another 25 per cent was also deducted by way of concession and further 10 percent deducted on the ground that the owner himself was to drive the vehicle. In this manner, according to this witness, the total premium of Rs. 47. 00 was reduced to Rs. 10. 00. Another 25 per cent was also deducted by way of concession and further 10 percent deducted on the ground that the owner himself was to drive the vehicle. In this manner, according to this witness, the total premium of Rs. 47. 00 was reduced to Rs. 10. 00. The witness further added that no claim bonus is given when no accident takes place during the last two or three years. In the present case, according to him. only for one previous year no claim bonus was not given but for the previous so many years, concession was given on behalf of the company. No enquiry was made in respect of accident between 13. 8. 1958 and 18. 8. 1958. According to him, the vehicle in question was not insured. The witness could not remember after how long the insurance policy was issued. Indeed he never saw the office copy of the insurance policy, though he produced R. W. 5/3 as office copy. He could not depose about the remarks on R. W. 5/3 made by the head office which purported to be a receipt of Rs. 10. 00 on 20. 11. 1958. Adverting to the document Exhibit R. W. 5/2, it bears the signatures of Santokh Singh in Urdu which have been identified by Teja Singh appearing as R. W. 6 on 20. 5. 1963. The body of the form is filled in by some one in English and this has obviously not been proved in accordance with law. The date prima facie does not appear to have been written by Santokh Singh because of the difference in ink. At the back of this form, there appears the account reducing the premium of Rs. 47. 00 to Rs. 10. 00 as deposed by Kewal Krishna. Exhibit R. W. 5/2 is apparently not a very impressive document and we are disinclined to place implicit reliance on it for the purpose of holding that this document was executed on 18. 8. 1958, as suggested. . Teja Singh who has appeared as R. W. 6 has emphatically asserted that the vehicle in question has been insured regularly year by year ever since he secured it. The insurance amount used to be paid to Kewal Krishna, agent of respondent No. 5, who used to sit in the office of the transport authority and he used to issue the certificate of insurance. The insurance amount used to be paid to Kewal Krishna, agent of respondent No. 5, who used to sit in the office of the transport authority and he used to issue the certificate of insurance. No receipt for the insurance policy used to be given and the policy used to arrive about four or six months later. On two or three occasions, the policy did not arrive at all. In the present case, the money had been handed over to Santokh Singh prior to the accident for the purpose of renewing the insurance. Santokh Singh had told Teja Singh that the money had been given and the certificate of insurance would be obtained a couple of days later. In cross-examination on behalf of respondent No. 5, it was elicited that the vehicle in question had been purchased in 1952. Santokh Singh had joined service with Teja Singh about five or ten days prior to the accident. Teja Singh of course did not accompany Santokh Singh when he went to get the vehicle insured. This witness has categorically denied to have filled in any proposal form or application for renewal of insurance. R. W. 5/3, the policy issued by respondent No. 5 on 20. 11. 1958, does not throw any light on the precise point falling for determination in the present case. ( 13 ) THE foregoing evidence led on behalf of respondent No. 5 seems to us to be unimpressive and quite inadequate to prove satisfactorily that the proposal form was actually signed on 18. 8. 58 or that the. premium money for renewal of the policy was not paid before the expiry of the previous policy. It is certainly not proved that the premium amount was paid on 18. 8. 1958 as urged on behalf of respondent No. 5. What, however, seems to us to clinch the matter is the fact that the period of insurance under the policy Exhibt R. W, 6/3 of this vehicle for the following year was from 13. 8. 1959 to 12. 8. 1960. Now this policy is dated 28. 12. 1959 and the amount of premium is stated to be Rs. 20. 00. To complete the picture, we consider it desirable to mention the dates etc. of the earlier policies relating to this vehicle as well. Exhibit R. W. 6/2 is the insurance policy for the year 14. 8. 1955 to. 13. 8. Now this policy is dated 28. 12. 1959 and the amount of premium is stated to be Rs. 20. 00. To complete the picture, we consider it desirable to mention the dates etc. of the earlier policies relating to this vehicle as well. Exhibit R. W. 6/2 is the insurance policy for the year 14. 8. 1955 to. 13. 8. 1956 and the amount of premium is stated to be Rs. 12. 00. Exhibit R. W. 6/1 is the insurance policy for the year 14. 8. 1956 to 13. 8. 1957 and the amount of premium is again Rs. 12. 00. Respondent No. 5 has not chosen to produce the proposal forms relating to these policies nor is there any evidence as to the manner in which the premium amount was determined as Rs. 12. 00. This vehicle, as is obvious, used to be insured only from 14th August to the 13th August of the following year. Now if in 1958, as respondent No. 5 desired this Court to hold, it was insured on 18. 8. 1958 for the year ending 17. 8. 1959, then it is not understood, and indeed no explanation is traceable on the record, why the insurance policy for the following year should have started from 13. 81959 and not from 18. 8. 1959. We are not inclined to believe that Teja Singh was foolish enough to pay double the premium for having two operative policies relating to this vehicle for the period of four days viz. , 13. 8. 1959 to 17. 8. 59. This double payment was quite clearly sheer waste and on the evidence on the record we are disinclined to impute, in the absence of any cogent explanation, such folly to Teja Singh. On the other hand, we are inclined to think that the proposal form Exhibit R. W. 5/2 and the policy Exhibit R. W. 5/3 were prepared when respondent No. 5 decided to put forth the defence that on 17. 8. 1958 the vehicle in question was not insured. This plea, needless to observe, seems to us most probably to be an afterthought. The proposal Form and the account of premium for the year 14. 8. 1959 to 13. 8. 1960 has also not been produced by respondent No. 5. Had that document been produced, one would perhaps have known as to how Rs. 20. This plea, needless to observe, seems to us most probably to be an afterthought. The proposal Form and the account of premium for the year 14. 8. 1959 to 13. 8. 1960 has also not been produced by respondent No. 5. Had that document been produced, one would perhaps have known as to how Rs. 20. 00 were charged on account of premium. At the back of the proposal form Exhibit R. W. 5/2, such an account does find place. Was the premium amount of 20. 00 paid for the year 14. 8. 1959 to 13. 8. 1960 higher than the premium amounting to Rs. 10. 00 for the previous year due to the accident in question ? This query couldbest have been answered by respondent No. 5, but for reasons not disclosed on the record, the Court has not been given any information about it. On a consideration of all the material on the record and the attending circumstances on the case, we find no hesitation in holding that Teja Singh had duly applied for renewal of the policy of insurance relating to the vehicle in question and paid the premium money before the expiry of the policy on 13. 8. 1958 and the plea of respondent No. 5 that the vehicle in question was insured only from 18. 8. 1958 and was uninsured on 17. 8. 1958 is incorrect. It further appears to us that in all probability the written statement now on the record is also not the original one and that this written statement was, in all likelihood, irregularly placed on the record for the purpose of including therein the new plea which appears to be an afterthought. Loss of the original documents by the insured may have induced respondent No. 5 to put forth the new plea. On the view that we have taken of the facts, it is unnecessary to dwell at length on the decisions cited by Mr. Dhir or to seriously deal with the Insurance Rules relied on by him. We would merely make a passing reference to them. Mr. On the view that we have taken of the facts, it is unnecessary to dwell at length on the decisions cited by Mr. Dhir or to seriously deal with the Insurance Rules relied on by him. We would merely make a passing reference to them. Mr. Dhir has referred us to Rules 4 and 5 (2) of the Motor Vehicles (Third Party Insurance) Rules, 1946, Rule 4 requires an insurer to issue to every holder of a policy, other than a cover note issued by the insurer, a certificate of insurance in Form A. Rule 5 (1) provides that every policy in the form of a cover note should be in form B and according to sub-rule (2), every such cover note is to be valid for a period of fifteen days from the date of its issue. The validity of such cover note can be extended for a further period of 15 days but the total period of validity cannot exceed two months. As indicated earlier these two rules do not affect the case before as. The learned counsel has made a reference to Halsbury s Laws of England, Third Edition, Volume 22, at pages 250 and 251, paragraphs 487 and 488. These paragraphs deal with revival of policy and it is stated therein that if there is a revival of a policy after the expiration of the period of grace, then such revival operates as a new contract, the rights and liabilities of the parties not beginning until the new contract has started to run. Reference has also been made to Shawcross on Motor Insurance at page 468, where it is stated that renewal of contract of insurance may take place either by virtue of or apart from the terms of the existing contract, and whilst the parties may by mutual agreement, either express or implied, as by payment of a further premium and expenses, effect a renewal of the policy otherwise than under its express terms, the latter method is the more common. Renewals, according to this passage, are usually effected by the issue of a renewal receipt by the insurers or their authorised agent, but may take place by the issue of a new policy. These observations also, instead of helping respondent No. 5, go against him on the facts and circumstances of the present case. Renewals, according to this passage, are usually effected by the issue of a renewal receipt by the insurers or their authorised agent, but may take place by the issue of a new policy. These observations also, instead of helping respondent No. 5, go against him on the facts and circumstances of the present case. The cases of Biggar v. Rock Life Insurance Company,1 Nowsholrne Brothers v. Road Transport and General Insurance Company, Limited, and Bir Singh v. Sm. Hashi Rashi Banerjee also do not seem to assist the learned counsel for respondent No. 5 on the facts and circumstances of the present case. ( 14 ) THIS brings us to the question of quantum of damages. The Court below has observed that Rs. 4,000. 00 would be a fairly appropriate estimate of damages for the pain and suffering, both physical and mental, to which Niranjan Dass was subjected. Rs. 425. 71 were considered to be the expenses incurred by him on the following basis : " (1) Amount incurred on medicines Rs. 175. 71 (2) Amount spent for artificial limbs and spare foot Rs. 250. 00 Total Rs. 425. 71 The learned counsel has seriously argued that the finding about these amounts is incorrect and the amount awarded is too inadequate. ( 15 ) THE Court below has observed in its judgment that no evidence was led by the claimant that he was re-employed at Rs. 150. 00 per month as claimed, after his retirement. The claimant s case regarding the amount paid for massage and treatment was not sustained for want of receipts. In our opinion, this approach in this respect is not quite appropriate. Merely because receipts for these small amounts have not been preserved or obtained may not discredit the claim for the simple reason that it appears to be highly consistent with probabilities. In cases of this type massage etc. , is generally speaking an essential requirement. It is not understood why, what is described as the bald statement of the petitioner, should not be believed when it is supportable by the probabilities and is not controverted by the opposite side on any cogent ground. It is significant that the respondents counsel had practically nothing cogent to urge before us against this view. The estimate of Rs 4,000. It is significant that the respondents counsel had practically nothing cogent to urge before us against this view. The estimate of Rs 4,000. 00 on account of permanent disability as a result of amputation of the leg and for pain and suffering undergone by the petitioner, who was 60 years old at that time, also seems to us to be inadequate and very much on the lower side. It is true that in such cases there cannot be any rigid test possessing the quality of mathematical precision and to some extent, the determination of the amount by evaluating, in terms of money, the pain etc. , must from its very nature depend on a rule of the thumb guided by a broad general idea which is variable, depending to an extent on personal outlook and inclination of the individual judge. In the present case, we are of the view that Rs. 5,000. 00 may be considered to be a more appropriate figure on this count and Rs. 500. 00 as a round figure on account of other expenses making thereby a total sum of Rs. , 5,500/. ( 16 ) IN the final result, we allow the appeal and setting aside and reversing the judgment and decree of the Court below grant to the appellant-claimant a decree for Rs. 5,500. 00 with proportionate costs both here and in the Court below. ( 17 ) BEFORE finally closing the judgment, we consider it proper to draw the attention of the Court below to the desirability of proper check on the ministerial staff in the matter of preparation and preservation of the judicial records. The sanctity of the judicial records is inextricably connected with the sanctity of the judicial process and it is the duty of the Presiding Officers of Courts to see that judicial records are prepared and preserved strictly in accordance with the instructions issued by the High Court, contained in Chapter 16-A, Vol. 1 of the High Court Rules and Orders.